People of the Philippines vs. Gregorio Taylaran

The defense of accidental killing, like self-defense, must be established by clear and convincing evidence; where the accused admits the killing, the burden is on him to prove the exempting circumstance. An admission volunteered upon surrender, before any formal custodial investigation, is admissible and does not trigger the constitutional safeguards for persons under investigation.

Gregorio Taylaran alias "Goring" was the grandson-in-law of Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing, a local quack doctor in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol, known to treat snake bites. The legal backdrop includes Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which protects persons under investigation from being compelled to be witnesses against themselves and guarantees the rights to silence and counsel. The case therefore implicated both the credibility of an accident defense and the admissibility of an accused's statements made outside formal custodial investigation.

At about 10:00 P.M. on November 5, 1976, Gregorio Taylaran alias "Goring" went to the house of Ofremia Atup y Sarabosing in barrio Binliw, Ubay, Bohol, for treatment of a snake bite on his left foot. Ofremia was his grandmother-in-law and a local quack doctor known to cure snake bites. She opened the door for him. According to the prosecution, once inside, she took her medicine paraphernalia and began treating him; suddenly Taylaran drew his small bolo (Exhibit A) and stabbed her several times, causing her to fall dead on the floor. After killing her, he proceeded to the house of her son to kill him and his wife, but the son refused to let him enter. He then surrendered himself with his bolo to policeman Demetrio Basilad at the municipal hall of Ubay. When asked why he killed the deceased, who was also his grandmother-in-law, he answered that she promised to kill him with a "barang," so he killed her first. The prosecution presented Salvador Atup, policeman Demetrio Basilad, and Juanita Busalla.

The defense gave a different account. Taylaran testified that at about 9:00 P.M. on November 5, 1976, he went to tend his carabao and, on the way, was bitten by a snake at the smallest toe of his left foot. He proceeded to Ofremia's house and arrived at about 10:00 P.M. She opened the door and let him in. Inside, they stood on the floor facing each other. Ofremia instructed him to open his snake bite with a bolo (Exhibit A) so that the venom could drain. While he was opening the snake bite, he accidentally put out the light of a kerosene lamp placed on the floor. Ofremia bent her body down with her two hands extended toward the floor to relight the lamp. At that moment, Taylaran lifted his right hand holding the bolo upward, and the point accidentally hit Ofremia's right chest, penetrating the nipple and causing her death. Upon realizing she was fatally wounded, he asked for her forgiveness and ran away. Elpidio Mendez testified for the defense.

The trial court found it undisputed that Ofremia died from wounds inflicted by Taylaran; the conflict was whether the wounds were inflicted with deliberate intent or purely by accident. It found the accident version extremely difficult to accept. More than one wound was found on different parts of the body, and one single stroke could not have inflicted all of them. The first wound could possibly have been accidental, but the other wounds could not have been similarly inflicted if they did not result from the first blow; their locations precluded a single blow producing all the wounds. The court also reasoned that if Taylaran had been trying to succor the old woman after an accidental hit, he would have dropped the bolo instantly, as instinct would have made him do; the infliction of more wounds after the first was therefore deliberate. It found it hard to believe that a mere accidental hitting with the point of the small bolo, and therefore not with so much force, would inflict the fatal chest wound.

The trial court further found that intent to kill was reflected by Taylaran's statement upon surrendering to Pat. Demetrio Basilad at the municipal building that he killed the old woman because she had allegedly promised to kill him by "barang" or witchcraft. It gave full credence to Basilad, an impartial witness, and held that the statement was admissible not because it was part of the res gestae but because the witnesses heard Taylaran make the statement through their own perception. Juanita Busalla, the deceased's daughter, also testified that when Taylaran was already in jail, he told her he killed her mother because of witchcraft, corroborating Basilad. The court also noted that when Taylaran went directly from the old woman's house to the house of Juanita Busalla, he was not allowed to enter, which showed he appeared dangerously angry and was a deliberate killer rather than a sorrowful, harmless penitent. Dr. Silverio Gaviola, who issued the post-mortem examination report, died before he could testify; the court held this did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence because Pat. Sarabosing testified on the number and location of the wounds and, as a peace officer with basic knowledge in medico-legal medicine, could serve the purpose of the autopsy report.

The trial court concluded that the issue was one of credibility and gave more credit to the prosecution witnesses. It found Taylaran's denial of the admission unconvincing in light of the other prosecution evidence. It also found that, because Taylaran admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he invoked called for clear and convincing evidence, as required of defenses similar to self-defense; he failed to fulfill this burden.

• Accidental Killing: Appellant insisted that the killing was accidental, not deliberate, claiming the fatal chest wound occurred when the bolo he was using to open his snake bite accidentally hit the deceased as she bent to relight the kerosene lamp.
• Admissibility of Admission / Constitutional Safeguards: Appellant invoked Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution to block admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the safeguards for persons under investigation had not been made available to him.
• Res Gestae: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting his statement upon surrender as part of the res gestae.
• Autopsy Report / Hearsay: Appellant stressed that Dr. Silverio Gaviola, who issued the post-mortem examination report, failed to testify because he died before he could be called, and argued that the report was hearsay and affected the sufficiency of the evidence.
• Denial of Admission: Appellant denied having made the admission.

• Custodial Investigation: Respondent, through the Solicitor General, argued that if appellant voluntarily admitted the killing and surrendered precisely to admit it, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and counsel may not be invoked.

• Accidental Killing: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant's defense of accidental killing and finding that he deliberately killed the deceased with intent to kill.
• Admissibility of Admission: Whether appellant's statement upon surrender that he killed the deceased because she allegedly promised to kill him by witchcraft was admissible despite Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution and despite not being part of the res gestae.
• Autopsy Report: Whether the failure of Dr. Silverio Gaviola to testify on the post-mortem examination report rendered the evidence insufficient or the report inadmissible hearsay.
• Credibility: Whether the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses should be disturbed.
• Burden of Proof: Whether appellant, having admitted the killing, proved by clear and convincing evidence the exempting circumstance of accidental killing.

• Accidental Killing: No. The accident theory was inherently incredible because multiple wounds on different parts of the body could not have resulted from a single accidental blow, and the infliction of additional wounds was deliberate.
• Admissibility of Admission: Yes. The statement was admissible; it was not made in a formal custodial investigation, and witnesses testified from their own perception, not because it was res gestae.
• Autopsy Report: No. The doctor's failure to testify did not affect sufficiency; Pat. Sarabosing testified on the number and location of wounds and could serve the purpose of the autopsy report.
• Credibility: No. The lower court's credibility findings were affirmed; no reason appeared to disturb its preference for the prosecution witnesses.
• Burden of Proof: No. Having admitted the killing, appellant bore the burden of proving the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence, which he failed to do.

• Accidental Killing: The trial court's rejection of accident rested on physical evidence: more than one wound was found on different parts of the body; one single stroke could not have inflicted all of them; the first wound could possibly have been accidental, but the other wounds could not have been similarly inflicted if they did not result from the first blow; and their locations precluded a single blow producing all the wounds. If appellant had been trying to succor the old woman after an accidental hit, he would have dropped the bolo instantly, as instinct would have made him do; the infliction of more wounds after the first was therefore deliberate. It was also hard to believe that a mere accidental hitting with the point of the small bolo, and therefore not with so much force, would inflict the fatal chest wound. Intent to kill was reflected by appellant's statement upon surrender and by his behavior when he went to Juanita Busalla's house. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses.

• Admissibility of Admission: Article IV, Section 20 applies to a person under investigation. No written confession was sought to be presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation; what was testified to was only what appellant told the police why he was surrendering. It is natural for one who surrenders to the police to give a reason or explanation for his act of surrendering, and it can hardly be said that under such circumstance the surrendering person is already "under investigation" within the meaning of the constitutional provision. The Solicitor General correctly observed that if appellant voluntarily admitted the killing and surrendered precisely to admit it, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to silence and counsel may not be invoked. In any case, Juanita Busalla, who was not a policeman, also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail that he killed Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft; the constitutional safeguard could have no application to her testimony on what appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation. The statement was admissible not because it was part of the res gestae, but because the witnesses heard appellant make the statement through their own perception.

• Autopsy Report: Dr. Silverio Gaviola failed to testify on the post-mortem examination report because he died before he could be called to the stand. This did not affect the sufficiency of the evidence against appellant. The autopsy report, if not admitted as such, was part of the testimony of Pat. Sarabosing, who testified on the number and location of the wounds. His testimony, being that of a peace officer with basic knowledge in medico-legal medicine, having taken a course therein, could well serve the purpose of the autopsy report if the report itself was not admissible as independent evidence. The evidence was more than adequate to make the mind rest at ease on appellant's guilt as charged.

• Credibility: The issue was one of credibility. The lower court gave more credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The Supreme Court found no reason to disturb the lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of the opposing witnesses. Appellant's denial of having made the admission was not convincing in the light of the other evidence of the prosecution. His behavior in going to the house of the deceased's daughter and not being allowed to enter showed that he appeared dangerously angry, indicative of a deliberate killer rather than a sorrowful and harmless penitent for a killing committed only by accident.

• Burden of Proof: Appellant having admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he invoked in his defense called for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses such as self-defense. He failed dismally to fulfill this burden. The appealed decision was therefore affirmed.

• Accidental Killing as Exempting Circumstance; Clear and Convincing Evidence — When an accused admits the killing, the burden shifts to him to prove the exempting circumstance he invokes. The defense of accidental killing, like self-defense, must be established by clear and convincing evidence. Appellant admitted the killing but failed to prove accident, so the defense was rejected.
• Multiple Wounds Negate a Single Accidental Blow — Where the victim sustained more than one wound on different parts of the body, a single accidental stroke cannot account for all of them. The first wound might be accidental, but additional wounds not resulting from that first blow are deliberate. This reasoning robbed the accident theory of plausibility.
• Admissibility of Statements Made Upon Surrender; Custodial Investigation Safeguards — The constitutional rights to silence and counsel under Article IV, Section 20 apply to a person under investigation. A voluntary admission made upon surrender, before any formal custodial investigation or written confession, does not trigger those safeguards. The statement may also be admitted through witnesses who heard it through their own perception, not necessarily as res gestae.
• Autopsy Report and Testimonial Substitute — The failure of the physician who issued a post-mortem report to testify does not necessarily render the evidence insufficient where another witness with basic medico-legal knowledge testifies on the number and location of the wounds and may serve the purpose of the autopsy report.
• Deference to Trial Court Credibility Findings — The lower court's appreciation of the relative credibility of opposing witnesses will not be disturbed absent reason. The Supreme Court found none and affirmed.

• "That the deceased died from wounds inflicted by the appellant is not disputed. As gleaned from the opposing versions set forth above, the conflict is in how the wounds were inflicted — whether with deliberate intent, or purely by accident." — This passage frames the central factual and legal issue: the killing itself was admitted, and the dispute turned on whether it was deliberate or accidental.
• "The first wound could possibly have been accidentally inflicted, but the other, wounds could not have been similarly inflicted if, as just pointed out, they did not result from the first blow. Their locations preclude that a single blow produced all the wounds. This fact robs the accident theory of appellant of any plausibility." — This is the core ratio for rejecting the accident defense, grounding the conclusion in the number and location of the wounds.
• "It is but natural for one who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering." — This passage supports the ruling that appellant's statement upon surrender was not made during formal custodial investigation and was therefore admissible.
• "Moreover, appellant having admitted the killing, the burden of proving the exempting circumstance he has invoked in his defense calls for clear and convincing evidence, as is required of similar defenses as that of self-defense." — This states the controlling evidentiary burden for the defense of accidental killing.

• People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Abejuela, 92 SCRA 503 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 466 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Balmaceda, 97 SCRA 94 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Sales, 44 SCRA 489 — Cited in footnote 2 in support of the rule that the lower court's appreciation of witness credibility will not be disturbed absent reason.
• People vs. Obeda, 101 SCRA 675 — Cited in footnote 3 in support of the rule that an exempting circumstance, like self-defense, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 — Cited in footnote 3 in support of the rule that an exempting circumstance, like self-defense, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Jamero, 75 SCRA 137 — Cited in footnote 3 in support of the rule that an exempting circumstance, like self-defense, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Quintab, 16 SCRA 146 — Cited in footnote 3 in support of the rule that an exempting circumstance, like self-defense, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Libed, 14 SCRA 410 — Cited in footnote 3 in support of the rule that an exempting circumstance, like self-defense, must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.

• Article IV, Section 20, Constitution — No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself; any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such right; no force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates free will shall be used; and any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence. The Court held that the provision did not apply because no written confession was sought to be presented as a result of formal custodial investigation; only appellant's voluntary statement upon surrender was testified to, and Juanita Busalla's testimony concerned a statement not made in the course of a police investigation.

Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, J., concurred in the result.