People of the Philippines vs. Guevarra

A person who commits an act with intent to kill and with treachery is responsible for the consequences of his acts, and the purely accidental circumstance that a person other than the one intended was killed does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen criminal responsibility. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it.

The case involves Constancio Guevarra, a policeman of the municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, who was charged with murder together with fellow policeman Felipe Cornelio. The political context involved the defeat of Mayor Amando Melgar, a Nacionalista, in the election of that year, and a rumor attributed to Andres Papasin, a defeated Liberal candidate for councilor, that Mayor Melgar lost because of the abuses of the police force of Naujan. This rumor created resentment among the policemen against Papasin and set the stage for the events that followed.

Late in the afternoon of November 12, 1959, appellant Constancio Guevarra, together with Felipe Cornelio, Estelito Frayre, Gregorio Mercado and Jugo Fajardo, all policemen of the municipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, went to the house of Mayor Amando Melgar in barrio San Jose No. 2 to inquire about benefits accruing to them for their services as policemen, inasmuch as they were contemplating tendering their resignation in view of the defeat of Mayor Melgar in the election of that year. Guevarra was in civilian clothes carrying his service pistol. Afterwards, the policemen went to a store in front of the house of Mayor Melgar owned by Sgt. Garchico, where they drank wine. Yolando Sarabia, a friend of the policemen, joined them. They commented about a rumor coming from the barrio of Inarawan that Andres Papasin, a defeated candidate for councilor in the last election, a Liberal, had said that Mayor Melgar, a Nacionalista, lost in the elections because of the abuses of the police force of Naujan. In the course of the conversation, Cornelio remarked that if there was some truth to the rumor, something would happen. The group entertained a general feeling of resentment against Andres Papasin.

Cornelio and Frayre volunteered to go and ask Papasin about the rumor. They left the store and proceeded to the house of Papasin, which was about 400 meters away. On the way, Sarabia, who followed them, tried to dissuade them from seeing Papasin, but they proceeded nevertheless. Upon arrival at the house, Papasin invited Cornelio and Frayre inside. Sarabia did not go up but stayed by the gate of the fence, later joined by appellant Guevarra. After a while, Papasin went down and proceeded to the store of Minerva Montejo, opposite the road. Cornelio and Frayre followed him. Appellant Guevarra and Sarabia also followed but stayed only by the door of the store. Inside the store were Gregorio Mercado and Jugo Fajardo. Papasin ordered drinks. Shortly thereafter, a heated discussion between Cornelio and Papasin ensued, in the course of which Cornelio bluntly told Papasin about the rumor attributed to him. Papasin denied the charge and asked Cornelio who gave him the information. Apparently, Cornelio was satisfied with the explanation of Papasin. Frayre, however, was not satisfied, and in an ugly mood said: "Tirahin na iyan." Upon hearing those words, appellant Guevarra pulled out his .45 caliber gun and was about to fire at Papasin when Amado Garing, who was standing beside appellant Guevarra, grabbed the gun and foiled his attempt against Papasin. Soon Papasin's wife arrived and she led her husband out of the store and together they returned to their house.

After Papasin had left, Frayre broke the bottles on the table. Then, Cornelio, Mercado, Frayre and Sarabia went back to the store in front of the house of Mayor Melgar. In the store of Montejo, appellant Guevarra was heard to have said that he was going home to the poblacion and took the road that passes by the house of Papasin. Sarabia followed him. Mercado also followed and joined appellant Guevarra in going back to the poblacion where they were still assigned for duty. Appellant Guevarra stopped under a tamarind tree opposite the house of Papasin, about 20 meters from the house, and waited there. In the meantime, friends of Papasin arrived in a jeep driven by Antonio Valencia. Amado Garing told Valencia to advise Papasin not to go down the house. Later, Agapito Salazar, a cousin of Papasin, arrived and also told Papasin not to go out of the house. Valencia stood near his jeep which was parked in front of the house of Papasin.

Shortly thereafter, Agapito Salazar went down the house, crossed the road and proceeded to the coconut grove to take the shortcut path to his house. That road taken by Salazar led towards the very place where appellant Guevarra was waiting under the tamarind tree. When Salazar was about 15 meters away from appellant Guevarra, the latter fired his gun. After firing, appellant Guevarra emerged from under the tamarind tree, moved to an atis tree nearer to Salazar, and from there, at a distance of 6 to 8 meters, successively fired two more shots. Salazar fell. Upon seeing his victim fall, appellant Guevarra ran away, but in his hurry, he bumped his head against a guyabano tree. He fell to the ground, and as soon as he had recovered, he pursued his way passing at the back of the house of the barrio lieutenant until he reached the house of Mayor Melgar, which he entered through the back door.

Mayor Melgar, witness for the defense, declared that when Guevarra arrived at his house, he saw the .45 caliber gun of Guevarra on the cot, which he delivered to Capt. Nevero. Guevarra told the Mayor that while he was going to San Jose No. 1, he heard a shot from the house of Andres Papasin and then what he did was to fire a shot pointing to the sky. As appellant Guevarra was bleeding, Mayor Melgar told Sarabia to accompany Guevarra to the poblacion for treatment of his head wound. The next day, November 13, 1959, Sgt. Perfecto de la Rosa of the PC brought appellant Guevarra, Cornelio, Frayre, Mercado and Fajardo to the PC headquarters in Calapan, Mindoro. Appellant Guevarra gave his statement, Exhibit A, to Sgt. de la Rosa, which was reduced to writing, after which Guevarra was brought to the office of the clerk of court of first instance of Oriental Mindoro, where he swore to the truth of the contents of his statement before the clerk of court. Appellant Guevarra admitted in his statement that he shot Agapito Salazar, mistaking him for Andres Papasin. Dr. Edith Panganiban performed the autopsy that same night and certified that the cause of death was acute circulatory and respiratory failure due to non-penetrating gunshot wound at the neck. The slug extracted from the neck of Agapito Salazar could have been fired from a .45 caliber pistol.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant assailed the trial court's giving weight to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Yolando Sarabia, Gregorio Mercado, and Antonio Valencia, arguing that their testimonies were inherently improbable and contradictory, particularly regarding distances and visibility at night.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Appellant contended that the prosecution failed to prove that his extra-judicial confession, Exhibit A, was voluntary, alleging that he was threatened with bodily harm by Sgt. De la Rosa and that he signed on the promise of release and exclusion from the information.
• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, claiming that he did not shoot the victim and that the bullet came not from his gun but from somebody else.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The prosecution presented three eyewitnesses — Yolando Sarabia, Gregorio Mercado, and Antonio Valencia — who positively testified that they saw appellant Guevarra fire the shots, and they were positive thereof because the spark of the gunburst came from the place where the appellant was hidden.
• Voluntariness of Confession: The trial court found that the confession was freely and voluntarily made, noting that appellant's shifting, contradictory, and puerile excuses showed the extremes to which he had gone to extricate himself, and that the confession agreed in essential particulars with the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
• Corroborating Circumstances: The prosecution pointed to appellant's conduct after the shooting — hiding in the storeroom of Mayor Melgar's house like a common criminal, failing to report the matter to the Mayor, and failing to account for his forehead injury — as evidence of guilt.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight to the testimony of prosecution witnesses Yolando Sarabia, Gregorio Mercado, and Antonio Valencia.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Whether the trial court erred in holding that the extra-judicial confession, Exhibit A, of appellant Constancio Guevarra was proven to be voluntary.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the trial court erred in not holding that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery properly qualified the killing even though the victim was not the intended target.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses were sustained, the Court finding no reason to depart from the settled rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses, for the latter is in a better position to appreciate the same having seen and heard the witnesses themselves.
• Voluntariness of Confession: No. The confession was freely and voluntarily made, the Court concurring in the trial court's finding that appellant's shifting, contradictory, and puerile excuses showed the extremes to which he had gone to extricate himself, and that the confession agreed in essential particulars with the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution established the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt through the positive testimony of three eyewitnesses, the appellant's own extra-judicial confession, and corroborating circumstantial evidence.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Yes. Treachery properly qualified the killing because the appellant was well hidden behind a tree, and the victim, who was unarmed and unaware, had no way of defending himself.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found the arguments attacking the credibility of the prosecution witnesses misleading. Regarding Sarabia, the argument that appellant could not have mistaken Salazar for Papasin at a distance of 5 meters was rebutted by the testimony of no less than three eyewitnesses who declared that they saw the appellant fire the shots, positive thereof because the spark of the gunburst came from the place where the appellant was hidden. Regarding Mercado, counsel failed to take into account the witness' other answers on direct and cross-examination showing that when Guevarra fired the second volley of shots, the witness was only 5 meters away from him, and after the firing, Guevarra emerged from the place where he was hiding. Regarding Valencia, the witness testified that he saw the spark of the gunburst from the tamarind tree, and after the firing, Guevarra emerged therefrom, and Valencia saw him coming out. The testimony of Mayor Melgar, instead of being an impeachment of the testimony of the eyewitnesses for the prosecution, served to corroborate the evidence of the prosecution, as Guevarra hid in the storeroom of the Mayor's house like any common criminal trying to escape from the clutches of the law.

• Voluntariness of Confession: The Court concurred in the trial court's finding that the confession was freely and voluntarily made. The trial court noted that appellant admitted he signed Exhibit A after it was read to him by the clerk of court, that he swore to the truth of its contents, and that he did not air any complaint to the clerk of court or to any other authority thereafter. His excuses — first claiming he was threatened with bodily harm, then alleging he signed on the promise of release, then admitting he was not really threatened but signed because he did not want to embarrass Sgt. De la Rosa — were shifting, contradictory, and puerile. The confession was not proven false or untrue; on the contrary, it agreed in essential particulars with the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and the other facts proven in the case.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The Court found that the prosecution established guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant's denial that he shot anyone that night was "highly incredible," remaining not only uncorroborated but contradicted by his previous sworn statement executed the next day after the commission of the crime when he did not have the opportunity to contrive. His claim was likewise belied by the testimony of his own friend and brother policeman who positively testified that they saw him shoot his gun at the deceased. Moreover, when he ran away to Mayor Melgar's house after supposedly firing the shots in the air, he avoided the straight and direct road and instead went through a circuitous and dark route by the backyard and coconut groves, as a result of which he suffered a wound on the head. Only a guilty conscience would try to sneak away unnoticed from the scene of the crime.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: The crime committed by the appellant was murder qualified by treachery. When he shot the victim, appellant was then well hidden behind a tree, and the victim, who was unarmed and unaware, had no way of defending himself. Thus, appellant employed means, methods or forms to insure the execution of the crime, without risk to himself. As the appellant committed the act with intent to kill and with treachery, the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shots a person other than the one intended was killed does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen his criminal responsibility, and he is responsible for the consequences of his acts. The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation could not be appreciated because the deceased was not the intended victim; neither could the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated because it was already absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery; nor the aggravating circumstance of superior strength because only appellant Guevarra was responsible for the crime; nor that of official position because there was no proof that the appellant used the influence, prestige, or ascendency which his office gives him as the means by which he realized his purpose.

• Aberratio Ictus (Mistake in the Blow) — When a person intending to kill one individual accidentally kills another, the crime committed is determined by the intent and the manner of execution, not by the identity of the actual victim. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the purely accidental circumstance that Agapito Salazar, rather than Andres Papasin, was killed does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen the appellant's criminal responsibility, and he is responsible for the consequences of his acts.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The Court held that treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it. In this case, the appellant was well hidden behind a tree, and the victim, who was unarmed and unaware, had no way of defending himself.

• Doctrine of Credibility of Witnesses — Appellate courts will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses, for the latter is in a better position to appreciate the same having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the trial. The Court applied this settled rule in affirming the trial court's findings on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.

• "As the appellant committed the act with intent to kill and with treachery, the purely accidental circumstance that as a result of the shots a person other than the one intended was killed, does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen his criminal responsibility, and he is responsible for the consequences of his acts." — This passage states the ratio decidendi of the case, articulating the doctrine of aberratio ictus and its effect on criminal responsibility.

• "The qualifying circumstance of treachery may be properly considered, even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, if it appears from the evidence that neither of the two persons could in any manner put up defense against the attack or become aware of it." — This passage defines the canonical formulation of the rule on treachery in cases of mistake in the identity of the victim.

• "To the findings made and conclusion arrived at by the trial court, We fully agree, it appearing that it is sustained by the evidence on the record, and We find no reason to depart from the settled rule that appellate courts will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses for the latter is in a better position to appreciate the same having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the trial." — This passage articulates the doctrine of credibility of witnesses and the appellate court's deference to trial court findings.

• People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil. 907 — Cited as controlling precedent for the proposition that treachery may be properly considered even when the victim of the attack was not the one whom the defendant intended to kill, and that the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be appreciated because the deceased was not the intended victim.
• People vs. Tolentino, et al., 82 Phil. 808 — Cited as precedent for the rule that treachery may be considered even when the victim was not the intended target.
• People vs. Mamasalayan, 92 Phil. 639 — Cited as precedent for the rule on treachery in cases of mistaken identity of the victim.
• People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950 — Cited as precedent for the rule on treachery in cases of mistaken identity of the victim.
• U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 156 — Cited as precedent for the rule that the aggravating circumstance of official position cannot be appreciated where there is no proof that the accused used the influence, prestige, or ascendency which his office gives him as the means by which he realized his purpose.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining the crime of murder. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction for murder qualified by treachery.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — The provision on criminal liability for the consequences of one's acts. The Court applied this provision in holding that the appellant is responsible for the consequences of his acts even though the person killed was not the intended victim.

Justices Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando concurred. Chief Justice Concepcion was on leave.