People of the Philippines vs. Gerardo Latupan y Sibal

Where multiple deaths and injuries result from several distinct acts of stabbing rather than a single act, and no offense is a necessary means for committing the other, no complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is committed; the accused is liable for separate counts of murder and physical injuries.

Gerardo Latupan y Sibal, alias Jerry, was charged with offenses against the Asuncion family of Angang, Tuao, Cagayan. Lilia Asuncion was the wife of Emy Asuncion and the sister of the wife of their neighbor Ceferino Dagulo; Lilia’s children were Jose, Jaime, and Leo. The charges implicated Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which governs complex crimes, and Article 248, which then penalized murder with reclusion temporal maximum to death. The case also required the Court to distinguish reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment and to apply the proper nomenclature for penalties under the Revised Penal Code.

On April 29, 1991, around 4:00 in the afternoon, Ceferino Dagulo was chopping firewood outside his house in Angang, Tuao, Cagayan, when he heard the shouts of a woman and a child coming from the north. Moments later, Ceferino saw Gerardo Latupan y Sibal, alias Jerry, walking toward him carrying a thin, bloodied knife. Latupan entered Ceferino’s house and started chasing Ceferino’s wife, who was able to run to another house nearby. Unable to catch her, Latupan turned to Ceferino and said, “I will kill you all.” At that time, Latupan’s clothes, chest, hands, and legs were full of blood. Latupan attempted to thrust the knife into Ceferino, who was able to parry it. Later, Latupan told Ceferino to bring him to the authorities and tried to give the knife to Ceferino. Ceferino refused to touch the knife and told accused to go to the authorities by himself; hearing this, Latupan ran away.

The house of Emilio “Emy” Asuncion was 100 meters from Ceferino’s house. At around 4:00 in the afternoon of the same day, Emy Asuncion was returning to his house from a store. He reached his house and found his wife, Lilia, dead on the ground with several stab wounds on her body. His one-year-old son, Leo, was lying on top of Lilia. Emy picked up Leo and saw that the left side of Leo’s face was lacerated. He saw Jaime, his three-year-old son, and asked where Jose, his eldest son, was. At that moment, Emy heard the voice of Jose from upstairs of the house, asking for medicine. He ran upstairs and saw that Jose was wounded. He asked Jose who stabbed him, and Jose replied, “Uncle Jerry, Tatang.” Emy brought Jose to Ceferino’s house and then returned to his house to get his two other children, Leo and Jaime. They left the corpse of Lilia Asuncion inside Emy’s house. Lilia Asuncion was the sister of Ceferino’s wife.

Ceferino tried to ask a barangay councilman for assistance. Failing to obtain assistance, Ceferino went back to his house and found Emy Asuncion and his children there. Ceferino then went to a military camp to borrow a vehicle to bring the children to the hospital, and the military men provided them with a jeep. The three children were taken to the Nuestra Señora de Piat Hospital in Cabalansan. Riding in the jeep were five soldiers, accused Latupan, Emy Asuncion, Ceferino Dagulo, Ceferino’s wife, and the three children, Leo, Jaime, and Jose Asuncion. During the trip to the hospital, Emy’s son Jose saw accused Latupan inside the jeep and pointed to him as the one who stabbed him. At the hospital, the doctors treated the injuries of Leo and Jaime, but advised Emy and Ceferino to bring Jose to another hospital due to the seriousness of his wounds. They proceeded to Cagayan Valley Regional Hospital, where Jose was dead on arrival; he was only nine years old.

Jaime, the five-year-old son of Emy Asuncion, testified that he was three years old when the incident occurred. He stated that accused Latupan stabbed his mother, stepped on him, threw his brother Leo outside the window, and stabbed his other brother Jose. After presenting testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case. The defense did not present any testimonial or documentary evidence, merely relying on accused’s plea of guilty, and the case was considered submitted for decision. The trial court’s factual findings rested on Jaime’s eyewitness testimony and evidence that Latupan was seen not far from the scene with a bloodied knife and clothes, mumbling threats at onlookers including Ceferino and his wife.

• Complex Crime: Whether the killing of Lilia and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion constitute the complex crime of double murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, or separate counts of murder and physical injuries.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation may be appreciated against accused-appellant despite the absence of proof as to when the plan to kill was hatched and the time that elapsed before it was carried out.
• Penalty Nomenclature: Whether the proper penalties are “life imprisonment” and “ten days imprisonment,” or reclusion perpetua and arresto menor under the Revised Penal Code.
• Plea of Guilty: Whether conviction based on accused-appellant’s plea of guilty is valid where the trial court received evidence to determine his guilt.
• Damages: Whether death indemnity and moral damages may be awarded to the heirs of the victims.

• Complex Crime: No. The deaths and injuries resulted from several distinct acts of stabbing, not a single act, and no offense was a necessary means for committing the other; Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code does not apply, and accused-appellant is liable for two separate counts of murder and two counts of slight physical injuries.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation must be proven with equal certainty as the crime itself and cannot be presumed from the plea of guilty; no proof showed when accused-appellant meditated or reflected on the plan or the intervening time before execution.
• Penalty Nomenclature: Reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment, is the proper penalty for each murder; arresto menor, not “ten days imprisonment,” is the proper penalty for slight physical injuries. The Revised Penal Code’s prescribed nomenclature and accessory penalties must be observed.
• Plea of Guilty: Yes. Where the trial court receives evidence to determine whether the accused erred in admitting guilt, the improvidence of the plea loses legal significance because conviction rests on the evidence proving the offense.
• Damages: Yes. Death indemnity of P50,000.00 for each victim was sustained, and moral damages of P50,000.00 for each victim were awarded without need of proof of physical suffering and mental anguish.

• Complex Crime: Article 48, Revised Penal Code, applies only when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, in which case the penalty for the most serious crime is imposed in its maximum period. Neither instance was present. The killing of Lilia Asuncion and Jose Asuncion and the wounding of Jaime and Leo Asuncion resulted not from a single act but from several and distinct acts of stabbing. The rule cited is that where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed. Thus, accused-appellant was liable not for a complex crime of double murder but for two separate counts of murder and separate counts of physical injuries. The treacherous manner of the attack left the victims without means of defense or escape, making the killings murder.

• Evident Premeditation: The trial court incorrectly assumed that evident premeditation was included in the plea of guilty. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances that increase the penalty must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as a criminal offense. Evident premeditation cannot be presumed. To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. No proof, direct or circumstantial, showed when accused-appellant meditated and reflected upon his decision to kill the victims or the intervening time that elapsed before the plan was carried out. When it is not shown how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered.

• Penalty Nomenclature: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder at the time of the commission of the crime in April 1991 was reclusion temporal maximum to death. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of murder and sentenced him to “life imprisonment,” but the proper imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment; the trial court obviously intended to impose reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not the same as reclusion perpetua. They are distinct in nature, duration, and accessory penalties. Life imprisonment is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code. Life imprisonment does not carry accessory penalties, while reclusion perpetua has accessory penalties. Life imprisonment has no definite extent or duration, while reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years. The trial court also sentenced accused-appellant to “ten days of imprisonment” for each count of slight physical injuries. Courts must employ the proper legal terminology because of the substantial difference in legal effects and accessory penalties. The appropriate name of the penalty must be specified, since under the scheme of penalties in the Revised Penal Code the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. Thus, the proper penalty for each murder, absent aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties. Accused-appellant is liable for two counts of slight physical injuries and must be sentenced to twenty days of arresto menor in each case, likewise with accessory penalties.

• Plea of Guilty: Accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the single offense of multiple murder with multiple frustrated murder. Although convictions based on a plea of guilty in capital offenses have been set aside because of improvidence and when such plea is the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment, the circumstances of this case merited a different result. Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made loses legal significance, because the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged. The prosecution’s evidence was sufficient. Crucial was the testimony of eyewitness Jaime Asuncion, who witnessed the incident and suffered injuries from the unprovoked attack. He was familiar with accused-appellant and categorically related the events of April 29, 1991, including how accused-appellant stabbed his mother, threw his brother out of the window, stepped on him, and stabbed his other brother. Accused-appellant was also seen not far from the scene with a bloodied knife and clothes, mumbling threats at onlookers, including Ceferino Dagulo and his wife. Thus, accused-appellant was liable for the deaths of Lilia and Jose Asuncion and the physical injuries of Jaime and Leo Asuncion.

• Damages: The trial court’s award of fifty thousand pesos as death indemnity for each victim was sustained. No further proof is necessary other than the fact of death of the victim and the accused’s responsibility therefor. In addition, moral damages of fifty thousand pesos for each victim were awarded, without need of proof of consequent physical suffering and mental anguish of the heirs of the victims, in line with recent rulings.

• Complex Crime under Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Article 48 applies in two instances: when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. In either case, the penalty for the most serious crime is imposed in its maximum period. The ruling applied the rule by holding that separate and distinct acts of stabbing, which killed two victims and injured two others, did not constitute a complex crime; the accused was liable for separate counts of murder and physical injuries.

• Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution and that the decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt. It must be proven with equal certainty as the crime itself and cannot be presumed. The decision found no proof of when the plan to kill was hatched or the intervening time before execution, so the aggravating circumstance was not appreciated.

• Distinction between Life Imprisonment and Reclusion Perpetua — Life imprisonment is imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, carries no accessory penalties, and has no definite extent or duration. Reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised Penal Code, carries accessory penalties, and entails imprisonment for at least thirty years, after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon, with the maximum period not exceeding forty years. The ruling held that the proper penalty for each murder was reclusion perpetua, not life imprisonment.

• Proper Nomenclature of Penalties — Courts must employ the proper legal terminology in imposing penalties because of the substantial difference in their legal effects and accessory penalties. Under the Revised Penal Code, the principal penalty for a felony has its own specific duration and corresponding accessory penalties. The ruling thus required “reclusion perpetua” rather than “life imprisonment,” and “arresto menor” rather than “ten days of imprisonment.”

• Plea of Guilty and Evidence — Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance, because the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission of the offense charged. The ruling applied this rule to uphold the conviction despite the plea of guilty, given the prosecution’s evidence, including the eyewitness testimony of Jaime Asuncion.

• Death Indemnity and Moral Damages — Death indemnity of fifty thousand pesos for each victim may be awarded upon proof of the victim’s death and the accused’s responsibility therefor. Moral damages of fifty thousand pesos for each victim may be awarded without need of proof of the heirs’ consequent physical suffering and mental anguish. The ruling sustained the death indemnity and additionally awarded moral damages.

• "When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period." — This is the Court’s quotation of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the controlling provision on complex crimes; it supplied the rule that the trial court misapplied because the killings and injuries resulted from separate acts.
• "Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting the complex crime of double murder and for treating the killings as separate murders.
• "Where the trial court receives evidence to determine precisely whether or not the accused erred in admitting his guilt, the manner in which the plea of guilty is made (improvidently or not) loses legal significance, for the simple reason that the conviction is based on the evidence proving the commission by the accused of the offense charged." — This passage defines the rule that validated the conviction notwithstanding the plea of guilty, because the trial court received evidence of guilt.
• "To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but also that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent attempt." — This passage sets out the requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court found unproven and therefore not appreciated against accused-appellant.

• People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 [1997] — Cited for the rule that where the trial court receives evidence to determine whether the accused erred in admitting guilt, the improvidence of the plea of guilty loses legal significance because conviction is based on the evidence proving the offense.
• People vs. Abubu, 322 SCRA 407 [2000] — Cited in support of the holding that the instant case did not fall under either instance of a complex crime under Article 48.
• People vs. Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32 [1997] — Cited for the rule that where the death of two persons results from two different acts, two separate murders, not a complex crime, are committed.
• People vs. Piamonte, 303 SCRA 577 [1999]; People vs. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 [1999]; People vs. Enolva, 323 SCRA 295 [2000] — Cited for the requirement that evident premeditation be proven with equal certainty as the crime and cannot be presumed.
• People vs. Ricafranca, 323 SCRA 652 [2000]; People vs. Fuertes, 326 SCRA 382 [2000] — Cited for the distinction between life imprisonment and reclusion perpetua and the proper nomenclature of penalties.
• People vs. Literado, 209 SCRA 319 [1992]; People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Baguio, 196 SCRA 459 [1991]; Austria vs. Court of Appeals, 339 Phil. 486 [1997] — Cited for the rule that courts must employ the proper legal terminology in imposing penalties.
• People vs. Paraiso, 319 SCRA 422 [1999]; People vs. Cayago, 312 SCRA 623 [1999] — Cited for the award of death indemnity.
• People vs. Sullano, 331 SCRA 649 [2000]; People vs. Atrejenio, 310 SCRA 229 [1999]; People vs. Salcedo, 340 Phil. 12 [1997] — Cited for the award of moral damages without need of proof of physical suffering and mental anguish.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines complex crimes: when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime is imposed in its maximum period. The provision was applied to hold that separate acts of stabbing did not constitute a complex crime, so separate counts were proper.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — At the time of the April 1991 killings, prescribed the penalty for murder of reclusion temporal maximum to death. The provision was applied to hold that the proper penalty for each murder, absent aggravating and mitigating circumstances, was reclusion perpetua.
• Article 44, Revised Penal Code — Cited in relation to accessory penalties. The provision was used to emphasize that reclusion perpetua carries accessory penalties, unlike life imprisonment.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred. Ynares-Santiago, J., was on official business abroad.