People of the Philippines vs. Fabro

Deprivation of liberty in kidnapping and serious illegal detention does not require physical restraint, locking, or harsh treatment; it is sufficient that the victim, particularly a minor of tender age, is placed in an unfamiliar location from which she cannot find her way home, rendering her freedom subject to the control of the abductor, provided the accused intended to deprive the victim of liberty notwithstanding the victim's freedom to roam or communicate within the place of detention.

Zenaida Fabro, also known as Zenaida Viñegas Manalastas, was the aunt of AAA, a nine-year-old student residing in YYY. On March 2, 2006, Fabro arrived at XXX Elementary School where AAA was attending Grade IV classes. Fabro, who resided adjacent to AAA's family, fetched AAA from her classroom with the teacher's permission. Instead of returning AAA to her parents, Fabro transported her to Nueva Ecija, where she detained the child for four days despite AAA's repeated requests to be brought home.

• The Taking: On March 2, 2006, nine-year-old AAA was attending Grade IV classes at XXX Elementary School in YYY when accused-appellant Zenaida Fabro arrived and fetched her from the classroom. The teacher permitted the release because Fabro was AAA's aunt and neighbor.
• The Detention: Fabro transported AAA to Nueva Ecija instead of returning her home. AAA remained in Nueva Ecija from March 2 to March 5, 2006 (four days), first at an unspecified location and later at the house of Fabro's brother, Barangay Captain Fabro, in Barangay Villa Viniegas, Llanera.
• Victim's Testimony: AAA testified that she repeatedly asked Fabro to bring her home, to which Fabro replied "Huwag muna daw po." AAA stated that she cried because she wanted to go home, and that she was able to speak with her mother via cellphone during which her mother pleaded for her return, but Fabro refused to release her.
• Rescue: AAA's parents reported the abduction to the police on the same day. After receiving information that Fabro might go to her brother's house, police operatives organized a surveillance team. On March 5, 2006, police accompanied by AAA's parents rescued AAA and apprehended Fabro at the brother's house.
• Defense Version: Fabro testified that she brought AAA with the consent of AAA's mother and teacher, intending to proceed to the barangay captain to prove that her husband had taken her luggage, but when the barangay captain was unavailable, they proceeded to Nueva Ecija at AAA's request. She claimed AAA was free to roam and communicate, and that she intended to return the child.
• Disputed Facts: Fabro claimed she was in good terms with AAA's family and that AAA frequently visited her house. She alleged AAA voluntarily agreed to go to Nueva Ecija. The prosecution maintained that AAA was deceived (told they were going to the barangay captain but taken to Nueva Ecija instead) and detained against her will.

• Lack of Deprivation of Liberty: Accused-appellant argued that AAA was not deprived of liberty as there was no evidence of physical restraint, constant control, or prevention from going home; AAA was free to interact with others and communicate with relatives.
• Consent of Victim and Parents: She maintained that AAA voluntarily went with her and that she had the mother's consent to take the child to Nueva Ecija.
• Failure to Prove Intent: She asserted that the prosecution failed to prove intent to detain, noting that the RTC found insufficient evidence regarding alleged ransom demands or plans to poison the victim.
• Inconsistent Statements: She questioned AAA's credibility, pointing out that AAA stated in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that she was taken by force, but testified in court that she voluntarily went with accused-appellant.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The People countered that all elements of serious illegal detention were established: Fabro was a private individual who took and detained a minor for four days against her will.
• Constructive Deprivation: Respondent argued that physical restraint is unnecessary; deprivation of liberty exists when a minor is placed in an unfamiliar location from which she cannot return home unassisted.
• Invalid Consent: Respondent maintained that a nine-year-old is incompetent to consent to illegal detention, and parental consent was belied by the immediate police report and the mother's pleas for return.
• Credibility: Respondent argued that the alleged inconsistency between affidavit and testimony was explained by the different contexts (force used outside school vs. voluntary departure from classroom), and that affidavits are generally incomplete compared to testimony.

• Deprivation of Liberty: Whether the prosecution proved that AAA was deprived of her liberty when accused-appellant did not physically restrain her but kept her in an unfamiliar place.
• Intent to Detain: Whether the prosecution proved the specific intent to deprive AAA of liberty.
• Consent as Defense: Whether the alleged consent of the nine-year-old victim or her teacher justified the detention.
• Credibility of Witness: Whether discrepancies between AAA's affidavit and testimony destroyed her credibility.

• Deprivation of Liberty: The curtailment of liberty need not involve physical restraint upon the victim's person; it is sufficient that the victim, due to tender age and unfamiliar surroundings, was under the control of the accused and unable to return home unassisted. Leaving a child in a place from which she does not know the way home constitutes deprivation of liberty.
• Intent to Detain: Intent to deprive the victim of liberty was established by Fabro's refusal to return AAA despite her repeated pleas and her parents' requests, coupled with the deception employed to take her from school.
• Consent as Defense: Consent of a minor to illegal detention is legally impossible; minors are presumed incompetent to assent to seizure and detention. Permission from the teacher does not justify detention against the parents' will.
• Credibility of Witness: Discrepancies between statements in an affidavit and testimony in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness, as ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete and inferior to testimony given in open court. The trial court's assessment of credibility, affirmed by the CA, is accorded great respect.

• Elements of Serious Illegal Detention: The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim is a minor, the duration of detention is immaterial.
• Deprivation of Liberty Without Physical Restraint: Physical restraint, enclosure, or harsh treatment is not required for kidnapping. The deprivation of liberty exists where the victim, particularly a child of tender age, is placed in an unfamiliar environment from which she cannot find her way home, rendering her freedom subject to the mercy and control of the abductor.
• Presumption of Lack of Consent in Minors: Where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. A minor is incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention; the consent of such a child places the accused in no better position than if the act had been done against her will.
• Affidavit vs. Testimony: Discrepancies between statements in an ex parte affidavit and testimony in open court do not necessarily discredit the witness, as affidavits are generally incomplete, abbreviated, and sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth. Sworn statements taken ex parte are considered inferior to testimony given in open court.

• "The curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly."
• "Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor."
• "Where the victim is a minor, lack of consent is presumed. She is incompetent to assent to seizure and illegal detention. The consent of such child could place accused-appellant in no better position than if the act had been done against her will."
• "Discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete."
• "The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same."

• People v. Bisda, G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003 — Controlling precedent establishing that kidnapping does not require physical restraint or harsh treatment, and that a child's consent obtained through comfort or food is legally meaningless; also established that minors are presumed incompetent to consent to detention.
• People v. Acosta, G.R. No. L-11954, March 24, 1960 — Cited for the principle that a child of tender age placed in an unfamiliar location is deprived of liberty even with freedom of locomotion within the premises, analogous to imprisonment.
• People v. Baluya, G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011 — Cited regarding the definition of deprivation of liberty in kidnapping cases.
• People v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, January 16, 2017 — Cited for the rule that discrepancies between affidavit and testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defines Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, with specific circumstances including detention of a minor.
• Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act) — Cited in relation to the protection of minors and the confidentiality of the victim's identity.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Rules for application of indivisible penalties, applied in imposing reclusion perpetua where no mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Antonio T. Carpio, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.