People of the Philippines vs. Hernandez, et al.

Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary and admissible when the accused waives the rights to silence and counsel with the assistance of counsel, but a conviction for kidnapping for ransom cannot stand against one who merely picked up ransom money without knowledge of the kidnapping conspiracy; the legality of a warrantless arrest is waived by entering a plea and participating in trial.

Sharleen Tan was a six-year-old preparatory student at the Immaculate Concepcion Academy in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, and the daughter of Jacinto and Shirley Tan and granddaughter of Ramona Cheng. Eva Sta. Cruz was the housemaid of Ramona Cheng and Sharleen’s nanny, while Jose Lorenzo was employed as collector and driver in the Tan family business. The decision opens against the backdrop of a sharp increase in kidnapping-for-ransom cases in the 1990s, described in Fortune Magazine as making the country the “Kidnapping Capital of Asia.” Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code penalized kidnapping for ransom; R.A. 7659 later restored the death penalty for the offense, but the crime at bar was committed before that amendment.

Sharleen Tan, a six-year-old preparatory student at the Immaculate Concepcion Academy in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, lived with her family at #60 Polk Street, North Greenhills, San Juan. She was the daughter of Jacinto and Shirley Tan and granddaughter of Ramona Cheng. Eva Sta. Cruz, the housemaid of Ramona Cheng and Sharleen’s nanny, and Jose Lorenzo, the family’s driver and collector, regularly brought Sharleen to school and fetched her in the afternoon. On January 21, 1992, at about 3:30 p.m., Lorenzo drove Eva to the academy to fetch Sharleen; he parked in the school’s parking lot while Eva went to get the child. When Eva returned with Sharleen, the child took the backseat behind the driver. As Eva was about to board beside Sharleen, an unidentified man pushed her into the car, held her nape down, and warned her not to shout or she would be shot. Another man took the front seat beside Lorenzo and cuddled Sharleen on his lap; the car then sped away.

While the car was moving, Lorenzo asked the two men, “Saan tayo?” and one replied, “Sa dati.” After about twenty minutes, one of the men instructed Lorenzo to blow the horn three times; the car slowed, an iron gate opened, and Sharleen and the man in the front seat alighted. The car sped away again. After a few minutes, the man holding Eva’s head down assured her that she would be released so she could inform her employer of Sharleen’s ransom. Eva was allowed to alight at an unfamiliar place; she learned from a telephone lineman that she was on Paterno Street, San Juan. She used the telephone to call her employer, recounted the incident, and was fetched by Samson Cheng, Sharleen’s uncle.

Jacinto Tan received a call from one of the kidnappers demanding a P10 million ransom. He haggled, but no agreement was reached, and the police left the Tan house. Several more calls followed; Jacinto pleaded that he be allowed to pay P409,000, and the kidnappers eventually agreed. They instructed him to leave the money in a garbage can in front of the Town and Country Lodge in Old Sta. Mesa, Manila. Jacinto complied and returned home to await a call on Sharleen’s release, but none came that night. A week later, on January 28, 1992, the kidnappers called again and said they had released Sharleen at the Perpetual Help Hospital in España, Manila. Jacinto rushed to the hospital and found Sharleen extremely traumatized; he himself suffered a nervous breakdown.

An intensive manhunt was launched. CIS Chief Inspector Major Ruben Zacarias organized two teams; one team composed of SPO3 Gregorio Cuachon and SPO1 Danilo T. Salas, headed by Inspector Warlito Platon, verified information that Sharleen had been hidden by Alfredo Tumaneng at #15 Kennedy Street, Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City. Surveillance confirmed the information, and the officers learned that Tumaneng had moved to Mayupis, Malabon, Metro Manila. Seven suspects were identified, and five were captured: Efren Hernandez, Alfredo Tumaneng, Jose Lorenzo, Dionisio Jacob, and Marlon Famodulan. Each executed an extrajudicial confession that became the basis of the criminal charge.

Hernandez was arrested on February 5, 1992 by the Central Police District in connection with another crime and turned over to the CIS. In his extrajudicial confession dated February 6, 1992, executed after waiving his rights to silence and counsel in the presence of Atty. Solomon Villanueva, Hernandez admitted that Lorenzo had asked him to join a plan to kidnap Sharleen. He stated that Bolante and Jacob abducted the child, Mansuer drove the taxi, and Sharleen was dropped at a house on John Kennedy Street, Project 8, Quezon City; Jacob negotiated the ransom, Mansuer and Jacob picked it up, and Jacob later gave Hernandez P15,000 as his share at Isetann, Manila. Tumaneng was invited by the CIS after surveillance and investigated by Sgt. Romeo Cudia; informed of his rights, he waived his right to counsel, accepted Atty. Villanueva as counsel, and executed an extrajudicial confession dated February 6, 1992. He stated that Hernandez and Bolante brought Sharleen to his house on January 21, 1992, that he fed and attended to her for five days, and that on January 28, 1992, after Hernandez failed to pick her up, he and Bolante left her at the third floor of Perpetual Hospital; he denied receiving any ransom. Lorenzo was found by Major Zacarias in front of the Crame gate, disclosed that he was contemplating surrender, and was invited to the CIS office. After waiving his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Villanueva, he executed an extrajudicial confession dated February 7, 1992, admitting his participation in the abduction but claiming he did not know where Sharleen was hidden, did not know ransom was demanded, and did not receive a share; he said he stayed with Mansuer in San Andres Bukid, Manila, lost contact with the others, and decided to surrender after reading of Hernandez’s capture.

Jacob was captured on February 8, 1992 in San Pablo City by a CIS team accompanied by Hernandez; he was found hiding under a wooden bed and identified by Hernandez. In his extrajudicial confession dated February 8, 1992, executed after waiving his right to counsel in the presence of Atty. Villanueva and his common-law wife Margarita Albiso, Jacob admitted involvement, named Mansuer, Hernandez, Bolante, and Tumaneng as accomplices, stated that he did not participate in the actual abduction, and said that using the codename “Papa Charlie” he negotiated the ransom, which was reduced from P2 million to P409,000; his share was P50,000. Famodulan was invited by CIS operatives on February 8, 1992 and executed a sworn statement dated February 10, 1992 after waiving his rights in the presence of Atty. Villanueva. He declared that he did not know Sharleen or her parents, that Hernandez asked him to pick up money in a trash can near a Meralco post in front of the Town and Country Lodge, that he was promised a reward, and that he turned the money over to Hernandez, Mansuer, and Jacob; he insisted he did not know it was ransom. For their defense, Lorenzo and Tumaneng claimed their confessions were elicited under duress, while Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the money as directed. Lorenzo testified that he was forced at gunpoint to drive the car, did not see the kidnappers’ features, did not report the incident for fear of reprisal, and was maltreated before signing a document he was not allowed to read; Tumaneng claimed he was forcibly taken from his aunt’s house in Maysilo, Malabon, tortured, and made to sign a confession without a lawyer; Famodulan testified that Hernandez poked a knife at him and ordered him to pick up a package, for which he received P200, and that he was investigated without the assistance of counsel before Atty. Villanueva was introduced only when he signed his statement. Alvin “Allan” Laso, a jogging companion of Famodulan, corroborated that he saw Famodulan pick up a plastic bag and hand it to a man who gave him money.

The five captured accused were charged with kidnapping for ransom. At trial, the prosecution relied mainly on the extrajudicial confessions and on Eva Sta. Cruz, who positively identified Lorenzo as the driver who asked the kidnappers where they were going. The trial court rejected the claims of maltreatment and gave weight to the confessions and Eva’s identification.

• Illegal Warrantless Arrests (Tumaneng and Lorenzo): Appellants Tumaneng and Lorenzo argued that their warrantless arrests were illegal.
• Involuntary Extrajudicial Confessions (Tumaneng and Lorenzo): They maintained that their extrajudicial confessions were obtained without the benefit of a competent and independent counsel of their own choice; they also charged that their confessions were involuntary because they were maltreated by CIS operatives.
• Lack of Positive Identification / Insufficient Evidence (Famodulan): Famodulan contended that he was not positively identified as one of the conspirators and that the evidence of his alleged participation in the crime was insufficient to justify his conviction.
• Invalid Affidavit and Constitutional Violations (Famodulan): Famodulan argued that he was arrested and investigated in violation of his constitutional rights and that his February 10, 1992 affidavit was invalid and insufficient to warrant his conviction.
• Mere Pickup of Ransom (Famodulan): Famodulan maintained that he merely picked up the money as directed by Hernandez and was unaware that it was ransom for a kidnapped child.

• Legality of Warrantless Arrests: Whether appellants waived their right to challenge the legality of their warrantless arrests by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial.
• Voluntariness of Extrajudicial Confessions: Whether the extrajudicial confessions of Tumaneng and Lorenzo were involuntary because they were allegedly maltreated by CIS operatives.
• Assistance of Competent and Independent Counsel: Whether the extrajudicial confessions were obtained without the assistance of a competent and independent counsel of the accused’s own choice.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Tumaneng and Lorenzo: Whether the guilt of Tumaneng and Lorenzo for kidnapping for ransom was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy and Sufficiency Against Famodulan: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Famodulan was part of the conspiracy to kidnap Sharleen Tan.
• Penalty: Whether reclusion perpetua was the proper penalty for kidnapping for ransom committed on January 21, 1992, before the amendment of Article 267 by R.A. 7659.

• Legality of Warrantless Arrests: The arrests violated the Constitution, but the objection was waived. An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move to quash the Information before arraignment; by pleading not guilty and participating in trial, appellants waived the issue.
• Voluntariness of Extrajudicial Confessions: The confessions were admissible. Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary, and the accused failed to prove involuntariness; no medical certificate, physical marks, or administrative or criminal complaint supported the claim, and the confessions were subscribed before Fiscal Lugtu, who certified voluntariness.
• Assistance of Competent and Independent Counsel: No violation. Atty. Villanueva’s former membership in the Judge Advocate’s Office did not show bias, and the right to counsel is designed to preclude coercion leading to false admissions, not to prevent an accused from telling the truth.
• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Tumaneng and Lorenzo: Affirmed. Tumaneng’s confession and Lorenzo’s confession plus Eva Sta. Cruz’s positive identification established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy and Sufficiency Against Famodulan: No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Famodulan was part of the conspiracy; he was unaware of the kidnapping and was not mentioned in his co-accused’s confessions.
• Penalty: Reclusion perpetua. The crime was committed on January 21, 1992, before R.A. 7659 restored the death penalty for Article 267; the penalty next lower in degree was reclusion perpetua.

• Legality of Warrantless Arrests: The Court found no question that appellants were arrested without a warrant and under circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court; their arrests therefore violated the Constitution. However, jurisprudence holds that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move to quash the Information before arraignment. Because appellants entered pleas of not guilty and participated in trial, they waived the right to challenge the warrantless arrests. The Court cited People vs. Lopez, Jr., People vs. Samson, and People vs. Compil, among others.

• Voluntariness of Extrajudicial Confessions: Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary because no sane person would confess to a crime unless he committed it; the burden is on the accused to prove involuntariness. Appellants did not discharge that burden. Their claim of maltreatment lacked proof: no medical certificate, no physical marks of violence, and no administrative or criminal complaint against their alleged torturers. They subscribed their confessions before Fiscal Reynaldo Lugtu, who certified that he personally examined them and was convinced they voluntarily executed and understood the confessions. The confessions contained details that could have been known only to them, and the trial court rightly rejected the allegation of maltreatment. The Court cited People vs. Ruelan and People vs. Garde.

• Assistance of Competent and Independent Counsel: The Court was unpersuaded that the constitutional requirement was violated. Atty. Villanueva’s status as a retired member of the Judge Advocate’s Office did not cast doubt on his impartiality absent concrete evidence of bias. In People vs. Aquino, the Court explained that the right to counsel is designed to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false; it does not require a lawyer to prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Since appellants waived their rights in the presence and with the assistance of Atty. Villanueva, and he did not prevent truthful answers, he could not be deemed incompetent. A lawyer’s oath binds him to prevent falsehood, not suppress truth.

• Sufficiency of Evidence Against Tumaneng and Lorenzo: With the confessions properly admitted, the guilt of Tumaneng and Lorenzo was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Lorenzo was convicted not only on his extrajudicial confession but also on Eva Sta. Cruz’s positive identification. Eva testified that during the abduction she heard Lorenzo ask the kidnappers where they were going and that one replied they would go to the “usual place”; Lorenzo understood the reply because no further directions were given. The Court found Eva categorical and credible, familiar with Lorenzo’s voice after working with him for about a year, and without motive to implicate him. Lorenzo’s version was full of improbabilities: he had opportunities to see the kidnappers’ features, his presence at Crame was not mere bad luck, and his failure to return to Paterno Street or contact his employer or family after release was inconsistent with innocence. Tumaneng’s confession, detailed and voluntary, supported his conviction.

• Conspiracy and Sufficiency Against Famodulan: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Famodulan was part of the conspiracy. In both his extrajudicial confession and court testimony, he consistently claimed he was unaware of the kidnapping activities of Hernandez and the others before, during, or immediately after he picked up the money. The prosecution established only that he was ordered to pick up money in a garbage can without knowing it was ransom. His co-accused’s confessions did not mention him as a co-conspirator. The plan to abduct Sharleen was hatched by the six other accused; Famodulan came into the picture only after the abduction and ransom demand, when the others asked someone else to pick up the ransom. No proof showed he knew of the kidnapping plot, so there was no agreement between him and his co-accused.

• Penalty: Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, penalizing kidnapping for ransom, was amended by R.A. 7659 on December 31, 1993, restoring the death penalty. The crime was committed on January 21, 1992, almost a year before the amendment. The penalty imposable on Lorenzo and Tumaneng was therefore the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua.

• Waiver of Objection to Illegal Warrantless Arrest — An accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move to quash the Information before arraignment. By entering a plea of not guilty and participating in trial, he waives the right to challenge the warrantless arrest. In this case, the Court found the arrests unconstitutional but held that Tumaneng, Lorenzo, and Famodulan had waived the objection.

• Presumption of Voluntariness of Extrajudicial Confessions — Extrajudicial confessions are presumed voluntary because no sane person would confess to a crime unless he committed it; the burden is on the accused to prove involuntariness. The Court applied this rule to reject the maltreatment claims of Tumaneng and Lorenzo, noting the absence of medical proof, physical marks, or complaints, and the certification of Fiscal Lugtu.

• Right to Counsel in Custodial Investigation — The right to counsel is designed to preclude the slightest coercion that would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent the accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. A lawyer who allows truthful answers is not incompetent. The Court held that Atty. Villanueva’s assistance satisfied the constitutional requirement and that his former JAGO membership did not prove bias.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it. It must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Mere participation in an isolated act after the kidnapping, without knowledge of the criminal design, does not make one a co-conspirator. The Court applied this to acquit Famodulan, who merely picked up the ransom without knowledge of the kidnapping.

• Penalty for Kidnapping for Ransom Committed Before R.A. 7659 — Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code was amended by R.A. 7659 on December 31, 1993, restoring the death penalty for kidnapping for ransom. For a crime committed on January 21, 1992, before the amendment, the penalty next lower in degree is reclusion perpetua. The Court applied this to Lorenzo and Tumaneng.

• "There is no question that appellants were arrested without the benefit of a warrant and under circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest. Clearly, their warrantless arrests violated the Constitution. However, jurisprudence is settled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment." — This passage establishes the warrantless arrest violation and the waiver rule applied to the appellants.

• "We rule that appellants' extrajudicial confessions are admissible in evidence. It bears emphasis that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary for no sane person would confess to a crime unless he has committed it. Thus, the burden is on the accused to prove the involuntariness of his confession." — This states the presumption of voluntariness and the burden of proof.

• "We explained in explicit terms that the right to counsel is designed to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit something which is false. It ought to follow that a lawyer should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth whether in an extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court." — This defines the purpose of the right to counsel and supports the finding that Atty. Villanueva was not incompetent.

• "We agree. After evaluating the totality of the prosecution's evidence, we find that it failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Famodulan was part of the conspiracy of the other accused to kidnap Sharleen Tan. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it." — This is the ratio for Famodulan’s acquittal and the conspiracy definition.

• People vs. Lopez, Jr., 245 SCRA 95, 105-106 [1995]; People vs. Samson, 244 SCRA 146, 150 [1995]; People vs. Compil, 244 SCRA 135, 144 [1995] — Cited for the rule that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move to quash the Information before arraignment.
• People vs. Llenaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995]; People vs. Macam, 238 SCRA 306 [1994]; People vs. De Guzman, 244 SCRA 93 [1993]; People vs. Codilla, 244 SCRA 104 [1993]; People vs. Rabang, 187 SCRA 682 [1990]; Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 [1988] — Cited for the waiver of the right to challenge warrantless arrest by entering a plea and participating in trial.
• People vs. Ruelan, 231 SCRA 650, 657 [1994]; People vs. Enanoria, 209 SCRA 577 [1992]; People vs. Estevan, 186 SCRA 182 [1990]; People vs. Talla, 181 SCRA 133 [1990]; People vs. Dela Cruz, 115 SCRA 184 [1982] — Cited for the presumption of voluntariness of extrajudicial confessions and the burden on the accused to prove involuntariness.
• People vs. Aquino, 186 SCRA 851, 859-860 [1990], citing People vs. Layuso, 175 SCRA 47, 53 [1989], and Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 [1988] — Cited for the purpose of the right to counsel: to preclude coercion leading to false admissions, not to prevent an accused from telling the truth.
• People vs. Garde, G.R. No. 103968, July 11, 1996; People vs. Llenaresas, 248 SCRA 629 [1995] — Cited in rejecting the claim of maltreatment and upholding the trial court’s assessment of the confessions.

• Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court — Enumerates the circumstances for a lawful warrantless arrest: in the presence of the arresting officer, when an offense has just been committed and the officer has personal knowledge, or when the person is an escaped prisoner. The Court found the appellants’ arrests did not fall under any of these circumstances, so they violated the Constitution.
• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the decision as the constitutional provision violated by the warrantless arrests. The Court held that the violation did not bar conviction because the objection was waived.
• Article 8, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons come to an agreement to commit a felony and decide to commit it. The Court applied this to find no conspiracy between Famodulan and his co-accused.
• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 — Penalizes kidnapping for ransom. R.A. 7659, enacted on December 31, 1993, restored the death penalty for the offense, but the crime committed on January 21, 1992 was governed by the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua.
• R.A. 7659 — The amendatory law that restored the death penalty for kidnapping for ransom under Article 267. The Court declined to apply it to the appellants because the crime preceded its enactment.

Regalado and Martinez, JJ., concurred. Mendoza, J., was on leave.