People of the Philippines vs. Herminiano Marzan y Olonan

Circumstantial evidence alone may sustain a conviction for murder when it forms an unbroken chain leading to no other conclusion than the accused's guilt; the accused's denial, being negative and self-serving, cannot overcome credible testimony that he was the last person seen with the victim at the locus criminis. Treachery qualifies the killing of a child who, by reason of tender years, cannot significantly defend himself against strangulation.

Herminiano Marzan y Olonan was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for the killing of eight-year-old Joseph Sarmiento. The Information alleged intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength.

At about 4:45 p.m. on February 22, 1996, farmer Samuel Basalio was gathering grasses near a creek in Sitio Valdez, Barangay Romualdez, President Quirino, Sultan Kudarat, when he saw from about 40 meters away the appellant, Herminiano Marzan y Olonan, and eight-year-old Joseph Sarmiento walking toward the creek. About 20 minutes later, Basalio saw Marzan walking alone from the creek toward the rice field; when Marzan noticed Basalio, he stared at him with a "dagger" look and returned to the creek.

At 5:00 a.m. the next day, February 23, 1996, Kagawad Dominador Regino saw Marzan, who told him that he was going to General Santos City. Later that morning, Elizabeth Sarmiento, the victim's mother, asked for assistance to look for her missing son. Officer-in-Charge Barangay Captain Amado Tomas was informed about the missing child. At 11:30 a.m., Amado went to Makar Port with the victim's uncle, Antonio Delfinado, after receiving a report that the missing child could be there with Marzan. At the port, Amado sought the assistance of the maritime police in looking for Marzan. Marzan was indeed at the port but ran upon seeing them; the maritime police gave chase and caught him. Meanwhile, the body of the victim was found at the creek. A postmortem examination revealed that the victim died from strangulation. Antonio testified that he spent ₱10,000.00 for the victim's funeral and burial, but failed to present any receipt.

Marzan denied the charge. While admitting that he was with the victim at 1:00 p.m. of February 22, 1996, he claimed that at 4:00 p.m., the victim asked permission to go to the barangay proper of Romualdez and he allowed him to go.

In its March 20, 1998 decision, the RTC convicted Marzan of murder based on eight pieces of circumstantial evidence: (1) his admission that he was with the victim at about 4:00 p.m. of February 22, 1996; (2) evidence that he was seen at about 4:45 p.m. of February 22, 1996 with the victim going toward the creek; (3) evidence that he was seen leaving alone, at about past 5:00 p.m. of February 22, 1996, coming from the creek going toward the direction of Barangay Katiku; (4) the report made to the barangay officials and to the police station in the morning of February 23, 1996 that the victim was missing; (5) evidence that Marzan was seen leaving at about past 5:00 a.m. of February 23, 1996, on board a passenger jeep going to Tacurong; (6) evidence that he was seen at about 2:00 p.m. of February 23, 1996 at the Makar Port by Amado and Antonio; (7) evidence that he ran away upon seeing Amado and Antonio at the Makar Port but was caught by the maritime police; and (8) the discovery of the dead body of the victim at about past noon of February 23, 1996 at the creek where the victim and Marzan had been seen together in the afternoon of February 22, 1996. The RTC appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery because the victim's weakness due to his tender age resulted in the absence of any danger to Marzan.

• Denial: Appellant denied the charge. While admitting that he was with the victim at 1:00 p.m. of February 22, 1996, he claimed that at 4:00 p.m., the victim asked permission to go to the barangay proper of Romualdez and he allowed him to go.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder beyond reasonable doubt.
• Denial as Defense: Whether the appellant's denial could overcome the prosecution's circumstantial evidence.
• Treachery: Whether treachery was correctly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Civil Liability: Whether the appellant should be held liable for exemplary damages in addition to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The evidence constituted an unbroken chain that could only lead to the conclusion that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.
• Denial as Defense: No. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim.
• Treachery: Yes. A child, by reason of tender years, could not significantly defend himself against the strangulation that he was subjected to.
• Civil Liability: Yes. Since the killing was attended by treachery, the heirs are additionally entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00; the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed because neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: The RTC enumerated eight pieces of circumstantial evidence. After due consideration, the evidence was found to constitute an unbroken chain that could only lead to the conclusion that the appellant was the perpetrator. The Court noted that this was not the first case where the accused was convicted on a similar set of facts and based solely on circumstantial evidence, citing People vs. Raymundo Corfin, where the accused was the last person seen with the victim, the accused and victim were seen together near a dry creek, the accused was seen leaving the place alone, and the body of the victim was later found in the dry creek.
• Denial as Defense: The defense of denial is inherently weak unless supported by other evidence. Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim. The appellant failed to support his denial by any supporting evidence.
• Treachery: The RTC correctly appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since a child, by reason of tender years, could not significantly defend himself against the strangulation that he was subjected to. The Court cited People vs. Talavera and People vs. Gonzales.
• Civil Liability: The lower court's error in considering and imposing the penalty was in its failure to appreciate the full civil liability of the appellant. Since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, his heirs are additionally entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00. The Court cited People vs. Lacaden and People vs. Gidoc. The penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed because neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.

• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction when it forms an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. In this case, the eight pieces of circumstantial evidence—placing the appellant with the victim before the killing, alone after the killing, fleeing, and the discovery of the victim's body at the creek—were collectively sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Denial as Defense — Denial is inherently weak, negative, and self-serving; unless supported by other evidence, it cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the accused was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim. The appellant's unsupported denial did not overcome the prosecution's evidence.
• Treachery — Treachery qualifies a killing when the victim, by reason of tender years, cannot significantly defend himself against the means employed. The strangulation of an eight-year-old child was attended by treachery because the child's tender age rendered him unable to defend himself.
• Exemplary Damages in Murder with Treachery — When the killing is attended by treachery, the heirs of the victim are entitled to exemplary damages in addition to civil indemnity, moral damages, and temperate damages. The Court awarded ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

• "After due consideration, we are satisfied that the evidence adduced against the appellant constitute an unbroken chain that could only lead to the conclusion that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime." — States the ratio for sustaining the murder conviction on circumstantial evidence.
• "Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness who positively testified that the appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim." — Defines the weight of the defense of denial against positive testimony.
• "The RTC correctly appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance since a child, by reason of tender years, could not significantly defend himself against the strangulation that he was subjected to." — States the basis for appreciating treachery in the killing of a child.
• "Since the killing of the victim was attended by treachery, his heirs are additionally entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00." — States the basis for the award of exemplary damages.

• People vs. Raymundo Corfin, G.R. No. 131478, April 11, 2002, 380 SCRA 504 — Cited as a similar case where conviction was upheld based solely on circumstantial evidence: the accused was the last person seen with the victim, they were seen together near a dry creek, the accused was seen leaving alone, and the victim's body was later found in the dry creek.
• People vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. 172372, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 307, 320; People vs. Mateo, G.R. No. 179036, July 28, 2008, 560 SCRA 375, 390 — Cited for the rule that denial is inherently weak unless supported by other evidence.
• People vs. Salas, G.R. No. 115192, March 7, 2000, 327 SCRA 319, 331 — Cited for the rule that denial cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimony of a credible witness.
• People vs. Talavera, G.R. No. 139967, July 19, 2001, 361 SCRA 433, 443; People vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 130507, July 28, 1999, 311 SCRA 547, 564 — Cited for the appreciation of treachery where the victim is a child who cannot defend himself.
• People vs. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 805; People vs. Gidoc, G.R. No. 185162, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 825, 837 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages when the killing is attended by treachery.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the appellant was convicted under this provision for the killing of Joseph Sarmiento.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Cited in the Information as the law amending Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson, on wellness leave), Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Ma. Lourdes P.A. Sereno.