People of the Philippines vs. Francisco Caber, Sr.

Self-defense cannot be invoked where the alleged aggressor has already fled and the danger to the accused has ceased; a killing committed under such circumstances, without proof of qualifying circumstances, is homicide, not murder, and voluntary surrender to a barangay tanod may be credited as mitigating because the tanod may be treated as an intermediary to surrender to a person in authority.

Francisco Caber, Sr. was a barangay tanod in Tacloban City, and Teodolfo Ramirez was known to him; prosecution eyewitness Julian Rama was Caber's fellow barangay tanod and Ramirez's kumpadre. The killing was prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code, with the information alleging murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation and the defense raising self-defense and mitigating circumstances. A rape complaint filed by Caber's wife against Ramirez shortly before the incident formed part of the background to the encounter. The case required the Supreme Court to apply the Revised Penal Code provisions on self-defense, qualifying circumstances, and mitigating circumstances.

At around 7:30 in the morning of November 20, 1994, in Barangay 80, Marasbaras, Tacloban City, Julian Rama was in the front yard of his house when he saw Francisco Caber, Sr. chasing Teodolfo Ramirez with a bladed weapon locally known as a pisao. Rama knew both men: Caber was his fellow barangay tanod, while Ramirez was his kumpadre. Ramirez ran toward Rama asking for help. Rama raised his hands and told Caber, "Pare, don’t come near us!" but Caber did not heed him. Although Ramirez sought cover behind Rama, Caber stabbed him twice on the chest. Rama called on his neighbors to help, but they got scared and fled. Caber surrendered to Rama, who instructed another tanod to take him to the city police station. Rama and still another companion took Ramirez to the Tacloban City Hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

Dr. Leo B. Lagado issued a medico-legal report dated October 3, 1995, describing two stab wounds: one about 1-cm. in length in the mid-sternal area at the level of the nipple, penetrating the left thoracic cavity, and another about 2-cm. in length in the left parasternal area, 1st intercestal space, penetrating the left thoracic cavity. Dr. Lagado testified that Ramirez died of hypovolemic shock secondary to the stab wounds. He opined that the stab wounds were caused by a bladed weapon, possibly by the fan knife locally known as pisao. The two stab wounds were fatal, and the one in the mid-sternal area, which penetrated the victim’s left thoracic cavity, by itself could have caused Ramirez’s death.

Caber admitted killing Ramirez but claimed self-defense. He testified that he was 63 years old, married, and worked at the Mercado’s Caltex Gasoline Station in front of the Divine Word University in Tacloban City. At around 7:30 in the morning of November 20, 1994, he took a pedicab to work. Just after he had alighted from the vehicle, he heard someone shout, "Manong Caber, someone is going to kill you!" Instinctively, he turned around and caught Ramirez’s hand as the latter was about to stab him. He parried the blow, turned the knife toward his attacker, and thrust it into Ramirez’s chest. Ramirez then ran toward Rama’s house; Caber gave chase; and after catching up with Ramirez, he stabbed the latter on the chest once. Thereafter, he surrendered to a barangay tanod at the police outpost near the City Hospital and was detained at the Tacloban City Jail.

Caber claimed that his wife, Adelina Caber, had filed a rape case on November 18, 1994 against Ramirez, as a result of which Ramirez was arrested and detained. He said that before the stabbing incident, he did not know that Ramirez had been released from jail. He denied having harbored any grudge against the victim for what the latter had done to his wife. Adelina Caber corroborated her husband’s testimony that on November 18, 1994, she filed a complaint for rape against Ramirez, for which reason he was arrested and detained at the city jail on the same day. Asked whether her husband harbored any grudge, Adelina said that her husband merely told her that he was not going to harm her if she told everything to him.

The prosecution’s eyewitness account placed Caber as the pursuer and attacker, while Caber’s own account conceded that Ramirez ran away after Caber turned the knife on him and that Caber still pursued and stabbed him. The trial court convicted Caber of murder, and he appealed.

• Self-Defense and Eyewitness Account: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court gravely erred in relying solely on Julian Rama’s eyewitness account and disregarding his testimony that he was previously attacked by the victim and merely acted in self-defense. He argued that Rama witnessed only the second stage of the encounter—when he chased and stabbed Ramirez—while the initial aggression was committed by Ramirez.
• Murder and Voluntary Surrender: Accused-appellant argued that, even assuming no self-defense, the trial court erred in finding him guilty of murder and in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Passion or Obfuscation: The Solicitor-General contended that the trial court erred in crediting accused-appellant with the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation.

• Self-Defense: Whether accused-appellant acted in self-defense when he killed Teodolfo Ramirez.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Passion or Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation was properly credited in favor of accused-appellant.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender should be credited as a mitigating circumstance.
• Crime, Penalty, and Damages: Whether accused-appellant is liable for murder or homicide and what penalty and damages should be imposed.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established; any unlawful aggression by Ramirez had ceased when he fled, and accused-appellant pursued and stabbed him, negating the indispensable element of unlawful aggression.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to prove the time of determination, an act showing persistence in that determination, and sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• Treachery: No. The victim knew the danger and tried to escape; the accused did not consciously adopt a method of attack that ensured execution without risk from the victim’s defense.
• Passion or Obfuscation: No. Accused-appellant’s own testimony that he harbored no grudge and was unaware of Ramirez’s release negated the circumstance; revenge and the three-day interval also precluded it.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Accused-appellant voluntarily gave himself up to barangay tanod Julian Rama, who arranged his surrender to the city police; Rama could be treated as an intermediary to a person in authority.
• Crime, Penalty, and Damages: Homicide only, not murder. The penalty is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, plus ₱50,000 moral damages in addition to ₱50,000 civil indemnity.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, accused-appellant admitted the killing and bore the burden to prove (a) unlawful aggression by the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it; and (c) sufficient provocation on his part. Unlawful aggression is indispensable. Even if initially present, the right to kill or wound ceases once the aggression stops and the danger disappears. The prosecution’s evidence showed Caber ran after and stabbed Ramirez twice as Ramirez tried to seek cover behind Rama. Caber’s own account stated that after he turned the knife toward Ramirez and thrust it at him, Ramirez ran away; Caber nevertheless pursued and stabbed him. At that point, any danger to Caber had ceased. People vs. Alconga was cited: the alleged aggressor fled after being wounded, but the accused pursued and mortally wounded him; self-defense was rejected because the right to inflict injury ceased after the victim fled. Caber also failed to present the pedicab driver or the person who warned him to corroborate his account, weakening his credibility.
• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated absent proof of (a) the time when accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating he clung to that determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection and conscience to overcome the resolution. The only evidence presented to prove this was the rape charge; this alone was insufficient to show that Caber premeditated revenge against Ramirez.
• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender commits a crime against persons employing means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The prosecution must show (a) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (b) that the accused consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. Here, Caber chased Ramirez and stabbed him as Ramirez tried to seek cover behind Rama; this shows Ramirez knew the danger and tried to escape, albeit unsuccessfully. Thus, no treachery. Caber’s testimony that Rama was holding the victim’s hands during the second blow showed the victim’s position was accidental; Caber could not have consciously or deliberately taken advantage of it.
• Passion or Obfuscation: This circumstance mitigates because causes naturally producing powerful excitement cause a person to lose reason and self-control, diminishing will power. Requisites: (a) an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (b) the act producing obfuscation must not be so far removed from the crime, because after considerable time the perpetrator might have recovered equanimity. It must also arise from lawful sentiments, not a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. Caber testified he did not harbor any grudge against Ramirez and was not aware Ramirez had been released; he was surprised when Ramirez allegedly attacked him. These statements negated passion or obfuscation. Even if he killed to avenge the wrong to his wife, he would have acted in a spirit of revenge. Moreover, the alleged rape was on November 17, 1994, while the stabbing was on November 20, 1994—three days later. United States vs. Sarikala held that a lapse of more than 24 hours from the act producing passion or obfuscation to the felony constituted a considerable period after which the circumstance would no longer be deemed present.
• Voluntary Surrender: Requisites: (1) offender not actually arrested; (2) offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) surrender was voluntary. The evidence showed that shortly after stabbing Ramirez, Caber gave himself up to barangay tanod Julian Rama, who arranged for his surrender to the city police. Although a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of a person in authority, Rama could be treated as an intermediary to Caber’s surrender, justifying appreciation of the mitigating circumstance.
• Crime, Penalty, and Damages: Based on the foregoing, Caber is liable for homicide only, punishable by reclusion temporal under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. With voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. In addition to the ₱50,000 civil indemnity awarded by the trial court, Caber must pay the heirs of Teodolfo Ramirez ₱50,000 moral damages.

• Self-Defense — Requisites and Cessation of Unlawful Aggression — A person invoking self-defense admits the killing and must prove (a) unlawful aggression by the victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel it, and (c) sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is indispensable; even if it initially existed, the right to kill or wound ceases once the aggression stops and the danger disappears. The Court applied this rule because Caber pursued and stabbed Ramirez after Ramirez had fled, so any unlawful aggression had ceased.
• Evident Premeditation — Requisites — Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The Court found these requisites unproved; the rape charge alone did not establish premeditated revenge.
• Treachery — Requisites — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure the crime’s execution without risk to himself arising from the victim’s defense. It requires (a) that the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack and (b) that the accused consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack. The Court found no treachery because Ramirez knew the danger and tried to escape, and his position during the second blow was accidental.
• Passion or Obfuscation — Requisites and Time Element — Passion or obfuscation mitigates because powerful excitement causes loss of reason and self-control. It requires (a) an unlawful act sufficient to produce that condition and (b) that the act not be so far removed from the crime; it must also arise from lawful sentiments, not revenge. The Court denied the circumstance because Caber’s own testimony negated it, revenge would not qualify, and the three-day interval from the alleged rape to the stabbing was too long under United States vs. Sarikala.
• Voluntary Surrender — Requisites and Barangay Tanod as Intermediary — Voluntary surrender requires (1) that the offender was not actually arrested, (2) that he surrendered to a person in authority, and (3) that the surrender was voluntary. Although a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of one, the Court treated barangay tanod Julian Rama as an intermediary to Caber’s surrender to the city police, thus crediting the mitigating circumstance.
• Homicide vs. Murder and Indeterminate Sentence — Absent proof of qualifying circumstances such as evident premeditation and treachery, a killing is homicide, not murder. Homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code. With voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance, the Indeterminate Sentence Law fixes the minimum and maximum terms. The Court applied this to reduce the conviction to homicide and impose six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• "To begin with, by invoking self-defense, accused-appellant admits to the crime for which he is charged and, therefore, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove (a) that the victim was guilty of unlawful aggression; (b) that there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by him to repel the aggression; and (c) that there was sufficient provocation on his (accused-appellant’s) part." — This passage states the requisites of self-defense and explains why the burden shifted to the accused after he admitted the killing.
• "Even if initially there was unlawful aggression, the person attacked has no more right to kill or wound the former aggressor the moment the aggression ceases. When the danger or risk to him has disappeared, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person defending himself." — This is the ratio for rejecting self-defense: Caber continued to pursue and stab Ramirez after the alleged aggression had ceased.
• "Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the Court’s canonical definition of treachery, applied to hold that the qualifying circumstance was not proven.
• "In this case, the evidence shows that shortly after stabbing Ramirez, accused-appellant gave himself up to barangay tanod Julian Rama who then arranged for his surrender to the city police. Although a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of a person in authority, nevertheless, Rama could be treated as an intermediary to accused-appellant’s surrender so as to justify appreciating this mitigating circumstance in favor of accused-appellant." — This passage explains why voluntary surrender was credited despite the surrender being made to a barangay tanod rather than directly to a person in authority.

• People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 (1947) — Cited as controlling for the rule that self-defense cannot be invoked when the alleged aggressor has fled; after the victim ran away, the accused’s right to inflict injury ceased.
• United States vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil. 486 (1918) — Cited for the rule that a lapse of more than 24 hours from the act producing passion or obfuscation to the commission of the felony is a considerable period after which the mitigating circumstance is no longer deemed present.
• People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation and treachery.
• People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 31, 2000 — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender and for treating a barangay tanod as an intermediary to surrender.
• People vs. De Guzman, 164 SCRA 225 (1988) — Cited for the rule that a barangay tanod is not a person in authority but only an agent of a person in authority.
• People vs. Javier, 311 SCRA 576 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of passion or obfuscation.
• People vs. Pampanga, 139 SCRA 339 (1985) — Cited for the requirement that passion or obfuscation arise from lawful sentiments and not from revenge.

• Revised Penal Code, Art. 11(1) — Self-defense; cited as the basis for the requisites accused-appellant had to prove after admitting the killing.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 14(16) — Defines treachery; cited in rejecting treachery as a qualifying circumstance.
• Revised Penal Code, Art. 249 — Homicide punishable by reclusion temporal; applied because only homicide, not murder, was established.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms after voluntary surrender was credited and no aggravating circumstance was found.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.