People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Edmar P. Castillo, Sr., et al.

A court may issue a search warrant even over an offense that falls outside its jurisdiction over the criminal action, provided the application complies with Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; the issuance of a search warrant is an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, not of original jurisdiction over the offense.

Private respondent Jeofrey Jil Rabino y Taloza was charged with violation of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, an offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding six years and thus within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court governs the court where an application for a search warrant shall be filed, while Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution sets the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant. These provisions frame the dispute over the authority of a municipal trial court to issue a search warrant for an offense beyond its jurisdiction.

On January 13, 2012, Judge Marcelo C. Cabalbag of the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan issued Search Warrant No. 45 upon the application of SPO1 Ronel P. Saturno of the Regional Intelligence Division based at Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City. The warrant authorized the search of the residence of Jeofrey Jil Rabino at Rizal Street, Maura, Aparri, Cagayan, and the seizure of shabu (methamphetamine) and paraphernalia, upon a finding of probable cause that Rabino had violated R.A. No. 9165.

Pursuant to the warrant, elements of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency and officers of the Philippine National Police conducted a search of Rabino's house in Aparri, Cagayan, yielding one sachet containing residue of suspected methamphetamine hydrochloride. The confiscated item was submitted to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office No. 2 of the PNP in Tuguegarao City for qualitative examination, which gave a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

An Information dated January 15, 2012 was filed against Rabino for violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, alleging that on or about January 14, 2012, in Aparri, Cagayan, he had in his possession and control one big zip-lock transparent plastic sachet containing two pieces of transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance, one of which tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 11-10881 and raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Edmar P. Castillo, Sr.

Before arraignment, on March 13, 2012, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence, raising the following grounds: (a) the issuing court must have territorial jurisdiction over the place to be searched and no compelling reason existed for the MTC of Gattaran to issue the warrant; (b) no probable cause to issue the warrant; (c) no searching question was elicited from the deponent; (d) no particularity in the places to be searched; (e) irregularity in the implementation of the search; and (f) suppression of evidence was just and proper.

The RTC, through Judge Castillo, granted the motion in a Joint Resolution dated May 14, 2012. It reasoned that because the minimum penalty for illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride was imprisonment of twelve years and one day to twenty years — beyond six years — the MTC of Gattaran had no jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue Search Warrant No. 45, rendering the warrant null and void and all proceedings taken pursuant thereto likewise null and void. The RTC quashed Search Warrant No. 45, suppressed all evidence obtained in its execution, and dismissed the Information, declaring further discussion of the other grounds raised by the accused and the opposition of the public prosecutor to be surplusage. A motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated September 24, 2012, prompting the People to file the present petition.

• Authority of the MTC to Issue the Warrant: Petitioner argued that the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan had the authority to issue Search Warrant No. 45 to search and seize the shabu stated therein in Aparri, Cagayan, a place within the same second judicial region, in violation of R.A. No. 9165, notwithstanding that the power to hear and try the offense was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner maintained that the assailed Joint Resolution of May 14, 2012 was issued by respondent Judge Castillo with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or was patently erroneous.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Private respondent claimed that the petition was filed in violation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and that petitioner did not provide any compelling reason that would merit the direct filing with the Supreme Court of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Proper Party: Private respondent argued that the petition should have been filed by the State through the Office of the Solicitor General, and not by petitioner Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Carlos B. Sagucio, because the petition was in the nature of an appeal and the OSG is vested with the power of representing the People before any court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Private respondent insisted that the petition does not show that the assailed Joint Resolution of the RTC was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Whether the petition for certiorari may be filed directly with the Supreme Court notwithstanding the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
• Proper Party: Whether the petition may be filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor instead of the Office of the Solicitor General.
• Authority of the MTC to Issue a Search Warrant: Whether a municipal trial court has the authority to issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction.

• Hierarchy of Courts: Yes. The Court may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it in exceptional cases, for compelling reasons, or when warranted by the nature of the issues raised, as when the pivotal issue involves the application of a rule promulgated by the Court on the jurisdiction of courts to issue search warrants.
• Proper Party: Yes. The technicality may be relaxed in the interest of justice, consistent with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict application resulting in technicalities must be avoided.
• Authority of the MTC to Issue a Search Warrant: Yes. A municipal trial court may issue a search warrant over an offense beyond its jurisdiction, provided the application complies with Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, because the issuance of a search warrant is an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action.

• Hierarchy of Courts: The general rule mandates adherence to the hierarchy of courts, but the Court may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it in exceptional cases, for compelling reasons, or when warranted by the nature of the issues raised. The pivotal issue raised by petitioner involved the application of a rule promulgated by the Court in the exercise of its rule-making power under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution regarding the jurisdiction of courts in the proper issuance of a search warrant, and the Court thus deemed it proper to resolve the petition. The Court had previously allowed direct recourse to itself or to the Court of Appeals via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant.

• Proper Party: The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, the Court recognized an exception, citing Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, where a private corporation was allowed to file a petition for certiorari, considered as one filed by the OSG. In People vs. Nano, the Court declared that if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants as if it were filed by the Solicitor General. Since the Court had previously considered petitions filed by private complainants as if filed by the OSG, there was no reason to disallow the petition filed by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. The technicality was relaxed in the interest of justice, consistent with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.

• Authority of the MTC to Issue a Search Warrant: Section 2, Article III of the Constitution requires probable cause determined personally by the judge after examination under oath of the complainant and witnesses, and a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. A motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The RTC quashed the warrant and dismissed the case based merely on the fact that the warrant was issued by the MTC of Gattaran, an offense beyond the latter's jurisdiction. It was therefore safe to presume that the other grounds raised by the private respondent in his motion to quash were devoid of any merit. By that alone, the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. A search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting. Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an application for a search warrant shall be filed with (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed; or (b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced; however, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. The application for the search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly committed. For compelling reasons, the MTC of Gattaran had the authority to issue a search warrant to search and seize the dangerous drugs in Aparri, Cagayan, a place within the same judicial region. The fact that the search warrant was issued meant that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the application after it was found to have been filed for compelling reasons. Section 2, Rule 126 was duly complied with. Nothing in the rule states that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126, and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present.

• Ancillary Jurisdiction over Search Warrants — A search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Consequently, the court issuing a search warrant need not have jurisdiction over the offense charged; the resultant criminal case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the MTC of Gattaran could validly issue Search Warrant No. 45 even though the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

• Requisites for the Issuance of a Search Warrant — Under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a search warrant is valid only if the following requisites are present: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. The Court held that the warrant issued in this case satisfied these requisites and that the RTC's quashal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense was improper.

• Grounds to Quash a Search Warrant — A motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. The Court held that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in quashing the warrant on a basis other than these accepted grounds.

• Venue for Applications for Search Warrants — Under Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, an application for a search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed; or (b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced; however, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. The Court held that the application filed with the MTC of Gattaran, within the same judicial region as Aparri where the crime was committed, complied with the rule.

• Hierarchy of Courts — The general rule mandates adherence to the hierarchy of courts, but the Court may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it in exceptional cases, for compelling reasons, or when warranted by the nature of the issues raised. The Court applied this exception because the pivotal issue involved the application of a rule promulgated by the Court on the jurisdiction of courts to issue search warrants.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules — Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. The Court applied this principle in allowing the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file the petition in lieu of the Office of the Solicitor General.

• "It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the authority to issue a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 and is an exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, not of jurisdiction over the criminal action.

• "Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of such warrant are present." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the holding, frequently cited for the proposition that jurisdiction over the offense is not a prerequisite to the authority to issue a search warrant.

• "It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice." — This passage articulates the Court's rationale for relaxing procedural technicalities, including the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and the rule on the proper party to file the petition.

• "The general rule is that the proper party to file a petition in the CA or Supreme Court to assail any adverse order of the RTC in the search warrant proceedings is the People of the Philippines, through the OSG. However, in Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, and considered the petition as one filed by the OSG." — This passage defines the exception to the general rule on the proper party in search warrant proceedings, which the Court applied to allow the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file the petition.

• United Laboratories, Inc. vs. Isip, 500 Phil. 342 (2005) — Controlling precedent recognizing the exception to the general rule that the proper party to file a petition assailing an adverse order of the RTC in search warrant proceedings is the People through the OSG; the Court allowed private complainants to file the petition, deemed filed by the OSG.
• Columbia Pictures Entertainment, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals — Cited in United Laboratories; allowed a private corporation (the complainant in the RTC) to file a petition for certiorari, considered as one filed by the OSG.
• People vs. Nano — Cited for the rule that if there appears to be grave error committed by the judge or a lack of due process, the petition will be deemed filed by the private complainants as if it were filed by the Solicitor General.
• Macondray & Co., Inc. vs. Bernabe, 67 Phil. 658 (1939) — Cited for the principle that a search warrant is merely a process issued in the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.
• Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 113 (1945) — Cited alongside Macondray for the ancillary-jurisdiction character of a search warrant.
• Abuan vs. People, 536 Phil. 672 (2006) — Cited for the grounds extrinsic of the search warrant upon which a motion to quash may be based.
• People vs. Francisco, 436 Phil. 383 (2002) — Cited for the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant.
• Santos vs. Pryce Gases, Inc., 563 Phil. 781 (2007) — Cited for allowing direct recourse to the Court via a special civil action for certiorari from a trial court's quashal of a search warrant.
• Ang Biat Huat Sons Industries, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 547 Phil. 588 (2007) — Cited for the requisites of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Villanueva vs. Porras-Gallardo, G.R. No. 147688, July 10, 2006 — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.
• San Miguel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 425 Phil. 951 (2002) — Cited for the definition of a "plain, speedy and adequate" remedy.
• People of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 468 Phil. 1 (2004) — Cited for the principal office of certiorari.
• Buscaino vs. Commission on Audit, 369 Phil. 886 (1999) — Cited for the relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice.
• Aguam vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137672, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 784 — Cited for the relaxation of procedural rules in the interest of justice.

• Article III, Section 2, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right of the people to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The Court used this provision to enumerate the requisites for a valid search warrant and to hold that the warrant in this case satisfied them.
• Section 2, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Governs the court where an application for a search warrant shall be filed: (a) any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed; or (b) for compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced; and if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. The Court held that the application filed with the MTC of Gattaran, within the same judicial region as Aparri where the crime was committed, complied with this rule.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides for the petition for certiorari when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court used this provision to justify the availability of certiorari to challenge the RTC's quashal of the search warrant.
• Section 11, Republic Act No. 9165 — Penalizes illegal possession of dangerous drugs; the offense charged against private respondent Rabino and the subject of the quashed search warrant.
• Section 5, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Vests in the Supreme Court the rule-making power over pleading, practice, and procedure; cited to justify the Court's taking cognizance of the petition because the pivotal issue involved the application of a rule promulgated by the Court on the jurisdiction of courts to issue search warrants.
• Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Referenced in the search warrant itself as the provision governing the delivery of the seized items and the person arrested to the issuing court.

Perez, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), J., on official leave.