People of the Philippines vs. Gilbert Dadivo y Mendoza

Treachery may qualify a killing to murder even where the attack is frontal, provided the attack is sudden and unexpected and the unarmed victim is thereby given no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; evident premeditation, by contrast, must be proven as clearly as the crime itself, with every element established beyond reasonable doubt — the time the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. Speculation that the accused "might have been slighted" cannot supply the missing elements.

Gilbert Dadivo y Mendoza and Teodorico dela Cruz were acquaintances who moved in the same circle of drinking companions in Calaocan, Santiago City. The killing was prosecuted as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the crime with reclusion perpetua to death, and the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information — treachery and evident premeditation — determined both the classification of the offense and the range of the imposable penalty under Article 63 of the same Code.

At four o'clock in the afternoon of December 31, 1995, Gilbert Dadivo y Mendoza joined a drinking session at the house of Rudy dela Cruz in Calaocan, Santiago City, together with his friends Sonny Ocampo, Anthony Galot, Ben Calimlim, and the victim Teodorico dela Cruz. The conversation was merry and light. Dadivo, Ocampo, and Galot sat on one long bench, while Calimlim and Teodorico sat on the opposite bench, with a small table holding their appetizers and drinks between them.

At six o'clock in the evening, Dadivo left the group and went out of the house. He returned shortly and, instead of resuming his seat, stood beside Galot. Calimlim had his right arm on Teodorico's shoulder, and Teodorico had his left arm on Calimlim's shoulder. Without any warning, Dadivo lunged at Teodorico and stabbed him in the chest with a knife wrapped in a handkerchief. Before anyone could react, he stabbed Teodorico a second time. Teodorico weakly said, "may tama ako." He died before reaching the hospital.

Dadivo gave a different account. He testified that at three o'clock in the afternoon he had gone to a nearby store to buy candy, where he saw Sonny Tejada, whom he invited for a drink; the store owner, however, refused to let them drink in front of the store. Teodorico, who was nearby, then invited them to drink at his brother's house. They drank gin and ate appetizers, and were later joined by Sonny Ocampo, Anthony Galot, and Raul Espiritu. At six o'clock in the evening, Dadivo went out of the house to relieve himself. Already intoxicated and dizzy, he had difficulty keeping his balance. When he returned to the group, he told Teodorico that he wished to leave because he had had enough, but Teodorico refused to let him go, held his leg, and cursed him. Teodorico then tried to reach for a knife on the table. Seeing this as a threatening move, Dadivo "jumped the gun," so to speak, and stabbed Teodorico with the latter's own fan knife.

The trial court disbelieved the claim of self-defense and found that Dadivo was the unlawful aggressor. It found that he attacked Teodorico from behind, and surmised that the victim "might have slighted" Dadivo during the drinking spree, though no evidence supported that premise. The medical evidence showed, however, that both wounds were located on the chest, and the testimonial evidence indicated a frontal attack.

• Insufficiency of Evidence for Qualifying Circumstances: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty of murder despite the insufficiency of the evidence adduced to prove the qualifying circumstances, specifically evident premeditation and treachery.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Intoxication: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in not considering the mitigating circumstance of intoxication in his favor, given his testimony that he was already intoxicated and dizzy at the time of the incident.

• Intoxication Not Established: The Solicitor General observed that accused-appellant himself narrated that after stabbing the victim he ran home, confessed to his parents what he had done, and asked them to surrender him to the police — actuations hardly those of a man so inebriated that his will-power was impaired or that he could no longer comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, notwithstanding the trial court's finding that the attack was launched from behind.
• Intoxication: Whether the mitigating circumstance of intoxication may be appreciated in favor of the accused.
• Damages: Whether the awards of moral damages, actual damages, and indemnity ex delicto were proper and supported by the evidence.

• Evident Premeditation: No. The elements of evident premeditation were not established, the trial court's premise that the accused might have been slighted being speculative and unsupported by evidence.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing to murder, the attack being sudden and unexpected and the unarmed victim having been given no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
• Intoxication: No. The circumstance was not proven, and even if proved it would have no effect on the penalty, the conditions for its appreciation not having been shown.
• Damages: Partly. The indemnity ex delicto of P50,000.00 was affirmed, but moral damages were reduced to P50,000.00 and actual damages to P4,500.00, the balance not having been duly proven.

• Evident Premeditation: The requisites of evident premeditation are (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. Premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious and must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill; in the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. A qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself, and every element must be shown to exist beyond reasonable doubt, not as a mere product of speculation. Here, the trial court's premise that Teodorico "might have slighted" Dadivo during the drinking spree was unsupported by any evidence and therefore speculative; there was no way of knowing when Dadivo decided to stab the victim, so the first requisite was unmet. The second requisite likewise failed, for if the time of the decision cannot be determined with certainty, one cannot infer that the accused clung to a determination to kill, nor can the act of leaving the house — presumably to relieve himself — be deemed the overt act manifesting that determination; settled is the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. The third requisite was also lacking, the accused's act of leaving the house having been too short a time for him to meditate or reflect upon the consequences of his decision; to warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that the decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.

• Treachery: For treachery to be appreciated, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. The trial court's finding that the accused attacked the victim from behind was belied by the testimonial evidence and by the location of the wounds, both of which were on the chest, indicating a frontal attack. This did not, however, negate treachery, because the settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. From all indications, Teodorico was simply enjoying the drinks, the food, the talk, and the company; his left arm was on Calimlim's shoulder and he was seated on a bench, so he could not have anticipated the accused's evil intention. Before the fatal first thrust, the knife was concealed in a handkerchief, and the victim as well as his drinking companions realized what was happening only when the knife was uncovered after the first thrust. Treachery was therefore present, qualifying the killing to murder.

• Intoxication: Even if proved, intoxication would have no effect as far as the penalty is concerned. In any event, the accused failed to prove that he was intoxicated. The rule is that intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony; the accused failed to prove those conditions. As the Solicitor General observed, the accused himself narrated that after stabbing the victim he ran home, confessed to his parents what he had done, and asked them to surrender him to the police — actuations hardly those of a man so inebriated that his will-power was impaired or that he could no longer comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts.

• Damages: The trial court correctly granted the award of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto for the death of Teodorico dela Cruz. The award of P100,000.00 as moral damages, however, was reduced to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. The award of P200,000.00 as actual damages, inclusive of loss of earning capacity as well as funeral and burial expenses, was improper: Rudy dela Cruz, the victim's brother, testified on the funeral and burial expenses, but only P4,500.00 representing funeral services was duly receipted. Sinamar dela Cruz, the victim's widow, testified that her husband earned P26,000.00 per annum as a farmer and part-time construction worker, but indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven; a self-serving statement, being unreliable, is not enough, and for lost income to be recovered there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average, not just gross, income, since an award for loss of earning capacity refers to net income. Recovery of actual damages requires proof, with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, of the amount actually expended in connection with the victim's death.

• Penalty: The accused is guilty of murder, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code by reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstance that attended the killing, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties — reclusion perpetua — was imposed pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Evident Premeditation — Requisites — Evident premeditation requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious and must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill; in the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient. A qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself, and every element must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the trial court's supposition that the victim "might have slighted" the accused was speculative and unsupported by evidence, no time of determination could be fixed, the act of leaving the house could not be deemed an overt act of determination, and the interval was too short for meditation or reflection; all three requisites therefore failed.

• Treachery — Requisites and Frontal Attack — Treachery requires (1) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means. Treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself; what is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from an unarmed victim, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate. The concealment of the knife in a handkerchief, the victim's relaxed posture with his arm on a companion's shoulder, and the absence of any warning established the deliberate adoption of a means of execution that foreclosed defense or retaliation.

• Intoxication as a Mitigating Circumstance — Intoxication of the offender is taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, provided the intoxication is not habitual and is not subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. Both conditions must be proved by the defense. Even when appreciated, the circumstance is unavailing where the penalty is fixed by the presence or absence of other circumstances, and in this case the accused's own conduct after the stabbing — running home, confessing to his parents, and asking to be surrendered to the police — negated the claim that his will-power was impaired.

• Loss of Earning Capacity as Actual Damages — Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages and must be duly proven; a self-serving statement, being unreliable, is not enough. For lost income to be recovered, there must be unbiased proof of the deceased's average, not just gross, income, since the award refers to net income. Recovery of actual damages requires proof, with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, of the amount actually expended in connection with the victim's death.

• Indemnity Ex Delicto and Moral Damages — The award of P50,000.00 as indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim is proper, while moral damages must be fixed in line with prevailing jurisprudence, which in this case warranted a reduction from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.

• "The premeditation to kill must be plain and notorious; it must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward acts showing the intent to kill. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient." — This passage states the evidentiary standard governing evident premeditation and supplied the ratio for rejecting the trial court's speculative finding that the accused might have been slighted by the victim.
• "The settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or defend himself. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack, without the slightest provocation from a victim who is unarmed, made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate." — This is the canonical formulation of the frontal-attack rule on treachery, and it is the passage that sustained the murder classification notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous finding of a rear attack.
• "Settled is the rule that the intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony." — This passage restates the requisites for appreciating intoxication in favor of the accused and explains why the defense failed, the accused having proved neither condition.
• "Indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages which must be duly proven. A self-serving statement, being unreliable, is not enough." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Panabang, is the controlling statement on the proof required for lost income and justified the reduction of the actual damages awarded by the trial court.

• People vs. Base, 329 SCRA 158 [2000] — Cited for the three requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court applied in finding the circumstance unproven.
• People vs. Chua, 297 SCRA 229 [1998] — Cited for the rule that premeditation must be plain and notorious and proven by outward acts, and that mere presumptions and inferences are insufficient.
• People vs. Timblor, 285 SCRA 64 [1998] — Cited for the rule that a qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself, every element beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 [1999] — Cited for the rule that when it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.
• People vs. Eribal, 305 SCRA 341 [1999] — Cited for the requirement that the decision to kill be the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt.
• People vs. Geral, 333 SCRA 453 [2000] — Cited for the two elements of treachery.
• People vs. Tan, 314 SCRA 413 [1999] — Cited for the rule that treachery may exist even where the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, the controlling precedent sustaining the murder classification in this case.
• People vs. Bato, 348 SCRA 253 [2000] — Cited for the rule on intoxication as a mitigating circumstance and the conditions for its appreciation.
• People vs. Olivo, 349 SCRA 499 [2001] — Cited as prevailing jurisprudence warranting the reduction of moral damages to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Panabang, G.R. Nos. 137514-15, January 16, 2002 — Quoted at length for the rule that indemnification for loss of earning capacity is in the nature of actual damages requiring competent proof, and that a self-serving statement is insufficient.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, the crime for which the accused was convicted, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied it after finding that treachery qualified the killing, while evident premeditation was rejected.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the penalty when the crime is punished by two indivisible penalties and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, in which case the lesser penalty shall be imposed. The Court applied it in imposing reclusion perpetua rather than death, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the killing.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.