People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Nazar U. Chavez, et al.

Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. For certiorari to prosper, the petitioner must prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent, which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

The case arose from a murder charge against respondent SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la Victoria for the shooting of Jeffrey G. Wabe on September 21, 1996 at Cogon Market, Cagayan de Oro City. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-822 with Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chavez. Because the offense charged was murder, a capital offense, the question of whether the evidence of guilt was strong was central to the bail determination.

Respondent SPO1 Reynaldo Lim de la Victoria was charged with murder for the shooting of Jeffrey G. Wabe on September 21, 1996 at Cogon Market, Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case No. 96-822 before Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, presided by respondent Judge Nazar U. Chavez. On September 8, 1997, respondent SPO1 de la Victoria filed an application for bail. The prosecution opposed the application, and during the hearing, presented two witnesses: Marcos Dabodado, who allegedly witnessed the shooting of the victim, and Diosdado Wabe, who allegedly saw respondent SPO1 de la Victoria fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the shooting.

On October 9, 1997, respondent judge granted the application for bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt is not strong. On December 2, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General received the letter-request of the Chief State Prosecutor for the filing of a petition for certiorari of the October 9, 1997 Resolution. On January 30, 1998, the People, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 46678, assailing the grant of bail. Respondent SPO1 de la Victoria filed his comment on the petition.

On July 2, 1998, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on two grounds: (i) certiorari is available only to correct defects on jurisdiction and not errors of judgment; and (ii) petitioner did not file a motion for reconsideration to afford the trial judge the opportunity to correct his mistake. On July 24, 1998, petitioner moved for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated August 3, 1998, the Court of Appeals required respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration, and petitioner allegedly did not receive the comment of respondent.

On June 4, 1999, petitioner received an Entry of Judgment certifying that the decision dismissing the petition had become final and executory on November 13, 1998. On July 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment on the ground that the entry was premature since petitioner had not yet received any resolution from the Court of Appeals resolving its motion for reconsideration. In a Resolution dated November 5, 1999, the Court of Appeals denied the motion, relying on the Division Clerk's report stating that the Resolution dated October 20, 1998 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration was received by the OSG on October 28, 1998, and that the Resolution dated May 5, 1999 authorizing the issuance of the entry of judgment was received by the OSG on May 13, 1999.

Petitioner alleged that upon further investigation, it discovered that an OSG docket employee signed a logbook in the Administrative Section, which is in charge of opening mail matters, making it appear that the OSG received the Resolution, but that said Resolution never reached the OSG Docket Section and no entry was ever made in its logbook as is the usual course and regular procedure for receipt of court processes and resolutions. Petitioner argued that the purported receipt was anomalous and highly irregular, and that the mere signature of an OSG Docket employee in the Administrative Division's logbook did not validate receipt of the Resolution.

• Due Process — Premature Entry of Judgment: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals deprived it of due process in denying the Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment without giving petitioner any chance to prove that it did not indeed receive any Court of Appeals resolution resolving the pending Motion for Reconsideration dated July 23, 1998.
• Bail in Capital Offense: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari, thereby allowing respondent de la Victoria to post bail in a capital offense (murder) despite the fact that the evidence of guilt against him is strong.
• Motion for Reconsideration Not Required: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the court a quo, notwithstanding the doctrine that such motion is no longer necessary when urgent relief is sought and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
• Non-Receipt of Resolution: Petitioner contended that the signature of an OSG Docket employee on the OSG Administrative Division's logbook was not tantamount to receipt by petitioner as contemplated by law, since the Resolution never reached the OSG Docket Section and no entry was made in its logbook.
• State Not Bound by Negligence of Agents: Petitioner invoked the principle that in the performance of a governmental function, the state is not bound by the neglect of its agents and officers, and therefore it was not bound by the negligence or irregularity committed by the OSG Docket Division employees.

N/A — The decision does not recount the specific arguments raised by respondents in opposition to the petition.

• Premature Entry of Judgment: Whether the entry of judgment made by the Court of Appeals was premature, considering petitioner's alleged non-receipt of the October 20, 1998 Resolution denying its motion for reconsideration.
• Necessity of Motion for Reconsideration: Whether the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition precedent for the filing of a petition for certiorari under the circumstances of this case.
• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari is the proper remedy to correct the trial court's grant of bail on the ground that the evidence of guilt is not strong.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting bail to respondent SPO1 de la Victoria.

• Premature Entry of Judgment: Yes. The entry of judgment was premature. The Court agreed with petitioner that the entry of judgment as ordered by the Court of Appeals was indeed premature, given the peculiar circumstances surrounding the alleged non-receipt of the Resolution, and the precipitate entry of judgment worked injustice against petitioner and the People whom petitioner represents.
• Necessity of Motion for Reconsideration: No. The filing of a motion for reconsideration is not a condition precedent for the filing of certiorari in this case. While as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari, this rule admits of an exception where other special circumstances warrant the immediate and more direct action. The fact that bail has been granted and the accused is free to roam around warrants dispensing with the motion for reconsideration.
• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari is not the proper remedy to correct mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact. A review of evidence cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The prosecution failed to convince the Court that grave abuse of discretion attended the grant of bail. The trial court assessed the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the basis of credibility, and the discrepancies in their testimonies were described as material and irreconcilable. Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge erred in evaluating the evidence, certiorari will still not lie, as no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged wrongful appreciation of facts and evidence.

• Premature Entry of Judgment: The Court reviewed the circumstances surrounding the alleged non-receipt by petitioner of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals denying its motion for reconsideration. It appeared that some OSG Docket employee signed receipt of the Resolution in the Administrative Division's logbook instead of signing in the OSG Docket Section's logbook, a fact that renders highly suspicious petitioner's supposed receipt of said Resolution. The anomalous receipt was the subject of an investigation conducted by the OSG. The Court declared that while the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, "it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities." The Court of Appeals should have seriously considered petitioner's allegation by requiring petitioner to prove its claim and by awaiting petitioner's acknowledgment of its receipt of the Resolution in question.

• Necessity of Motion for Reconsideration: The Court recognized the general rule that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari, but held that this rule admits of an exception. A motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary where other special circumstances warrant the immediate and more direct action. In this case, the fact that bail has been granted and the accused is free to roam around, the filing of a motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with and the filing of a petition for certiorari is called for.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court upheld the Court of Appeals' dismissal of petitioner's petition for certiorari on the ground that what petitioner sought before said court was a correction or evaluation of the evidence presented to the trial court during the hearing for bail. The Court cited a number of cases holding that a review of evidence cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Hence, certiorari is not the proper remedy to correct mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions or to cure erroneous conclusions of law and fact.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The Court held that for certiorari to prosper, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility." A careful perusal of the resolution of the trial court betrayed the paucity of evidence to support petitioner's claim that respondent judge arbitrarily set aside the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. It was on the basis of credibility or lack of it, that the trial court judge assessed the testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses. The respondent judge acknowledged the principle in law that relationship alone need not necessarily adversely affect a witness' testimony, if such testimony is otherwise consistent and credible in its material aspects. What militated against the evidence of the prosecution were the discrepancies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, which respondent judge described as material and irreconcilable.

• Certiorari Limited to Errors of Jurisdiction — Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court. A review of evidence cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition, since the OSG sought correction or evaluation of the evidence presented to the trial court during the bail hearing.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — For certiorari to prosper, the burden is on the petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the prosecution failed to prove grave abuse of discretion in the trial court's grant of bail.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Condition Precedent to Certiorari — As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the grant of certiorari. However, this rule admits of an exception: a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary where other special circumstances warrant the immediate and more direct action. The Court applied this exception where bail had been granted and the accused was free to roam around, making the filing of a motion for reconsideration dispensable.

• Right to Appeal — While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, it is an essential part of the judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the precipitate entry of judgment worked injustice against petitioner.

• "While the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, 'it is an essential part of our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.'" — This passage articulates the Court's rationale for finding the entry of judgment premature and underscores the policy favoring the preservation of appellate rights.

• "In jurisprudence, 'grave abuse of discretion' implies such 'capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.'" — This is the canonical definition of grave abuse of discretion applied in determining whether certiorari lies against the trial court's grant of bail.

• "In short, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of procedure or mistakes in the findings or conclusions of the lower court." — This states the fundamental limitation on the writ of certiorari and the basis for upholding the Court of Appeals' dismissal of the petition.

• Moslares vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 440 (1998) — Cited as authority for the principle that the right to appeal is an essential part of the judicial system and courts should ensure every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity for proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities.
• Conti vs. Court of Appeals, 307 SCRA 486 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine that a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary where other special circumstances warrant the immediate and more direct action.
• People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 (1989) — Cited in support of the proposition that the filing of a motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with where bail has been granted and the accused is free to roam around.
• Resoso vs. Sandiganbayan, 319 SCRA 238 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a review of evidence cannot be secured in a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
• GSIS vs. Olisa, 304 SCRA 421 (1999) — Cited for the same proposition that certiorari is not the proper remedy to correct mistakes in the judge's findings and conclusions.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, 308 SCRA 687 (1999) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the rule that no grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its alleged wrongful appreciation of facts and evidence.
• Don Orestes Romualdez Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 319 SCRA 255 (1999) — Cited for the rule that for certiorari to prosper, the burden is on petitioner to prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Section 2, Rule 36, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that if no appeal or motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed within the time provided in the Rules, the judgment or final order shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. Cited by petitioner in support of its argument that the entry of judgment was premature.
• Section 8, Rule 120, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides that after a judgment has become final, it shall be entered in accordance with Rule 36. Cited by petitioner in support of its argument regarding the prematurity of the entry of judgment.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the petition for review before the Supreme Court.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Court — The procedural basis for the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which the Court construed as limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment.

• Justice Melo (Chairman)
• Justice Vitug
• Justice Panganiban
• Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.