People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Mario J. Gutierrez, et al.

The Supreme Court possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree the transfer of the trial of a criminal case pending in a Court of First Instance to another court of equal rank within the same district when the interest of justice and truth so demand and serious and weighty reasons show that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the original court; the Secretary of Justice, however, has no power to transfer specified individual cases.

The People of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor General and State Prosecutors, instituted a special civil action against Judge Mario J. Gutierrez of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur and the private respondents accused in two arson cases. The dispute implicated Republic Act No. 5179, which created Circuit Criminal Courts to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and to accelerate the disposition of criminal cases, and Department of Justice Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274, which required transfers of pending cases to Circuit Criminal Courts to be effected by raffle.

In the morning of May 22, 1970, a group of armed persons descended on barrio Ora Centro, municipality of Bantay, Province of Ilocos Sur, and set fire to various inhabited houses therein. On the afternoon of the same day, in barrio Ora Este of the same municipality and province, several residential houses were likewise burned by the group, resulting in the destruction of various houses and in the death of an old woman named Vicenta Balboa. After investigation by the authorities, the provincial fiscal, with several state prosecutors assigned by the Department of Justice to collaborate with him, filed on June 10, 1970, in the Court of First Instance of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, two informations: Criminal Case No. 47-V for arson with homicide and Criminal Case No. 48-V for arson. The informations charged seventeen private respondents, together with eighty-two other unidentified persons, with confederating, conspiring, confabulating, and helping one another in willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously burning or causing to be burned several residential houses, knowing the said houses to be occupied, in barrios Ora Este and Ora Centro, Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

Accused Camilo Pilotin and Vincent Crisologo furnished bail, and on June 15, 1970, voluntarily appeared before respondent Judge Gutierrez, were arraigned, and pleaded not guilty. Trial was then set for July 27, 28, and 29, 1970. On the same day, the Secretary of Justice issued Administrative Order No. 221, authorizing Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, with official station at San Fernando, La Union, to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur from and after July 1, 1970. Three days thereafter, on June 18, 1970, the Secretary further issued Administrative Order No. 226, authorizing Judge Mario Gutierrez to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, “in the interest of justice and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274” of the Department of Justice.

On June 22, 1970, the prosecution moved the respondent judge for a transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court, invoking the administrative orders and calling attention to the circumstance that they were issued at the instance of witnesses seeking transfer of the hearing from Vigan to either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown in their affidavits. The accused vigorously opposed the transfer. On July 20, 1970, the respondent judge declined the transfer sought, on the ground that Administrative Order No. 258 only provided for transfer of cases to the Circuit Criminal Court where the interest of justice required it for the more expeditious disposal of the cases, and in the cases involved the accused had already pleaded; that if the objective of the proposed transfer was to subsequently obtain a change of venue from the Supreme Court under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5179, the same should have been done right at the very inception of the cases.

In view of the lower court’s denial of the motion to transfer the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, the prosecution resorted to the Supreme Court for writs of certiorari and mandamus, charging abuse of discretion and praying that the order of denial be set aside and that the respondent Court of First Instance be compelled to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, as well as to authorize the latter to try the cases at either San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City. Respondents in their answer denied any abuse of discretion in view of the fact that Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized the court below, but did not require or command it, to transfer the cases in question to the Circuit Criminal Court, and likewise denied that the circumstances justified any such transfer. At petitioners’ request, the Supreme Court enjoined respondent Judge Gutierrez from proceeding with the trial of the cases until further orders.

The record showed that the prosecution witnesses refused to testify in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, because they felt their lives would be endangered. Their claim was buttressed by the affidavits of the injured parties and prosecution witnesses, reaffirming their fear to appear in Vigan to testify in the cases and expressing their willingness to testify if the cases were heard outside of Ilocos Sur, where they could be free from tension and terrorism. The fear thus expressed could not be considered fanciful and unfounded when account was taken of the circumstances that the informations showed that of the one hundred armed participants in the burning of the houses, some eighty-two were still unidentified and at large; that accused Vincent Crisologo belonged to an influential family in the province, being the son of the Congressman for the first district of Ilocos Sur and of the lady Governor; that the reluctant witnesses were themselves the complainants in the criminal cases and therefore had reasons to fear that attempts would be made to silence them; that it was not shown that the Executive branch was able or willing to give these witnesses full security during the trial and for a reasonable time thereafter; that even if armed security escorts were provided, the same would be no guarantee against the possibility of murderous assault against the affiant witnesses; that Constabulary reports showed that between January 1 and May 31, 1970, no less than seventy-eight murders had been reported committed in the province, of which number only twenty-one were solved; and that the promotion and confirmation of respondent Judge Mario Gutierrez from Clerk of Court to Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Second Judicial District, Branch III, was actively supported by Congressman and Governor Crisologo, parents of accused Vincent Crisologo.

• Authority to Transfer Under Administrative Orders: Petitioner invoked Administrative Order No. 226, issued pursuant to Republic Act No. 5179 and implemented by Administrative Order Nos. 258 and 274, as the basis for transferring Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner charged respondent Judge Gutierrez with abuse of discretion in denying the prosecution’s urgent motion to transfer the cases.
• Witness Security and Impending Miscarriage of Justice: Petitioner contended that transfer was necessary because prosecution witnesses refused to testify in Vigan for reasons of security and personal safety, as shown by their affidavits, and that a miscarriage of justice was impending if the cases remained there.
• Relief Sought: Petitioner prayed for writs of certiorari and mandamus to set aside the order of denial, to compel the respondent Court of First Instance to remand the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court, and to authorize trial in San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City.

• Administrative Order Merely Permissive: Respondents denied any abuse of discretion because Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized, but did not require or command, the transfer of the cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
• No Justifying Circumstances: Respondents denied that the circumstances justified any transfer of the cases.
• Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue: Respondents contended that a transfer of the trial site could not be made because criminal procedure requires that one who commits a crime is amenable therefor only in the jurisdiction where the crime is committed; that the jurisdiction of a Court of First Instance is limited to its territory; and that Rule 110, Section 14(a) of the Revised Rules of Court requires that the action be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of its essential ingredients took place.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: Whether Republic Act No. 5179, as implemented by Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274, and Administrative Order No. 226 authorized the Secretary of Justice to transfer specified individual criminal cases to the Circuit Criminal Court.
• Inherent Power to Transfer Trial Venue: Whether the Supreme Court possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree the transfer of the trial of a case pending in a Court of First Instance to another Court of First Instance within the same district when the interest of justice and truth so demand and serious and weighty reasons show that a fair and impartial trial would not result in the original court.
• Sufficiency of Grounds for Transfer: Whether sufficient and adequate reasons existed to transfer the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur to the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: No. Republic Act No. 5179 and Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 did not authorize the Secretary of Justice to transfer specified individual cases; transfers to Circuit Criminal Courts were to be effected by raffle, and Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized, not directed, transfer.
• Inherent Power to Transfer Trial Venue: Yes. The Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power under the Constitution and statutes, possesses inherent power and jurisdiction to decree transfer of trial to another Court of First Instance within the same district when the interest of justice and truth so demand and serious and weighty reasons show that trial in the original court would not result in a fair and impartial trial and would lead to a miscarriage of justice.
• Sufficiency of Grounds for Transfer: Yes. The prosecution witnesses’ well-founded fear for their safety and refusal to testify in Vigan, together with the circumstances in the record, rendered transfer necessary in the interest of truth and justice; the respondent court’s denial of the transfer was grave abuse of discretion.

• Authority of the Secretary of Justice: The Court agreed with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party and could be transformed into a means of predetermining the outcome of individual cases. The creation by Republic Act No. 5179 of the Circuit Criminal Courts to alleviate the burden of the regular Courts of First Instance and accelerate the disposition of criminal cases nowhere indicated an intent to permit the transfer of preselected individual cases. Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, Section 2 of its Part V, as confirmed by Administrative Order No. 274, Section 3 of Part III, provided that transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle, chance operating to nullify any executive arbitration of what particular cases should be apportioned to either tribunal. Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized, and did not direct, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez to transfer specified cases, revealing that the Secretary himself was aware of the impropriety of imperatively directing transfer. Respondent Judge Gutierrez, in construing Administrative Order No. 226 as permissive and not mandatory, acted within the limits of his discretion and violated neither the law nor the Executive Orders.

• Inherent Power to Transfer Trial Venue: The Court held that the Constitution has vested judicial power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law, and such judicial power connotes certain incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice. Courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government. One of these incidental and inherent powers is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This authority was recognized in England even prior to the eighteenth century and passed to the State Supreme Courts of the American Union. Philippine courts possess such inherent powers because they were organized on the American pattern with the enactment of Act No. 136 on June 11, 1901, by the Philippine Commission, then composed of a majority of American lawyers familiar with common-law institutions. Although not expressly conferred by Act No. 136, the framers did not intend to deny to Philippine courts the inherent jurisdiction possessed by English and American courts to transfer the place of trial to secure and promote the ends of justice. Republic Act No. 5179, Section 4, expressly recognized this power by providing that Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their districts, that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime was committed, and that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district. The requirements for proper jurisdiction were satisfied by the filing of the criminal cases in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, where the offenses charged were committed; the holding of trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue than jurisdiction. Rule 110, Section 14(a), is a general rule whose purpose, as explained in Beltran vs. Ramos, is not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause him great inconvenience in looking for witnesses and other evidence. Where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, the court should have power to decide where the balance of convenience or inconvenience lies and to determine the most suitable place of trial according to the exigencies of truth and impartial justice. Since the rigorous application of the general rule would prevent a fair and impartial inquiry into the actual facts, the exigencies of justice demand that the general rule yield to occasional exceptions wherever there are weighty reasons therefor; otherwise, the rigor of the law would become the highest injustice.

• Sufficiency of Grounds for Transfer: The Court found sufficient and adequate reasons for transfer. The prosecution witnesses refused to testify in Vigan because they felt their lives would be endangered, and their affidavits reaffirmed their fear and willingness to testify outside Ilocos Sur. The fear was not fanciful: of the one hundred armed participants in the burning, eighty-two were still unidentified and at large; accused Vincent Crisologo belonged to an influential family, being the son of the Congressman and the lady Governor; the reluctant witnesses were themselves the complainants; it was not shown that the Executive branch was able or willing to give them full security; armed security escorts would be no guarantee against murderous assault; Constabulary reports showed seventy-eight murders in the province between January 1 and May 31, 1970, with only twenty-one solved; and respondent Judge Gutierrez’s promotion was actively supported by the Crisologo parents. To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses would not be at liberty to reveal what they knew would make a mockery of the judicial process and betray the purpose for which courts were established. The accused could not complain that transfer would railroad them into conviction, because regardless of the place of trial the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; a dismissal for lack of evidence is a verdict the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal. The Court thus decreed that the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or Baguio City, at the earliest available date, with the same trial judge later authorized to hear defense witnesses in Vigan if circumstances demanded, and with adjudication by a judge other than respondent Gutierrez to remove any doubt or suspicion of influence.

• Separation of Powers and Executive Non-Interference in Judicial Assignment — The Secretary of Justice cannot determine what court should hear specific cases. Such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the separation of the Executive and the Judiciary, endangers the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party, and could predetermine the outcome of individual cases. In this case, Republic Act No. 5179 and Administrative Orders Nos. 258 and 274 required transfers to Circuit Criminal Courts to be effected by raffle, and Administrative Order No. 226 merely authorized, not directed, transfer.
• Inherent Judicial Power to Transfer Trial Venue — Courts possess incidental and inherent power to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands. This power is part of judicial power under the Constitution and was recognized at common law and in Philippine jurisprudence. The Court applied it to order the transfer of Criminal Cases Nos. 47-V and 48-V.
• Venue vs. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases — Jurisdiction is satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in the province where the offense was committed. The holding of trial in a particular place is a matter of venue, not jurisdiction. Rule 110, Section 14(a), is a general venue rule that may yield to exceptions where weighty reasons demand, especially when prosecution witnesses cannot safely testify in the original locality.
• Prosecution’s Right to Fair Opportunity and Non-Appealability of Acquittal — A dismissal for lack of evidence is a verdict that the prosecution can neither challenge nor appeal. Courts should not compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a place where its witnesses cannot reveal what they know, because that would deny the State a fair chance to present its side.
• Summum Jus, Summa Injuria — The rigorous application of a general legal rule may result in the highest injustice. The general rule on venue must therefore yield to occasional exceptions where there are weighty reasons, particularly when applying it strictly would prevent a fair and impartial inquiry.

• "We agree with respondents that the present laws do not confer upon the Secretary of Justice power to determine what court should hear specific cases. Any such power, even in the guise of administrative regulation of executive affairs, trenches upon the time-honored separation of the Executive and the Judiciary; and while not directly depriving the courts of their independence, it would endanger the rights and immunities of the accused or civil party." — This passage states the Court’s holding on the absence of executive power to transfer specified individual cases and grounds it in separation of powers.
• "One of these incidental and inherent powers of courts is that of transferring the trial of cases from one court to another of equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a miscarriage of justice, so demands." — This is the canonical formulation of the inherent judicial power to transfer trial venue, the ratio decidendi for the Court’s grant of relief.
• "Since the requirements for proper jurisdiction have been satisfied by the filing of the criminal case in question with the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, in which province the offenses charged were committed, according to the informations; since the holding of the trial in a particular place is more a matter of venue, rather than jurisdiction; since the interests of truth and justice can not be subserved by compelling the prosecution to proceed to trial in the respondent court in Ilocos Sur, because its witnesses, for just and weighty reasons, are unwilling to testify therein, and the respondent court, ignoring their safety, has abusively denied the motion to have the case transferred to another court, this Supreme Court, in the exercise of judicial power possessed by it under the Constitution and the statutes, should decree that the trial of cases 47-V and 48-V should be heard and decided by the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District, either in San Fernando, La Union, or in Baguio City, at the earlier available date." — This passage applies the venue-versus-jurisdiction distinction and the inherent power to the specific facts, explaining why transfer was ordered.
• "The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties." — Quoted from Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, this passage reinforces the Court’s view that procedural rules should not be applied rigidly to defeat the ends of justice.

• U.S. vs. Cunanan, 26 Phil. 376 — Cited by respondents for the rule that one who commits a crime is amenable only in the jurisdiction where the crime was committed; the Court acknowledged the general rule but held that it must yield to exceptions in the interest of justice.
• People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665 — Cited by respondents for the same territorial-jurisdiction principle; the Court treated it as part of the general rule subject to exceptions.
• Beltran vs. Ramos, 96 Phil. 149, 150 — Explained that the purpose of the venue rule is not to compel the defendant to move to and appear in a different court from that of the province where the crime was committed, as it would cause great inconvenience; where the convenience of the accused is opposed by that of the prosecution, the court may decide the balance of convenience and determine the most suitable place of trial.
• Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 — Cited for the principle that courts can by appropriate means do all things necessary to preserve and maintain every quality needful to make the judiciary an effective institution of government.
• Crocker vs. Justices of the Superior Court, 208 Mass. 162, 21 Ann. Cases 1067 — Cited as showing the common-law recognition of the power to transfer venue and the practice in England.
• Rex vs. Cowle, (Eng.) 2 Burr 834 — Cited for Lord Chief Justice Mansfield’s statement that the law on transfer of venue is clear and uniform as far back as it can be traced.
• Reg. vs. Conway, 7 Jr. C. J. 507 — Cited for the common-law right of either party to have a case taken out of the proper county and brought into an indifferent county when a fair and impartial trial cannot be obtained.
• Cochecho R. Co. vs. Farrington, 26 N.H. 428, 436 — Cited for the rule that the power to transfer the place of holding trials became engrafted upon the common law long before American independence and is exercised by many state courts.
• Alzua and Arnalot vs. Johnson, 21 Phil. 300, 333 — Cited for the principle that Philippine courts were organized on the American pattern and that common-law rules, principles, and doctrines may be used to ascertain the meaning and scope of Philippine legislation; also used to support the existence of inherent judicial powers.
• Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney General, 20 Phil. 523 — Quoted for the principle that the purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice but to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.

• Article VIII, Section 13, Constitution — Vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. The Court held that this judicial power connotes incidental and inherent attributes reasonably necessary for an effective administration of justice, including the power to transfer trial venue.
• Rule 110, Section 14(a), Revised Rules of Court — Provides that in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The Court held this to be a general venue rule that may yield to exceptions where weighty reasons demand.
• Republic Act No. 5179, Section 4 — Provides that Circuit Criminal Courts may hold sessions anywhere within their respective districts; that cases shall be heard within the province where the crime was committed; and that when the interest of justice so demands, with prior approval of the Supreme Court, cases may be heard in a neighboring province within the district. The Court cited this as express legislative recognition of the power to transfer the place of trial.
• Administrative Order No. 258, Series of 1968, Section 2, Part V; Administrative Order No. 274, Section 3, Part III — Provide that transfer to Circuit Criminal Courts of cases pending in the regular Courts of First Instance should be effected by raffle. The Court used these provisions to reject the Secretary of Justice’s power to transfer specified individual cases.
• Administrative Order No. 226 — Merely authorized, and did not direct, Judges Arciaga and Gutierrez to transfer specified cases to the Circuit Criminal Court. The Court held that respondent Judge Gutierrez correctly construed it as permissive and not mandatory.
• Administrative Order No. 221 — Authorized Judge Lino Anover of the Circuit Criminal Court of the Second Judicial District to hold a special term in Ilocos Sur. The Court sustained the respondent court’s order insofar as it held Administrative Order No. 221 not mandatory but only directory.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, and Teehankee concurred. The source header identifies concurring opinions by Barredo and Fernando, but the texts of those opinions are not included in the provided material. Concepcion, C.J., took no part; Villamor, J., reserved his vote; Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., were on leave.