People of the Philippines vs. George Daeng, et al.

In capital cases, a plea of guilty must not be accepted with alacrity; the trial court must be extra solicitous in ensuring that the accused fully understands the meaning of the plea and the import of an inevitable conviction, and it should take evidence notwithstanding the plea to determine guilt and the degree of culpability. A trial court’s remarks that assume guilt and warn of an inescapable death penalty may render a change of plea involuntary or improvident.

The defendants were convicted prisoners confined at the New Bilibid Prison, while the victim, Basilio Beltran, was another convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution. The case was an offshoot of the gang war that plagued various prisons in the country during the second half of 1970. The prosecution was commenced in the Circuit Criminal Court holding sessions in Pasig, Rizal, and the case reached the Supreme Court on automatic appeal from a death sentence.

The information charged that on or about December 13, 1970, in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, the defendants, while confined at the institution, conspiring, confederating, and acting together, each armed with improvised deadly weapons, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assaulted and wounded Basilio Beltran, No. 71495-P, another convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution, then in the process of serving the accused breakfast, inflicting multiple stab wounds while Beltran was unarmed and unable to defend himself, as a result of which Beltran died instantly. The information alleged evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness as qualifying circumstances.

On June 28, 1971, all four defendants pleaded not guilty. Shortly before the trial was adjourned for another date, the trial judge addressed them, stating that he understood they were confused and not ready to plead guilty to the crime charged, but giving them until 8:00 o’clock the following morning to make a “soul search,” concentrate, and ask their heart, mind, and body as to the consequence of their act. He further stated that under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, by virtue of the crime committed, the court had no alternative except to impose the death penalty, which was the maximum penalty under Art. 248, and that the court had no power to pardon, parole, or lower the penalty; clemency was for the executive department. He gave them until 8:00 o’clock on June 29 to make up their minds.

On June 29, 1971, the defendants, assisted by counsel de oficio, withdrew their former plea of not guilty and substituted a plea of guilty. Allowing the change of pleas, the trial judge forthwith dictated and promulgated his decision in open court, and all four defendants were sentenced to death. The case was then brought to the Supreme Court on automatic appeal.

The record did not show that the defendants needed or wanted additional time to consider or reconsider their initial plea. The trial judge’s remark that he understood they were confused and not ready to plead guilty was susceptible of being interpreted as an outright solicitation by the court itself of a change of plea. His further remark that under Art. 160 the court had no alternative except to impose the death penalty could mean, to an unschooled prisoner, that the judge had already assumed guilt and that the death sentence was inescapable; it was not farfetched that one, some, or all changed their pleas out of resignation to what appeared to be a pre-ordained fate. The record also did not show that the trial court directed any question to any accused regarding the circumstances of the crime. Because the case was an offshoot of the gang war that plagued various prisons during the second half of 1970, it was not a remote possibility that one or some of the defendants acted only as an accomplice or accomplices, or that treachery was absent, making the crime only homicide, which would not warrant the death penalty. The Court also noted that in at least three criminal cases appealed to it, including the present, from the Circuit Criminal Court in Pasig involving prisoners charged with participation in prison gang wars, Atty. Jose O. Galvan had been appointed counsel de oficio; in every case the defendants either pleaded guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their plea from not guilty to guilty. There was no evidence that he had applied for and been granted such appointment.

• Improvident Plea: Defendants-appellants, through counsel de oficio, argued that the circumstances attending their change of plea from “not guilty” to “guilty” generated serious doubt regarding their ability, at the time, to appreciate fully the import and consequences of the change.
• Presentation of Evidence: They maintained that the trial court should not have rendered the decision appealed from without requiring the presentation of evidence despite the plea of guilty, because in capital cases evidence is necessary to determine guilt and the degree of culpability and to dispel doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of the plea.
• Possible Lesser Liability: They suggested that one or some of the four defendants may have acted only as an accomplice or accomplices, or that the qualifying circumstance of treachery may not have been present, making the crime only homicide and not warranting the death penalty.

• Improvident Plea: The Solicitor General, as counsel for the People, joined the view that the records do not show that the trial court explained to the four appellants the full import and meaning of their plea of guilty, nor did it conduct any inquiry to remove all reasonable possibility that they entered their plea improvidently or without a clear and precise understanding of the exact nature of the charge and the import of an inevitable conviction.
• Presentation of Evidence: The Solicitor General agreed that the trial court should not have rendered the decision without requiring presentation of evidence despite the plea of guilty, and suggested the possibility that one or some of the defendants may have acted only as an accomplice or accomplices, or that treachery may not have been present, making the crime only homicide.

• Validity of Plea of Guilty: Whether the trial court erred in accepting the defendants’ change of plea from not guilty to guilty without ensuring that they fully understood the nature and consequences of the plea.
• Presentation of Evidence in Capital Cases: Whether the trial court should have required the presentation of evidence despite the plea of guilty in a capital case to determine guilt and the degree of culpability.
• Appointment of Counsel De Oficio: Whether courts should avoid the frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio in capital cases.

• Validity of Plea of Guilty: No. The plea was improvidently accepted; the trial judge’s remarks could be interpreted as solicitation of a change of plea and as assuming guilt, and the record did not show the defendants understood the real nature and consequences of pleading guilty.
• Presentation of Evidence in Capital Cases: Yes. In capital cases, evidence should be taken notwithstanding a plea of guilty to determine guilt and the degree of culpability and to dispel doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of the plea.
• Appointment of Counsel De Oficio: Yes. Courts were cautioned against frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio, because it is unfair to the attorney and may turn the fixed compensation into a regular source of income, to the prejudice of the accused.

• Validity of Plea of Guilty: The Court examined the manner by which the trial court allowed the change of plea and was convinced that the defendants were not made to understand and appreciate the real nature and consequences of their decision. The defendants had initially pleaded not guilty, and the record did not show that they needed or wanted additional time to consider or reconsider that plea. The trial judge’s remark that he understood they were “confused and ... not ready to plead guilty to the crime charged” and his grant of twenty-four hours could be interpreted as an outright solicitation by the court itself of a change of plea. His further remark that under Art. 160 of the Revised Penal Code, by virtue of the crime committed, the court had no alternative except to impose the death penalty under Art. 248, could mean to an unschooled prisoner that the judge had already assumed guilt and that the death sentence was inescapable. It was not farfetched that one, some, or all of the defendants changed their pleas out of resignation to what appeared to be a pre-ordained fate. The judge’s curt speech instructing them to make a “soul search” fell far below the exacting standard of care with which a plea of guilty must be regarded, as spelled out in People vs. Apduhan: trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
• Presentation of Evidence in Capital Cases: The counsel de oficio and the Solicitor General were one in observing that the trial court should not have rendered the decision without requiring the presentation of evidence despite the plea of guilty. The Court had repeatedly stressed the importance and advisability of taking evidence in capital cases, notwithstanding the affirmative plea of the accused, for the purpose of determining his guilt and the degree of his culpability, to the end that such evidence would dispel all doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of his plea. The record did not show that the trial court directed any question to any accused regarding the circumstances attending the commission of the crime. Because the case was an offshoot of the gang war that plagued various prisons during the second half of 1970, it was not a remote possibility that one or some of the four defendants acted only as an accomplice or accomplices, or that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present, making the crime only homicide, which does not warrant the death penalty. The rule was first enunciated in U.S. vs. Talbanos and later affirmed in subsequent cases.
• Appointment of Counsel De Oficio: In at least three criminal cases appealed to the Court, including the present, from the Circuit Criminal Court holding sessions in Pasig, Rizal, involving prisoners charged with and convicted for participation in prison gang wars, Atty. Jose O. Galvan had been appointed by the court a quo to act as counsel de oficio for the defendants. In every case, the defendants either pleaded guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their plea from “not guilty” to “guilty.” The appointment of Atty. Galvan in all three cases might have been a coincidence, since there was no evidence that he had applied for and been granted such appointment. The Court nevertheless cautioned all courts against the frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio for two basic reasons: first, it is unfair to the attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases; and second, the compensation provided for by section 32 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (a fixed fee of P500 in a capital offense) might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the Rule does not envision. In every case, the accused stands to suffer because the overburdened counsel would have too little time to spare for his de officio cases and would be inordinately eager to finish such cases in order to collect his fees within the earliest possible time.

• Plea of Guilty in Capital Cases — Trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused’s plea of guilty. While justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. In this case, the trial judge’s remarks and the twenty-four-hour period to make a “soul search” could be interpreted as solicitation of a change of plea and as an assumption that guilt and the death penalty were inevitable; the plea was therefore not validly accepted.
• Evidence Notwithstanding Plea of Guilty in Capital Cases — In capital cases, evidence should be taken notwithstanding the affirmative plea of the accused for the purpose of determining his guilt and the degree of his culpability, to the end that such evidence will dispel all doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of his plea. The trial court failed to ask any question about the circumstances of the crime, and the possibility of accomplice liability or absence of treachery meant the crime might only be homicide, not warranting death.
• Counsel De Oficio Appointment — Courts should avoid the frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio. Such practice is unfair to the attorney, who already bears the burden of regular practice, and the fixed compensation under section 32 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (P500 in a capital offense) might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income, which the Rule does not envision. The overburdened counsel may have too little time for the case and may be eager to finish it to collect fees, to the prejudice of the accused.

• "must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation, drawn from People vs. Apduhan, of the standard governing acceptance of a guilty plea in a capital case.
• "this Court has repeatedly stressed the importance and advisability of taking evidence, in capital cases, notwithstanding the affirmative plea of the accused, for the purpose of determining his guilt and the degree of his culpability, to the end that such evidence will dispel all doubt that the accused misunderstood the nature and effects of his plea." — This states the rule requiring evidence despite a guilty plea in capital cases, which the trial court failed to follow.
• "The judge's curt speech to the defendants, instructing them "to make a soul search, concentrate and ask (their) heart, mind and body as to the consequence of (their) act," falls far below the exacting standard of care with which a plea of guilty must be regarded by a trial court..." — This passage applies the Apduhan standard to the trial judge’s conduct and explains why the plea was improvidently accepted.
• "We would, nevertheless, caution all courts against the frequent appointment of the same attorney as counsel de oficio, for two basic reasons: first, it is unfair to the attorney concerned, considering the burden of his regular practice that he should be saddled with too many de officio cases; and, second, the compensation provided for by section 32 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (a fixed fee of P500 in capital offense) might be considered by some lawyers as a regular source of income, something which the Rule does not envision." — This is the Court’s caution regarding repeated appointments of the same counsel de oficio, an ancillary but notable procedural admonition.

• People vs. Apduhan, L-19491, August 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798 — Controlling precedent; the Court relied on it for the rule that trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity a plea of guilty and must be extra solicitous in ensuring that the accused understands fully the meaning of the plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
• U.S. vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541 — The Court cited it as the case that first enunciated the rule requiring the taking of evidence in capital cases despite a plea of guilty; the rule was later affirmed in subsequent cases.
• People vs. Matias, et al., L-35384, November 28, 1972 — Cited as a recent case applying the Apduhan standard regarding acceptance of a guilty plea.

• Article 160, Revised Penal Code — The trial judge invoked this provision in warning the defendants that, by virtue of the crime committed, the court had no alternative but to impose the death penalty. The Court treated this remark as part of the circumstances that could have led the accused to believe that guilt was already assumed and that death was inevitable.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The trial judge stated that the maximum penalty for the crime was death under this article. The Court noted that if treachery was absent, the crime would only be homicide and would not warrant the extreme penalty of death.
• Section 32, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Cited in the Court’s caution against frequent appointment of the same counsel de oficio; it provides a fixed fee of P500 in a capital offense, which the Court said should not be treated by lawyers as a regular source of income.

Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, and Esguerra, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, C.J., took no part.