People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Jaime Manuel

The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court; the consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea, and where the prosecution has already rested its case, such a plea may be allowed only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.

Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged by the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, with violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the Dangerous Drugs Act, which punishes the possession of regulated drugs with imprisonment of six years and one day to twelve years and a fine of ₱6,000 to ₱12,000. The lesser offense to which he later sought to plead guilty, violation of Section 17 of the same law, punishes record-keeping violations by pharmacists, physicians, dentists, veterinarians, manufacturers, and wholesalers with imprisonment of six months and one day to four years and a fine of ₱600 to ₱4,000. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court governs pleas of guilty to lesser offenses, permitting an accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, to plead guilty to a lesser offense regardless of whether it is necessarily included in the crime charged, without need of amending the complaint or information. The proceedings were presided over by respondent Judge Martin S. Villarama, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156.

On August 24, 1990, an information was filed against Jaime Manuel y Ohide charging him with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. The information alleged that on or about August 21, 1990, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of the court, Manuel, without the corresponding license or prescription, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession, custody and control 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) wrapped in an aluminum foil, a regulated drug.

At his arraignment, Manuel entered a plea of not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued. On November 21, 1990, the prosecution rested its case.

On January 9, 1991, counsel for Manuel verbally manifested in open court that his client was willing to change his former plea of not guilty to that of guilty to the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended. That same day, respondent Judge issued an order directing Manuel to secure the consent of the prosecutor and setting the promulgation of decision for January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, the promulgation was postponed to February 18, 1991 to give Manuel another opportunity to secure the prosecutor's consent, and on that same date Manuel filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge issued another order postponing the promulgation to February 25, 1991 for the same purpose.

On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense on three grounds: (a) the prosecution had already rested its case on November 21, 1990; (b) the possibility of conviction of Manuel of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution; and (c) the valuable time which the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to waste. On February 21, 1991, Manuel filed his Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a Lesser Offense, alleging, among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.

On February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision granting the motion. The trial court reasoned that nothing in Section 2, Rule 116 requires that the plea be availed of prior to the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, and that, in light of the liberal construction mandated by Section 2, Rule 1 and for humanitarian considerations, the motion should be approved; it added that the accused's admission of guilt indicated his submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform, while expressly disclaiming that it was putting a premium on the accused's change of heart in mid-stream. Manuel was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 17, Article III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentenced to a straight prison term of two years and one day of prision correccional, a fine of ₱2,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs, with full credit for the period of preventive imprisonment; the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride were ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of according to law.

The prosecutor's Motion for Reconsideration was denied in the order of March 13, 1991. The decision and the order denying reconsideration dwelt solely on the least persuasive of the prosecutor's three objections — the waste of valuable time already spent by the court and the prosecution — and made no finding on the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence; the trial court instead observed that the Office of the Provincial Fiscal had not been consistent in its treatment of lesser-offense pleas and suggested that the said Office lay down a guideline on when its consent would be given as a matter of course and when it would be withheld. The People thereupon filed the present petition for certiorari, and on January 20, 1992, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Judge from enforcing the questioned judgment.

• Timeliness of the Plea: The People maintained that respondent Judge erred in granting private respondent's request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because the request was filed out of time, the prosecution having already rested its case on November 21, 1990.
• Absence of Consent: The People argued that the consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party to the change of plea was not obtained, the fiscal having opposed the request.
• Strength of the Prosecution's Evidence: The People contended that the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the crime originally charged was high because of the strong evidence of the prosecution, and that the valuable time already expended by the court and the prosecutor would be put to waste.
• Invalidity of the Conviction: The People argued that respondent Judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.

• No Prescribed Period: Private respondent argued that the Rules on Criminal Procedure do not fix a specific period within which an accused is allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.
• Consent of the Fiscal Alone: Private respondent maintained that only the consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving violation of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, because there is no offended party to speak of, and that even the latter's consent is not an absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the accused to change his plea.
• Double Jeopardy: Private respondent maintained that his change of plea and his conviction of the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, is no longer open to review, otherwise his constitutional right against double jeopardy would be violated.

• Timeliness and Consent: Whether respondent Judge erred in granting private respondent's request to plead guilty to a lesser offense because the request was filed out of time and the consent thereto of the prosecutor and the offended party was not obtained.
• Validity of the Change of Plea and Conviction: Whether respondent Judge erred in convicting private respondent of the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, instead of the offense originally charged of violation of Section 16 of the same law, in view of the absence of a valid change of plea.

• Timeliness and Consent: Yes. The consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense under Section 2, Rule 116, and the acceptance of such a plea is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must study the prosecution's evidence once the fiscal has submitted his comment.
• Validity of the Change of Plea and Conviction: Yes. The conviction of the lesser offense cannot stand, the change of plea having been approved without the fiscal's consent and without any finding on the weight of the prosecution's evidence; the case must be remanded for continuation of trial on the original charge.

• Timeliness and Consent: The governing provision is Section 2, Rule 116, which allows an accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, to plead guilty to a lesser offense regardless of whether it is necessarily included in the crime charged. The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court (Manuel vs. Velasco). Although the rule fixes no period within which the plea must be made and thus does not by itself bar a plea offered after the prosecution has rested, jurisprudence supplies the yardstick for the exercise of that discretion: People vs. Kayanan held that the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged, and the concurring opinion of then Justice Barredo in People vs. Parohinog explained that after the prosecution has rested, the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act is the evidence already in the record, since the provision was not and could not have been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. The trial court therefore need not have waited for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor; as soon as the fiscal submitted his comment, whether for or against the motion, it behooved the trial court to study the prosecution's evidence as well as all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea. The rulings under review disclosed no assessment of the strength or weakness of the prosecution's evidence and dwelt solely on the waste of valuable time, the least persuasive of the three objections interposed by the fiscal; absent any finding on the weight of the evidence, the acceptance of the change of plea was improper and irregular. The consent requirement was likewise unsatisfied: Section 2, Rule 116 is clear that the consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense (Manuel vs. Velasco), because the fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco vs. Sandiganbayan) and it is his duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former (People vs. Parohinog; Vda. de Bagatua vs. Revilla).
• Validity of the Change of Plea and Conviction: The contention that there is no offended party in crimes under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, was rejected. While the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others; the threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People vs. Ale), and its pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts themselves but also by their families, so that society's survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The State is therefore the offended party; as guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines, and the fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests threatened by crime to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense (United States vs. Samio). Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e., the State, had to be secured from the fiscal who acts in behalf of the government. Because the fiscal did not consent, and because the trial court's approval of the change of plea was irregular and improper, the conviction of the lesser offense cannot stand. The plea of double jeopardy is unavailing: the right against double jeopardy under Section 2, Rule 116 applies only where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the change of plea, which was not the situation here. The more pertinent and applicable provision is Section 7, Rule 117, under which the conviction of the accused is not a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information where the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. Private respondent could thus still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

• Plea bargaining — A process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval, usually involving the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. It is ordinarily made during the pre-trial stage, although the law still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his plea thereafter. The Court used this definition to frame its analysis of the plea tendered by private respondent.
• Plea of guilty to a lesser offense; consent as a condition precedent — Under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court, and no amendment of the complaint or information is necessary; a conviction under the plea is equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy. The consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense. The Court applied this rule to invalidate the plea accepted by the trial court without the fiscal's consent.
• Discretion of the trial court; the yardstick after the prosecution has rested — The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court. Where the motion to change the plea is made after the prosecution has already rested its case, the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged; the only basis on which the fiscal and the court could rightfully act is the evidence already in the record, the provision not having been intended as a procedure for compromise, much less bargaining. As soon as the fiscal has submitted his comment, the trial court must study the prosecution's evidence and all the circumstances upon which the accused made his change of plea. The Court found the acceptance improper because no finding on the weight of the evidence was made.
• The State as the offended party in dangerous drugs prosecutions — In crimes under Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, the State is the offended party. Although the acts constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of others; the government, as guardian of the rights of the people, files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines, and the fiscal who represents the government is duty bound to defend the public interests threatened by crime to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense. The consent of the offended party required by Section 2, Rule 116 must therefore be secured from the fiscal acting in behalf of the government.
• Double jeopardy; exception for a plea made without the required consents — The right against double jeopardy under Section 2, Rule 116 applies where both the fiscal and the offended party consent to the accused's change of plea. Where the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party, Section 7, Rule 117 provides that the conviction of the accused is not a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

• "The acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court." — States the settled rule on the nature of the plea, drawn from the En Banc Resolution in Manuel vs. Velasco; it is the premise from which the Court measured the trial court's action.
• "the rules allow such a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged." — The yardstick supplied by People vs. Kayanan for the trial court's exercise of discretion where the motion to change the plea is made after the prosecution has rested its case.
• "The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense." — The ratio decidendi on the consent requirement, which the Court applied to invalidate the change of plea.
• "The state is, therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the rights of the people, the government files the criminal action in the name of the People of the Philippines." — Rejects the argument that dangerous drugs offenses have no offended party and identifies the State as the party whose consent must be secured through the fiscal.

• Manuel vs. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26, 1991 (En Banc Resolution) — Controlling authority for the rule that the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable as a matter of right but is addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court, and that the consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea.
• People vs. Kayanan, L-39355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450 — Source of the yardstick that, where the prosecution has already rested, the rules allow a plea of guilty to a lesser offense only when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged.
• People vs. Parohinog, G.R. No. L-47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377 — Cited through the concurring opinion of then Justice Antonio Barredo, explaining that after the prosecution has rested, the only basis for allowing a change of plea is the evidence already in the record, and that the rule was not intended as a procedure for compromise or bargaining; also cited for the fiscal's duty to prosecute the proper offense.
• Cinco, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15, 1991 — Cited for the proposition that the fiscal has full control of the prosecution of criminal actions.
• Vda. de Bagatua, et al. vs. Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396 — Cited, together with People vs. Parohinog, for the fiscal's duty to always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the evidence in his hands can only sustain the former.
• People vs. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50, 58 — Cited for the malevolent and incessant threat posed by drugs against human dignity and the integrity of society, supporting the conclusion that the State is the offended party in dangerous drugs cases.
• United States vs. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696 — Cited for the proposition that the fiscal is duty bound to defend the public interests threatened by crime to the point that it is as though he were the person directly injured by the offense.
• People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966 — Cited by the trial court in its decision for the proposition that an admission of guilt indicates the accused's submission to the law and a moral disposition on his part to reform.

• Section 2, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Provides that the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the fiscal, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not it is necessarily included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial court, and that no amendment of the complaint or information is necessary; a conviction under the plea is equivalent to a conviction of the offense charged for purposes of double jeopardy. The Court held that the consent of both the fiscal and the offended party is a condition precedent to a valid plea under this provision, and that the trial court's approval of the plea without such consent was improper.
• Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Provides that the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or information where the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the consent of the fiscal and of the offended party. The Court applied this exception to hold that private respondent could still be prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.
• Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — The provision under which private respondent was originally charged; it prescribes the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to twelve years and a fine ranging from ₱6,000 to ₱12,000. The Court ordered the continuation of trial on the original charge under this section.
• Section 17, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — The lesser offense to which private respondent sought to plead guilty; it penalizes any pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer, or wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required under Section 25 of the Act, where the violation or failure involves a regulated drug, with imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years and a fine ranging from ₱600 to ₱4,000. The Court set aside the conviction under this section.
• Section 25, Republic Act No. 6425 — Referred to by Section 17 as the source of the record-keeping duties whose violation constitutes the lesser offense.
• Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court — Invoked by the trial court in granting the motion, providing that the rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. The Supreme Court did not rely on this provision; it held that the trial court's acceptance of the change of plea was improper and irregular.
• Section 20, Article IV, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended — Cited in the trial court's decision as the basis for confiscating and forfeiting the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride in favor of the Government.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino, and Bellosillo, JJ.