People of the Philippines vs. Francis Patricio y Torda

Treachery is present when the victim is attacked suddenly and unexpectedly, is unarmed, and is immobilized or restrained by co-accused while the principal assailant inflicts multiple fatal stab wounds, leaving the victim with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate. The claim of self-defense cannot be sustained where the accused fails to prove unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence, and where the means employed—inflicting 14 stab wounds—is not reasonably commensurate to the alleged attack.

The case involves the prosecution of Francis Patricio y Torda, together with Nicholas Dimagiba y Patricio and Don Diego Pastrana y Masangya, for the murder of Jeffrey De Castro y Alviz. The accused and the victim were neighbors and childhood friends in Quezon City. The crime was charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. Nicholas remained at large throughout the proceedings, while Francis voluntarily surrendered to the police on September 6, 2018, almost three years after the commission of the crime.

Francis Patricio y Torda, Nicholas Dimagiba y Patricio, and Don Diego Pastrana y Masangya were charged with murder for the death of Jeffrey De Castro y Alviz, their neighbor and childhood friend. On November 13, 2015, around 3:00 a.m., Nelia Espinosa rushed to the home of Consuelo De Castro, Jeffrey's mother, and reported that Jeffrey was being stabbed. Jennifer De Castro, Jeffrey's younger sister, hurried to the nearby "cara y cruz-an" and from about two meters away saw Francis stabbing Jeffrey while Nicholas and Diego held Jeffrey's arms. Jennifer testified that Francis repeatedly stabbed Jeffrey with a knife, and although Jeffrey struggled and tried to defend himself by raising his lower arms, he was unable to resist the attack. Jennifer ran to call for help, and when she and Consuelo returned, they were prevented by Barangay Security Police Officers from viewing Jeffrey's bloodied body.

Roy Espinosa, Jr., a neighbor whose house was about five meters from the "cara y cruz-an," testified that he was awakened by noise from a brawl. He went to his terrace and witnessed Francis stabbing Jeffrey while Nicholas and Diego held him. Roy saw Jeffrey crawl on the ground and utter "Bakit ako?" to Francis, but Francis continued stabbing him until Jeffrey fell into the river. Francis then said "Edwin, wala kang nakita," and all the accused fled. Dr. Rupero J. Sombilon, Jr., a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, performed the autopsy and found that Jeffrey sustained injuries in the face and head and 14 stab wounds in different parts of his body, nine of which were fatal since they hit vital organs such as the liver and lungs. Dr. Sombilon concluded that Jeffrey's death was due to multiple stab wounds.

Francis presented a different version of events. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he left a drinking session at Nicholas's house and went to buy noodles. Along the way, he met Diego, and they decided to go to the "looban" to play "cara y cruz." Francis placed a bet of ₱50.00, and Jeffrey ordered him to buy a few things. When Francis protested, Jeffrey said "Bakit, papalag ka ba?" and later told him "Gusto mo suntukin kita?" Jeffrey then punched him, leaving him groggy. Francis saw Jeffrey take something from his pocket, and thinking his life was in danger, he lunged at him. They grappled for the object, which turned out to be a knife. Francis claimed that Jeffrey repeatedly said "Pag nakawala ako dito, papatayin kita! Papatayin kita!" and that he feared for his life since Jeffrey was notoriously known as a "siga" in their neighborhood. When Francis was able to snatch the knife, he stabbed Jeffrey, but he could not recall how many times. On cross-examination, Francis admitted that he stabbed Jeffrey near the shoulder blade while Jeffrey was holding his neck, and that he made sure Jeffrey was already dead when he left him, thinking that if he left Jeffrey alive, Jeffrey might still kill him. Francis denied that he, Nicholas, and Diego planned to kill Jeffrey, and he clarified that Diego and Nicholas had no participation in the crime he committed. He admitted that there was no medical certificate to prove his injuries supposedly caused by Jeffrey's punch.

The trial court convicted Francis as charged, ruling that the prosecution sufficiently proved all the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court appreciated treachery, finding that Diego and Nicholas were holding Jeffrey while Francis continuously stabbed him, and that Jeffrey was still being stabbed while crawling on the ground until he fell into the river. The trial court also found conspiracy among the three accused. The trial court rejected Francis's claim of self-defense, ruling that Jeffrey's supposed threat to kill Francis, not followed by external acts, was insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression, and that Francis's testimony was not supported by medical records showing any injury inflicted on him by Jeffrey. The trial court did not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, noting that Francis surrendered almost three years after the commission of the crime.

• Self-Defense: Francis argued that his claim of self-defense should be considered since there was no sufficient provocation on his part, and it was Jeffrey who started the fight and provoked him.
• Absence of Treachery: Francis argued that treachery did not attend Jeffrey's killing.
• Insufficient Evidence: Francis faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict of conviction despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Elements of Murder Proven: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that the prosecution had proven all the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
• No Unlawful Aggression: The People argued that there was no sufficient provocation on the part of Jeffrey since the latter's statements that he would kill Francis, without any action, did not endanger Francis's safety nor constitute unlawful aggression.
• Disproportionate Response: The People argued that Francis's claim of self-defense was not commensurate to the number of stab wounds he inflicted on Jeffrey.
• Presence of Treachery: The People argued that treachery was present since Jeffrey had no opportunity to resist the attack, as Diego and Nicholas held him while Francis stabbed him, and Francis continued stabbing him even when he was already crawling on the ground.

• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Jeffrey De Castro y Alviz.
• Self-Defense: Whether Francis's claim of self-defense should be sustained.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in Francis's favor.
• Damages: Whether the monetary awards imposed by the lower courts were proper, and whether temperate damages should be awarded.

• Treachery: Yes. Treachery attended the killing, as Jeffrey was unarmed, was held by Nicholas and Diego while Francis stabbed him 14 times, and was still being stabbed even after he had fallen and was crawling on the ground, leaving him with no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate.
• Self-Defense: No. Francis failed to prove unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence, and the means employed—inflicting 14 stab wounds—was not reasonably commensurate to the alleged attack. The supposed unlawful aggression had ceased from the moment Francis successfully gained possession of the knife.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Francis fled and hid for almost three years before surrendering, so his surrender was not spontaneous and cannot be deemed voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Damages: The Court of Appeals correctly imposed ₱75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages pursuant to People vs. Jugueta. The Court additionally awarded ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, since no evidence of burial and funeral expenses was presented.

• Treachery: The Court defined treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offenders arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It requires: (i) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (ii) the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court found that the testimonies of Jennifer and Roy positively identified Francis as the one who stabbed Jeffrey multiple times while Nicholas and Diego held Jeffrey's arms. Jeffrey was unarmed and immobilized, and Francis continued stabbing him even after he had fallen and was crawling on the ground, pleading for his life. The Court cited People vs. Casela, People vs. Tacla and Tabios, and People vs. Vallespin to support the finding that treachery may be appreciated even where the victim was put on guard, so long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend themselves or to retaliate. The number, nature, and location of the wounds—14 spindle-shaped stab wounds, nine of which were fatal—were strong indications that the assailants had ensured the success of their effort to kill Jeffrey without risk to themselves.

• Self-Defense: The Court applied the hornbook doctrine that where the accused admits full responsibility for the killing but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon them to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified. The elements of self-defense are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The Court found that Francis's lone testimony on his theory of self-defense was self-serving, and he did not proffer any clear and specific explanation on why Jeffrey allegedly attacked him. The trial court's factual finding that Jeffrey's act of saying he would kill Francis, not followed by any other acts, was insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression, was not disturbed on appeal. The Court cited Miranda vs. People for the principle that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon, and whatever the accused did thereafter is no longer self-defense but retaliation. The Court also found that the means employed by Francis was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack, as the 14 stab wounds were beyond commensurate.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Court agreed with the lower courts that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated. As borne by the records, Francis fled and hid for almost three years. His surrender was not spontaneous and cannot be deemed as a voluntary surrender contemplated under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Damages: The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' imposition of ₱75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages, in line with People vs. Jugueta. The Court additionally awarded ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, citing case law that the award of temperate damages in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved. The Court cited People vs. Racal for the principle that it would be anomalous and unfair for the victim's heirs who presented receipts to receive less than those who presented no evidence at all. All monetary awards shall earn 6% interest per annum from finality of the Decision until fully paid, pursuant to Nacar vs. Gallery Frames.

• Treachery — Treachery exists when offenders commit any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make. It requires: (i) the employment of means of execution which gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (ii) the said means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The essence of treachery consists of the sudden and unexpected attack on an unguarded and unsuspecting victim without any ounce of provocation on their part. In this case, treachery was established where the victim was unarmed, was held by two co-accused while the principal assailant stabbed him 14 times, and was still being stabbed even after he had fallen and was crawling on the ground.

• Self-Defense — Where the accused admits full responsibility for the killing but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon them to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified. The elements are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The pith and soul of self-defense is the presence of unlawful aggression; its absence readily converts the claim into nothingness even with the existence of the other elements. Although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon, and whatever the accused did thereafter is no longer self-defense but retaliation.

• Voluntary Surrender — For the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the surrender must be spontaneous. A surrender made almost three years after the commission of the crime, after the accused fled and hid, is not spontaneous and cannot be deemed voluntary surrender under Article 13(7) of the Revised Penal Code.

• Temperate Damages — The award of temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 in homicide or murder cases is proper when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial court, as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victims suffered pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.

• "There is treachery when offenders commit any of the crimes against a person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This passage defines the qualifying circumstance of treachery under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and is the canonical formulation applied to the facts of the case.

• "The essence of treachery consists of the sudden and unexpected attack on an unguarded and unsuspecting victim without any ounce of provocation on their part." — This statement articulates the core principle of treachery and was central to the Court's finding that the killing of Jeffrey was attended by treachery.

• "Although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to be the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the accused did thereafter is no longer self-defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense." — This quotation from Miranda vs. People was adopted by the Court to reject Francis's claim of self-defense, as the supposed unlawful aggression had ceased once he gained possession of the knife.

• "The pith and soul of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is the presence of unlawful aggression. Its absence readily converts the claim of self-defense into nothingness even with the existence of the other elements." — This passage underscores the indispensable nature of unlawful aggression as a requisite for self-defense and was applied to deny Francis's claim.

• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Controlling precedent for the amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages (₱75,000.00 each) in cases where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua for murder.
• Miranda vs. People, 846 Phil. 125 (2019) — Followed for the principle that the victim ceases to be the aggressor once dispossessed of the weapon, and subsequent acts by the accused constitute retaliation, not self-defense.
• People vs. Casela, 547 Phil. 690 (2007) — Followed for the principle that treachery may be appreciated based on the testimony of a witness who saw the attack already happening, and that a lone witness's positive testimony can sustain a finding of treachery.
• People vs. Tacla and Tabios, G.R. No. 256735, July 6, 2022 — Followed for the principle that restraining the victim while another stabbed him or her proves the existence of treachery.
• People vs. Vallespin, 439 Phil. 816 (2002) — Followed for the principle that treachery may still be appreciated even if the victim was put on guard about impending danger, so long as the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend themselves or to retaliate.
• People vs. Racal, 817 Phil. 665 (2017) — Cited to support the award of temperate damages, on the principle that it would be anomalous for heirs who presented receipts to receive less than those who presented no evidence at all.
• Nacar vs. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) — Controlling authority for the imposition of 6% interest per annum on monetary awards from finality of the decision until fully paid.
• People vs. Toro, 894 Phil. 569 (2021) — Cited for the elements of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder with reclusion perpetua to death when committed with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. This was the provision under which Francis was convicted.
• Article 13(7), Revised Penal Code — Defines the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The Court held that Francis's surrender almost three years after the crime was not spontaneous and could not be appreciated as voluntary surrender.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred in the Decision.

• M. Lopez, J. — Justice M. Lopez filed a separate concurring and dissenting opinion, the contents of which are not detailed in the provided text. The opinion is noted as "please see concurring and dissenting opinion" in the Decision.