People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan (Second Division) et al.

Once an information has been filed in court, the dismissal of the criminal case depends on the court’s independent assessment of the merits of the motion seeking dismissal; the Ombudsman may move to withdraw the information, but the Sandiganbayan is not obligated to grant the motion, and the court commits grave abuse of discretion if it dismisses the case based solely on the prosecution’s admissions or recommendations without independently evaluating the evidence.

Public officers from the Department of Public Works and Highways Regional Office No. VII and Mandaue City, together with private individual Isabelo A. Braza, were charged before the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) with violation of Republic Act No. 3019 in connection with the procurement and installation of street lighting facilities for the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu. The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas conducted the fact-finding and preliminary investigation. The consolidated petitions concern the respective powers of the Office of the Ombudsman and the Sandiganbayan after an information has been filed, particularly the court’s duty to independently assess probable cause when confronted with a motion to withdraw or dismiss.

In January 2007, the Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office (PACPO) of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, in collaboration with several cause-oriented groups, initiated a fact-finding investigation into the streetlamps installed along the streets of Cebu City, Mandaue City, and Lapu-Lapu City for the 12th ASEAN Summit. On March 23, 2007, a Final Evaluation Report was submitted to the Director of PACPO, who was concurrently the OIC-Deputy of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, recommending that a criminal complaint be filed against respondents for violation of Republic Act No. 3019. The Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas then conducted a preliminary investigation. During that investigation, respondents Robert G. Lala, Gloria R. Dindin, Marlina S. Alvizo, Pureza A. Fernandez, Agustino P. Hermoso, Luis A. Galang, Cresencio T. Bagolor, Restituto R. Diano, and Buenaventura C. Pajo (collectively, Lala, et al.) filed a Consolidated Motion for Inhibition, Suspension of the Proceeding and Extension of Time dated April 26, 2007, informing the Office that the Final Evaluation Report and attachments furnished to them were missing certain pages and praying for additional time to file their counter-affidavits. In a May 31, 2007 Order, the Office denied the Consolidated Motion for Inhibition but did not resolve the Motion for Extension. Lala, et al. then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Resolve the Motion for Extension dated July 2, 2007, pointing out that the missing pages, documents, or attachments were so numerous and substantial that they must be furnished with them to be fully apprised of the charge and intelligently prepare their counter-affidavits. They filed an Urgent Motion to Resolve on August 28, 2007. The Office directed them to submit a verified position paper and other additional relevant affidavits or documentary evidence, but Lala, et al. reiterated that they could not effectively prepare their defenses until the missing pages were furnished. The Office denied this motion and directed them to file their position paper. Lala, et al. filed a Motion for Reconsideration and to Furnish the Missing Pages/Documents/Attachments, which was denied in a November 6, 2007 Order. Consequently, Lala, et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA G.R. Sp. No. 03141, on the ground that the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not furnish them with the missing pages, documents, or attachments of the Final Evaluation Report. The Court of Appeals set aside the November 6, 2007 Order.

On April 22, 2008, after the preliminary investigation had been concluded, a January 24, 2008 Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan and docketed as SB-08-CRM-0271. The Information charged Gloria P. Dindin, Robert G. Lala, Pureza A. Fernandez, Thadeo Z. Ouano, Midelisa P. Latonio, Gregorio J. Omo, Mario S. Gerolaga, Alfredo R. Sanchez, Sr., Rosalina M. Denque, Marlina S. Alvizo, Agustin P. Hermoso, Luis A. Galang, Restituto R. Diano, Buenaventura C. Pajo, and Isabelo A. Braza with violation of Republic Act No. 3019. It alleged that they connived in preparing and approving the Program of Work and Detailed Estimates for the supply and installation of street lighting facilities consisting of seventy-eight sets of single arm assembly at about P72,500.00 per set, fifty-eight sets of double arm assembly at about P85,500.00 per set, and four sets of triple arm assembly at about P95,000.00 per set, along the approaches to and vicinity of the Cebu International Convention Center, Mandaue City, and along Plaridel Sr., W.O. Sano St., C.D. Seno St., Ouano Avenue, and Soriano Avenue, Mandaue City (Contract ID No. 06H00021); that they conducted the bidding, recommended the award to FABMIK Construction and Equipment Supply Co., Inc., and entered into the corresponding contract with Braza, the President and Chairman of the Board of FABMIK; and that the contract was manifest and grossly disadvantageous to the Republic because the costs exceeded the prevailing prices of only about P6,000.00 per single arm assembly, P7,500.00 per double arm assembly, and P11,000.00 per triple arm assembly, to the damage and prejudice of the government.

On April 28, 2008, Ouano filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas. Lala, et al. filed a May 14, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration before the same office. Lala, et al. also filed their May 19, 2008 Consolidated Urgent Motions before the Sandiganbayan: (1) to dismiss; (2) to suspend proceedings if no dismissal; (3) to defer the issuance of a warrant of arrest and, if one was issued, to recall the same; and (4) in the event of no dismissal, to order the conduct of preliminary investigation. They grounded these motions on the following: the accused were not accorded preliminary investigation; the Office of the Ombudsman committed a violation of due process in the conduct thereof, acting as judge, complainant, and prosecutor at the same time; and the Court of Appeals 20th Division had already issued a Decision in CA G.R. SP No. 03141 nullifying in effect the November 6, 2007 Order of the Office of the Ombudsman which refused to furnish the accused with more than two hundred or about three hundred missing pages that were made the basis of the charge, finding a violation of due process and rendering the preliminary investigation null and void. On May 23, 2008, the Sandiganbayan set the arraignment and pre-trial of all the accused on July 30, 2008. Upon motion, Braza was conditionally arraigned on June 18, 2003, as stated in the text, in view of his travel abroad. During the July 30, 2008 hearing, however, the Sandiganbayan, on motion of Lala, et al., rescheduled their arraignment to September 15, 2008 due to their pending Consolidated Urgent Motions. On August 13, 2008, because of the suspension of arraignment, Ouano filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan’s July 30, 2008 Order and prayed that an earlier setting of his arraignment be made on September 15, 2008, arguing that arraignment is a personal act wholly different from presentation of evidence; that the delay in his arraignment constituted a violation of his right to speedy trial; and that the prosecution’s admission that its case was weak and that it intended to amend the Information could not operate as a bar to his right to enter his plea and assure his right against double jeopardy. Braza filed an August 22, 2008 Motion for Reinvestigation, praying that the proceedings be suspended and that the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, be directed to conduct reinvestigation or reconsideration of the finding of probable cause. Due to the pendency of these motions, the September 15, 2008 arraignment was again cancelled and reset to December 4, 2008. Ouano’s August 13, 2008 Motion for Reconsideration to set his arraignment to an earlier date was opposed by petitioner in an August 21, 2008 Opposition. In an October 6, 2008 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Ouano’s Motion for Reconsideration and set his arraignment to October 17, 2008, finding the motion meritorious as an invocation of a statutory prerogative and a strong plea for his constitutional right to speedy disposition, and stating that the arraignment of one of the accused could hardly be considered contributory to piecemeal proceedings.

On October 15, 2008, petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw Information. The motion cited the panel of Prosecutors’ September 18, 2008 Comment to Braza’s Motion for Investigation, which stated that the alleged spurious and falsified import documents were material not only to the resolution of the case but also to the determination of whether there was a need to suspend further proceeding, and that the prosecution was not in a position to determine whether the overpriced lighting poles were anchored on spurious and falsified import documents submitted by the Bureau of Customs because the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, not the prosecution, conducted the preliminary investigation. It further stated that considering the intricacies of the issues raised, a further study of the case was imperative. After a thorough study, the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas recommended the conduct of further investigation to obtain additional evidence in light of the Audit Report prepared by the Commission on Audit relative to the procurement of street lighting facilities during the 12th ASEAN Summit and to determine whether the finding of gross overpricing was based on spurious and falsified import documents from the Bureau of Customs. The Motion to Withdraw prayed that it be granted, that the case be dismissed without prejudice, and that Ouano’s scheduled arraignment on October 17, 2008 be cancelled. On October 17, 2008, during the hearing on the Motion to Withdraw and the arraignment of Ouano, the Sandiganbayan gave all the accused ten days within which to file their respective comments. As regards Ouano, however, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw verbally and in open court. Petitioner’s verbal Motion for Reconsideration was likewise verbally denied, and Ouano was arraigned. Petitioner then filed a Petition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 185503, praying mainly that the Sandiganbayan’s order denying the Motion to Withdraw as to Ouano and his consequent arraignment be nullified.

In response to the Motion to Withdraw Information, Braza filed a November 14, 2008 Manifestation with Motion (to Vacate Information and Dismiss the Case with Prejudice). He moved that the Information against him be vacated for lack of probable cause and the case be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that petitioner was guilty of abusing its investigatory and prosecutorial powers and violated his right to the speedy disposition of his case. In a March 10, 2009 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan granted Braza’s Motion to Vacate, finding that the prosecution, in seeking dismissal of the case, violated the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of his case. It reasoned that the key was to scrutinize the prosecution’s motive in asking for dismissal without prejudice, and that the plea was essentially an appeal to conduct anew a preliminary investigation, which the court could not sanction; dismissing the case without prejudice would, in effect, give the prosecution the imprimatur to do indirectly what it could not do directly. Petitioner filed a Petition before the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 187603, praying that the March 10, 2009 Resolution be set aside.

On March 13, 2009, Lala, et al. filed a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss the Case with Prejudice. The Sandiganbayan issued a July 28, 2009 Resolution resolving Lala, et al.’s Consolidated Urgent Motion, the Prosecution’s Motion to Withdraw Information, and Lala’s Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. The Sandiganbayan found that the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas violated Lala, et al.’s right to due process during the preliminary investigation by not supplying them with more than 200 pages of documents. It held that the right to preliminary investigation is a component of due process and a substantive right, and that to deny an accused of preliminary investigation is to deprive him of his right to due process. Applying the standards of due process laid down in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, the Sandiganbayan concluded that the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion and violated Lala, et al.’s right to due process. It also relied on statements made by the prosecution in open court that the evidence on record was not sufficient to establish probable cause. Based on these, the Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against Lala, et al., stating that there was no evidence against them. Resolving petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan held that the preliminary investigation conducted was “hasty and injudicious,” noting that the prosecution admitted that the case had no sufficient evidence as evidenced by its move to withdraw the Information. Petitioner filed a Petition with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 192166. The Supreme Court consolidated G.R. No. 185503 with G.R. Nos. 187603 and 192166. The Sandiganbayan found that the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas failed to furnish Lala, et al. with more than 200 pages of documents during the preliminary investigation; that the prosecution had stated in open court that it had no sufficient evidence; and that the preliminary investigation was hasty and injudicious. It also noted that the Information alleged gross overpricing based on prevailing prices far lower than those stated in the contract.

• Ombudsman’s Power to Investigate and Prosecute: Petitioner argued that filing a motion to withdraw is an exercise of the constitutionally-mandated power of the Office of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases, and that the Sandiganbayan cannot compel petitioner to prosecute when it is not convinced that the quantum of evidence supports the information.
• Arraignment and Speedy Trial: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan placed too much premium on the accused’s right to speedy trial, forcing petitioner to litigate without a case; proceeding with Ouano’s arraignment despite pending motions and the Motion to Withdraw, and denying deferment and withdrawal, effectively foreclosed petitioner’s right to fairly prosecute erring government officials and their cohorts.
• Reliance on Admissions and Due Process: Petitioner argued that its supposed admission regarding the amount of evidence should not have been relied on without considering its other motions; there was no inordinate delay during the preliminary investigation; the prayer to withdraw and conduct a new preliminary investigation was not malicious or oppressive; it was premature to assume that a new preliminary investigation would violate the accused’s right to speedy trial; and petitioner must also be afforded due process.
• Sandiganbayan’s Dismissal and Ouano Status: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan should not have ruled on the Motion to Withdraw in its July 28, 2009 Resolution because it had already denied the same in open court on October 17, 2008; that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in stating that the case against Ouano was dismissed with prejudice when no order dismissing the case had been issued; that the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation against Ouano was not attended with abuse; and that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case outright and ruling that petitioner had no sufficient evidence against Ouano. Petitioner also argued that preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, and that probable cause is determined from the material averments of the information and its appendages.

• Ouano — Arraignment and Speedy Trial: Respondent Ouano argued that proceeding with his arraignment was pursuant to the right of the accused to a speedy trial, and that the dismissal of the case was perfectly within the Sandiganbayan’s discretion.
• Braza — Double Jeopardy and Speedy Disposition: Respondent Braza claimed that the petition was barred by the rule on double jeopardy; that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing his case; that petitioner categorically admitted that it had no case against him; and that the withdrawal of the information to enable petitioner to obtain additional evidence was prejudicial to his right to a speedy disposition of his case.
• Lala, et al. — Due Process and Lack of Evidence: Respondents Lala, et al. insisted that petitioner deprived them of due process during the preliminary investigation and that petitioner had no sufficient evidence against them to proceed to trial.

• Motion to Withdraw Information: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in denying petitioner’s Motion to Withdraw.
• Dismissal of Cases Against Braza and Lala, et al.: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases in G.R. No. 187603 against respondent Isabelo A. Braza and in G.R. No. 192166 against respondents Robert Lala, et al.
• Arraignment of Ouano: Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in proceeding with the arraignment of respondent Thadeo Z. Ouano despite several pending motions.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the petitions assailing the dismissal of the cases against respondent Isabelo A. Braza and respondents Robert Lala, et al. are barred by the proscription against double jeopardy.
• Speedy Trial / Speedy Disposition: Whether the Sandiganbayan violated respondent Isabelo A. Braza’s right to speedy trial.
• Status of Ouano Case: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in stating that the case against respondent Thadeo Z. Ouano had been dismissed with prejudice.

• Motion to Withdraw Information: No. Once an information is filed, dismissal depends on the Sandiganbayan’s independent assessment; the Ombudsman may move to withdraw, but the court is not obligated to grant it. The Motion to Withdraw did not cite absence of probable cause and was based solely on a recommendation for further investigation.
• Dismissal of Cases Against Braza and Lala, et al.: Yes. The Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the cases without independently evaluating the evidence, relying instead on the prosecution’s purported admissions and alleged irregularities in the preliminary investigation.
• Arraignment of Ouano: No. The Sandiganbayan correctly proceeded with the arraignment, which was held almost six months after the information was filed, because no ground for suspension under Rule 116, Section 11 existed and a pending motion to withdraw is not an obstacle.
• Double Jeopardy: No. The petitions are not barred by double jeopardy because the state may challenge a dismissal attended by grave abuse of discretion, and the Sandiganbayan abdicated its duty to independently assess the merits.
• Speedy Trial / Speedy Disposition: No. No violation of Braza’s right to speedy trial was shown; the period of less than seven months was not vexatious, capricious, or oppressive, and the filing of the Motion to Withdraw did not cause delay.
• Status of Ouano Case: No. Even assuming the Sandiganbayan misstated that the case against Ouano was dismissed with prejudice, the error was inconsequential to the case against Lala, et al., which was the subject of the assailed resolution.

• Motion to Withdraw Information: The Court applied Crespo vs. Mogul: the filing of a complaint or information in court initiates the criminal action and the court acquires jurisdiction; the preliminary investigation is terminated; any reinvestigation or disposition requires the court’s permission and is addressed to its sound discretion. The court may grant or deny a motion to dismiss and require trial on the merits. Although the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute and may move to withdraw, Velez teaches that the Sandiganbayan has discretion to allow withdrawal. Here, the Motion to Withdraw did not show or even mention any legal ground; it did not cite absence of probable cause and was based solely on the Ombudsman’s recommendation for further investigation. Denial did not interfere with the Ombudsman’s authority; if denied, the prosecutor must proceed with the prosecution. Thus, no error.
• Dismissal of Cases Against Braza and Lala, et al.: A trial court cannot grant a motion to withdraw or dismiss without an independent evaluation and assessment of the merits. Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank held that reliance on the prosecutor’s averment is an abdication of the court’s duty; Summerville held that where the prosecution is unsure, the court should be most circumspect. In G.R. No. 187603, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Braza relying solely on petitioner’s purported admissions that it had no case, without independent assessment. In G.R. No. 192166, it dismissed Lala, et al. primarily because of alleged grave abuse of discretion during the preliminary investigation. But once the information was filed, the preliminary investigation was terminated; any challenge to its validity was moot after the Sandiganbayan judicially determined probable cause and set arraignment. Even assuming grave abuse occurred during the preliminary investigation, it was rendered moot. The Sandiganbayan’s statement that there was “no evidence” relied on the prosecution’s admissions, not an independent evaluation. Thus, grave abuse of discretion.
• Arraignment of Ouano: Under Republic Act No. 8493, Section 7, arraignment shall be held within thirty days from filing of the information or from the accused’s appearance, whichever last occurs. The Sandiganbayan arraigned Ouano almost six months after the case was filed. Rule 116, Section 11 allows suspension only for unsound mental condition, prejudicial question, or a pending petition for review with the Department of Justice or Office of the President, with suspension not exceeding sixty days. None existed. ABS-CBN vs. Gozon held that after the sixty-day period, the court is bound to arraign the accused. A pending motion to withdraw is not an obstacle to arraignment; the court’s independent assessment would take time. Petitioner filed the Motion to Withdraw only two days before the scheduled arraignment and waited nearly six months after the information was filed. Thus, the Sandiganbayan properly proceeded.
• Double Jeopardy: Double jeopardy prohibits the state from appealing an acquittal or dismissal, but the prohibition is not absolute. Villareal vs. People recognized exceptions: deprivation of fair opportunity to prosecute, mistrial, or grave abuse of discretion. Here, the dismissals were attended by grave abuse of discretion because the Sandiganbayan abdicated its duty to independently assess the merits. Thus, the petitions are not barred by double jeopardy.
• Speedy Trial / Speedy Disposition: The right is violated only when proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Mendoza-Ong factors include conduct of both parties, length of delay, reasons, assertion of the right, and prejudice. Declaro held that delay is not necessarily a violation and must be balanced with the prosecution’s due process. Cagang laid out guidelines, including burden shifting and timely invocation. In G.R. No. 187603, the Information was filed on April 22, 2008, and Braza filed his Motion to Vacate on November 14, 2008, less than seven months later. The records do not show delay attributable to petitioner or that any delay was vexatious and oppressive. The Sandiganbayan treated the filing of the Motion to Withdraw itself as a violation, but the motion was denied on the same day it was heard, so it caused no delay. Dismissal based on speculation about a future reinvestigation was improper. Seven months, considering the number of accused, was neither vexatious nor oppressive.
• Status of Ouano Case: Even assuming the Sandiganbayan misstated that the case against Ouano had been dismissed with prejudice, the error was inconsequential to the case against Lala, et al. The March 24, 2010 Resolution disposed of the case against Lala, et al., not Ouano. Whether the Ouano case had been dismissed with prejudice was irrelevant to the dismissal of the Lala, et al. case. The statement may have referred to a hypothetical dismissal. Thus, no reversible grave abuse.

• Independent Assessment Doctrine (Crespo vs. Mogul) — Once a complaint or information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the criminal case and the preliminary investigation is terminated. Any subsequent disposition, including a motion to withdraw or dismiss, is addressed to the court’s sound discretion, which must independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case. The court may not rely solely on the prosecutor’s recommendation or admission; doing so is grave abuse of discretion. Applied: the Sandiganbayan properly denied the Motion to Withdraw because it had discretion, but erred in dismissing Braza and Lala, et al. without independent assessment.
• Ombudsman’s Power to Withdraw Information — The Office of the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute, and may move to withdraw an information. However, the motion’s grant is discretionary upon the Sandiganbayan; the Ombudsman’s power does not impose an obligation on the court to automatically grant withdrawal. If denied, the prosecutor should not shirk from appearing for the People. Applied: the denial of the Motion to Withdraw as to Ouano was affirmed.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing Criminal Cases — A trial court commits grave abuse of discretion when it grants a prosecution motion to dismiss or withdraw based solely on the prosecutor’s recommendation or admission without independently evaluating the evidence. Where the prosecution is unsure, the court must be most circumspect. Applied: the Sandiganbayan dismissed Braza and Lala, et al. based on prosecution admissions and alleged preliminary investigation irregularities, not an independent evidence assessment.
• Mootness of Challenge to Preliminary Investigation After Judicial Probable Cause — Once an information is filed and the court has determined probable cause, issued a warrant, and/or arraigned the accused, the preliminary investigation is terminated and any challenge to its validity in another venue is moot. Applied: the alleged grave abuse in the Ombudsman’s preliminary investigation of Lala, et al. was rendered moot by the Sandiganbayan’s judicial determination of probable cause and arraignment settings.
• Double Jeopardy and Grave Abuse Exception — Double jeopardy bars reprosecution after a valid conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused’s express consent, but the state may challenge a dismissal where there is grave abuse of discretion, mistrial, or deprivation of a fair opportunity to prosecute. Applied: the petitions were not barred because the Sandiganbayan dismissed with grave abuse.
• Speedy Disposition / Speedy Trial — The right is violated only when delays are vexatious, capricious, and oppressive; factors include the conduct of both parties, length of delay, reasons, assertion of the right, and prejudice. Cagang guidelines govern analysis. Applied: no violation was shown; seven months was not oppressive; the Motion to Withdraw was denied the same day; dismissal was premature.
• Suspension of Arraignment — Under Rule 116, Section 11, arraignment may be suspended only for unsound mental condition, prejudicial question, or a pending petition for review with the Department of Justice or Office of the President, with suspension not exceeding sixty days. A pending motion to withdraw is not a ground. Applied: the Sandiganbayan properly arraigned Ouano.

• "Applying the doctrine in Crespo, after the information against private respondents was filed with the Sandiganbayan, the dismissal of the criminal case depended on its independent assessment of the merits of the motion. Therefore, whether to grant or deny petitioner's Motion to Withdraw was within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan." — This passage states the core rule that once an information is filed, the Sandiganbayan must independently assess the merits of a motion to withdraw and has discretion to grant or deny it.
• "Although the Office of the Ombudsman may move to withdraw an information filed in court, in Velez, this Court pointed out that whether to allow the withdrawal is discretionary upon the Sandiganbayan:" — This excerpt clarifies that the Ombudsman’s power to move for withdrawal does not obligate the Sandiganbayan to grant the motion.
• "Pursuant to this bounden duty, a trial court may not rely solely on the recommendations of the prosecutor in determining whether to dismiss a case. Thus, it is grave abuse of discretion to grant the prosecution's motion to dismiss where it is evident that the trial court did not make an independent evaluation or assessment of the case." — This passage defines the grave abuse of discretion committed when a court abdicates its duty to independently evaluate the evidence before dismissing a criminal case.
• "This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court's acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process: (2) where there is a finding of mistrial: or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion." — This excerpt enumerates the exceptions to double jeopardy, including grave abuse of discretion, which the Court applied to allow review of the dismissals.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Controlling precedent; once an information is filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and any disposition of the case rests on the court’s sound discretion, including motions to withdraw or dismiss.
• People vs. Velez, 445 Phil. 784 (2003) — Followed; the Ombudsman may move to withdraw an information, but the Sandiganbayan has discretion to allow the withdrawal.
• Punzalan vs. Dela Peña, 478 Phil. 771 (2004) — Cited by petitioner for respect to the prosecuting agency; distinguished because the denial of the Motion to Withdraw did not interfere with the Ombudsman’s authority.
• Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc., 384 Phil. 322 (2000) — Followed; a trial court must independently evaluate the merits and may not rely solely on the prosecutor’s averment, which would be an abdication of duty.
• Summerville General Merchandising & Co., Inc. vs. Hon. Antonio M. Eugenio, Jr., 556 Phil. 121 (2007) — Followed; where the prosecution is unsure, the court should be most circumspect and independently determine probable cause.
• De Lima vs. Reyes, 776 Phil. 623 (2016) — Followed; a challenge to the validity of the preliminary investigation is moot after the court has judicially determined probable cause and arraignment has occurred.
• Ho vs. People, 345 Phil. 597 (1997) — Cited; the judge must personally determine probable cause and cannot rely solely on the prosecutor’s report.
• ABS-CBN Corporation vs. Gozon, 755 Phil. 709 (2015) — Followed; suspension of arraignment is limited to sixty days, after which the court is bound to arraign the accused.
• Villareal vs. People, 680 Phil. 527 (2012) — Followed; double jeopardy requisites and exceptions, including grave abuse of discretion, were applied.
• Mendoza-Ong vs. Sandiganbayan, 483 Phil. 451 (2004) — Followed; the right to speedy disposition is violated only by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays.
• People vs. Hon. Declaro, 252 Phil. 139 (1989) — Cited; delay is not necessarily a violation of the right to speedy trial and must be balanced with the prosecution’s right to due process.
• Cagang vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 206438, 206458 & 210141-42 (July 31, 2018) — Followed; guidelines for analyzing whether the right to speedy disposition or speedy trial has been violated.
• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940) — Cited by the Sandiganbayan for due process standards in the preliminary investigation; the Supreme Court noted its application.

• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — Double jeopardy; cited in Villareal vs. People and applied to reject the claim that the petitions were barred, because the grave abuse of discretion exception applied.
• Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution — Right to speedy disposition of cases; invoked by Braza and addressed by the Court, which found no violation.
• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Judge’s personal determination of probable cause; cited in Ho vs. People to support the independent assessment requirement.
• Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court — Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy; provides the requisites and bar relied upon in the double jeopardy analysis.
• Rule 116, Section 11, Rules of Court — Suspension of arraignment; allows suspension only for unsound mental condition, prejudicial question, or pending petition for review with the Department of Justice or Office of the President, not exceeding sixty days; none existed as to Ouano.
• Republic Act No. 8493 (Speedy Trial Act of 1998), Section 7 — Arraignment shall be held within thirty days from filing of the information or from the accused’s appearance; applied to uphold Ouano’s arraignment.
• Republic Act No. 3019 — Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; the offense charged in the Information.
• Republic Act No. 9184 — Government Procurement Reform Act; mentioned in the Information as the standards for procurement contracts.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — Certiorari; referenced in the double jeopardy exception for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Hernando, Inting, Delos Santos, and J. Lopez, JJ., concur.