People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Ireneo Gako, Jr. and Vicente Go

When bail is discretionary — as where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong — the court must first conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, and must prepare a summary of the prosecution's evidence before granting or denying bail; the absence of either renders the order void. Separately, an offended party in a criminal case has sufficient interest and personality as a "person aggrieved" to file a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, notwithstanding that only the Solicitor General may represent the People before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.

The criminal case arose from the killing of Rafael Galan, Sr. on June 25, 1991, for which Vicente Go, Sonny Herodias, and Leopoldo dela Peña were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Guadalupe Galan, the victim's widow, is the private complainant, while the Office of the Solicitor General represents the People. At the time of the filing of the Information in 1991, murder was punishable by reclusion perpetua, Republic Act No. 7659 not yet having re-imposed the death penalty; the case also predated the creation of Special Heinous Crimes Courts under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, as amended by Administrative Order No. 104-96.

On June 25, 1991, Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead. An Information for murder was filed on July 9, 1991 against Leopoldo dela Peña, Sonny Herodias, and Vicente Go before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-22474, and Judge Godardo Jacinto issued a warrant of arrest against the three accused. Earlier, on July 3, 1991, dela Peña had executed an extra-judicial confession implicating Herodias and Go in the conspiracy to kill the victim.

On July 22, 1991, an Urgent Motion to Confine private respondent Go in a hospital was filed. A hearing on the motion was conducted on August 2, 1991, with the prosecution reserving its right to cross-examine Dr. Gonzales. On August 6, 1991, the court issued an Order confining Go in a hospital without the prosecution having cross-examined Dr. Gonzales on his medical report.

On July 15, 1992, a hearing was conducted at which dela Peña was presented as a witness for the prosecution. Presiding Judge Priscila S. Agana sustained the objections of the defense counsels each time the prosecution attempted to establish the conspiracy to kill the victim. The prosecution filed a motion to inhibit Judge Agana, which was denied. On November 20, 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a speedy trial had been violated, leaving dela Peña to face trial.

The prosecution challenged the order of dismissal before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32954. In its Decision dated April 18, 1994, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the order of dismissal, ordered the inhibition of Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch. With the dismissal of the appeal of Go and co-accused Herodias by the Supreme Court in a Minute Resolution dated June 26, 1995, the criminal case was set anew for trial. The case was re-raffled to RTC-17, and on October 28, 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias.

On February 2, 1997, Dr. Matig-a, Go's physician, filed a Clinical Summary on Go's illness, and on February 13, 1997, Go filed a Petition for Bail. On March 7 and 10, 1997, the prosecution presented dela Peña, who had been acquitted in 1993 and who testified on matters on which he had not been allowed to testify by Judge Agana. On March 21, 1997, a Manifestation on the Confinement of Go was filed urging his arrest because he was out of the intensive care unit. The prosecution's motion to transfer the criminal case to a Special Heinous Crimes Court was denied by then presiding Judge Jesus de la Peña, and the case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Ireneo Gako, Jr. as presiding judge.

On September 16 and 17, 1997, the hearing was resumed before Judge Gako, Jr. On September 26, 1997, an Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest was filed, praying for Go's arrest before his Clinical Summary Report could be heard. On November 10, 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting Go's Petition for Bail, fixing bail at ₱50,000.00 after taking into consideration that Go was then confined in the hospital and was suffering from ischemic heart disease, essential hypertension, NIDDM, hypercholesterolemia, and respiratory tract infection, and relying on the clinical summary report of Dr. Generoso Matiga dated February 4, 1997 stating that Go's confinement in prison would cause his disease to terminate fatally.

Thereafter, the prosecution filed a Vehement Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. due to his alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with Go's arrest, and moved for reconsideration of the November 10, 1997 Order. A Supplemental Motion to Inhibit was filed by the counsel of the offended party on the ground that Judge Gako, Jr. had allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it was short of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment, and a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration followed on the ground that the transcripts had allegedly not been read. On December 1, 1997, a Motion for the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum was filed to produce Dr. Matig-a's records to determine whether the medical findings on Go were exaggerated to prevent his arrest. On December 11, 1997, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the prosecution's Manifestation dated March 21, 1997 and the Urgent Motion to Enforce the Alias Warrant of Arrest dated September 26, 1997, holding that the alias warrants had been improvidently issued because the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991 was still valid and subsisting, and that the issue had become moot and academic with Go's release on bail. On January 20, 1998, Judge Gako, Jr. issued an Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration, the Motion to Inhibit, and the Supplemental Motion to Inhibit.

The prosecution's motions having been denied, private complainant Guadalupe Galan, the widow of the victim, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for a defective certification against forum shopping; the Office of the Solicitor General's subsequent petition was likewise dismissed as filed out of time. On the merits of the bail grant, Judge Gako, Jr. had found that Go was confined in the hospital and suffering from several ailments, and had relied on the August 6, 1991 order of confinement and on Dr. Matiga's February 4, 1997 clinical summary in justifying Go's continued hospital confinement and his release on bail.

• Dismissal of the Certiorari Petition: Petitioner OSG argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not giving due course to its special civil action for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47142.
• Timeliness: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that its special civil action was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Failure to Reach the Merits: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in not touching on the merits of the petition.
• Bail Without Hearing: Petitioner submitted that the November 10, 1997 Order granting bail was improper because it did not express the court's finding that the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.
• Custody of Law: Petitioner advanced the theory that private respondent Go was not under the custody of the law at the time he applied for bail, arguing that the August 6, 1991 order of confinement was void for lack of cross-examination of the doctor; that Go was bodily released when the case was dismissed on November 20, 1992; that the trial court lost jurisdiction over his person; that Go traveled extensively abroad; that he continued to be confined on the strength of the allegedly void order; that Judge Gako, Jr. refused to enforce the alias warrant of arrest; and that Go voluntarily admitted himself to the hospital.
• Inhibition: Petitioner moved to inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. for alleged delay in resolving the incidents in connection with Go's arrest, and the offended party's counsel filed a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit on the ground that the judge had allegedly pre-judged the prosecution's evidence.
• Special Heinous Crimes Court: Petitioner recommended that the criminal case be raffled to a Special Heinous Crimes Court.

• Standing of the Offended Party: Whether private complainant Galan had legal standing to file the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.
• Non-Forum Shopping Certification: Whether the dismissal of Galan's petition for a defective certification against forum shopping was proper.
• Timeliness of the OSG's Petition: Whether the OSG's petition was filed beyond the 60-day period prescribed in Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Bail — Hearing: Whether the November 10, 1997 Order granting bail was proper without the court expressing a finding that the evidence of guilt of the accused is not strong.
• Bail — Summary of Evidence: Whether the order granting bail was valid without a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
• Custody of Law: Whether private respondent Go was under the custody of the law at the time he applied for bail.
• Inhibition: Whether Judge Gako, Jr. should be inhibited on the ground of partiality.
• Venue / Special Court: Whether Criminal Case No. CBU-22474 should be tried by the Special Heinous Crimes Court.

• Standing of the Offended Party: Yes. As an offended party in a criminal case, Galan had sufficient interest and personality as a "person aggrieved" to file the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Non-Forum Shopping Certification: Yes. The dismissal was proper because the certificate against forum shopping was signed by Galan's counsel, not by Galan herself, and the OSG's subsequent adoption of the petition did not cure the defect.
• Timeliness of the OSG's Petition: Yes. The OSG's petition was filed beyond the 60-day period, but the Court relaxed the rule in the interest of substantial justice.
• Bail — Hearing: No. The grant of bail was void for failure to conduct the mandatory hearing required when bail is discretionary.
• Bail — Summary of Evidence: No. The order granting bail was void for failure to include a summary of the prosecution's evidence.
• Custody of Law: Yes. Go was under the custody of the law, having been arrested on a valid warrant and arraigned, and his hospital confinement having been by court order.
• Inhibition: No. The charge of partiality was not supported by clear and convincing evidence; an erroneous grant of bail alone does not prove bias.
• Venue / Special Court: No. The case was properly retained by the branch where trial had already begun, pursuant to Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, as amended.

• Standing of the Offended Party: The Court of Appeals held that private complainant Galan had no legal standing because only the Solicitor General may represent the People before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. The Court differed. Citing Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz and People vs. Calo, it reiterated that while only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a special civil action for prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65, in line with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court. As the widow of the victim, Galan had a valid grievance against the order granting bail to the alleged murderer of her husband. The proper ground for dismissing her petition was therefore the defective certification, not lack of standing.

• Non-Forum Shopping Certification: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that there was sufficient ground to dismiss Galan's petition because her counsel, not Galan herself, signed the certificate on non-forum shopping, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 in relation to Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The OSG's manifestation adopting Galan's petition did not cure the defect, since the certification was still not signed by Galan and the OSG's manifestation itself contained no certification on non-forum shopping.

• Timeliness of the OSG's Petition: By the time the OSG filed its petition for certiorari on August 3, 1998, the dismissal of Galan's petition had already been reaffirmed on June 18, 1998, and the 60-day period for the OSG to file its petition had already lapsed. The Court of Appeals was therefore correct that the OSG's petition was filed out of time. Nonetheless, the Court resolved to grant the petition in part in view of the primordial interest of substantial justice, noting that the issues raised presented extenuating circumstances that should have compelled the Court of Appeals to pass upon the merits, and that in a number of cases it had set aside the strict application of procedural technicalities in the higher interest of justice to avoid a miscarriage of justice and to end the streaks of delay which had saddled the criminal case.

• Bail — Hearing: Section 13, Article III of the Constitution and Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provide that bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Private respondent Go was charged with murder in 1991, before the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, so murder was then punishable by reclusion perpetua and his right to bail was merely discretionary. The Court has consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused, to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable, confined to substantial matters and avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-examination. It was inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution; his reliance on the "voluminous records" did not suffice. The prosecution is equally entitled to due process. A hearing was also necessary to determine the amount of bail under Section 6, Rule 114; absent such hearing, the ₱50,000.00 bail was arbitrary and without basis.

• Bail — Summary of Evidence: The order granting bail merely made a conclusion without a summary of the evidence, a substantive and formal defect that voids the grant of bail. After the hearing, whether bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which he formulates his own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused. The importance of a summary cannot be downplayed; it is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense, and its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail. The Court laid down the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is filed: (1) notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) conduct a hearing of the application regardless of whether the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong; (3) decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (4) if the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon approval of the bail bond, otherwise the petition should be denied. The irregularity was not attenuated by Go's ailments: the findings were based on the summary clinical report of Dr. Matiga dated February 4, 1997, while the order granting bail was issued on November 10, 1997, so it could not be reasonably assumed that the report still accurately reflected Go's actual state of health nine months later. It was clear error to depend solely on the dated medical report when the defense failed to present a more recent one that would convincingly raise strong grounds to apprehend that imprisonment would endanger the accused's life.

• Custody of Law: By the very definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, the person applying for bail must be in the custody of the law. A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. The Court rejected the OSG's theory. The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance; it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. Go had been duly arraigned on December 11, 1991, before the case was erroneously dismissed, and the affirmance of the Court of Appeals decision voiding the dismissal was a clear declaration that the trial court's jurisdiction over the criminal case and over Go's person continued to subsist. Go had been arrested on the basis of the warrant issued by Judge Jacinto on July 9, 1991, which gave the trial court jurisdiction over him. At the retrial, his confinement in the hospital was by virtue of the August 6, 1991 court order, and the restraint on his freedom was evident. There was no need to enforce the alias warrant of arrest since Go was still under the custody of the law and there was no evidence that he had escaped or refused to obey a lawful order of the court. The setting aside of the December 11, 1997 order denying enforcement of the alias warrant became moot and academic with Go's provisional freedom after bail was erroneously granted. The Court, however, found merit in the OSG's argument that the August 6, 1991 order of confinement was a continuing one and a built-in license for the accused to confine himself as many times as he liked; the proper course should have been to recall the order of confinement and to order Go's detention until the defense could prove through competent evidence that imprisonment would imperil his health.

• Inhibition: Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court governs the disqualification of judges. Partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph that would per se disqualify a judge from sitting in a case; jurisprudence is clear that partiality is a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of the judge under the second paragraph. Judge Gako, Jr. had already ruled that he would not inhibit himself. To overturn that ruling, there must be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge of partiality. The parameters are: mere suspicion that a judge was partial to a party is not enough; there should be adequate evidence to prove the charge; there must be a showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case; and the bias and prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extra-judicial source and to have resulted in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. The OSG's accusations of partiality — the grant of bail without a hearing and the alleged suppression of the hearing on the Clinical Summary Report — did not meet this standard. An erroneous ruling on the grant of bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias, and reliance on the order of confinement, even if erroneous, was not sufficient to show manifest partiality. To allow the disqualification of a judge on a mere allegation of partiality would open the floodgates to forum shopping.

• Venue / Special Court: Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96 dated May 3, 1996, creating the Special Heinous Crimes Court, provides that all cases covered by the order where trial has already been commenced shall continue to be heard by the branches to which they were originally assigned. Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996, amending Administrative Order No. 51-96, contains a similar provision: where trial has already begun, the same shall continue to be heard by the respective branches to which they have been originally assigned; a criminal case is considered begun when the accused or any of them has already been arraigned. The trial of the case had already begun, and the crime charged occurred prior to the creation of the Special Heinous Crimes Court. There was no cogent reason to set aside the May 23, 1997 order denying the transfer, and no extraordinary circumstances compelled the exercise of the Court's power under the Constitution to order a change of venue or place of trial.

• Bail as a matter of right or discretion — Under Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, all persons before conviction are bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Because murder was punishable by reclusion perpetua at the time Go was charged in 1991, before the passage of Republic Act No. 7659, his right to bail was merely discretionary.

• Mandatory hearing and summary of evidence in bail applications — When bail is discretionary, the court must conduct a hearing, whether summary or otherwise, to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it against the accused, to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence. A summary hearing is such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable, confined to substantial matters and avoiding unnecessary examination and cross-examination. After the hearing, whether bail is granted or denied, the presiding judge is mandated to prepare a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which he formulates his conclusion on whether the evidence is strong enough to indicate the accused's guilt. The absence of a hearing or of a summary invalidates the grant or denial of bail, as both are aspects of procedural due process for the prosecution and the defense.

• Duties of a judge in bail applications — (1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing for bail or require him to submit his recommendation; (2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong, for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion; (3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and (4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond; otherwise, the petition should be denied.

• Custody of the law — A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. Custody of the law is a condition sine qua non for bail.

• Jurisdiction once attached is not ousted — The jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events although of a character which would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance; it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case. The nullification of the order dismissing the criminal case meant that the trial court's jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused continued to subsist.

• Standing of offended parties in criminal cases — While only the Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or the State in criminal proceedings pending in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a special civil action for prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65, in line with the liberal construction of the Rules of Court.

• Inhibition of judges on the ground of partiality — Partiality is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 that would per se disqualify a judge; it is a recognized ground for voluntary inhibition under the second paragraph. To disqualify a judge, there must be clear and convincing evidence showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise, in the prosecution of the case, and that the bias and prejudice stemmed from an extra-judicial source and resulted in an opinion on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. An erroneous ruling on the grant of bail alone does not constitute evidence of bias.

• Liberal construction of procedural rules — The strict application of procedural technicalities may be set aside in the higher interest of justice, particularly where extenuating circumstances warrant resolution of the merits to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

• Special Heinous Crimes Courts — Under Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, as amended by Administrative Order No. 104-96, all cases covered by the order where trial has already been commenced shall continue to be heard by the branches to which they were originally assigned; a criminal case is considered begun when the accused or any of them has already been arraigned.

• "We have consistently held that when bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the evidence presented by the parties." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the hearing requirement in bail applications and is the canonical formulation of the rule applied to void the grant of bail.

• "The importance of a summary cannot be downplayed, it is considered an aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail." — This passage articulates the second independent ground for voiding the bail order — the absence of a summary of the prosecution's evidence — and is frequently cited for the proposition that the summary is a due process requirement.

• "In cases when the grant of bail is void, this Court will not hesitate to set aside the order granting bail and order that the accused be recommitted to jail pending his application for bail, as this Court now holds in the case at bar." — This passage states the remedy the Court itself applied, ordering Go's recommitment pending a proper bail hearing.

• "A person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or even without a warrant under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities." — This passage supplies the controlling definition of custody of the law for purposes of bail, drawn from Dinapol vs. Baldado.

• Narciso vs. Romana-Cruz, G.R. No. 134504, March 17, 2000 — Cited as the recent case reiterating the doctrine that offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality to file a special civil action for certiorari.
• People vs. Calo, 186 SCRA 620 (1990) — Cited for the doctrine that the offended party has sufficient personality to file a special civil action for certiorari, and as authority for the remedy of recommitment where bail is void.
• Paredes vs. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 (1969) — Cited for the ruling that offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "persons aggrieved" to file a special civil action for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65.
• Basco vs. Rapatalo, 269 SCRA 220 (1997) — Cited for the requirement of a hearing in bail applications when bail is discretionary, and for the guidelines on the amount of bail.
• People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA 489 (1989) — Cited for the principle that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process, and as authority for the remedy of recommitment where bail is void.
• People vs. Cabral, 303 SCRA 361 (1999) — Cited for the duties of a judge in bail applications and for the rule that the absence of a summary of evidence invalidates the grant or denial of bail.
• Dinapol vs. Baldado, 225 SCRA 110 (1993) — Cited for the definition of custody of the law.
• People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 (1990) — Cited for partiality as a recognized ground for the voluntary inhibition of a judge.
• People vs. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 705 (1999) — Cited for the parameters in disqualifying a judge for partiality, including the requirement that bias stem from an extra-judicial source.
• Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998); Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998); BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 267 (1998); Piczon vs. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 31 (1990) — Cited for the relaxation of the strict application of procedural technicalities in the higher interest of justice.

• Section 13, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be bailable by sufficient sureties before conviction. Applied to classify Go's right to bail as merely discretionary, since murder was punishable by reclusion perpetua at the time of the charge.
• Section 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Provides that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. Applied to deny Go bail as a matter of right.
• Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Applied to require custody of the law as a condition for the grant of bail.
• Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Sets the guidelines for determining the amount of bail. Applied to hold the ₱50,000.00 bail arbitrary and without basis absent the required hearing.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action for certiorari and requires a sworn certification of non-forum shopping. Applied to sustain the dismissal of Galan's petition and to recognize her standing as a person aggrieved.
• Section 3, Rule 46, Rules of Court — Requires the petitioner to submit a sworn certification of non-forum shopping and provides that failure to comply is a sufficient ground for dismissal. Applied to sustain the dismissal of Galan's petition.
• Section 1, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Governs the disqualification of judges, enumerating the grounds for compulsory disqualification and recognizing voluntary inhibition for just or valid reasons. Applied to deny the motion to inhibit Judge Gako, Jr., partiality not being a per se ground.
• Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 51-96, as amended by Administrative Order No. 104-96 — Provides that all cases covered by the order where trial has already been commenced shall continue to be heard by the branches to which they were originally assigned, and that a criminal case is considered begun when the accused has already been arraigned. Applied to deny the transfer of the case to the Special Heinous Crimes Court.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ.