People of the Philippines vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division) and Benjamin S. Abalos

A judgment of acquittal is final and immediately executory and cannot be reversed through a petition for certiorari absent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a violation of the prosecution's right to due process, such as denial of the opportunity to present evidence, a sham trial, or a mistrial.

Benjamin S. Abalos was then Chairman of the Commission on Elections, a constitutional commission subject to Article IX, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits its members from being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with the government or its instrumentalities. The National Broadband Network Project was a contract for the supply of equipment and services between the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, and ZTE, a Chinese corporation doing business in the People's Republic of China. Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 penalizes a public officer who directly or indirectly has financial or pecuniary interest in any business transaction in which he intervenes by virtue of his office. The statutory and constitutional backdrop thus centered on whether Abalos had a prohibited financial or pecuniary interest in the NBN Project.

This case involves the Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Service for the National Broadband Network Project between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment, Inc., a Chinese corporation doing business in the People's Republic of China. During the material period alleged in the Information, Abalos was a public officer, being then the Chairman of the Commission on Elections. In September 2006, ZTE filed a proposal with the Commission on Information and Communications Technology for the implementation of an NBN project in the country. Under its proposal, the NBN Project would be a government undertaking under a tied loan to be extended by the government of the People's Republic of China to the Philippine Government to finance the contract with ZTE. The ZTE proposal was later endorsed by the DOTC to the National Economic and Development Authority, of which former Secretary Romulo L. Neri was the Director General. In October 2006, Amsterdam Holdings, Inc. conducted a presentation before NEDA on its own proposed version of an NBN project under the Build-Operate-Transfer framework, and in January 2007, AHI also submitted its own formal proposal to the DOTC. NEDA conducted a study of the two proposals from February to April 2007. On April 3, 2007, a certification was issued by the NEDA Board Secretary that ZTE's NBN Project was approved. Subsequently, on April 21, 2007, the contract for the NBN Project was executed between the DOTC, represented by former Secretary Leandro Mendoza, and ZTE, represented by its Vice President, Yu Yong.

Sometime afterwards, Abalos was charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019. The Amended Information dated July 15, 2010 alleged that during the period from September 2006 to April 2007 in Metro Manila, Abalos, as Chairman of COMELEC and as such prohibited by Section 2 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, while occupying that position and wielding his powers and influence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and criminally directly or indirectly have financial or pecuniary interest in the business transaction between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, which required the consideration, review, and approval of NEDA, of which Sec. Neri was then Director General. The Information alleged that Abalos interceded and brokered for and in behalf of ZTE for a fee or commission, as shown by his acts of attending conferences, lunch meetings, and golf games with ZTE officials, including a meeting and socializing with them in China, and in one such meeting, asking from ZTE officials in the presence of Jose De Venecia III the balance of his commission for the NBN Project. It further alleged that he offered bribes to Sec. Neri in the amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos to ensure favorable action for its approval, and to Jose De Venecia III, President and General Manager of AHI, in the amount of Ten Million U.S. Dollars for the latter to back off from his proposal, and arranged meetings between ZTE officials and Sec. Mendoza, Secretary of the DOTC.

According to the prosecution's theory, Abalos, for a fee or commission, brokered in favor of ZTE for the implementation of the NBN Project, a project of the Philippine Government requiring approval by NEDA; hence, he directly or indirectly had financial or pecuniary interest therein despite being prohibited from doing so by the Constitution. In support of this theory, the prosecution presented evidence tending to establish that Abalos attended meetings where the NBN Project was discussed. The Sandiganbayan summarized these meetings as spanning September 2006 to March 2007. These included a lunch at Wack Wack Golf and Country Club in September 2006 attended by Lozada, Sec. Neri, Abalos, Ruben Reyes, Leo San Miguel, and ZTE executives Yu Yong and Fan Yang, where Sec. Neri advised the ZTE executives to coordinate all matters regarding approval of the project with Lozada; a meeting in Wack Wack in September 2006 attended by Abalos, Reyes, San Miguel, Fan Yang, and George Zhu, testified to by Dante R. Madriaga, who admitted on cross-examination that he was not privy to the meeting; a meeting at Sec. Neri's office in NEDA sometime within December 2006 to January 2007, where Abalos invited Sec. Neri to play golf at Wack Wack; a meeting in Wack Wack in December 2006 attended by Abalos, Joey De Venecia, and former First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, also testified to by Madriaga who admitted he was not privy; a meeting where Abalos purportedly told Lozada that once the NBN-ZTE deal was signed, Abalos would give Sec. Neri Two Hundred Million Pesos the following day; a golf game with Sec. Neri where Abalos, while in the golf cart, told the latter "Sec., may 200 ka dyan" without further context; a golf game at the Chenzhen Golf Course in Hongkong in November 2006 attended by former Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr., former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband FGMA, Abalos, and some Chinese individuals, followed by lunch at the ZTE headquarters; a breakfast at former Speaker JDV, Jr.'s residence on December 5, 2006 attended by Abalos, Reyes, Jimmy Paz, San Miguel, and Torch dela Torre, where Abalos purportedly proposed augmenting AHI's network in areas of the 4th, 5th, and 6th municipalities; a meeting in Ayala Alabang sometime in 2006 where former DOTC Secretary Margarito B. Teves met Abalos, who told him he knew some Chinese businessmen who wanted to discuss agri-related projects in Mindanao; a breakfast in Wack Wack where Abalos purportedly asked Jose Perez De Venecia III to withdraw AHI's NBN proposal in exchange for Ten Million U.S. Dollars, which JDV III refused, instead inviting Abalos to become a member of the board of AHI; a meeting in Kempinski Hotel in Zhinchin, China sometime in December 2006 where Abalos invited JDV III to meet ZTE officials, who showed a bill of materials and proposal from ZTE, and where Abalos purportedly said that "we" were expecting monies or commissions for the project and that the president, speaker, and political party were waiting for these funds, with Yu Yong responding that normally the commission is given upon financial closing and Fan Yang asking about moneys already advanced; a meeting at the COMELEC office sometime in January 2007 where Abalos introduced JDV III as his partner to CICT Assistant Secretary Formoso and asked the Assistant Secretary to "pakituloy nyo na yung dapat ituloy na proyekto"; a meeting at Diamond Hotel sometime in mid-January 2007 or February 2007 attended by JDV III, Abalos, and ZTE officials including Yu Yong and Fan Yang, where an agreement in principle was arrived at for ZTE to provide transmission equipment; a meeting in Wack Wack where Abalos introduced JDV III to DOTC Assistant Secretary Elmer Soneja; a lunch at a Chinese restaurant in Makati Shangri-La sometime in January 2007 attended by Sec. Neri, ZTE officials, Lozada, and Abalos; a dinner at Makati Shangri-La attended by JDV III, Abalos, Lozada, and FGMA; a meeting at Wack Wack GCC in relation to a furious call from Abalos received by JDV III because JDV III did not withdraw AHI's proposal nor commit to signing an agreement with ZTE; and a reconciliation meeting in Wack Wack conference room sometime in March 2007 initiated by then DOTC Sec. Mendoza, attended by FGMA, Abalos, JDV III, and the members of the Filipino Group.

As mentioned in the summary of meetings, Abalos also purportedly offered bribes to Sec. Neri in relation to approving ZTE's NBN proposal, and to JDV III in consideration of the withdrawal of AHI's NBN proposal. For the defense, Abalos testified that he met some officials of ZTE sometime in April or May 2006, who requested that he introduce them to Sec. Teves. The ZTE officials wanted to propose an economic project for Mindanao — the conversion of the land from Compostela Valley to Butuan into agricultural land for a corn plantation, and the putting up of a corn mill. According to Abalos, it was JDV III who approached him, through his father, former Speaker JDV, Jr., seeking to be introduced to ZTE. JDV III had purportedly learned that ZTE bagged the contract for operation of the NBN. According to Abalos, the ZTE officials disapproved of partnering with JDV III because the latter was connected to another company which still owed ZTE Ten Million U.S. Dollars. Upon JDV III's insistence, however, Abalos was able to convince the Chinese individuals to meet with JDV III in Shenzhen in December 2006 where JDV III discussed his offer to the ZTE officers. JDV III's proposal was, however, later turned down. Abalos denied offering bribes to JDV III and Sec. Neri. He also claimed he never discussed the NBN Project with the ZTE officials since he was only interested in the project relating to the development of Mindanao. He further stated that he believed he was doing the Philippines a favor by introducing the ZTE officers to Sec. Teves.

In its Assailed Decision, the Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution's evidence was only able to prove that Abalos was brokering the collaboration between AHI and ZTE, but not that he brokered the contract between ZTE and the Philippine Government for a fee. While Abalos's presence at meetings with officers from ZTE and the Philippine Government was established, evidence on what was taken up during the said meetings was minimal or sketchy, and the Sandiganbayan refused to rely on such evidence to conclude that Abalos asked for favors from government officials, particularly Sec. Teves and Sec. Mendoza, as regards the contract between ZTE and the government. Abalos's alleged brokering between the government and ZTE was the basis of the prosecution's theory that he had financial interest in the NBN-ZTE contract, and in turn, Abalos's alleged financial interest was the cornerstone of the charge of violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019. Because of the prosecution's failure to prove such fact, Abalos was acquitted of the crime charged.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Appreciation of Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when, despite finding that Abalos attended lunch meetings and golf games with ZTE officials, it refused to consider the plain and accepted meaning of those acts as constituting interceding and bartering for and in behalf of ZTE for a fee or commission.
• Due Process — Disregard of Prosecution's Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, effectively denying the prosecution its right to due process, when it disregarded the whole picture portrayed by the prosecution's evidence showing that Abalos interceded and brokered for and in behalf of ZTE relative to the Philippine Government's NBN Project.
• Exception to Finality of Acquittal: Petitioner relied on the limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule, anchoring the nullity of Abalos's acquittal on the Sandiganbayan's alleged partiality, gross misapprehension of facts, and refusal to consider Abalos's acts of attending meetings and golf games with ZTE officials as proof that he had financial and pecuniary interest in the subject transaction, which purportedly violated the prosecution's right to due process.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Appreciation of Evidence: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when, despite finding Abalos attended lunch meetings and golf games with ZTE officials, it refused to consider the plain and accepted meaning of those acts as constituting interceding and bartering for and in behalf of ZTE for a fee or commission.
• Due Process — Disregard of Prosecution's Evidence: Whether the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, effectively denying petitioner its right to due process, when it disregarded the whole picture portrayed by the prosecution's evidence showing that Abalos interceded and brokered for and in behalf of ZTE relative to the Philippine Government's NBN Project.
• Double Jeopardy — Finality of Acquittal: Whether the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal may be reversed through certiorari without placing Abalos in double jeopardy, absent grave abuse of discretion or a violation of the prosecution's right to due process.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Appreciation of Evidence: No. The Sandiganbayan's evaluation and appreciation of the evidence were not capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary; petitioner raised errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, which are not correctible by certiorari under Rule 65.
• Due Process — Disregard of Prosecution's Evidence: No. The prosecution was able to present and formally offer its evidence, and the Sandiganbayan considered each piece; disagreement with the weighing of evidence does not amount to a denial of due process or a sham trial.
• Double Jeopardy — Finality of Acquittal: Yes, reversal is barred. Double jeopardy attached because all requisites were present, and the finality-of-acquittal rule made the judgment unappealable and immediately executory absent the narrow due-process exception.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Appreciation of Evidence: The extraordinary remedy of certiorari cannot be resorted to in order to correct perceived errors of fact or law by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers where said tribunal is not shown to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion means a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. Petitioner's grievances that the Sandiganbayan refused to consider the plain and accepted meaning of Abalos's acts and disregarded the whole picture of the prosecution's evidence were essentially disagreements with the Sandiganbayan's understanding, evaluation, and appreciation of the evidence. The Petition did not demonstrate that the Sandiganbayan's conclusions were utterly baseless or arbitrary; the Assailed Decision exhaustively discussed every testimony offered by the prosecution. What were raised were errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, and erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari will not lie to review the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis of law or facts, or the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision.
• Due Process — Disregard of Prosecution's Evidence: Petitioner relied on the limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule, arguing that the Sandiganbayan's gross misapprehension of facts and refusal to consider Abalos's acts as proof of financial or pecuniary interest violated the prosecution's right to due process. The Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion which stripped it of jurisdiction to decide the criminal case against Abalos. In the conduct of trial, the prosecution was able to present and formally offer evidence in support of its case. The Sandiganbayan noted, evaluated, and considered each and every piece of evidence, and the Assailed Decision painstakingly discussed the same before making conclusions which are far from being offensive to reason or logic. This was not the sham trial sought to be avoided by the limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule. Just because petitioner disagreed with how the Sandiganbayan weighed the prosecution's evidence did not mean that it was deprived of due process. No party to litigation has a vested right in a favorable decision.
• Double Jeopardy — Finality of Acquittal: Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. The requirements for double jeopardy to exist are: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. The case met all the foregoing requirements. Abalos was charged with violation of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Sandiganbayan under an information dated July 15, 2010. He was arraigned and pleaded not guilty on August 10, 2010. On May 11, 2016, the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division issued the Assailed Decision acquitting Abalos for failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This was affirmed by the Sandiganbayan Special Fourth Division in its Assailed Resolution dated September 29, 2016, which denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The existence of double jeopardy called for the application of the finality-of-acquittal rule, which makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The rationale is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The finality-of-acquittal rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the court which rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process, such as when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence, or where the trial is sham, or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void. An example is Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, where the Court remanded the case because the previous trial was a mockery. Petitioner relied on this singular limited exception, but no grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan and no violation of petitioner's right to due process existed. The Court thus upheld Abalos's acquittal, lest he be unjustly subjected to double jeopardy.

• Grave abuse of discretion — An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases wherein the act of the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void. In this case, the Sandiganbayan's evaluation of the evidence was not shown to be capricious, whimsical, or arbitrary.
• Error of judgment vs. error of jurisdiction — Alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and flawed conclusions of the Sandiganbayan, are errors in judgment, not of jurisdiction, and are not within the province of a special civil action for certiorari. Erroneous conclusions based on evidence do not, by the mere fact that errors were committed, rise to the level of grave abuse of discretion. For as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction, any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof amounts to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable and correctible by a timely appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the prosecution's certiorari petition.
• Requisites of double jeopardy — Double jeopardy exists when the following requirements are present: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction of the crime charged; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and had pleaded; and (4) the accused was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed without his express consent. All requisites were met in this case, as Abalos was charged under a valid information, arraigned and pleaded not guilty, and acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
• Finality-of-acquittal rule — A judgment of acquittal is unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The rationale is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. An acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The Court applied this rule to bar reversal of Abalos's acquittal.
• Exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule — The finality-of-acquittal rule is inapplicable where the court which rendered the acquittal did so with grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process, such as when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence, or where the trial is sham, or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void. The Court found no such exception because the prosecution was able to present and formally offer evidence, and the Sandiganbayan considered each piece of evidence.
• Certiorari under Rule 65 — Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that cannot be resorted to in order to correct perceived errors of fact or law by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers where said tribunal is not shown to have acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It will not lie for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court on the basis of either the law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision. The Court applied this doctrine in dismissing the petition.

• "An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."" — This passage defines grave abuse of discretion, the threshold for Rule 65 relief, and anchors the Court's rejection of the prosecution's certiorari petition.
• "The existence of double jeopardy in this case calls for the application of the "finality-of-acquittal" rule, which, as the name implies, makes a judgment of acquittal unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation." — This states the finality-of-acquittal rule, the core doctrine that barred reversal of Abalos's acquittal.
• "The "finality-of-acquittal" rule has one exception: it is inapplicable where the Court which rendered the acquittal did so with— x x x grave abuse of discretion that is strictly limited whenever there is a violation of the prosecution's right to due process such as when it is denied the opportunity to present evidence or where the trial is sham or when there is a mistrial, rendering the judgment of acquittal void." — This defines the narrow exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule and explains why the prosecution's reliance on it failed.
• "Just because petitioner disagrees with how the Sandiganbayan weighed the prosecution's evidence does not mean that it was deprived of due process. No party to litigation has a vested right in a favorable decision." — This passage rejects the prosecution's due-process argument and emphasizes that disagreement with evidentiary weighing is not a denial of due process.

• Miranda vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017, 833 SCRA 614 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the rule that errors of judgment are not correctible by certiorari; applied to reject the petition.
• Yushi Kondo vs. Toyota Boshoku (Phils.) Corporation, G.R. No. 201396, September 11, 2019 — Cited for the rule that certiorari will not lie to review the intrinsic correctness of a judgment of the lower court; applied to dismiss the petition.
• Chiok vs. People, G.R. No. 179814, December 7, 2015, 776 SCRA 120 — Cited for the requisites of double jeopardy and the finality-of-acquittal rule; applied to find that double jeopardy attached.
• People vs. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000, 340 SCRA 207 — Cited for the rationale of the finality-of-acquittal rule and the acquitted defendant's right of repose; applied to uphold Abalos's acquittal.
• Erwin Torres vs. AAA, G.R. No. 248567, November 10, 2020 — Cited for the limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule; applied to find no exception because there was no grave abuse of discretion or due-process violation.
• Galman vs. Sandiganbayan — Cited as an example of the exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule where the previous trial was a mockery; distinguished because no sham trial occurred in this case.
• Philippine Savings Bank vs. Bermoy, G.R. No. 151912, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 94 — Cited along with Erwin Torres vs. AAA for the limited exception to the finality-of-acquittal rule.

• Section 3(h), Republic Act No. 3019 — The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provision under which Abalos was charged for allegedly having a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in the NBN Project; the acquittal rested on the prosecution's failure to prove the alleged brokering for a fee.
• Article IX, Section 2, 1987 Philippine Constitution — Quoted in the Amended Information; prohibits members of a constitutional commission from holding any other office or employment, practicing a profession, engaging in active management or control of a business affected by the functions of their office, or being financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or franchise or privilege granted by, the government or its instrumentalities. It supplied the constitutional prohibition alleged against Abalos as COMELEC Chairman.
• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Philippine Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense; applied because reversing Abalos's acquittal would violate his right against double jeopardy.
• Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs former conviction or acquittal and double jeopardy; enumerates the requisites for double jeopardy and the exceptions; applied to find that Abalos's acquittal barred further prosecution.
• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the special civil action for certiorari; applied to hold that the petition could not correct alleged errors of judgment absent grave abuse of discretion.

Carandang, Zalameda, Gaerlan, and Rosario, JJ., concur. Rosario, J., was designated as an additional Member per Raffle dated May 26, 2021 vice Chief Justice Alexander G. Gesmundo.