People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert Floresta y Selencio

Admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae is not equivalent to its probative value; where the utterance contains no positive and categorical identification of the accused, it cannot be treated as direct evidence of the killing, and the equipoise rule precludes its use to establish the identity of the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt. Corollarily, conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence only where the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

Gilbert Floresta y Selencio and Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito were residents of Barangay Malinta, Masbate City, between whom a previous quarrel had occurred. The killing was prosecuted as Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes the crime when the killing is attended by any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated therein, such as treachery and evident premeditation.

On the evening of December 28, 2012, Jay Lourd Bones y Zurbito was having a drinking session with his friend Allan Andaya and a certain Benjie at the kitchen of his house in Sitio Calumpang, Barangay Malinta, Masbate City. Gilbert Floresta y Selencio, the accused, was a resident of the same locality, and the two men had previously quarreled with each other. An Information dated December 29, 2012 charged Gilbert with Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that on or about December 28, 2012, with intent to kill, treachery, and evident premeditation, he attacked and shot Jay Lourd with a firearm of unknown caliber, hitting him on the left upper chest and inflicting mortal wounds that were the direct cause of his death.

According to the prosecution, after drinking two shots of gin, Jay Lourd suddenly stood up and said to Allan, "Pare, I was hit, may tama ako." As Allan was about to hug Jay Lourd, he heard a cracking sound behind him and ran away. Jay Lourd's wife, Jennifer Bones, was breastfeeding their youngest child when she heard the gunshot coming from the kitchen; she hurriedly went there and saw her husband bloodied on the floor, prompting her to cover his wound with a piece of cloth. At that moment, Jay Lourd told her, "Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?" Jennifer then hid in a room with their elder child until her uncle and sister-in-law arrived to bring Jay Lourd to the hospital. She decided to stay behind and wait for the police officers, but when they informed her that they would continue the investigation the following day, she proceeded to the hospital, where she was told that Jay Lourd was already dead. She thereafter went to the Masbate City Police Station to tell the authorities that it was Gilbert who shot her husband, and Gilbert was consequently apprehended by the police.

Gilbert denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He alleged that from 12:30 until 3:00 in the afternoon of December 28, 2012, he was watching a cockfight in Purok Casili, Barangay Igang, Masbate City, and that he afterwards played cara y cruz with Rico Adovas, Rely Dinglasan, Soy Tugbo, and Linkoy Lorenzo until 9:00 in the evening. He then went back to Barangay Malinta and saw a crowd near the house of Jay Lourd; upon asking the people what had happened, he learned that Jay Lourd had been shot to death. He went home and had dinner, after which police officers arrived at his house and he was investigated, examined, and detained. At trial, Rico and Rely corroborated his averments.

Allan testified on cross-examination that although he looked back in the direction from which the gunshot came, he did not see anybody "because it was very dark" ("madulom-dulom"), and that he did not know whether Jay Lourd was able to see the shooter because he had already run away. The RTC found that Jay Lourd's utterance to Jennifer was part of the res gestae, being a spontaneous reaction to a startling occurrence, and treated it as evidence bearing on the identity of the assailant; it likewise found treachery to have attended the killing, as Jay Lourd was drinking with his friends and had no inkling that anyone would shoot him, and discredited Gilbert's alibi for his failure to show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the vicinity of the crime.

• Alibi: Gilbert interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that from 12:30 until 3:00 in the afternoon of December 28, 2012 he was watching a cockfight in Purok Casili, Barangay Igang, Masbate City, and that he thereafter played cara y cruz with Rico Adovas, Rely Dinglasan, Soy Tugbo, and Linkoy Lorenzo until 9:00 in the evening, an account corroborated at trial by Rico and Rely.
• Res Gestae Declaration as Afterthought: Gilbert claimed that the declaration made by Jay Lourd to Jennifer was a mere afterthought and therefore did not qualify as part of the res gestae.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the person who shot and killed Jay Lourd Bones.
• Res Gestae Declaration: Whether Jay Lourd's utterance, "Panggay, you see if Gilbert is still there?", though admissible as part of the res gestae, constituted direct evidence positively and categorically identifying Gilbert as his assailant.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the prosecution's circumstantial evidence, consisting of the res gestae declaration and the previous quarrel between Gilbert and Jay Lourd, sufficed to establish Gilbert's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: No. The prosecution failed to establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that Gilbert was the person who shot and killed Jay Lourd, the identity of the offender being as indispensable to conviction as the commission of the crime itself.
• Res Gestae Declaration: Admissible but without sufficient probative value. The utterance qualified as part of the res gestae, yet admissibility is not equivalent to weight of evidence; containing no positive and categorical identification of Gilbert, it could not be treated as direct evidence of the killing under the equipoise rule.
• Circumstantial Evidence: No. The remaining circumstance — the previous quarrel between Gilbert and Jay Lourd — did not constitute the unbroken chain of circumstances required to point to Gilbert, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

• Identity of the Perpetrator: An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review, and the reviewing tribunal is duty-bound to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether assigned or unassigned; the appeal confers full jurisdiction on the appellate court, rendering it competent to examine the records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. To successfully prosecute Murder under Article 248 of the RPC, the prosecution must establish that (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) the killing is not parricide or infanticide. The Court found that the prosecution failed to establish the second element beyond reasonable doubt. It is elementary that in every criminal prosecution the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt; the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.

• Res Gestae Declaration: Under the Revised Rules on Evidence, a declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. Jay Lourd's utterance satisfied all three: there was a startling occurrence, namely his having been mortally shot; the declaration was spontaneously made without opportunity to concoct or contrive a story, having been uttered shortly after the shooting; and it concerned the shooting in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The Court nonetheless clarified that admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence — admissibility refers to whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to whether the admitted evidence proves an issue, so that a particular item of evidence may be admissible but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. While it may be argued that from the utterance Gilbert had something to do with the mortal wounds, the statement is ultimately inconclusive to prove that Gilbert was identified by Jay Lourd as his assailant, as it contained no positive and categorical identification. Faced with conflicting interpretations as to the nature of the statement, the Court was guided by the equipoise rule, which instructs that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The courts a quo therefore erred in considering the utterance as direct evidence of the killing and of Gilbert's authorship thereof.

• Circumstantial Evidence: Although the prosecution may sustain a conviction despite the absence of direct evidence, it must present circumstantial evidence establishing the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience, and is sufficient for conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances presented must constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person; the series of circumstances duly proven must be consistent with each other, and each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. Aside from Jay Lourd's utterance, only one other circumstance could possibly point to Gilbert as the assailant — their previous quarrel — and the totality of these circumstances was insufficient to produce moral certainty that it was indeed Gilbert who shot and killed Jay Lourd. The testimony of Allan, who was with Jay Lourd when the latter was killed, further cast doubt on the real identity of the perpetrator: on cross-examination he admitted that it was improbable to see who the shooter was and where the gunshot came from "because it was very dark," and he opined that he was not sure whether Jay Lourd was able to see the shooter, as he had already run away. Accordingly, there being no evidence sufficient to support a conviction, Gilbert was acquitted of the crime charged.

• Res gestae — A declaration is deemed part of the res gestae and admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The Court applied the test to hold that Jay Lourd's utterance shortly after he was mortally shot was admissible, satisfying all three requisites.

• Admissibility of evidence distinguished from probative value — Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue; a particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the res gestae declaration, though admissible, was not thereby direct evidence of the killing or of the accused's authorship.

• Equipoise rule — Where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. The Court applied the rule to conclude that Jay Lourd's utterance could not be treated as direct evidence positively and categorically implicating Gilbert in the crime charged.

• Circumstantial evidence — requisites and unbroken chain test — Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the main fact in issue may be inferred based on reason and common experience. It is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain leading to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person; each and every circumstance must be consistent with the accused's guilt and inconsistent with his innocence. The Court found the two circumstances relied upon — the res gestae declaration and the previous quarrel — insufficient to meet this standard.

• Proof of identity of the offender beyond reasonable doubt — In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt; the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt. This principle supplied the decisive ground for the acquittal.

• Scope of appellate review in criminal appeals — An appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned; the appeal confers upon the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders it competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The Court invoked this principle as the threshold justification for reviewing the conviction notwithstanding the parties' framing.

• "At this point, however, it is well to clarify that admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence." — This passage states the pivotal distinction on which the acquittal turned: the victim's utterance was admissible as res gestae but its probative value still had to be judicially evaluated, and it did not amount to direct evidence of the killing or of the accused's identity.

• "Faced with conflicting interpretations as to the nature of Jay Lourd's statement, the Court must be guided by the equipoise rule, which instructs that where inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." — This is the canonical formulation of the equipoise rule as applied in the case, and it supplies the ratio for rejecting the res gestae declaration as direct evidence of guilt.

• "To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty person." — This passage articulates the unbroken chain test governing convictions resting on circumstantial evidence, which the prosecution's two circumstances failed to satisfy.

• "It is elementary that in every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt." — This is the dispositive principle of the decision, stating the ground on which the conviction was reversed and the accused acquitted.

• People vs. Dahil, 750 Phil. 212, 225 (2015) — Cited for the rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and that the reviewing tribunal must correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether assigned or unassigned.
• People vs. Comboy, 782 Phil. 187, 196 (2016) — Cited for the proposition that an appeal confers full jurisdiction on the appellate court, rendering it competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law.
• Ramos vs. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017) — Cited for the enumeration of the elements of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Sace, 631 Phil. 335, 348 (2010) — Cited for the requisites of a declaration falling within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.
• Republic vs. Galeno, 803 Phil. 742, 750 (2017), citing People vs. Parungao, 332 Phil. 917, 924 (1996) — Cited for the rule that admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence.
• Heirs of Sabanpan vs. Comorposa, 456 Phil. 161, 172 (2003) — Cited for the distinction between admissibility, which concerns whether evidence is to be considered at all, and probative value, which concerns whether the admitted evidence proves an issue.
• People vs. Librias, 795 Phil. 334, 344 (2016) — Cited for the equipoise rule, under which evidence capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with innocence, does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.
• Atienza vs. People, 726 Phil. 570, 582–583 (2014) — Cited for the requisites of circumstantial evidence sufficient for conviction and for the unbroken chain test.
• People vs. Caliso, 675 Phil. 742, 752 (2011) — Cited for the rule that the identity of the offender must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt in every criminal prosecution.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of Murder. The Court enumerated its elements — (a) that a person was killed; (b) that the accused killed him or her; (c) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 248; and (d) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide — and held that the prosecution failed to establish the second element, namely that the accused killed the victim.

• Revised Rules on Evidence (res gestae exception to the hearsay rule) — Governs the admissibility of a declaration as part of the res gestae, which requires (a) a startling occurrence as the principal act; (b) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (c) that the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The Court applied the provision to hold Jay Lourd's utterance admissible, while ruling that admissibility did not supply the probative weight needed to establish the accused's identity.

• Carpio (Chairperson)
• Caguioa
• J. Reyes, Jr.
• Lazaro-Javier