People of the Philippines vs. Filomeno Mayingque, et al.

An accused who admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, the elements of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and must rely on the strength of his own evidence rather than on the weakness of the prosecution's. Exemplary damages may be awarded in a criminal case when the crime is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, treachery being included within the broad or generic sense of the term.

The appellants are members of one family: Gregorio Mayingque is the father of Toribio Mayingque, and Filomeno Mayingque is Toribio's brother. They were neighbors of Edgardo Sumalde Tusi on Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City, and, together with one Edwin Macas, regularly held drinking sessions on Sundays at Macas's place, which adjoined the Tusi residence. Macas remained at large throughout the proceedings, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from a conviction for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The appellants — Toribio Mayingque, also known as Loloy; his father Gregorio Mayingque, also known as Gorio; and Toribio's brother Filomeno Mayingque, also known as Boy Roti — were residents of Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City, where the victim, Edgardo Sumalde Tusi, likewise lived. The appellants and one Edwin Macas, who remained at large, regularly held drinking sessions on Sundays at Macas's place, which stood beside the Tusi residence. On one such occasion, Edgardo, annoyed by the noise the group was making, admonished them to tone down their voices, and the appellants and Macas resented the admonition.

At around five o'clock in the afternoon of May 30, 1999, Salvacion Tusi, Edgardo's wife, and Edgardo were resting in front of their house. Toribio arrived and, without saying anything, stabbed Edgardo twice on his side. Salvacion shouted for help, but her cousin Ruben Bernal could not come to Edgardo's aid because Edwin, Filomeno, and Gregorio had by then joined the assault. Ruben Bernal and Jaime Bernal corroborated Salvacion's account: the appellants ganged up on Edgardo, with Toribio wielding a kitchen knife with which he stabbed Edgardo twice, Gregorio hacking Edgardo on the head with a bolo, and Filomeno and Edwin restraining Edgardo. The witnesses heard Edwin tell the appellants to make sure that Edgardo was lifeless before leaving him.

Dr. Romeo T. Salen, Medico Legal Officer of the Western Police District Crime Laboratory, testified in representation of Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas, who had performed the autopsy, and produced the request for examination on the cadaver, the certification of identification and consent for autopsy signed by Edgardo's brother, the post mortem examination or anatomical sketch, the medico legal report, and the death certificate. Based on Dr. Aranas's written findings, Edgardo had sustained twelve wounds in the head, neck, and chest, eight of which were fatal. The wounds consisted of two superficial stab wounds on the parietal region, a fatal stab wound on the right orbital region piercing the optic nerve, two superficial incised wounds on the right temporal and submental regions, and seven stab wounds on the neck, clavicular, sternal, and mammary regions, several of which pierced the upper lobe of the left lung, the upper lobe of the right lung, and the pericardium and right ventricle of the heart.

The defense presented the three appellants and Agustin Tano. Tano testified that he was on his way home in the late afternoon of May 30, 1999 when he saw Edgardo punch Toribio and then hit him with a lead pipe, and Toribio retaliate by successively stabbing Edgardo with a knife; the other accused, he said, were not present during the incident. Filomeno claimed that he had left his house at 9:00 a.m. that day to attend the birthday party of his nephew in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City; that at 6:30 p.m. his wife arrived there and begged him not to go home because Toribio had figured in a fight with Edgardo and Edgardo's family had threatened to retaliate against Toribio's relatives; and that he and his wife thus stayed in Golden Gate from May 30, 1999 until July 28, 1999, when he visited Toribio in detention and was invited by a police officer for questioning and immediately detained. Gregorio attested that he had been caring for his two-month-old grandson on the day of the incident when a neighbor advised him to leave at once because his son Toribio had been involved in a fight; that he entrusted the child to the neighbor and went to Antipolo City, where his other son resided, staying there for two months out of fear of Toribio's enemies; and that upon his return to Las Piñas City on July 28, 1999 to fetch his wife and daughter, policemen invited him for questioning and detained him for his alleged involvement in Edgardo's killing.

Toribio, for his part, testified that he was walking toward Edwin's place at around 5:00 p.m. on May 30, 1999 when he saw Edgardo, Ruben, and Jaime drinking together; that the three hailed him and invited him to drink; that although he initially declined, he relented after Edgardo got mad at him; that when he later declined a second invitation and said he was going elsewhere, Edgardo warned him not to be a toughie, stood up, and attacked him with a lead pipe, hitting his left arm and leaving a scar of an inch; that he ran to Edwin's place and stayed there for about twenty minutes; that on leaving, he passed by the three, who were still drinking, and Edgardo spotted him, held him by the collar, and punched him, while Ruben and Jaime hit him with a lead pipe and a wooden club (dos por dos), injuring his left chest; that he parried their blows until they reached the street, where he fell on a small table used for selling Indian mangoes; that he was able to pick up a small knife used for peeling the mangoes and, while prostrate, stabbed Edgardo on the head, neck, and chest; that he did not report the incident to the police and instead went home; that he did not seek medical attention because his wounds were only slight; and that he surrendered to the Antipolo City police authorities eight days later, upon learning that the other appellants had been implicated in Edgardo's death and were being hunted down by the police.

The trial court found the prosecution's eyewitnesses credible and rejected Toribio's self-defense, holding that the twelve wounds sustained by the victim — ten stab wounds and two incised wounds, of different sizes — belied any pretension of self-defense and indicated that more than one assailant had inflicted them with more than one instrument. It likewise rejected the denial and alibi of Gregorio and Filomeno, all three having been positively identified in court as the perpetrators. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the testimonies of Salvacion, Ruben, and Jaime positively identified Toribio as the one who stabbed Edgardo, Gregorio as the one who hacked him on the head with a bolo, and Filomeno as the one who held him while he was being hacked, and that the medico-legal finding of eight fatal wounds out of twelve belied Toribio's self-defense.

• Self-Defense: Toribio Mayingque maintained that the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to his theory of self-defense, which he anchored on his claim that Edgardo, Ruben, and Jaime had attacked him with a lead pipe and a wooden club before he picked up a small mango-peeling knife and stabbed Edgardo.
• Conspiracy: The appellants argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding that they conspired to commit the crime of murder.
• Hearsay: The appellants contended that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to hearsay evidence, referring to the testimony of Dr. Salen on the autopsy findings of Dr. Aranas, which became the basis for their conviction.
• Voluntary Surrender, Incomplete Self-Defense, and Treachery: On the assumption that they were guilty, the appellants argued that the trial court gravely erred in failing to appreciate the circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense, and in finding that the crime was attended by treachery.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to Toribio Mayingque's theory of self-defense.
• Conspiracy: Whether the trial court gravely erred in finding that the appellants conspired to commit the crime of murder.
• Hearsay: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to hearsay evidence which became the basis for the conviction of the appellants.
• Voluntary Surrender, Incomplete Self-Defense, and Treachery: Whether, on the assumption that the appellants are guilty, the trial court gravely erred in failing to appreciate the circumstances of voluntary surrender and incomplete self-defense, and in finding that the crime was attended by treachery.

• Self-Defense: No. Where the accused admits killing the victim but pleads self-defense, he bears the burden of proving unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation by clear and convincing evidence. Toribio failed to establish unlawful aggression, having sought no medical attention for his claimed injuries, and the twelve wounds negated self-defense.
• Conspiracy: Affirmed. The prosecution eyewitnesses clearly showed that Toribio and his co-conspirators ganged up on Edgardo — Toribio with a knife, Gregorio with a bolo, and the other two holding the victim to render him defenseless — and the different sizes of the wounds indicated more than one assailant and more than one instrument.
• Hearsay: No reversible error. The conviction was affirmed, the Court finding no fact or circumstance of weight and influence that the Court of Appeals and the trial court overlooked that, if considered, should affect the outcome of the case.
• Voluntary Surrender, Incomplete Self-Defense, and Treachery: Treachery attended the killing, qualifying it as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed on each appellant.

• Self-Defense: The essential elements of self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code are (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defense, the accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence. The rule consistently adhered to is that when the accused admits that he was the author of the death of the victim and anchors his defense on self-defense, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court. The rationale is that the accused, having admitted the felonious wounding or killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes the fact of self-defense; only the onus probandi shifts to him, because self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof, and he must discharge that burden by relying on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's, for even if the prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved in view of the accused's admission of the killing. Toribio did not convincingly establish that there was unlawful aggression against him. His claim that Edgardo and the Bernals had attacked him with a lead pipe and a wooden club, which impelled him to stab Edgardo, became implausible because he did not even submit himself to any medical attention; he should have done so if he had truly sustained injuries at the hands of the victim and his group. The question of who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful aggressor was a question of fact best addressed to and left with the trial court for determination based on the evidence on record. Both lower courts rejected the plea of self-defense, and the Court held that they did so correctly: the defense evidence was not persuasive and lacked credibility, and did not prevail over the clear showing by Salvacion and the Bernals that Toribio and his co-conspirators had ganged up on Edgardo with a knife and a bolo while the other two held Edgardo to render him defenseless. The plea was further belied by the number (12) and the different sizes of the wounds inflicted on Edgardo; the presence of a large number of wounds on the victim's body negated self-defense and indicated, instead, a determined effort to kill him. The determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect, because the trial court had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing it in the unique position to assess their credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty, and candor. No fact or circumstance of weight and influence that the Court of Appeals and the trial court overlooked was shown that, if considered, should affect the outcome of the case.

• Conspiracy: The Court sustained the finding that the appellants acted in concert. The prosecution eyewitnesses clearly showed that Toribio and his co-conspirators had ganged up on Edgardo, with Toribio using a knife and Gregorio a bolo while the other two held Edgardo to render him defenseless. The trial court's observation that the different sizes of the wounds showed that more than one assailant had inflicted them and that more than one instrument had been used reinforced the finding of concerted action, and the Court agreed with the conclusion of both lower courts on this point. All three appellants were positively identified in court as the perpetrators, which overcame the denial and alibi interposed by Gregorio and Filomeno.

• Hearsay: The Court found no merit in the appeal as a whole, which necessarily included the appellants' challenge to the appellate court's appreciation of the evidence. The conviction was affirmed, the Court declaring that it had not been shown any fact or circumstance of weight and influence that the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court overlooked that, if considered, should affect the outcome of the case. The Court likewise affirmed the rejection of Filomeno's alibi, noting that the distance between Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City and Pedro Sabido Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City could be negotiated through a thirty-minute tricycle ride, which did not render it impossible for Filomeno to be at the place of the crime when it was committed, and citing the failure of Filomeno or other witnesses to credibly establish his presence in Golden Gate for the entire period from the morning of May 30, 1999 until after the commission of the crime, or to disprove the State's positive showing that he was present at the place of the crime when it was committed. Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove; to establish it, the accused must prove (a) that he was actually in another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was perpetrated, physical impossibility referring to the distance between the two places as well as to the facility of access between them.

• Voluntary Surrender, Incomplete Self-Defense, and Treachery: Treachery attended the killing, and the appellants were accordingly found guilty of murder and punished with reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The attendance of treachery as an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, also supplied the legal basis for an award of exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of the victim, the Court holding that the failure of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to recognize this right constituted a plain error that demanded immediate rectification as a matter of law, even if not assigned in the appeal.

• Self-Defense — Elements and Burden of Proof — Under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. When the accused admits that he was the author of the death of the victim and anchors his defense on self-defense, the onus probandi shifts to him; he must prove the justifying circumstance by clear and convincing evidence and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's, because even if the prosecution's evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved in view of the admission of the killing. The Court applied this rule to reject Toribio's plea, emphasizing that he never sought medical attention for the injuries he claimed and that the twelve wounds on the victim negated self-defense.

• Alibi — Requisites and Evidentiary Weight — To establish alibi, the accused must prove (a) that he was actually in another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was perpetrated. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where the crime was committed, as well as to the facility of access between the two places. Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. The Court rejected Filomeno's alibi because the distance between Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City and the crime scene could be negotiated in a thirty-minute tricycle ride, and because he failed to credibly establish his presence in Golden Gate for the entire period material to the crime.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The determination by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as great respect, if not conclusive effect, because the trial court had the first-hand opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses, their conduct and attitude under grilling examination, thereby placing it in the unique position to assess their credibility and to appreciate their truthfulness, honesty, and candor. The Court applied this principle in sustaining the concurrent findings of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals.

• Treachery — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. Treachery qualified the killing of Edgardo as murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. In the absence of direct proof of conspiracy, it may be deduced from the mode, method, and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest. The Court sustained the finding of conspiracy on the strength of the eyewitness accounts showing that the appellants ganged up on the victim, with two of them holding him to render him defenseless while the others stabbed and hacked him.

• Exemplary Damages for Aggravating Circumstances — Article 2230 of the Civil Code permits the imposition of exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, and Article 2229 allows such damages by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. The term "aggravating circumstances" is to be understood in its broad or generic sense, so that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Treachery, though a qualifying circumstance inseparable from murder, thus warranted an award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

• Death Indemnity and Moral Damages — Article 2206 of the Civil Code fixes the death indemnity at ₱50,000.00 pursuant to current judicial policy, without need of any evidence or proof of damages. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00 are awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering, because human nature and experience have shown that a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family.

• "The rationale for this requirement is that the accused, having admitted the felonious wounding or killing of his adversary, is to be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the fact of self-defense. Thereby, however, the burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt is not lifted from the shoulders of the State, which carries it until the end of the proceedings. In other words, only the onus probandi has shifted to him, because self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be established with certainty by sufficient and satisfactory proof." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the shifting of the burden of proof in self-defense cases, clarifying that the constitutional presumption of innocence is not displaced even as the accused assumes the onus probandi.

• "Alibi is an inherently weak and unreliable defense, because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove." — This is the canonical formulation of the judicial attitude toward alibi, cited to justify the rejection of Filomeno Mayingque's defense that he was in Golden Gate, Moonwalk, Las Piñas City at the time of the killing.

• "In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code." — Quoted from People vs. Catubig, this passage supplies the controlling rule on exemplary damages and explains why treachery, though a qualifying circumstance, still entitles the victim's heirs to exemplary damages.

• "xxx a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing." — This passage justifies the award of moral damages even in the absence of allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering, grounding the award on human nature and experience.

• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, 363 SCRA 621 — Quoted at length as the controlling precedent for the rule that an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article 2230 of the Civil Code.
• People vs. Calabroso, G.R. No. 126368, September 14, 2000, 340 SCRA 332 — Cited for the rule that self-defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 138629, June 20, 2001, 359 SCRA 200 — Cited for the rule that the accused who admits the killing must prove the justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court.
• People vs. Gelera, G.R. No. 121377, August 15, 1997, 277 SCRA 450 — Cited for the rule that only the onus probandi shifts to the accused who invokes self-defense.
• People vs. Molina, G.R. No. 59436, August 28, 1992, 213 SCRA 52 — Cited for the rule that the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's.
• People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 131817, August 8, 2001, 362 SCRA 338 — Cited for the rule that the number of wounds inflicted on the victim negates self-defense.
• Garcia vs. People, G.R. No. 144699, March 10, 2004, 425 SCRA 221 — Cited for the rule that the question of who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful aggressor is a question of fact best left to the trial court.
• People vs. Batidor, G.R. No. 126027, February 18, 1999, 303 SCRA 335 — Cited for the rule that alibi is inherently weak and unreliable.
• People vs. Saban, G.R. No. 110559, November 24, 1999, 319 SCRA 36 — Cited for the requisites of alibi, including the requirement of physical impossibility.
• People vs. Darilay, G.R. Nos. 139751-52, January 26, 2004, 421 SCRA 45 — Cited for the rule that the trial court's credibility findings, when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded full weight and credit.
• Gulmatico vs. People, G.R. No. 146296, October 15, 2007, 536 SCRA 82 — Cited for the trial court's unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses.
• People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 177569, November 28, 2007, 539 SCRA 306 — Cited, along with other cases, for the conclusiveness of the trial court's credibility determinations.
• Heirs of Castro vs. Raymundo Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327 — Cited for the rule that death indemnity and moral damages are distinct kinds of damages and that both should be awarded.
• People vs. Berondo, G.R. No. 177827, March 30, 2009, 582 SCRA 547 — Cited for the rule that moral damages are awarded even in the absence of allegation and proof of the heirs' emotional suffering.
• People vs. Panado, G.R. No. 133439, December 26, 2000, 348 SCRA 679 — Quoted for the passage explaining that a violent death invariably brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family.

• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Defines self-defense as a justifying circumstance. The Court applied it to require Toribio Mayingque to prove unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death when committed with attendant circumstances including treachery. The Court affirmed the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on each appellant pursuant to this provision.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the Court of Appeals' ruling, which the Court affirmed, for the rule that where the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — Provides for the death indemnity and for moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. The Court cited it in fixing the civil indemnity at ₱50,000.00 and in awarding ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
• Articles 2217 and 2219, Civil Code — Provide for moral damages for mental anguish, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code and Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Article 2229, Civil Code — Defines exemplary damages as those imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. The Court cited it as the statutory basis for the award.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Allows exemplary damages in criminal cases as part of the civil liability when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied it to award ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of treachery.
• Section 44, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Cited in the Court of Appeals' ruling for the admissibility of entries in official records, in connection with the anatomical sketch and medico-legal report prepared by Dr. Aranas.
• Section 13, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Cited in the certification accompanying the Decision, attesting that the conclusions reached had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Chairperson), Justice Arturo D. Brion, Justice Roberto A. Abad, and Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr.