People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Renato C. Dacudao, et al.

In a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, the prosecution must be given a reasonable opportunity to present evidence before the court resolves a motion for bail; an order granting bail without such hearing and without a summary of the prosecution’s evidence is void for violating procedural due process. Bail is not a matter of right for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.

The parties were the People of the Philippines as petitioner and Judge Renato C. Dacudao, Rey Christopher Paclibar, and Nero Desamparado as respondents. The criminal prosecution concerned the death of Cesarlito Nolasco and was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-11463 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XIV. The case implicated the constitutional and procedural rules on bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua following the 1986 Constitution’s treatment of the death penalty, as well as the requirement that the Solicitor General represent the People in criminal cases before the Supreme Court.

On August 11, 1987, an Information for Murder with qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch XIV, presided by Judge Renato C. Dacudao, against Rey Christopher Paclibar and Nero Desamparado for the death of Cesarlito Nolasco. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-11463. Upon arraignment, Paclibar entered a plea of not guilty.

On September 18, 1987, Paclibar filed a motion for bail, furnishing the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu with a copy. On September 29, 1987, without conducting a hearing on the application for bail, Judge Dacudao issued an order granting the motion and fixing Paclibar’s bailbond at P50,000.00. The order relied on the complaint and the sworn statements of Patrolman Elpidio Desquitado, Tadeo Abello, and Romeo Torrizo of the Integrated National Police, Bantayan (Cebu) Police Station, which the court described as the essential evidence so far of the prosecution. None of the affiants, by their own account, witnessed the slaying of Cesarlito Nolasco by Paclibar.

Private prosecutor Alex R. Monteclar filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that granting bail without a hearing violated procedural due process and was null and void. The motion prayed that the September 29 order be set aside, that the motion for bail be heard to determine whether the prosecution’s evidence warranted denial of bail, and that the accused be recommitted to jail immediately until the motion for bail was resolved. In an order dated November 20, 1987, Judge Dacudao held in abeyance the resolution on the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration pending the presentation by the prosecution of evidence to support its position that the evidence of guilt was strong. The order stated that unless and until the prosecution adduced the requisite evidence, there was no reason to reconsider the September 29 order, which was predicated on the postulate that the prosecution evidence thus far attached to the records did not make out a very strong case for murder. The court gave the prosecution five days from receipt to submit a pleading or motion for reconsideration and reset the continuation of the hearing to December 16, 1987.

The complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and the recommended Information were for homicide only, but when the Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an Information for murder. The petition also alleged that the accused was harassing, threatening, and coercing witnesses who were now afraid to testify.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Refusal to Recommit: Petitioner advanced that respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recommit accused Rey Christopher Paclibar to jail during the pendency of the hearing on the motion for bail.
• Procedural Due Process: Petitioner maintained that granting bail without a hearing violated procedural due process, rendering the order null and void; the prosecution should be heard on whether the evidence of guilt was strong. This was raised in the private prosecutor’s motion for reconsideration, which prayed for the order’s reconsideration, a hearing on the motion for bail, and immediate recommitment of the accused.

• Abolition of Death Penalty / Right to Bail: Defense counsel insisted that the accused was entitled to bail because the 1986 Constitution abolished the death penalty; murder was no longer a capital offense and no longer punishable with death.
• Prematurity of Petition: The defense objected that the petition was premature and should be dismissed because certiorari will not lie unless the inferior court has had an opportunity to correct the errors imputed to it through a motion for reconsideration.
• Homicide Charge: The defense contended that the Judge did not commit any error because the complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court was for homicide only and the recommended Information was also for homicide.

• Procedural Due Process in Bail Hearing: Whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when the trial court granted bail to an accused charged with murder without any hearing on the motion for bail.
• Recommitment During Pendency of Bail Hearing: Whether respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to recommit accused Rey Christopher Paclibar to jail during the pendency of the hearing on the motion for bail.
• Right to Bail After Abolition of Death Penalty: Whether the accused was entitled to bail as a matter of right because the 1986 Constitution abolished the death penalty, such that murder was no longer a capital offense.
• Prematurity of Certiorari and Prohibition: Whether the petition for certiorari and prohibition was premature for failure to first seek reconsideration in the trial court.
• Effect of Homicide Complaint and Recommended Information: Whether the trial judge erred because the complaint and recommended Information were for homicide only.

• Procedural Due Process in Bail Hearing: Yes. The prosecution was deprived of procedural due process; in a capital offense or offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present evidence before the court resolves bail, and the order granting bail without such hearing was void.
• Recommitment During Pendency of Bail Hearing: Yes. The order granting bail was set aside and the accused was ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail application; the trial court’s refusal to recommit during the pendency of the hearing was improper.
• Right to Bail After Abolition of Death Penalty: No. The abolition of the death penalty did not give all accused an absolute right to bail; bail is not a matter of right for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, and murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
• Prematurity of Certiorari and Prohibition: No. Although a motion for reconsideration is generally required, it may be dispensed with under special circumstances warranting immediate or direct action, such as urgent need for relief and the absence of a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Effect of Homicide Complaint and Recommended Information: No. When filed with the Regional Trial Court, the Information was already for murder; amendment or changing of an Information prior to plea is allowed absent prejudice, and no double jeopardy exists where the accused has not yet pleaded guilty.

• Procedural Due Process in Bail Hearing: The respondent court acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case without any hearing, without asking the prosecution for its conformity or comment, and over its strong objections. It granted bail solely on the complaint and affidavits of three policemen, none of whom witnessed the killing. Those materials were intended only for prima facie determination of whether there was sufficient ground to believe the crime was committed and who probably committed it; whether the evidence of guilt was strong for each accused still had to be established unless the prosecution submitted the issue on what it had already presented. To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard, as it is equally entitled to due process. Under People vs. San Diego, whether the motion for bail of a defendant in custody for a capital offense is resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence it may desire to introduce before the court resolves the motion. If the prosecution is denied that opportunity, procedural due process is violated and the order granting bail is void. The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. The order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the prosecution’s evidence followed by the court’s conclusion whether the evidence of guilt is strong. The order in this case granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and affidavits and did not contain the required summary of the prosecution’s evidence. The later effort to conduct the required hearing after ordering the release of the accused could not validate the void order.
• Recommitment During Pendency of Bail Hearing: Because the order granting bail was void for lack of procedural due process, the accused could not remain at liberty during the pendency of the required hearing. The petition was granted, the order granting bail was set aside, and the accused was ordered recommitted to jail pending the hearing on the bail application.
• Right to Bail After Abolition of Death Penalty: The defense argument was erroneous. Although the Constitution states that the death penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes, it does not follow that all persons accused of any crime have an absolute right to bail. The phrase “capital offenses” was replaced by “offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua.” Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 5, Article 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua.
• Prematurity of Certiorari and Prohibition: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition for certiorari and prohibition is filed, as held in Cebu Institute of Technology vs. Ople. However, the rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. A motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where execution has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent, as in Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court. Here, the petitioner was left with no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because the respondent court insisted on the continuation of the hearing of the criminal case even while the accused was free to roam around. There was also an allegation that the accused was harassing, threatening, and coercing witnesses who were now afraid to testify.
• Effect of Homicide Complaint and Recommended Information: The defense contention that the judge did not commit any error because the complaint in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court and the recommended Information were for homicide only was not persuasive. When the Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, it was already an Information for murder. The amendment or changing of an Information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed where there is no prejudice to him. Under Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to the offense.

• Due Process in Bail Proceedings for Capital or Reclusion Perpetua Offenses — In resolving a motion for bail in a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence it may desire to introduce before the court resolves the motion, whether the matter is resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. Denial of that opportunity violates procedural due process, and the order granting bail is void. The court’s discretion must be exercised in the light of a summary of the prosecution’s evidence; the order must contain that summary and the court’s conclusion on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Bail Not a Matter of Right for Reclusion Perpetua Offenses — Bail is not a matter of right for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. The abolition of the death penalty did not make all offenses bailable; the constitutional phrase “capital offenses” was replaced by “offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua,” and a hearing is required before resolving the bail motion for such offenses.
• Guidelines in Fixing Bail — In fixing a bailbond, the court should consider the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at trial, whether the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether the accused is under bond in other cases. These guidelines call for the presentation of evidence and a reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it; an ex parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard is highly doubtful.
• Exception to the Motion for Reconsideration Requirement for Certiorari and Prohibition — Although a motion for reconsideration is generally required before filing a petition for certiorari and prohibition, the requirement may be dispensed with when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action, such as when execution has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent, or when the petitioner has no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Amendment of Information Before Plea — The amendment or changing of an Information prior to the plea of the accused is allowed where there is no prejudice to him. No actual double jeopardy exists where the accused has not yet pleaded guilty to the offense.
• Authority to Represent the People Before the Supreme Court — A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to act for the People of the Philippines before the Supreme Court. It is the Solicitor General who appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the Supreme Court; at the very least, the Provincial Fiscal, with the conformity of the Solicitor General, should raise the issue. The Court nonetheless resolved the petition on the merits in the interest of a speedy determination, with a warning to follow the correct procedure in the future.

• "The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail." — Quoted from People vs. San Diego, this passage states the controlling due process requirement for bail hearings in capital offenses and supplies the ratio for voiding the bail order.
• "The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its conclusion whether of not the evidence of guilt is strong." — Defines the form and substance required of a bail order; the trial court’s order lacked the required summary.
• "The effort of the court to remedy the situation by conducting the required hearing after ordering the release of the accused may be a face-saving device for the Judge but it cannot serve the purpose of validating the void order granting bail and stamping an imprimatur of approval on a clearly irregular procedure." — Rejects a post-release hearing as a cure for the void bail order.
• "Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong." — Rejects the defense claim that the abolition of the death penalty made murder bailable as a matter of right.

• People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 (1968) — Controlling precedent, quoted extensively; held that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present evidence before the court resolves a motion for bail in a capital offense, and that an order granting bail without such opportunity is void.
• Cebu Institute of Technology (CIT) vs. Ople, 156 SCRA 529 (1987) — Cited for the general rule that a motion for reconsideration should first be availed of before a petition for certiorari and prohibition is filed.
• Phil. British Assurance Co., Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 (1989) — Cited for the exception allowing a motion for reconsideration to be dispensed with where execution has been ordered and the need for relief is extremely urgent.
• Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415 (1986) — Cited for the rule that no actual double jeopardy exists where the petitioner had not yet pleaded guilty to the offense, in relation to amendment of an Information prior to plea.

• Section 6, Rule 144, Rules of Court — Lists the guidelines in fixing a bailbond: the nature and circumstances of the crime, the character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether the accused is under bond in other cases. The Court noted that it is highly doubtful if the trial court can appreciate these guidelines in an ex parte determination where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
• Article III, Section 19(1), Constitution — Provides that the death penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous crimes. The Court cited it to reject the argument that the abolition of the death penalty gave all accused an absolute right to bail.
• Article 111, Section 13, Constitution (as cited in the text) — States that “capital offenses” is replaced by the phrase “offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua.” The Court used this to hold that bail is not a matter of right for persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
• Section 5, Article 114, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail by persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, where the prosecution may discharge its burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong.

Fernan C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.