People of the Philippines vs. Getulio Pantoja

Two killings caused by two separate shots are two separate and distinct murders, not a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code; the penalty for each murder must be imposed separately. The complex crime of double murder requires a single act killing two or more persons. In fixing civil liability, compensatory damages for death caused by a crime were set at P12,000 per victim in light of the peso's declining purchasing power.

Getulio Pantoja was a Philippine Army Sergeant. The case reached the Supreme Court on review of a death sentence imposed by the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the killing of Angel Marasigan and Wenceslao Hernandez in Barrio Malinao, Atimonan, Quezon. The appeal required application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code on complex crimes, Article 248 on murder, and Article 2206 of the New Civil Code on compensatory damages for death caused by a crime.

On the night of June 28, 1957, in Barrio Malinao, Atimonan, Quezon, a group of seven young men serenaded the house where Estelita Erotes lived. Invited to come up, the young men accepted. Wenceslao Hernandez sat beside Estelita. At about 1:30 A.M. on June 29, an uninvited Philippine Army Sergeant, Getulio Pantoja, wearing a T-shirt, came up and asked Hernandez to allow him to sit beside Estelita. Hernandez refused. Pantoja said nothing and showed no sign of anger.

Pantoja immediately left and went to his camp about half a kilometer distant, put on his fatigue uniform, got a rifle, returned to the house, and stationed himself on the stairway. At about 2:00 A.M., the serenaders left the house to serenade another house in the northern part of the barrio. Pantoja followed them. When the serenaders had walked about thirty meters, with Pantoja following about five meters behind, Pantoja suddenly shouted "Ano yan? Ano yan?" Turning their heads, they saw him raise the garand rifle and aim at them.

Before any of them could run, Pantoja fired two shots in rapid succession. The first shot hit Angel Marasigan, who instantly fell on his back. The second shot hit Wenceslao Hernandez, who fell down. The other serenaders scampered away for safety. Pantoja, who had walked nearer, then fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez.

Testifying in his own defense, the accused admitted that the shots he fired from the garand rifle killed Marasigan and Hernandez. The autopsy report attributed the deaths to internal hemorrhage and the destruction of vital organs.

• Evident Premeditation and Treachery: Appellant contended that the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery did not exist.
• Abuse of Public Position and Ignominy: Appellant contended that the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and ignominy were not present.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant contended that he should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Insanity: Appellant contended that the lower court erred in rejecting his defense of insanity.

• Complex Crime: Whether the lower court erred in finding appellant guilty of a complex crime of double murder for the killing of Angel Marasigan and Wenceslao Hernandez.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killings.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killings.
• Abuse of Public Position: Whether abuse of public position was a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Ignominy: Whether ignominy was a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender was a mitigating circumstance.
• Insanity: Whether the lower court erred in rejecting appellant's defense of insanity.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty for each murder should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Compensatory Damages: Whether the compensatory damages awarded to the heirs of each victim should be modified to P12,000.

• Complex Crime: No. The lower court erred. There were two acts—two shots—one killing Marasigan and the other killing Hernandez; Article 48's first class requires a single act, and the second class does not apply. Appellant is guilty of two separate and distinct murders.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The interval from 1:30 to 2:00 A.M. was insufficient for full meditation and reflection; the appellant's conscience could not have overcome the resolution of his will.
• Treachery: Yes. Appellant followed the serenaders, gave no indication he would shoot, and suddenly fired from behind two shots in rapid succession from about five meters.
• Abuse of Public Position: No. No showing that appellant took advantage of his being a sergeant; mere fatigue uniform and army rifle are insufficient.
• Ignominy: No. Firing additional shots at the prostrate bodies is not sufficient to show ignominy.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Immediately after the murders, appellant voluntarily surrendered to his detachment camp commander and surrendered the garand rifle.
• Insanity: No. The legal presumption of sanity stood; the evidence showed calm and collected conduct, revenge, and the medical report did not show insanity.
• Penalty: For each murder, the penalty is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248; with one mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty for each murder should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the judgment imposed 15 years to 20 years for each murder.
• Compensatory Damages: Yes. The award should be P12,000 for each victim, not P6,000, in light of the declining purchasing power of the peso; additional damages may be awarded in proper cases.

• Complex Crime: Article 48 as amended of the Revised Penal Code recognizes two classes of complex crimes: first, where a single act constitutes two or more crimes; second, where one crime is a necessary means for committing the other. The case did not fall under the first class because there were two acts, two shots, one killing Marasigan and the other killing Hernandez. Had there been only one shot killing both, there would have been a complex crime of double murder. The second class did not cover the case. Thus appellant was guilty of two separate and distinct murders and should suffer the penalty for each murder. Although appellant's brief did not assign this error, the Court considered it because the case under review was a criminal case.
• Evident Premeditation: The qualifying circumstance did not exist. Appellant had only about half an hour, from 1:30 to 2:00 A.M., for meditation and reflection from leaving the house, going to camp, putting on his fatigue uniform, getting the garand rifle, returning, following the serenaders, and firing. This was insufficient in the juridical sense for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning.
• Treachery: The contention was untenable. Appellant followed the serenaders as they walked, made no indication he would shoot, and then suddenly fired from behind two shots in rapid succession at Marasigan and Hernandez from about five meters. Under the circumstances, treachery was clearly present.
• Abuse of Public Position: The contention was meritorious. Nothing showed appellant took advantage of being a sergeant in the Philippine Army to commit the crimes. The mere fact he was in fatigue uniform and had an army rifle at the time was not sufficient to establish misuse of public position.
• Ignominy: The contention was meritorious. The mere fact appellant fired one more shot at the prostrate body of Marasigan and four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez was not sufficient to show ignominy.
• Voluntary Surrender: The contention was tenable. Evidence showed that immediately after the commission of the murders, appellant voluntarily surrendered to his detachment camp commander, to whom he also surrendered the garand rifle, and that he was ordered confined in the stockade.
• Insanity: The contention lacked merit. The legal presumption of sanity was reinforced by evidence that when he committed the crimes, appellant was calm and collected and did not show any sign of anger. The fact he fired four more shots at the prostrate body of Hernandez, who had refused his request to sit beside Estelita, showed revenge was in his heart. The report of Dr. Cesar Catindig of the V. Luna General Hospital, where appellant was confined for one month by order of the trial court, did not show insanity; it merely showed psychoneurotic depressive reaction and psychoneurotic dissociative reaction, and concluded that in the absence of reliable information it could not be ascertained whether the crime was committed when he was in such a state of mind.
• Penalty: The penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender, the penalty for each murder should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The dispositive portion imposed an indeterminate penalty of from 15 years to 20 years for each murder.
• Compensatory Damages: In 1947, when the Project of Civil Code was drafted, the Code Commission fixed P3,000 as the minimum compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. The Project was approved by both Houses of Congress in 1949 as the New Civil Code, effective 1950. In 1948, People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil. 424, awarded P6,000 for death caused by a crime considering the difference between the value of the present currency and that at the time the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted; that law was Commonwealth Act No. 284, effective 1938. In 1948, the purchasing power of the peso was one-third of its pre-war purchasing power. In 1950, when the New Civil Code took effect, Article 2206 fixed the minimum at P3,000 and repealed Commonwealth Act No. 284 by implication. Hence, from the effectivity of the New Civil Code, courts could properly have awarded P9,000. From 1948 to 1968, the purchasing power of the peso declined further, with the free market exchange at almost P4.00 to US$1.00, meaning present purchasing power was one-fourth of pre-war. Thus, the award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000. In proper cases, besides P12,000, courts may award additional sums as further compensatory damages for loss of earnings and support, and may likewise award moral and exemplary damages under Articles 2206 and 2230 of the New Civil Code.

• Complex Crimes under Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Article 48 recognizes two classes: (1) a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies; and (2) one crime is a necessary means for committing the other. In this case, two separate shots killed two different victims, so the killings were not a complex crime but two separate and distinct murders.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the victim might make. It was present because appellant followed the serenaders, gave no warning, and suddenly fired from behind at close range.
• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires sufficient time between the determination to commit the crime and its execution for the offender to meditate and reflect on the consequences, and for his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. The half-hour interval was insufficient.
• Abuse of Public Position — Abuse of public position as a generic aggravating circumstance requires proof that the offender took advantage of his public office in committing the crime. Mere wearing of a fatigue uniform and use of an army rifle did not establish it.
• Ignominy — Ignominy refers to a circumstance that adds a degree of humiliation or shame to the victim's death or injury beyond that inherent in the crime. Firing additional shots at the prostrate bodies was held insufficient to establish it.
• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender is mitigating when the offender voluntarily surrenders to the authorities or their agents. Appellant's immediate surrender to his detachment camp commander, including surrender of the garand rifle, entitled him to the mitigating circumstance.
• Presumption of Sanity — Every person is presumed sane; the defense of insanity must be established by clear and convincing evidence. The medical report showing only psychoneurotic reactions and inability to ascertain his state at the time did not overcome the presumption, especially given evidence of calmness and revenge.
• Compensatory Damages for Death Caused by a Crime — Article 2206 of the New Civil Code fixes a minimum indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict, subject to adjustment by jurisprudence in light of currency purchasing power. The Court fixed P12,000 per victim and noted that additional compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages may be awarded in proper cases.

• "It is well known to students of criminal law, as early as thirty-five years ago, that, according to Article 48 as amended, of the Revised Penal Code, there are two classes of complex crimes. The first class comprises cases where a single act constitutes two or more crimes. The second class covers cases where one crime is the necessary means for committing the other." — This states the controlling classification of complex crimes under Article 48.
• "The case at bar does not fall under the first class because in this case there were two acts, two shots, one killing Marasigan, and the other killing Hernandez. If there were only one shot killing both Marasigan and Hernandez, there would have been a complex crime, double murder." — This applies the complex-crime rule to the facts and is the core ratio for rejecting the lower court's complex-crime finding.
• "The appellant followed the serenaders as they walked, made no indication that he would shoot, and then suddenly fired from behind two shots in rapid succession at Marasigan and Hernandez from a distance of about five meters. Under the circumstances, clearly there was treachery." — This defines the factual basis for treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• "We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that the amount of award of compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict should now be P12,000." — This fixes the adjusted compensatory damages for each death and is a commonly cited ruling on death indemnity.

• People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil. 424 — Cited in the damages discussion; the Supreme Court there awarded P6,000 as compensatory damages for death caused by a crime, considering the difference between the value of the present currency and that at the time the law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 was enacted. The case was used as a benchmark in adjusting the award to P12,000.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines complex crimes into two classes: a single act constituting two or more crimes, and one crime as a necessary means for committing the other. Applied to hold that two shots killing two victims were not a complex crime.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for murder, reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Applied to determine the penalty for each murder.
• Article 2206, New Civil Code — Fixes the minimum compensatory damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict. Applied to support the P12,000 award per victim and the possibility of additional compensatory damages.
• Article 2230, New Civil Code — Authorizes exemplary damages in proper cases. Mentioned as a possible additional award.
• Commonwealth Act No. 284 — The law fixing a minimum indemnity of P2,000 for death caused by a crime, effective 1938; discussed as having been repealed by implication by the New Civil Code.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code to impose an indeterminate penalty of from 15 years to 20 years for each murder due to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Concepcion, C.J.; Reyes, J.B.L.; Dizon; Makalintal; Sanchez; Castro; Angeles; and Fernando, JJ., concur. Zaldivar, J., took no part.