People of the Philippines vs. Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr.

A plea of guilty does not extend to the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose their existence; and for purposes of recidivism, the phrase "at the time of his trial" is construed in its general sense as including the rendition of judgment, not merely the date of arraignment.

Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. and Reynaldo Aducal were both of Laoang, Northern Samar, and Lagarto bore a grievance against Aducal arising from the latter's stabbing and hospitalization of his brother Pablito in 1980. The killing was prosecuted under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes murder, and the case reached the Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty — a penalty thereafter changed to reclusion perpetua by Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The Rules of Court governing the reception of evidence upon a plea of guilty to a capital offense supplied the procedural framework within which the trial court took the prosecution's proofs.

Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. and Reynaldo Aducal both lived in Laoang, Northern Samar, and Lagarto harbored a grievance against Aducal, who had stabbed and hospitalized his brother Pablito in 1980.

In the early evening of May 25, 1983, Aducal was buying fish in the public market at Poblacion Laoang, Northern Samar, when he was fatally stabbed. Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan testified that at around six o'clock that evening, while he and Pat. Manuel Sevillana were passing the market place, his attention was called by a certain Armando Baluyot to a commotion; he observed that people were scampering for safety and that a man was escaping. When somebody shouted that the man was the assailant, Laguitan immediately followed and apprehended him on the spot, an act that thwarted the assailant's escape. At the police headquarters, the man admitted that he had long planned to kill the victim.

The prosecution's evidence included the case record of Criminal Case No. 1473, People vs. Eugenio Lagarto, Jr., showing that the accused had been convicted by final judgment of homicide; the death certificate of Reynaldo Aducal; the fan knife or balisong used in the killing; and the accused's extra-judicial confession. In that confession, the accused stated that Aducal had stabbed his brother Pablito in 1980, that Pablito had been hospitalized as a result, that he had stabbed Aducal to death in revenge or retaliation, and that he had been planning to avenge his brother from 1980 until May 25, 1983.

Zosimo Aducal, the victim's father, testified that on the evening of May 25, 1983 he was attending to his farm three kilometers away from the poblacion of Little Venice, Laoang, Northern Samar, when his grandson Artemio Aducal, the victim's son, informed him that Reynaldo had been stabbed dead. Unable to see his way in the darkness, he viewed his son's body only the following morning and saw two stab wounds on the right and left breast.

Upon arraignment the accused entered a plea of guilty after the trial court had satisfied itself that he understood the import and consequences of his plea, and the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence to establish his guilt and the degree of his culpability. The trial court found that the accused was a recidivist, that evident premeditation and treachery attended the killing, and that the accused had clandestinely concealed the knife in his body away from the searching eye of the prison guards, which it took as showing deliberate intent.

• Evident Premeditation: Counsel de oficio for the accused-appellant contended that the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against the accused.
• Treachery: Counsel de oficio contended that the lower court likewise erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery against the accused.
• Penalty: Counsel de oficio argued that, consequently, the lower court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the extreme penalty of death.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance in the commission of the crime.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance in the commission of the crime.
• Recidivism: Whether the accused is a recidivist, given that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 became final on the same day he was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 1566 and that the judgment in the second case was rendered only thereafter.

• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established, the evidence adduced having failed to disclose the time of the offender's determination to commit the crime, any act manifestly indicating that he had clung to that determination, and a sufficient lapse of time for reflection; a plea of guilty cannot supply these elements.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established, the prosecution having failed to prove the manner in which the victim was attacked; treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved as clearly as the crime itself.
• Recidivism: Yes. The accused is a recidivist, the phrase "at the time of his trial" being construed in its general sense as including the rendition of judgment, so that his prior homicide conviction, final before the second judgment was rendered, sufficed.

• Evident Premeditation: A plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt and an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances, provided it is made freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of its consequences and meaning, and unconditionally. The trial court in this case exerted its utmost effort to be extra solicitous in ensuring that the accused understood the meaning and importance of his plea, and the accused persisted despite being warned that death was the only possible penalty. Nevertheless, a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances. Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. The accused's statement that he had long planned to kill Aducal in retaliation for the stabbing of his brother did not adequately prove evident premeditation; it was necessary to establish that he meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and the time the crime was actually perpetrated. His proposition was nothing but an expression of his own determination to commit the crime, which is entirely different from premeditation. Premeditation must be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the determination to commit the same; it must be evident and not merely suspected or merely thought of or contemplated mentally without externalized acts. The trial court's finding that the accused clandestinely concealed the knife away from the searching eye of the prison guards was not borne out by the records, and findings of fact should not be based on mere assumptions.

• Treachery: In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was attacked. Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proved, and where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected but no precise data on the point, the circumstance cannot be taken into account. The records disclose no evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted so as to insure the perpetration of the crime and the safety of the assailant from any defense the victim might put up; there was an absence of evidence as to the means employed and the mode of attack. Treachery may not be simply deduced from assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the killing into murder.

• Recidivism: A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The accused had been convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 before the trial of Criminal Case No. 1566. His former counsel de oficio argued that because the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, the accused was not a recidivist when arraigned on October 11, 1983, but the phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of arraignment; it is employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. The phrase "at the trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. The accused was convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983; no appeal having been taken, that judgment became final on October 11, 1983; and the second conviction was rendered on October 26, 1983 for murder. The accused was therefore convicted by final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense, making him a recidivist.

• Plea of Guilty as Judicial Confession — A plea of guilty is both a mitigating circumstance and a judicial confession of guilt — an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. To be considered a true plea of guilty, however, it must be made freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of the act, and it must be made unconditionally. In this case, the trial court's extended colloquy with the accused established that he understood the import and consequences of his plea, including the possibility of death, and the plea was thus treated as a valid judicial confession.

• Limited Scope of a Plea of Guilty as to Qualifying Circumstances — A plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances. The plea admits only what the proofs support; it does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of establishing the circumstances that raise the killing to murder. This doctrine supplied the ratio for reducing the conviction from murder to homicide.

• Evident Premeditation — Requisites — Evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. It must be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the determination to commit the crime, and must be evident and not merely suspected or merely contemplated mentally without externalized acts. A bare statement by the accused that he had long planned the killing is an expression of his own determination, which is entirely different from premeditation.

• Treachery Must Be Proved as Clearly as the Crime Itself — Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proved, and the manner in which the victim was attacked must be established. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected but no precise data on the point, treachery cannot be taken into account. It may not be deduced from assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the killing into murder.

• Recidivism — "At the Time of His Trial" — A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "at the time of his trial" is not to be restrictively construed as the date of arraignment; it is employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. "At the trial" includes everything done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court.

• Duty of the Trial Court Upon a Plea of Guilty to a Capital Offense — Under the old Rules of Court, where the defendant pleads guilty and the trial court has discretion as to the punishment, the court may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed, and although it may sentence the defendant without taking testimony, it is advisable to call witnesses to establish guilt and the degree of culpability. Under the present rules, where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, it is mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused likewise entitled to present evidence, including that of mitigating circumstances. The trial court in this case complied by directing the prosecution to present evidence.

• "It is a rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying circumstances (People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123)." — This is the ratio decidendi for the modification of the judgment, limiting the reach of a judicial confession and preserving the prosecution's burden of proving qualifying circumstances.

• "Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will." — The canonical three-part formulation of evident premeditation, applied to reject the trial court's appreciation of the circumstance.

• "Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proved. Where there are merely indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, the circumstance of treachery can not be taken into account." — States the evidentiary standard for treachery, which the prosecution failed to meet in the absence of proof of the means employed and the mode of attack.

• "In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held that the phrase 'at the trial' is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court." — Supplies the controlling construction of "at the time of his trial" for recidivism, which the Court used to sustain the aggravating circumstance despite the timing of the prior judgment's finality.

• People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123 — Controlling precedent for the rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose their existence; the basis for reducing the conviction to homicide.
• People vs. Ariola, 100 SCRA 523 — Cited for the rule that a plea of guilty is a judicial confession of guilt admitting all material facts alleged in the information, and for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed but must be fully proved.
• People vs. Comendador, 100 SCRA 155 — Cited for the requisites of a true plea of guilty — that it be free, voluntary, with full knowledge of its consequences and meaning, and unconditional — and for the advisability of calling witnesses to establish guilt and the degree of culpability.
• US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23 — Followed for the construction of "at the trial" as including everything done in the course of the trial, from arraignment until after sentence is announced in open court.
• People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428 — Followed for the rule that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment.
• People vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704 and People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506 — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 — Cited for the distinction between a defendant's expression of his own determination to commit the crime and premeditation.
• People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224 — Cited for the ruling that there is no evident premeditation where the only supporting evidence is the accused's statement that he planned to kill the victim years before the actual stabbing.
• People vs. Guiyab, 139 SCRA 446 — Cited for the requirement that premeditation be shown by notorious acts evincing the determination to commit the crime.
• People vs. Iturriaga, 88 Phil. 534 — Cited for the rule that evident premeditation must be evident and not merely suspected.
• People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 — Cited, together with Section 3, Rule 116, for the mandatory duty of the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
• US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541 — Cited for the rule that a trial court may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged without the necessity of taking testimony.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder; the offense charged in the amended information and the provision under which the trial court convicted the accused, later modified to homicide on review.
• Article 40, Revised Penal Code — Provides for the accessories of a penalty; cited in the trial court's dispositive portion in imposing the death penalty with all its accessories.
• Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — The provision pursuant to which the penalty of death was changed to reclusion perpetua, as noted by the Court in taking up the case on automatic review.
• Section 5, Rule 118, old Rules of Court — Provides that where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed; the Court cited this as the rule governing the trial court's reception of evidence.
• Section 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Requires that where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused entitled to present evidence to prove, among others, mitigating circumstances; the trial court complied by directing the prosecution to present evidence.
• Recidivism, Revised Penal Code — As defined in the decision, a recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code; applied to sustain the aggravating circumstance against the accused.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento, and Regalado, JJ.