People of the Philippines vs. Gunda

Treachery qualifies a killing to murder but cannot be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty; where the penalty prescribed by law consists of two indivisible penalties and no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.

On the afternoon of May 25, 1997, at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Eladio Globio, Sr. and his son Eladio Jr. were walking along a trail when appellant Wilfredo Gunda and unidentified companions waylaid the victim. The appellant struck the victim's head with a wooden pole, and while the victim's arms were held by the appellant's companions, the appellant stabbed him repeatedly with a bolo, causing his death. The appellant denied participation, claiming he was gathering rattan poles in another barangay at the time.

• The Attack: On May 25, 1997, at approximately 4:00 p.m., at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Eladio Globio, Sr. and his son Eladio Jr. were walking along a trail. Eladio Jr. was approximately 10 meters ahead of his father when appellant Wilfredo Gunda and unidentified companions (John Does) waylaid the victim. The John Does held the victim's arms while appellant stabbed him several times. Eladio Jr., fearing for his life, fled and was pursued by the unidentified assailants but managed to outrun them. The following morning, Eladio Jr. informed his sister of their father's death, and they reported the incident to the police who eventually arrested the appellant.
• Eyewitness Account: Teofilo Ambal, Jr., the appellant's brother-in-law, testified that while gathering feeds for his pigs at his farm in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he saw appellant, armed with a wooden pole, position himself at the back of the victim and strike the latter's head. The appellant's companions then held the victim's arms, rendering him helpless, whereupon appellant drew a bolo (depang) and stabbed the victim several times. Ambal also fled fearing for his life.
• Post-Mortem Findings: Dr. Samuel Baldono conducted post-mortem examinations revealing that the victim suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death.
• Prosecution's Case: On July 31, 1997, an Information was filed charging appellant and the John Does with murder, alleging conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery, commission in an uninhabited place, and abuse of superior strength.
• Defense: Appellant denied the charge, claiming that on the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was at Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles. He admitted that the distance between Barangay Camada and Barangay Cabay could be traversed in an hour or less.
• Trial Court Findings: The RTC gave full credence to the testimonies of Eladio Jr. and Ambal, noting their consistency with the post-mortem findings. It disregarded the appellant's denial and alibi, finding that he failed to prove physical impossibility to be present at the crime scene. The RTC found treachery attended the commission of the crime because the victim was unarmed and unaware of the impending attack, and conspiracy existed between appellant and the John Does. It sentenced appellant to death.
• Appellate Court Findings: The CA affirmed the factual findings regarding appellant's guilt, the presence of treachery, and conspiracy, but modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

• Denial and Alibi: Petitioner maintained that he was at Barangay Camada gathering rattan poles at the time of the incident and could not have committed the crime.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding his denial.

• Positive Identification: Respondent countered that two prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant as the assailant, and their testimonies coincided with the post-mortem findings.
• Treachery: Respondent argued that the killing was attended by treachery as the victim was unarmed, unaware of the attack, and rendered helpless.
• Conspiracy: Respondent maintained that appellant acted in conspiracy with the unidentified assailants.
• Penalty: Respondent agreed with the CA that the proper penalty was reclusion perpetua, not death.

• Treachery as Aggravating: Whether treachery, having qualified the killing to murder, may be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the death penalty.
• Conspiracy as Aggravating: Whether conspiracy is a qualifying or generic aggravating circumstance warranting the imposition of the death penalty.
• Penalty Application: Whether the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua or death under the circumstances.
• Damages: Whether the award of damages should be modified to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Treachery: Treachery qualifies the killing to murder but cannot be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The attack was treacherous because the victim was unarmed, unaware of the impending assault, and rendered helpless when his arms were held by the appellant's companions while the appellant stabbed him repeatedly.
• Conspiracy: Conspiracy is neither a qualifying circumstance nor a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.
• Penalty: The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Both being indivisible penalties, and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua applies pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Parole Ineligibility: Appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346.
• Damages: The award of civil indemnity was increased to ₱75,000.00 and exemplary damages to ₱30,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Temperate damages of ₱25,000.00 were awarded in lieu of actual damages as the heirs indisputably suffered pecuniary loss. All damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the judgment until fully paid.

• Treachery as Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Once treachery qualifies the killing to murder, it cannot be appreciated anew as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
• Indivisible Penalties Rule — Where the penalty prescribed by law consists of two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
• Parole Ineligibility under RA 9346 — Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Temperate Damages — Temperate damages may be awarded in lieu of actual damages where it cannot be denied that the heirs suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved; such award is made for the purpose of recognizing or vindicating a violated right rather than for indemnification.

• "Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the same time be considered as a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of the maximum penalty." — Articulates the principle that a qualifying circumstance cannot be double-counted as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits [a crime] against the person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Definition of treachery applied to the facts.
• "It must be emphasized, however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which states that 'persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended'." — Clarifies the consequence of the penalty imposed.
• "This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification." — Explains the rationale for awarding temperate damages.

• People v. Jalbonian, G.R. No. 180281, July 1, 2013 — Controlling precedent on the definition of treachery and the proper award of damages in murder cases.
• People v. Bacatan, G.R. No. 203315, September 18, 2013 — Followed regarding the ineligibility for parole of persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua under Republic Act No. 9346.
• People v. Lucero, G.R. No. 179044, December 6, 2010 — Cited for the doctrine on the award of temperate damages in lieu of actual damages.
• People v. Beduya, G.R. No. 175315, August 9, 2010 — Cited for the principle that temperate damages are awarded for the recognition or vindication of a violated right rather than for indemnification.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of murder and prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the penalty consists of two indivisible penalties and there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Prohibits parole for persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or whose sentences are reduced to reclusion perpetua.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Mariano C. Del Castillo.