People of the Philippines vs. Freddie Braña

Abuse of superior strength qualifies a killing to murder where the assailant uses a knife against an unarmed victim, taking advantage of superiority of sex and weapon; evident premeditation is not established by a mere threat, and voluntary surrender may mitigate even if made after a warrant of arrest was issued.

Freddie Braña, a student, and Corazon Tabaño, a 19-year-old, were known to each other since 1962, when Braña frequented the residence of Corazon's family and later boarded at 178-A Magdalo Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, where Corazon also lived from 1964. Their connection to the same residence forms the background to the charge for Corazon's death on January 6, 1967.

At about 7:30 in the morning of January 6, 1967, 19-year-old Corazon Tabaño was found by her mother in their house at 178 Magdalo Street, La Paz, Iloilo City, bleeding from several stab wounds. She was rushed to St. Paul's Hospital but expired a few minutes after arrival. The autopsy report, Exhibit "A", revealed five stab wounds: one in the thorax penetrating downward at the right mid-clavicular line level of the first rib, perforating the upper lobe of the lungs through and through, with the point hitting the 6th rib; one 3-1/2 cm wound in the abdomen, 2-1/2 cm above the umbilicus, penetrating horizontally and perforating the jejunum and the aorta through and through, with the point hitting the spinal column; a third stab wound, 3-1/2 cm long, in the right middle portion of the abdomen, penetrating downward and perforating the right kidney through and through, with exit at the right posterior lumbar region, 1 cm long; a fourth stab wound, 12-1/2 cm long, on the left forearm, lateral aspect, distal third down to the wrist; and a fifth stab wound, 3-1/2 cm long, passing through and through from the left lateral elbow to the postero-lateral aspect, medial portion, with exit about 1 cm long. The cause of death was certified as shock due to hemorrhage from stab wounds. For this death, Freddie Braña, a student, was formally charged with murder qualified by evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, attended by the aggravating circumstances of disregard to sex and dwelling.

The prosecution presented Concepcion Tabaño, the mother of the deceased, who testified that while she was in the kitchen of their house at 178-A Magdalo Street, she heard Corazon cry, "Help, help, Mother, help"; that she ran to the room and saw Freddie Braña stabbing her daughter in rapid succession with a knife; that while Corazon tried to parry the blows, she heard Braña say, "So, you don't want me? I better kill you"; that Corazon escaped and ran toward the door, whereupon the mother pushed her into another room and barred the door; and that while inside, she heard Braña outside saying, "If I could only enter the room I will kill all of you." Concepcion also declared that she had known Braña since 1962 because he used to go to their then residence at the Normal School site, and that he later became a boarder of her sister at 178-A Magdalo Street, where she and her family also took residence. Rafaela Fortaleza, a first cousin of Corazon, testified that she came to know Braña in 1962 when he boarded in their house at 178-A Magdalo Street; that Corazon started living at the same address in 1964; that she heard Braña and Corazon talk about love, but Corazon did not accept Braña's proposal because she wanted to finish her studies first; that on two occasions, the last being January 5, 1967, Corazon informed her that Braña had threatened to kill her if she accepted other suitors; and that, on Corazon's request, she did not reveal the threat to Corazon's parents. Patrolman Felipe Lorca of the Iloilo City police force testified that on January 6, 1967, he met Braña at the Iloilo Mission Hospital when the latter was brought in on a stretcher; that upon inquiry, Braña told him he had stabbed himself after stabbing a woman on Magdalo Street; that after verifying that a woman had indeed been stabbed and was in serious condition at St. Paul's Hospital, he proceeded to 178 Magdalo Street to investigate; and that he found the knife smeared with blood, Exhibit "B", which he turned over to the police. Andres Suarez declared that on January 6, 1967, while on his way to school, he noticed a crowd near the railroad track on Magdalo Street; that when he got near, he saw Braña lying on his stomach pleading with Leopoldo Hortinilla to bring him to the hospital; that as Hortinilla was alone, he helped carry Braña to the main road; and that on the way, he asked Braña about his stomach wounds and Braña replied that he had stabbed himself after stabbing a woman.

The defense presented witnesses to disprove the prosecution's theory that Braña was a rejected suitor. Maria Luz Lauro, an aunt of Braña and a boarder at 178-A Magdalo Street, declared that Braña and Corazon were sweethearts; that she had seen them going out together; that in the house they took food from the same plate and used the same spoon; and that Braña had in his possession a picture of Corazon with a dedication at the back addressed to "Dearest Freddie." Delia Braña, sister of the accused, testified that she and her brother Freddie had stayed at 178-A Magdalo Street not as boarders because they cooked their own food; that she knew Freddie and Corazon were sweethearts because they saw movies together and used to eat from one plate with only one spoon; that when they were in the house they always stayed in the receiving room whispering to each other; that she even saw Freddie keeping a picture of Corazon with the dedication "Always love you" signed "Neneng" (Corazon); that her brother left the house at 178-A Magdalo Street on January 3, 1967 because Corazon's parents were often scolding her for seeing movies frequently with Freddie; and that when Freddie was still in the hospital, she brought him his notebooks left in Magdalo, and from one of the notebooks she saw Freddie get the picture of Corazon and tear it to pieces.

Accused Freddie Braña took the witness stand and testified that he and Corazon Tabaño were sweethearts from 1962 to 1967; that they often went to church, attended novenas, and saw motion pictures together; that at one time, while coming out of the balcony section of the Ever Theatre in Iloilo City, they were seen by a cousin of Corazon, Mamerto Donato, who upbraided her for missing her classes and took her home; that during the Christmas vacation of 1966 he asked Corazon to allow him to go to Janiuay, Iloilo; that she consented, although he was advised to behave well; that when he returned to Iloilo City on January 1, 1967, Corazon told him to transfer to another house because her parents had learned of their relationship and were always quarreling; that following her suggestion he moved to a house at the back of the Mission Hospital, although his sister was left behind at the house on Magdalo Street; that in the morning of January 6, 1967, he had taken a bus for Iloilo City to see Atty. Quirico Defensor; that the bus passed Magdalo Street and stopped in front of Corazon's house to allow a passenger to get off; that he saw Corazon going up their house; that he alighted from the bus and followed her; that he found nobody in the house except the deceased; that he first went to the kitchen to light his cigarettes, but as he could find none, he proceeded to Corazon's room; that there he caught her and kissed her without the latter offering any resistance; that while kissing, they heard footsteps coming from the main stairs, so Corazon pushed him away; that when the footsteps did not go to the place where they were, he tried to kiss her again, but Corazon held his hair, pushed him back, and ran away; that she returned holding a knife, demonstrating, "I told you not to court anyone. You court Inday Lala" (referring to Rafaela Fortaleza); that he retreated laughing and saying to her, "So, Ling, you are going to stab me?"; that as he had reached the wall and could back no farther, he jestingly raised his shirt, whereupon Corazon stabbed him; that his vision became blurred, and unknowingly he wrestled away the knife from Corazon's hand and stabbed her. Braña also declared that upon his discharge from the hospital he stayed for a few days in the house near the Mission Hospital until he was brought to the house of Atty. Rico Defensor, who surrendered him to the police authorities. He confirmed the testimonies of the defense witnesses that he and Corazon used to take their meals sharing one plate and using the same spoon, and that he destroyed Corazon's picture, the only evidence of their relationship, not knowing that it would be needed. Rizalino Villanueva of the Iloilo City Police Department testified for the defense that at about 2:45 in the afternoon of March 31, 1967, Braña was surrendered to him by Atty. Quirico Defensor, which fact was duly entered in the police blotter.

The trial court found the accused's version improbable and unsupported, and credited Patrolman Felipe Lorca and Andres Suarez that the injuries on the accused were self-inflicted. It also relied on Rafaela Fortaleza's testimony that Corazon had informed her of Braña's threat to kill her if she accepted other suitors.

• Evident Premeditation: Accused-appellant Freddie Braña contended that the trial court erred in considering the killing qualified by evident premeditation; a threat alone does not justify such a finding, and there was no proof that he decided to commit the crime as a result of meditation, calculation, and reflection, or that he took concrete steps and had sufficient time to reflect before the killing.
• Sufficient Provocation: Counsel de officio urged sufficient provocation by the victim, consisting in Corazon's act of assaulting the accused with a knife and wounding him.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Counsel de officio urged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• Voluntary Surrender: Counsel de officio urged voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Rejected Suitor Theory: The defense presented witnesses to disprove the prosecution's theory that the accused was a rejected suitor of the deceased, maintaining that he and Corazon were sweethearts.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court erred in finding evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
• Dwelling: Whether commission in the victim's dwelling was properly considered an aggravating circumstance.
• Insult or Disregard of Sex: Whether the fact that the victim was a woman constituted insult or disregard of respect due her sex as an aggravating circumstance.
• Sufficient Provocation: Whether sufficient provocation by the victim mitigated the offense.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: Whether lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong mitigated the offense.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender mitigated the offense.
• Penalty: Whether the imposable penalty should be death or life imprisonment.

• Evident Premeditation: No. A threat alone does not establish evident premeditation; the elements must be proved by evidence as clear as the proof of the crime itself, and no concrete steps or sufficient lapse of time were shown.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. The accused attacked an unarmed 4 feet, 11-inch girl with a knife, abusing the superiority afforded by his sex and weapon, leaving the victim unable to defend herself.
• Dwelling: Yes. The killing occurred in the house at 178-A Magdalo Street where the victim and her family resided, and the accused had ceased living therein.
• Insult or Disregard of Sex: No. The fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of the respect due her sex; no proof showed particular intent to cast insult or commit disrespect to her sex.
• Sufficient Provocation: No. The trial court's finding that the victim did not provoke the assault was upheld; the accused's injuries were found self-inflicted, and the credibility finding was not disturbed.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: No. Five rapid stab wounds, three to the thorax and abdomen damaging vital organs, negated lack of intent to cause so serious an injury.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The accused voluntarily presented himself to the police on March 31, 1967; the prior issuance of a warrant on March 7, 1967 did not detract from voluntariness absent proof the warrant was served or returned unserved.
• Penalty: Life imprisonment. Murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death; with dwelling offset by voluntary surrender, the penalty is the medium period, life imprisonment.

• Evident Premeditation: The lower court relied solely on Rafaela Fortaleza's testimony that on two occasions, the last on January 5, 1967, Corazon told her that Braña had threatened to kill her if she accepted other suitors. A threat on the victim's life is not enough to justify evident premeditation; it must be proved that the accused decided to commit the crime and that the decision resulted from meditation, calculation, and reflection. The elements are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating persistence or determination to commit it; and (3) sufficient lapse of time to enable meditation and reflection between the determination and the actual execution. These must be established by evidence as clear as the proof of the crime itself. Aside from Fortaleza's testimony being uncorroborated and its admissibility open to question, the record had no proof of concrete steps taken to carry out the threat or sufficient time to reflect between the alleged noontime threat of January 5, 1967 and the early morning killing of January 6, 1967. Evident premeditation was therefore not established.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: The Court affirmed the lower court's conclusion that the crime was murder because of abuse of superior strength. When the accused attacked the unarmed 4 feet, 11-inch girl with the knife, Exhibit "B", he abused the superiority afforded by his sex and weapon, from which the deceased was unable to defend herself. This circumstance qualified the killing to murder.
• Dwelling: The Court sustained the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. The incident occurred in the house at 178-A Magdalo Street where the victim and her family resided, and the accused had ceased living therein by that time.
• Insult or Disregard of Sex: The Court rejected the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of respect due to the victim's sex. The fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of the respect due her sex. For this circumstance to be considered, it must be proved that in committing the crime the accused particularly intended to cast insult or commit disrespect to the victim's sex. No such evidence was presented.
• Sufficient Provocation: The defense of previous provocation, consisting of Corazon's alleged assault with a knife and wounding of the accused, was overruled by the trial court as improbable and contradicted by Patrolman Felipe Lorca and Andres Suarez, who testified that the accused's injuries were self-inflicted. The Court found no reason to disagree. The challenge to the conclusion that the deceased did not provoke the assault raised the credibility of witnesses, and the trial judge's ruling on the weight of testimonies will not be disturbed unless unsupported by evidence. The record showed the accused's version to be melodramatic, implausible, and unsupported, and its improbability belied his story.
• Lack of Intent to Commit So Grave a Wrong: The claim was without merit. Intention is a mental process, an internal act, a state of mind, generally determined or deduced from the acts of the offender and the effects resulting therefrom. The infliction of five stab wounds in rapid succession, three of which were in the thorax and abdomen and damaged vital internal organs, showed the accused's intention to snuff out the deceased's life and negated any pretense of lack of intent to cause so serious an injury.
• Voluntary Surrender: The Court appreciated voluntary surrender in favor of the accused. Although the warrant for his arrest was dated March 7, 1967, and the police took custody of him only on March 31, 1967, there was nothing on record showing that the warrant had actually been served on him or returned unserved for failure to locate him. There was direct evidence that the accused voluntarily presented himself to the police on March 31, 1967. The fact that the surrender occurred after the warrant was issued did not detract from its voluntary character absent proof to the contrary. The Court noted a prior case where voluntary surrender was considered despite the accused showing up 16 days after the order for his arrest, because the law does not require surrender before the issuance of the arrest order.
• Penalty: The crime committed was murder, punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. With the aggravating circumstance of dwelling offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty should be the medium period, life imprisonment. The lower court's decision was modified accordingly, with indemnity to the heirs of P12,000.00 and costs.

• Evident premeditation — Requires proof that the accused decided to commit the crime and that the decision resulted from meditation, calculation, and reflection. The elements are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating persistence or determination to commit it; and (3) sufficient lapse of time to enable meditation and reflection between the determination and the execution. These must be established by evidence as clear as the proof of the crime itself. A mere threat on the victim's life does not suffice. In this case, the alleged threat on January 5, 1967, was uncorroborated and unsupported by proof of concrete steps or sufficient time to reflect before the January 6, 1967 killing.
• Abuse of superior strength — Qualifies a killing to murder when the assailant takes advantage of superiority of sex and weapon against an unarmed victim unable to defend herself. The Court applied it because Braña attacked an unarmed 4 feet, 11-inch girl with a knife.
• Dwelling as aggravating circumstance — Appreciated when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the victim, provided the accused was not residing there at the time. The Court sustained it because the killing occurred in the victim's house at 178-A Magdalo Street, where she and her family resided, and Braña had ceased living there.
• Insult or disregard of respect due to sex — The fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute this aggravating circumstance. It must be proved that the accused particularly intended to cast insult or commit disrespect to the victim's sex. No such proof existed.
• Voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstance — Requires voluntary presentation to the authorities. It is not negated by the fact that a warrant of arrest had already been issued, absent proof that the warrant was served or returned unserved. The Court credited Braña's surrender on March 31, 1967, despite the warrant dated March 7, 1967.
• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong — Intention is a mental process, an internal act, a state of mind, generally determined or deduced from the acts of the offender and the effects resulting therefrom. Five rapid stab wounds, three to the thorax and abdomen damaging vital organs, negated lack of intent.
• Credibility of witnesses — The trial judge's ruling on the weight of testimonies will not be disturbed by the appellate tribunal unless not supported by evidence. The Court applied this in rejecting the accused's provocation defense.
• Offsetting of aggravating and mitigating circumstances — When an aggravating circumstance is offset by a mitigating circumstance, the penalty is imposed in its medium period. The Court offset dwelling with voluntary surrender, reducing the penalty to life imprisonment.

• "It must be remembered in this connection that to justify a finding of evident premeditation it is not enough that there be a threat on the life of the victim; it must be proved that the accused not only had decided to commit the crime but also that the decision was the result of meditation, calculation, and reflection." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting evident premeditation and formulates the quantum of proof required.
• "For it cannot be disputed that when the accused attacked the unarmed 4 feet, 11-inch girl with the knife, Exhibit "B", the former had abused that superiority which his sex and weapon employed afforded him, and from which the deceased would be unable to defend herself." — This passage explains why abuse of superior strength qualified the killing to murder.
• "The fact that the victim is a woman does not per se constitute disregard of the respect due her sex that would aggravate a crime. For this circumstance to be properly considered, it must be proved that in the commission of the crime the accused had particularly intended to cast insult or commit disrespect to the sex of the victim." — This passage defines the aggravating circumstance of insult or disregard of sex and why it was rejected.
• "And the fact that it was effected sometime after the warrant of arrest had been issued does not in the least detract from the voluntary character of the surrender, in the absence of proof to the contrary." — This passage supports the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender despite the prior issuance of an arrest warrant.

• People vs. Diokno, 63 Phil. 601 — Cited among the authorities for the rule that evident premeditation requires proof that the decision to commit the crime resulted from meditation, calculation, and reflection, not merely a threat.
• People vs. Custodio, 97 Phil. 698 — Cited in support of the evident premeditation requisites and the requirement of clear proof.
• People vs. Diva, L-22946, 29 April 1968, 23 SCRA 332 — Cited for the elements of evident premeditation and for the rule that voluntary surrender may be appreciated even when effected after the issuance of an arrest warrant; the decision also cites People vs. Valera.
• People vs. Quesada, 62 Phil. 446 — Cited for abuse of superior strength as a qualifying circumstance.
• People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548 — Cited for the requirement that insult or disregard of respect due to sex must be shown by particular intent.
• People vs. Yu, I-13780, 28 January 1961 — Cited for the rule that intention may be determined or deduced from the acts of the offender and the effects resulting therefrom.
• People vs. Orongan, 58 Phil. 426 — Cited in relation to the rejection of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
• People vs. Valera, L-15662, 30 August 1962 — Cited in People vs. Diva for voluntary surrender notwithstanding delay after the arrest order.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concurred. Sanchez and Barredo, JJ., took no part.