People of the Philippines vs. Eugenio Crisostomo

A killing is qualified by treachery where the offender employs means, method, or forms in execution that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself; the suddenness of the attack alone does not suffice, but shooting an unarmed victim from behind at close range with a lethal weapon aimed at a vital spot establishes alevosia. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was credited despite a ten-day hiding period, the requisites having been satisfied.

Eugenio Crisostomo and Romeo Geronimo were residents of Hagonoy, Bulacan, known to each other and, according to Crisostomo, had previously had an altercation in a billiard hall after which friendly relations resumed. The charge against Crisostomo was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with treachery alleged as a qualifying circumstance; the appeal also implicated Article 14(16) on treachery, Article 15 on intoxication, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

On Christmas Day, December 25, 1967, between 6:00 and 7:00 in the evening, at Sto. Rosario, Hagonoy, Bulacan, Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of Romeo Geronimo. He met Geronimo and invited him to have a drink at a friend’s place; Geronimo declined. Suddenly Crisostomo rushed toward Geronimo, who was standing near a store facing the street with his back toward Crisostomo, and shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one meter. The bullet entered about two inches below the axilla, or armpit, and exited on the right side of the chest about one inch from the sternum. Geronimo fell to the ground mortally wounded, and Crisostomo ran away.

Bystanders Delfin Lopez, Ernesto Trillana, Apolonio Santos, Manuel Tamayo, and others, all friends of both the victim and assailant, came to Geronimo’s aid and brought him to Reyes Hospital in the Poblacion of Hagonoy, where the doctor pronounced him dead upon arrival. The body was brought to his home. An information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, charging Crisostomo with murder with evident premeditation and treachery.

At arraignment, Crisostomo entered a plea of not guilty. During trial and again after the prosecution had rested its case, he signified his intention to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute a plea of guilty to the lesser charge of homicide, praying that he be allowed to prove mitigating circumstances; the fiscal did not agree, and the court denied the petition. In his defense, Crisostomo testified that at the time of the incident, when he saw the victim, he played a joke by drawing his gun from his waist and pointing it at the victim, but the gun suddenly went off and the bullet hit the victim; taken by surprise, he fled. He also admitted a previous altercation with the victim in a billiard hall, where the victim hit him with a bottle, although he claimed they had resumed friendly relations thereafter.

Dr. Juan Santos, then municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, externally examined the victim’s body on the same night of the incident. He testified that the cause of death was a through-and-through gunshot wound caused by a bullet. He found no other sign of external violence except the shot wound. He described the left axilla wound as 2.5 millimeters, round, and deep, and the right chest wound as 8 millimeters, oval, and shallower; he denied that the wounds were identical and explained that the left axilla wound was the point of entry and the right chest wound the point of exit, caused by one bullet, with a trajectory from the left axilla to the right chest. No autopsy was performed. The death certificate and notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external examination were presented, and eyewitnesses Manuel Tamayo and Delfin Lopez testified that they saw Crisostomo rush at the victim and suddenly shoot him; the victim fell after being hit and was brought to the hospital, where the doctor pronounced him dead on arrival.

Crisostomo claimed he had been drinking from one o’clock in the afternoon on that Christmas day and had been drunk five times in his entire life, so it was not habitual. He also stated that he hid from the authorities for ten days but voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, upon the advice of his parents, and was detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. The trial court convicted him of murder, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal.

• Admission of Killing: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in finding that he admitted having killed Romeo Geronimo, instead of limiting its finding to the true extent of his admission.
• Cause of Death and Absence of Autopsy: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution failed to establish the actual cause of death beyond reasonable doubt because no autopsy was performed; the death certificate was admissible only to prove the fact of death, not its cause; Dr. Santos was not an expert and had no basis to opine on cause of death; and the two wounds of different sizes suggested the possibility that the victim was shot twice, the second time by another person.
• Treachery: Petitioner contended that the trial court erred in finding treachery; although he suddenly attacked the victim, it did not appear that he consciously adopted a mode of attack intended to facilitate the offense without risk to himself, especially since he was drunk and could not have reflected on the special means of execution.
• Drunkenness: Petitioner asserted that he was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness, having drunk from one o’clock in the afternoon and having been drunk only five times in his life, so the intoxication was not habitual.
• Voluntary Surrender: Petitioner argued that he should be credited with voluntary surrender because, although he hid from the authorities for ten days, he voluntarily surrendered thereafter upon the advice of his parents.
• Plea of Guilty to Lesser Offense: Petitioner claimed that his offer to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: Petitioner argued that he should be credited with the privileged mitigating circumstance arising from the presence of two ordinary mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance.

• Admission of Killing: Whether the trial court erred in finding that appellant admitted having killed Romeo Geronimo, instead of limiting its finding to the true extent of his admission.
• Cause of Death and Absence of Autopsy: Whether the prosecution established the actual cause of death beyond reasonable doubt despite the absence of an autopsy.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Drunkenness: Whether appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Plea of Guilty to Lesser Offense: Whether appellant’s offer to plead guilty to homicide should be credited as a mitigating circumstance.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: Whether appellant is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of two ordinary mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance.

• Admission of Killing: No. The trial court did not err; petitioner’s own testimony that he pointed the gun at the victim and it went off, followed by his flight, effectively admitted that he shot the victim, and the single shot caused his death.
• Cause of Death and Absence of Autopsy: No. The absence of an autopsy did not prevent proof of cause of death; Dr. Santos’s external examination, the death certificate and notes, and eyewitness testimony established the gunshot wound as the cause.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing; suddenness alone is insufficient, but petitioner used a lethal weapon at close range against an unarmed victim whose back was turned, aiming at a vital spot.
• Drunkenness: No. The claim was self-serving and uncorroborated; petitioner admitted he was only dizzy, remembered the details, and fled, showing his mental capacity was not impaired.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The requisites were satisfied; petitioner was not actually arrested, surrendered to the authorities on January 4, 1968 upon his parents’ advice, and was detained.
• Plea of Guilty to Lesser Offense: No. The offer to plead guilty to homicide was made after some prosecution evidence had been presented and again after the prosecution rested, not prior to the presentation of prosecution evidence as required.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: No. Only voluntary surrender was credited as an ordinary mitigating circumstance; without two ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the privileged mitigating circumstance does not apply.

• Admission of Killing: The defense version—that petitioner drew his gun as a joke, pointed it at the victim, and it suddenly went off—effectively admitted that he shot Romeo Geronimo. The Court noted that he fled upon realizing the gravity of what he had committed, and that the single shot felled the victim and was the immediate cause of his death. His offer to withdraw his plea and plead guilty to homicide during trial and after the prosecution rested did not alter this admission.
• Cause of Death and Absence of Autopsy: Dr. Santos, municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, categorically testified that the cause of death was a through-and-through gunshot wound caused by a bullet. Although not an expert witness, as a physician and health officer he was qualified to give an opinion on the cause of death. He externally examined the body on the same night and found no other external violence except the shot wound. Under such circumstances, one need not be an expert to opine that the gunshot wound caused death. Dr. Santos distinguished the two wounds: the left axilla wound was 2.5 millimeters, round, and deep; the right chest wound was 8 millimeters, oval, and shallower. The left axilla was the entry point and the right chest the exit point, caused by one bullet with a trajectory from left axilla to right chest. The speculation that the victim may have been shot twice was without basis. The death certificate and notes issued by Dr. Santos in the regular performance of his duty were prima facie evidence of the cause of death, and were confirmed by his testimony and by eyewitnesses Manuel Tamayo and Delfin Lopez, mutual friends of both the deceased and petitioner, whose testimonies were free from suspicion of bias or prejudice.
• Treachery: Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the employment of means, method, or forms in the execution of crimes against persons that tend directly and specially to insure execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The suddenness of the attack alone does not suffice to support a finding of alevosia; there must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. Here, petitioner admitted a previous altercation with the victim in a billiard hall, where the victim hit him with a bottle, although he claimed friendly relations resumed. At the time of the incident, petitioner invited the victim to a drinking spree; the victim declined; petitioner then suddenly, without ceremony, shot the victim while his back was turned. Petitioner used a gun, a lethal weapon, to insure his design to kill; he fired at short distance aiming at a vital spot; the victim was unarmed. From these environmental circumstances, alevosia was fully established.
• Drunkenness: Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code provides that intoxication is mitigating when the offender committed the felony in a state of intoxication, if not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony; otherwise, when habitual or intentional, it is aggravating. Petitioner’s allegation that he was drunk was self-serving and uncorroborated. He admitted he was only dizzy and was on his way to another drinking spree, showing he had not drunk enough. He remembered the details of the shooting, when it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed, and who was with him. He realized the gravity of the offense, fled, hid, sought sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle to the poblacion, and took a La Mallorca bus to Manila—acts of a man whose mental capacity was not impaired.
• Voluntary Surrender: The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. Petitioner’s testimony, undisputed by the prosecution, was that while in hiding, upon the advice of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, and was detained in the municipal jail of Hagonoy. The Court therefore agreed that he was entitled to this mitigating circumstance.
• Plea of Guilty to Lesser Offense: The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession of guilt was made in open court, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Petitioner offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented, and reiterated the offer after the prosecution rested its case. This was not mitigating.
• Privileged Mitigating Circumstance: In light of the foregoing, the claim to a privileged mitigating circumstance was without merit. The offense committed was murder because the killing was qualified by treachery. Considering the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposed the indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and increased the indemnity for the victim’s death to P30,000.00.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons by employing means, method, or forms in the execution thereof that tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The suddenness of the attack alone does not suffice; there must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate. The Court applied this doctrine where the accused shot an unarmed victim from behind at close range with a lethal weapon aimed at a vital spot, holding that alevosia was fully established.
• Voluntary Surrender — The requisites are: (a) the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. The Court credited the mitigating circumstance even though the accused had hidden for ten days, because he surrendered upon his parents’ advice and was not actually arrested before doing so.
• Intoxication as a Mitigating Circumstance — Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication is mitigating when the offender committed the felony in a state of intoxication, provided it is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony; if habitual or intentional, it is aggravating. The Court rejected the claim because it was self-serving and uncorroborated, the accused admitted he was only dizzy, and his detailed recollection and flight showed his mental capacity was not impaired.
• Plea of Guilty to a Lesser Offense as a Mitigating Circumstance — The requisites are: (1) the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) the confession was made in open court before the competent court trying the case; and (3) the confession was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. An offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense made after prosecution evidence had been presented, or after the prosecution rested, is not mitigating.
• Prima Facie Evidence of Cause of Death — Under Section 38, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, a death certificate and notes issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death. The Court applied this rule to uphold the finding of cause of death despite the absence of an autopsy.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Where a mitigating circumstance attends the commission of the offense, the Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the imposition of an indeterminate penalty with a minimum and a maximum term. The Court applied it after crediting voluntary surrender, setting the minimum at ten years and one day of prision mayor and the maximum at seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, which it applied to qualify the killing to murder.
• "The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support the findings of alevosia." — This passage limits the use of suddenness as proof of treachery and explains why the Court required evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted to prevent defense or retaliation.
• "The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the offender had not actually been arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) that the surrender was voluntary." — This defines the requisites the Court used to credit voluntary surrender despite the accused’s ten-day hiding before surrendering.
• "The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution." — This states the requisites the Court applied in rejecting the offer to plead guilty to homicide as a mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Arquiza, 55 SCRA 245 — Cited for the rule that the suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia.
• People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 742; People vs. Saez, 1 SCRA 937 — Cited for the requirement that there be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate.
• People vs. Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534 — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. de la Peña, 66 Phil. 451; People vs. Oandasan, 25 SCRA 277; People vs. Co Chang, 60 Phil. 293; People vs. De Guzman, 63 Phil. 874; People vs. Lambino, 103 Phil. 504 — Cited for the requisites of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty.
• People vs. Liones, 117 SCRA 382 — Cited in support of the rule that the death certificate and notes issued by the municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death.
• People vs. de la Fuente, 126 SCRA 158; People vs. Crisanto, Jr., 135 SCRA 413; People vs. Cortega, 134 SCRA 526, 532; People vs. Escoltera, 139 SCRA 218; People vs. Pampanga, 139 SCRA 393; People vs. Cañete, 129 SCRA 452; People vs. Suipas, 29 SCRA 539; People vs. Morichom, 132 SCRA 116; People vs. Moral, 132 SCRA 474; People vs. Pasea, Jr., 137 SCRA 508; People vs. Villanueva, 130 SCRA 75 — Cited collectively in support of the finding that alevosia was fully established.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes murder. The Court held the killing was murder because it was qualified by treachery, and applied the article in affirming the conviction while modifying the penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery. The Court applied it to qualify the killing to murder, finding that the accused employed a lethal weapon at close range against an unarmed victim whose back was turned, aiming at a vital spot.
• Article 15, Revised Penal Code — Governs intoxication as a mitigating or aggravating circumstance. The Court applied it in rejecting the claim of drunkenness because the intoxication was not proven and was not habitual or subsequent to a plan.
• Section 38, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that a death certificate and notes issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty are prima facie evidence of the cause of death. The Court applied it to uphold the finding of cause of death despite the absence of an autopsy.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires an indeterminate penalty where a mitigating circumstance is present. The Court applied it after crediting voluntary surrender, imposing a minimum of ten years and one day of prision mayor and a maximum of seventeen years, four months, and one day of reclusion temporal.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.