People of the Philippines vs. Fabian Urzais y Lanurias

A conviction for the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide cannot stand where the prosecution fails to prove the elements of carnapping beyond reasonable doubt; the lone circumstantial evidence of possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle, especially where the accused has offered an explanation for possession, cannot sustain conviction.

Fabian Urzais y Lanurias, also known as Michael Tapayan y Baguio, was charged together with Alex Bautista and Ricky Bautista under R.A. No. 6539, the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, for the taking of Mario Magdato’s Isuzu Highlander and Magdato’s killing. The statute defines carnapping and, under Section 14 as amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The two co-accused remained at large, and trial proceeded against Urzais alone.

On November 12, 2002, Mario Magdato left his house in Pulilan, Bulacan at around four o’clock in the morning to drive for hire his Isuzu Highlander with plate number UUT-838, valued at P500,000.00, from the Pulilan Public Market to the LRT Terminal in Metro Manila. When he did not return that day, his wife Shirley Magdato inquired of his whereabouts from his friends without success. The following day, she went to the terminal, where the barker told her that a person had hired their vehicle to go to Manila; she then asked neighbors to call her husband’s mobile phone, but no one answered. At around ten o’clock in the morning of November 13, 2002, her husband’s co-members in the drivers’ association arrived at their house and accompanied her to her husband’s supposed location; at the Sta. Rosa police station in Nueva Ecija, she was informed that her husband had passed away, and she took his body home. She later retrieved their vehicle on November 21, 2002 from the Cabanatuan City Police Station and had it cleaned because it had blood stains and reeked of a foul odor.

According to SPO2 Fernando Figueroa of the Philippine National Police, Cabanatuan City, in November 2002 their office received a flash alarm from the Bulacan PNP about an alleged carnapped Isuzu Highlander in forest green color. Their office was thereafter informed that the subject vehicle had been seen in the AGL Subdivision, Cabanatuan City, so a team conducted surveillance there and set up a checkpoint outside its gate. Around three o’clock in the afternoon of November 20, 2002, a vehicle fitting the description appeared; the officers apprehended it and asked the driver, accused-appellant, who was alone, to alight. When the officers noticed accused-appellant’s waist bulging, he was ordered to raise his shirt, and a gun was discovered tucked there. The officers confiscated the unlicensed 9mm Norinco pistol with Serial No. 508432, with magazine and twelve live ammunitions, and confirmed that the engine of the vehicle matched that of the victim’s. Found inside the vehicle were two plates marked “UUT-838” and a passport; the vehicle contained traces of blood on the car seats at the back and on its flooring. Accused-appellant was detained and a case for illegal possession of firearm was filed against him; the firearm was identified in open court.

Dr. Jun Concepcion testified that the victim sustained one gunshot wound in the head, with entrance at the right temporal area and exit at the opposite side. The victim also had several abrasions on the right upper eyelid, the tip of the nose, and around the right eye, as well as blisters on his cheek area that could have been caused by a lighted cigarette.

Accused-appellant testified in his defense and interposed denial. He claimed that in October 2002 he had ordered from brothers Alex and Ricky Bautista an owner-type jeepney worth P60,000.00 for use in his business, but that the brothers delivered instead a green Isuzu Highlander around half past three o’clock in the afternoon of November 13, 2002. The brothers told him that his P60,000.00 would serve as initial payment, with the remaining undetermined amount to be paid a week later; he agreed, amazed that he had been given a new vehicle at such a low price. He borrowed money to pay the balance, but the brothers never replied to his text messages. On November 16, 2002, his friend Oscar Angeles advised him to surrender the vehicle because it could be a “hot car”; accused-appellant was initially hesitant because he wanted to recover the amount he had paid, but he eventually decided to sell the vehicle, removed its plate number, and placed a “for sale” sign at the back. On November 18, 2002, he allegedly decided to surrender the vehicle upon advice by a certain Angie, but when he arrived home that afternoon, he alleged that he was arrested by Alex Villareal, a member of the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija. He also testified that he found out in jail about the owner of the vehicle and his unfortunate demise. On cross-examination, he admitted that his real name is Michael Tapayan y Baguio and that he used the name Fabian Urzais to secure a second passport in 2001 to be able to return to Taiwan.

Defense witness Oscar Angeles testified that he had known accused-appellant as Michael Tapayan when they became neighbors in the AGL Subdivision, and that accused-appellant also served as his computer technician. Angeles testified that accused-appellant previously did not own any vehicle until he purchased the Isuzu Highlander for P30,000.00 from his friends in Bulacan. Angeles advised accused-appellant that the vehicle might have been carnapped due to its very low selling price, and corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony that he did not want to surrender the car at first because he wanted to recover his payment for it.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found no direct evidence linking accused-appellant to the carnapping or the killing; both relied on the single circumstance that he possessed the vehicle. The prosecution’s evidence consisted of the victim’s disappearance, the discovery of his death, and the details surrounding accused-appellant’s arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped.

• No Direct Evidence: Accused-appellant maintained that there is no direct evidence that he robbed and murdered the victim.
• Insufficient Circumstantial Evidence: Accused-appellant argued that the lower courts erred in convicting him based on circumstantial evidence consisting only of the fact of his possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle.
• Improper Application of Disputable Presumption: Accused-appellant decried the appellate court’s error in relying on the disputable presumption under Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court to conclude that by virtue of his possession of the vehicle, he is considered the author of both the carnapping of the vehicle and the killing of its owner, and asserted that such presumption does not hold in the case.

• Proof of Carnapping: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as amended.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the lone circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant’s possession of the allegedly carnapped vehicle was sufficient to sustain conviction for carnapping with homicide.
• Disputable Presumption: Whether the disputable presumption under Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court may be applied to convict accused-appellant where he offered an explanation for his possession of the vehicle.
• Proof of Homicide/Murder: Whether the killing of Mario Magdato could be treated as an incident of carnapping or, alternatively, whether accused-appellant’s guilt for homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reasonable Doubt / Equipoise: Whether the prosecution’s evidence met the test of moral certainty or required acquittal under the equipoise rule and the constitutional presumption of innocence.

• Proof of Carnapping: No. The prosecution failed to prove all the elements of carnapping; there was no evidence that the vehicle had been carnapped or that accused-appellant was the author.
• Circumstantial Evidence: No. Only one circumstance—possession—was presented, and it did not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to accused-appellant to the exclusion of all others.
• Disputable Presumption: No. The presumption applies only where possession is unexplained or the explanation is implausible in view of independent evidence; accused-appellant’s explanation that he bought the vehicle from the Bautista brothers was unrebutted, so the presumption could not be invoked.
• Proof of Homicide/Murder: No. Because carnapping was not proved, the killing could not be treated as an incident of carnapping; even under the Revised Penal Code, guilt for homicide or murder was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Reasonable Doubt / Equipoise: Acquittal was required. The evidence was capable of an explanation consistent with innocence, and the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the presumption of innocence tilted the scales in favor of accused-appellant.

• Proof of Carnapping: R.A. No. 6539 defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things. Under Section 14 as amended by R.A. No. 7659, when the owner, driver, or occupant is killed or raped in the course of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof, the offense is a special complex crime; the prosecution must prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder, and must show that the original criminal design was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Here, the prosecution’s evidence consisted only of the victim’s disappearance, the discovery of his death, and the details surrounding accused-appellant’s arrest on rumors that the vehicle he possessed had been carnapped. There was no evidence supporting the theory that the victim’s vehicle had been carnapped, much less that accused-appellant was the author. The trial court’s decision itself made no mention of any direct evidence indicating guilt, and the Court of Appeals confirmed the lack of such direct evidence. Thus, the charge of carnapping was unsubstantiated for failure to prove all its elements.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; they must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other rationale except guilt. In this case, there was only one circumstantial evidence: accused-appellant’s possession of the vehicle. That sole circumstance did not lead to an inference exclusively consistent with guilt. The prosecution did not offer any evidence detailing the seizure of the vehicle or accused-appellant’s participation. There was even a variance on how he was discovered in possession: the prosecution’s uncorroborated evidence said he was apprehended while driving the vehicle at a checkpoint, although the vehicle did not bear any license plates, while accused-appellant testified that he was arrested at home. SPO2 Figueroa’s cross-examination revealed confusion and lack of personal knowledge, and he stated that the checkpoint had begun as early as November 3, 2002, before the alleged carnapping on November 12, 2002. The vehicle was at best classified as “missing,” and possession alone could not support conviction for the special complex crime.
• Disputable Presumption: Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court creates a disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. The Court held that this presumption is limited to cases where the possession is either unexplained or the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. Accused-appellant set up a defense of denial and adhered to his unrebutted version that the vehicle had been sold to him by Alex and Ricky Bautista. Although the explanation was not seamless, once an explanation is made for the possession, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may no longer be invoked, and the burden shifts to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense improbable. The prosecution failed to discharge this burden. SPO2 Figueroa’s testimony was confused, apprehensive, and uncorroborated, while accused-appellant testified unflinchingly and was corroborated by Angeles. The disputable presumption therefore could not prevail over accused-appellant’s explanation, and the legal presumption was disputed and could not find application.
• Proof of Homicide/Murder: Because the carnapping was not duly proved, the killing of the victim could not be treated as an incident of carnapping. Even under the provisions of homicide and murder under the Revised Penal Code, guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. There were no eyewitnesses to the killing. Both courts relied only on the circumstantial evidence of accused-appellant’s possession of the missing vehicle. Shirley testified that her husband and their vehicle went missing on November 12, 2002, and Dr. Concepcion testified on the cause of death and injuries. No connection was established between the victim’s gunshot wound and the firearm found on accused-appellant. SPO2 Figueroa’s testimony, even if true, did not link accused-appellant to the carnapping, much less to the murder or homicide, and did not preclude the probability of accused-appellant’s story that he had merely bought the vehicle from the Bautista brothers, who had themselves gone missing.
• Reasonable Doubt / Equipoise: The equipoise rule provides that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction; where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond reasonable doubt, by a preponderance of evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. The prosecution must present its side with clarity and persuasion so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, and must justify conviction with moral certainty. Upon its failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court. In this case, the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engendered doubt rather than moral certainty on the guilt of accused-appellant.

• Special Complex Crime of Carnapping with Homicide — Under Section 14 of R.A. No. 6539, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death is imposed when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The offense is a special complex crime by analogy to robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution must prove the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder, and more importantly, must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. Where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act cease to be applicable, and the homicide or murder, if proven, is punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
• Circumstantial Evidence — For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstantial evidence presented and proved must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rationale except that of guilt.
• Disputable Presumption from Possession of a Thing Taken in a Recent Wrongful Act — Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. This presumption is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto. Once the accused makes an explanation for the possession, the presumption arising from unexplained possession may no longer be invoked, and the burden shifts once more to the prosecution to produce evidence that would render the defense of the accused improbable.
• Equipoise Rule — Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction. Where the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption of innocence tilts the scales in favor of the accused.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Presumption of Innocence — Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove the fact of the crime and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is a burden particular to the prosecution and does not apply to exculpatory facts raised by the defense; the accused is not required to establish matters in mitigation or defense beyond reasonable doubt, nor by a preponderance of the evidence, or even to a reasonable probability. The constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and upon the prosecution’s failure to meet this test, acquittal becomes the constitutional duty of the Court.

• "Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two (2) things: 1. The fact of the crime, i.e. the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged; and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime." — This passage states the fundamental two-fold burden of the prosecution in criminal cases and frames the Court’s conclusion that both aspects were not proved.
• "For circumstantial evidence to sustain a conviction, following are the guidelines: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is as such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the requisites for circumstantial evidence, applied to reject the lone circumstance of possession.
• "The application of disputable presumption found in Section 3 (j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, in this case the alleged carnapping and the homicide/murder of its owner, is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence inconsistent thereto." — This passage defines the limits of the disputable presumption from possession and is central to the Court’s ruling that the presumption could not be invoked against accused-appellant.
• "The equipoise rule states that where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfil the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction." — This excerpt states the equipoise rule relied upon by the Court in holding that the evidence engendered doubt rather than moral certainty.

• People vs. Santos, 388 Phil. 993, 1005-1006 (2000) — Cited for the nature of carnapping with homicide as a special complex crime and the requirement that the prosecution prove the essential requisites of carnapping and homicide or murder, including that the original criminal design was carnapping and the killing was perpetrated in the course of or on the occasion thereof.
• People vs. Geron, 346 Phil. 14, 24 (1997) — Cited for the circumstantial evidence rule requiring an unbroken chain of circumstances, for the limitation of the disputable presumption from possession to unexplained possession, and for the principle that proof beyond reasonable doubt does not apply to exculpatory facts raised by the defense.
• People vs. Quitorio, 349 Phil. 114, 129 (1998) — Cited for the requirement that circumstantial evidence must constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others.
• People vs. Reyes, 349 Phil. 39, 58 (1998) — Cited for the same circumstantial evidence standard, together with related jurisprudence, to support the rejection of the lone circumstance of possession.
• People vs. Erguiza, 592 Phil. 363, 388 (2008) — Cited for the equipoise rule, which the Court applied in finding that the evidence was capable of an explanation consistent with innocence.
• People vs. Cabalse, G.R. No. 146274, 17 August 2004, 436 SCRA 629, 640 — Cited for the prosecution’s duty to present its side with clarity and persuasion so that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion, and to justify conviction with moral certainty.
• People vs. Asis, 439 Phil. 707, 728 (2002) — Cited for the constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, which can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Section 2, R.A. No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972) — Defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or by using force upon things. The Court found that the prosecution failed to prove all these elements.
• Section 14, R.A. No. 6539, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Prescribes the penalties for carnapping and imposes reclusion perpetua to death when the owner, driver, or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. The Court held that this special complex crime requires proof of carnapping and homicide or murder, and that the failure to prove carnapping made the Anti-Carnapping Act inapplicable.
• Section 3(j), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court — Creates the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act. The Court ruled that the presumption could not be applied because accused-appellant explained his possession and the prosecution failed to render that explanation implausible.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Revised Rules of Court — Sets out the requisites for circumstantial evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court applied this provision and found that only one circumstance—possession—was presented, which was insufficient.
• Presidential Decree 1612 — The Anti-Fencing Law, cited in the dispositive portion as the basis for a possible investigation despite accused-appellant’s acquittal for carnapping with homicide.
• Constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty — Invoked by the Court in holding that this right can be overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt, and that the prosecution’s failure to meet that burden required acquittal.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concurred. Peralta, J., was on official leave. Bersamin, J., sat as an additional member per Raffle dated 24 February 2016.