People of the Philippines vs. Gregorio Magallanes

Self-defense cannot be sustained where the victim's unlawful aggression has ceased and the accused becomes the aggressor, and treachery cannot qualify a killing to murder where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was impulsive, absent proof that the offender consciously adopted the means or method of attack from the inception.

On September 29, 1991, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, Gregorio Magallanes, a "mananari" or gaffer of fighting cocks, was walking along the road to the cockpit of Poblacion Sagbayan, Bohol. He was with several cockfighting aficionados, including Romualdo Cempron and Danilo Salpucial. As they passed the store of Umping Amores, located on the elevated side of the road, they saw Virgilio Tapales drinking. Tapales hailed Cempron and invited him for a drink, but Cempron refused because he was going to the cockpit. Tapales approached Cempron and conversed with him briefly.

For some unknown reason, Tapales then directed his attention to Magallanes, who was walking a few steps behind Cempron. Tapales held Magallanes by his shirt, slapped him, and strangled his neck. Seeing a knife tucked in Tapales' waist, Magallanes pulled out the knife and slashed at Tapales to loosen his grip. Magallanes succeeded in wounding Tapales' face and neck. Tapales let go of Magallanes and fled for his life.

Magallanes pursued Tapales. When Tapales fell, Magallanes stabbed him several more times before uttering the words, "you are already dead in that case." Magallanes then stood up and rode on a motorcycle driven by Danilo Salpucial. Later, Magallanes surrendered to the police authorities of Inabanga, Bohol.

For Tapales' death, Magallanes and Salpucial were charged as principal and accessory, respectively, with murder. The information alleged that Magallanes, with intent to kill and without justifiable cause, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, attacked, assaulted, and stabbed Tapales with a sharp-pointed, sharp-edged weapon, hitting vital parts and causing instantaneous death; Salpucial, as accessory, allegedly allowed Magallanes to backride on the motorcycle he was driving to flee from the scene. During arraignment, Magallanes expressed willingness to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide with the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and voluntary surrender; Salpucial pleaded not guilty. The prosecution refused to lower the charge from murder to homicide, and trial ensued.

The prosecution witnesses, Engineer Sabino Tubal and Esterlita Amodia-Tubal, testified that Magallanes pursued the already wounded Tapales and stabbed him after he fell. Dr. Pancracio Garay, the Rural Health Physician who examined Tapales' body, testified that Tapales sustained seven stab wounds caused by a sharp-bladed weapon. The wounds included incised wounds at the base of the skull and extending from the occipital area through the left ear, a stab wound at the anterior neck, a stab wound penetrating the thoracic area and hitting the spinal column, an incised wound above the left scapula, and incised wounds on the palms. Five of the seven wounds were located in the neck area. Magallanes claimed he acted in self-defense, but the prosecution's evidence showed that Tapales was running away when Magallanes chased and stabbed him. The trial court credited the prosecution witnesses' account that Magallanes chased and stabbed the fleeing Tapales.

• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that he was justified in stabbing Tapales because he was merely defending himself from Tapales' unlawful and unprovoked aggression.
• Nature and Number of Wounds: Appellant sought an exception to the rule that a large number of wounds negates self-defense, pointing out that the majority of the seven wounds were superficial and only one was fatal.
• Absence of Treachery: Appellant argued in the alternative that the killing was not attended by treachery and that he should be convicted of homicide only; he bewailed the finding of treachery despite the initial unlawful aggression having been started by Tapales at the middle of the road in broad daylight.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Appellant's willingness to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide, with voluntary surrender, was on record, and he sought the benefit of these mitigating circumstances.

• Self-Defense: Respondent countered that the prosecution witnesses uniformly testified that appellant mercilessly pursued the already wounded Tapales and, when the latter fell, inflicted several more stab wounds, including a fatal blow to the neck.
• Treachery: Respondent insisted that the killing was treacherous because it was perpetrated while the defenseless Tapales was running away from appellant, giving appellant the opportunity to stab him at the back without warning.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant acted in self-defense, thereby justifying the killing of Virgilio Tapales.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and plea of guilty should be appreciated in appellant's favor.

• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression had ceased when Tapales fled; appellant became the aggressor by pursuing and stabbing him, and the seven wounds negated self-defense.
• Treachery: No. The meeting was casual and the attack impulsive; treachery must be present at the inception of the attack and cannot be presumed from suddenness or from wounds inflicted on the victim's back.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Yes. Voluntary surrender and qualified plea of guilty should be credited; absent treachery, appellant is guilty only of homicide.

• Self-Defense: The prosecution generally bears the burden of proving guilt, but where the accused admits killing and invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove clearly and convincingly the three elements: unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The prosecution witnesses testified that Magallanes pursued the already wounded Tapales and stabbed him after he fell, including a fatal neck wound. Whatever aggression Tapales initiated had ceased when he fled; Magallanes then became the aggressor. The seven stab wounds, five in the neck area, and the absence of any injury to Magallanes negated self-defense. People vs. Tampon was cited for the rule that after the aggressor is disarmed or aggression ceases, the defender has no right to kill or wound him.
• Treachery: Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The second condition was negated by the chance meeting and impulsive attack. The Court cited People vs. Escoto: treachery cannot be presumed from the suddenness of the attack or from the fact that the victim was stabbed with his back towards the appellant; the victim's helpless position was accidental. Treachery must be present at the inception of the attack; if absent then, it cannot be considered if present at a subsequent stage. Since Tapales initiated the unlawful aggression, he was forewarned of possible retaliation. Absent treachery, the killing is homicide only.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The trial court erroneously failed to appreciate voluntary surrender and plea of guilty. PNP member Felix Estillore testified that Magallanes surrendered to the police of Inabanga, Bohol after the stabbing. Surrender in Inabanga rather than Sagbayan is not held against him; he fled Sagbayan to evade retaliation from the deceased's relatives, not to hide from police. The law requires only surrender to authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him. As to plea of guilty, Magallanes was willing to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide. In People vs. Yturriaga, a qualified plea of guilty does not deny guilt and may still be mitigating; the prosecution cannot nullify it by unfounded aggravating allegations. The Court thus imposed the indeterminate sentence and affirmed the rest of the judgment.

• Self-Defense — Burden and Requisites — Although the prosecution bears the burden of proving guilt, the burden shifts to the accused who admits killing but invokes self-defense. The accused must prove clearly and convincingly: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The claim fails where the victim's aggression has ceased and the accused becomes the aggressor.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Requisites and Inception — Treachery requires: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. It must be present at the inception of the attack; if absent then, treachery at a subsequent stage is not considered. It cannot be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack or from the fact that the victim was stabbed with his back towards the accused, especially where the meeting was casual and the attack impulsive.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender — To be entitled to voluntary surrender, the offender must surrender to the authorities to save the government the trouble and expense of looking for him in order to arrest him. The law does not require surrender in the municipality where the offense was committed. Surrender in another town is not held against the accused where he fled to evade retaliation rather than to hide from police.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty; Qualified Plea — A qualified plea of guilty, where the accused admits guilt but disputes a qualifying circumstance, may still be mitigating if the qualification does not deny guilt and is subsequently justified. The prosecution cannot nullify this mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances.
• Homicide vs. Murder — Absent any qualifying circumstance, the killing is homicide, not murder. Treachery is a qualifying circumstance that raises a killing to murder; where treachery is not proven, the accused can be convicted only of homicide.

• "Clearly, whatever act of aggression that was initiated by Tapales against the appellant had already ceased as demonstrated by the fact that Tapales was running away from the appellant. The tables were turned when the appellant chased Tapales with the obvious intent of stabbing him. At this juncture, the appellant had assumed the role of aggressor, thus, his claim of self-defense cannot obviously prosper." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting self-defense: the victim's unlawful aggression had ceased, and the appellant became the aggressor.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the Court's canonical definition of treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code.
• "Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him." — This passage enumerates the two requisites of treachery and anchors the Court's finding that the second requisite was absent.
• "Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny the defendant's guilt and, what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant's fault that aggravating circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom. If such qualification could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could nullify this mitigating circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Yturriaga, supports crediting the appellant's qualified plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Tampon, G.R. No. 105583, July 5, 1996 — Cited for the rule that after the aggressor is disarmed or the unlawful aggression has ceased, the defender has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor; applied to reject self-defense.
• People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87, 100 [1995] — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed from the suddenness of the attack or from the victim being stabbed with his back towards the accused, especially where the meeting was casual and the attack impulsive.
• People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534, 539 [1950] — Cited for the rule that a qualified plea of guilty may still be mitigating where the qualification does not deny guilt and is subsequently justified; the prosecution cannot defeat it through unfounded aggravating allegations.
• People vs. Maturgo, Sr., 248 SCRA 519, 530 [1995] — Cited for the two conditions of treachery: the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack.
• People vs. Rivero, 242 SCRA 354, 360 [1995] — Cited for the rule that the presence of a large number of wounds on the victim negates self-defense and indicates a determined effort to kill.

• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery or alevosia. The Court quoted the definition and found treachery absent because the meeting was casual and the attack impulsive, and because treachery must be present at the inception of the attack.
• Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — Defines plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance. The Court applied it to Magallanes' qualified plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.