People of the Philippines vs. Eugene Villanueva y Cañales

Where the prosecution fails to prove the elements of kidnapping and the qualifying circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, but conspiracy to kill is established, the accused may be convicted only of homicide as a co-principal.

Reggie Pacil y Nojas was a 42-year-old bachelor and school principal of Alijis Elementary School in Valladolid, Bacolod City. Eugene Villanueva y Cañales was a close friend of Pacil, who financed Villanueva’s fruit buying and selling business; Pacil also had a Canadian friend named Ray Truck. The case involves the Revised Penal Code provisions on kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and related provisions on self-defense, complex crimes, treachery, homicide, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

On the afternoon of February 12, 2004, Police Inspector Bonifer Gotas, Precinct Commander of Precinct VI, Bacolod City, received a report that a dead person had been recovered in a sugarcane field at Villa Angela Subdivision. The deceased was identified as Reggie Pacil y Nojas, a 42-year-old bachelor and the school principal of Alijis Elementary School in Valladolid, Bacolod City. During the investigation, PI Gotas was informed that the victim had been killed at the Taculing Court Apartelle. An inquiry with a roomboy revealed that on the evening of February 11, 2004, three men on board a Suzuki multi-cab rented and spent time at Room 106 of the apartelle. PI Gotas inspected the room and saw bloodstains scattered inside and on its wall. He was informed that one of the occupants was Edilberto Norada y Harder. Days after the incident, Norada was arrested, followed by appellant Villanueva and Agustin Seva y Lacbanes.

Rosalina Pacil, the victim’s mother, testified that the victim received a monthly salary of ₱12,837.00 as school principal. She further testified that appellant was a friend of her son and frequently visited their house since the victim financed appellant’s fruit buying and selling business. On February 11, 2004, appellant was in their house waiting for the victim. The victim arrived early in the evening with a Canadian friend, Ray Truck. Not long after, the victim and appellant left, leaving Truck behind. That was the last time Rosalina saw her son alive. Dr. Eli Cong, the medico-legal officer of the Bacolod City Health Office, found a lacerated wound and contusion hematoma on the victim’s body and gave the cause of death as uncal herniation secondary to contusion hemorrhage and skull fracture from trauma by a blunt instrument, which could have been caused by a piece of wood.

Appellant admitted that he was a close friend of the victim. According to his narration, on February 8, 2004, he met Reggie Pacil, who told him that he would treat him to a disco on February 11, 2004 to celebrate in advance his forthcoming birthday. Pacil instructed him to look for a car that they could hire. When he met Edilberto Norada, a taxi driver and old acquaintance, the following day, he told him to look for a car. Norada succeeded in leasing a red Suzuki multi-cab owned by Cecile Pioquinto, a girlfriend of Agustin Seva. On February 10, 2004, Villanueva and Norada took the car from Pioquinto’s house; Seva was then in Pioquinto’s house. Villanueva paid rental of ₱2,000.00. Leaving behind the car and Norada, Villanueva went to Valladolid to fetch Reggie Pacil. Pacil was not in his house, so he waited until about 7:30 in the evening. When Pacil arrived on board a taxi, he was with his Canadian friend Ray Truck. Villanueva and Pacil took the same taxi for Bacolod City while the Canadian was left behind in Pacil’s house. They met Norada at a designated place in the Golden Field Complex, but instead of proceeding directly to a disco, Pacil suggested that they first find a place to spend the rest of the night. Reggie Pacil rented a room at the Taculing Court Apartelle and said that they would wait there for Pacil’s other friends. As they waited, Villanueva and Pacil drank beer while Norada stayed outside the room. At about 2:00 in the morning, Pacil’s friends had not arrived, so Villanueva decided to go out alone. Pacil, however, would not allow him to leave. Villanueva then began to realize that Pacil intended to use him. When he held Pacil’s hand to enable him to leave, he slipped and fell on the floor. Pacil placed himself over him, and as they struggled, Norada entered the room. Norada tried to pacify them but was boxed by Pacil. Norada left and returned with a piece of wood and hit Pacil on the head several times. Pacil fell unconscious. Because blood was flowing out of Pacil’s head, Villanueva and Norada panicked. They wrapped Pacil in a bedsheet and loaded him on the Suzuki multi-cab. They went around Bacolod City not knowing what to do, and eventually dumped Pacil’s body at Villa Angela Subdivision.

Norada’s testimony, on the other hand, was that he and Agustin Seva had for some time been hatching a plan to organize a kidnap-for-ransom group in Bacolod City. The plan did not materialize because they had no money to fund the operation. Later, in 2003, he met Eugene Villanueva, a security guard of Riverside Hospital. Villanueva revealed that he was a close friend of Reggie Pacil, a schoolteacher in Valladolid, and that Pacil had a Canadian friend named Ray Truck who had plenty of money. Norada, Seva, and Villanueva then made a plan to kidnap Ray Truck. To carry out the plan, they rented the car of Cecile Pioquinto, Seva’s girlfriend, and also rented a room at the Taculing Court Apartelle. Villanueva would bring both Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck to the apartelle on the evening of February 11, 2004, and they would then execute the kidnap plan. On the appointed day, Villanueva fetched Reggie Pacil and Ray Truck at Pacil’s house in Valladolid, but only Reggie Pacil came; Ray Truck remained in the house. Because Ray Truck did not appear, they changed their plan and decided to kidnap Reggie Pacil instead, convinced that Ray Truck would pay ransom for his release. They decided that the kidnapping would take place as soon as Reggie Pacil fell asleep. Inside the rented room, Seva, Villanueva, and Pacil drank liquor, while Norada slept in the car in the apartelle’s garage. In the early morning of the following day, Norada said, Villanueva woke him up and told him that Pacil was already asleep. They began tying up Pacil, but he woke up and resisted. Norada hit Pacil on the head with a piece of wood. Pacil was rendered unconscious only briefly and struggled again. Norada hit him again, and this time Pacil stayed motionless but snoring. Seva then taped Pacil’s mouth while Norada and Villanueva tied his hands and feet. They wrapped Pacil in a blanket, loaded him into the car, and dumped his body at Villa Angela Subdivision. Thereafter, they parted ways.

The RTC gave probative value to Norada’s narration respecting the conspiracy to kidnap the victim and how he was killed. The CA likewise gave probative weight to Norada’s sworn statement and sustained its admissibility as a judicial admission. Both the RTC and the CA rejected appellant’s plea of self-defense for his failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. They found appellant’s version of the event not only uncorroborated but also a crude and clumsy prevarication. No prosecution witness saw how the killing was perpetrated.

• Self-Defense: Appellant invoked the justifying circumstance of self-defense to exculpate himself, claiming unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, who allegedly refused to let him leave the room and struggled with him; Norada intervened after the victim boxed him, and appellant sought exculpation on that basis.

• Kidnapping: Whether the crime of kidnapping was sufficiently established to support a conviction for attempted kidnapping.
• Self-Defense: Whether appellant’s plea of self-defense is tenable.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the accused was established.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superior strength attended the killing.
• Crime and Penalty: Whether appellant can be convicted only of homicide and, if so, what penalty should be imposed.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards of damages should be modified.

• Kidnapping: No. The prosecution failed to establish intent to deprive the victim of liberty; no concrete evidence of a plan or purpose to detain him, and the trial court’s finding rested on speculation.
• Self-Defense: No. Unlawful aggression, a condition sine qua non, was not proven; appellant’s claim of being boxed did not show injury or danger to his life.
• Treachery: No. The prosecution did not prove the deliberate adoption of a mode of attack ensuring execution without risk; a sudden attack alone does not qualify the killing as murder.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Appellant’s acts during and after the killing showed concerted action and unity of purpose; under the act of one is the act of all, he is liable as co-principal.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: No. No prosecution witness saw how the killing was perpetrated, so the circumstance cannot be appreciated.
• Crime and Penalty: Homicide. With no qualifying circumstances proven, appellant is liable under Article 249, RPC, with an indeterminate penalty of 10 years prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Civil Liability: Modified. Civil indemnity reduced to ₱50,000; moral damages ₱50,000; exemplary damages deleted; temperate damages ₱50,000; loss of earning capacity restored at ₱1,950,967.26; interest at 6% per annum from finality.

• Kidnapping: Article 267, RPC, as amended by RA No. 7659, defines kidnapping and serious illegal detention and requires: (1) the accused is a private individual; (2) the accused kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted or threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public official. The essence of the crime is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. The totality of the prosecution’s evidence failed to sufficiently establish kidnapping. There was no concrete evidence that appellant and his cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of liberty for some time and for some purpose; there was also no evidence that they thoroughly planned the kidnapping of the victim. The lack of motive to kidnap the victim was notable because they were bent on kidnapping his friend Truck. The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then tying his hands and feet was not determinant of intent to actually detain him or deprive him of liberty. The trial court was indulging in speculation when it held that the victim would either be taken away or kept in the hotel and thereafter ransom would be demanded from the Canadian Ray Truck. Courts should not indulge in speculation no matter how strong the guilt of the accused. Since the offense of kidnapping was not sufficiently established, the trial court erred in holding appellant liable for attempted kidnapping.

• Self-Defense: Article 11, RPC, requires the following indispensable elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant. By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect admitted his part in killing the victim. Unlawful aggression is a primordial element and a condition sine qua non; if no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense is unavailing because there would be nothing to repel. The courts below correctly found that appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression. Both the RTC and the CA held that his version of the event was not only uncorroborated but crude and clumsy prevarication. His claim of having been boxed by the victim did not show that he suffered any injury, and he made no allegation as to what part of his body was hit. More importantly, the punching, if true, did not place his life in danger. Thus, appellant’s claim of self-defense deserved no merit.

• Treachery: Article 14, paragraph 16, RPC, provides that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To constitute treachery, two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means, methods, or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party; and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of the means, method, or manner of execution. Treachery cannot be presumed; the circumstances surrounding the killing must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. The victim was struck on the head by Norada with a piece of wood, which resulted in his death. However, the records are bereft of any evidence that appellant and his co-accused made some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the victim to defend himself. In People vs. Antonio, it was held that it is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder; there must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a specific purpose. In People vs. Catbagan, the Court ruled that treachery cannot be considered when there is no evidence that the accused had resolved to commit the crime prior to the moment of the killing or that the death of the victim was the result of premeditation, calculation, or reflection. In the present case, the mode or manner of the attack on the victim did not appear to have been consciously and deliberately adopted.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them. In this case, the evidence showed that appellant did not prevent Norada from striking the head of the victim with the piece of wood. When the victim fell unconscious with blood oozing from his head, appellant even helped in wrapping the body with a bedsheet and loading him on the Suzuki multi-cab. To completely end the life of the victim, they did not bring him to the hospital despite his still being alive but instead dumped the body in a sugarcane field at Villa Angela Subdivision. These acts of appellant during and after the killing indubitably show that he acted in concert for a joint purpose and a community of interest with his co-accused in killing the victim. Thus, applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the act of one is the act of all, appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator and, regardless of his participation, is liable as co-principal. Although the CA did not make any discussion or finding of fact on the presence of conspiracy despite holding them solidarily liable for damages, the appeal threw the whole case wide open for review.

• Abuse of Superior Strength: The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present if the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked, or if there is notorious inequality of forces between the victim and aggressor and the latter takes advantage of superior strength. However, as none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated, abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated in this case.

• Crime and Penalty: Considering that none of the circumstances alleged in the information, i.e., treachery and abuse of superior strength, was proven during the trial, the same cannot be appreciated to qualify the killing to murder. Appellant can only be held liable for homicide. Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty prescribed for homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the absence of any mitigating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period, which has a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum should be within the range of prision mayor, which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, appellant should suffer an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Civil Liability: The Court found a need to modify appellant’s civil liability to conform to recent jurisprudence. The CA’s award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity was reduced to ₱50,000.00. The award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages was correct. The award of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages was deleted in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove that the killing was attended by treachery and abuse of superior strength. With respect to actual damages, the parties stipulated the amount of ₱40,000.00 for funeral, burial, and other incidental expenses and dispensed with the presentation of proof thereof; prevailing jurisprudence dictates an award of ₱50,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court. As to the deletion of the indemnity for loss of earning capacity by the CA, the Court restored the award of ₱1,950,967.26 as unearned income as appearing from the Pay Slip submitted in evidence, which the CA plainly overlooked. The figure was arrived at based on the net earning capacity of the victim using the formula: Net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 - age of the victim at the time of death) x (Gross Annual Income less the Reasonable and Necessary Living Expenses). The victim was 42 years old at the time of his death; his annual gross income was ₱154,044.00 computed based on his monthly income of ₱12,837.00; his necessary living expenses were deemed to be 50% of his gross income; and his life expectancy was assumed to be 2/3 of age 80 less 42.

• Kidnapping under Article 267, Revised Penal Code — The crime requires (1) a private individual; (2) kidnapping or detention or deprivation of liberty; (3) illegality of the act; and (4) any of the enumerated circumstances: detention for more than three days, simulation of public authority, serious physical injuries or threats to kill, or the victim is a minor, female, or public official. Its essence is actual deprivation of liberty coupled with intent to effect it. The Court found these elements not sufficiently established because there was no proof of intent to detain the victim for some time and for some purpose; the plan was to kidnap Ray Truck, and the trial court’s contrary conclusion was speculative.

• Self-Defense; Unlawful Aggression as Sine Qua Non — Under Article 11, RPC, self-defense requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Unlawful aggression is primordial and indispensable. The Court rejected appellant’s plea because he failed to prove that the victim attacked him in a manner that endangered his life; his uncorroborated claim of being boxed showed no injury and no danger.

• Treachery; Requisites and Deliberate Adoption — Under Article 14(16), RPC, treachery requires (1) employment of means, methods, or manner of execution ensuring the offender’s safety from defense or retaliation, and (2) deliberate or conscious choice of such means. It cannot be presumed and must be proved as indubitably as the crime. The Court found no evidence of preparation or deliberate adoption of a mode of attack; the sudden head strike with a piece of wood did not qualify the killing as murder.

• Conspiracy; Inference from Acts and Act of One Is Act of All — Conspiracy may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime showing concerted action and unity of purpose. The Court found conspiracy from appellant’s failure to prevent the attack, his help in wrapping and loading the victim’s body, and the dumping of the still-alive victim instead of bringing him to a hospital. As a co-conspirator, appellant is liable as co-principal under the principle that the act of one is the act of all.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — This aggravating circumstance is present when the accused purposely uses excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the victim, or when there is notorious inequality of forces and the aggressor takes advantage of it. It was not appreciated because no prosecution witness saw how the killing was perpetrated.

• Homicide and Indeterminate Sentence Law — When the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information are not proven, the killing is homicide under Article 249, RPC, punishable by reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law with no mitigating circumstance, the minimum is within prision mayor and the maximum within the medium period of reclusion temporal. The Court imposed 10 years prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Civil Liability in Homicide — Civil indemnity, moral damages, temperate damages, and indemnity for loss of earning capacity are recoverable. Exemplary damages require proof of the qualifying or aggravating circumstance. Temperate damages of ₱50,000 may be awarded in lieu of actual damages when no documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented. Loss of earning capacity is computed using the formula: net earning capacity = 2/3 x (80 - age at death) x (gross annual income less reasonable and necessary living expenses). The Court restored the RTC’s award based on the victim’s pay slip. Interest at 6% per annum from finality was imposed.

• "The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. It includes not only the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time." — This passage defines the essence of kidnapping and supports the finding that the prosecution failed to prove intent to deprive the victim of liberty.
• "In self-defense and defense of strangers, unlawful aggression is a primordial element, a condition sine qua non. If no unlawful aggression attributed to the victim is established, self-defense and defense of strangers are unavailing because there would be nothing to repel." — This passage states the indispensable element of unlawful aggression in self-defense, which appellant failed to prove.
• "Treachery cannot be presumed [for] the circumstances surrounding the [killing] must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself." — This passage places the burden on the prosecution to prove treachery with the same certainty as the crime itself, which it failed to do.
• "Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among them." — This passage supplies the basis for finding conspiracy from appellant’s acts during and after the killing.

• People vs. Mamantak, 582 Phil. 294, 302 (2008) — Cited in the discussion of the elements of kidnapping; the Court relied on its formulation of the crime’s elements.
• People vs. Del Castillo, 679 Phil. 233, 250 (2012) — Cited for the rule that unlawful aggression is a primordial element and condition sine qua non in self-defense; also cited in the discussion of abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Nueva, 591 Phil. 431, 446 (2008) — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed and must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself.
• People vs. Garcia, 577 Phil. 483, 503 (2008) — Cited for the requisites of treachery and for the formula on loss of earning capacity.
• People vs. Antonio, 390 Phil. 989, 1017 (2000) — Cited for the rule that a sudden attack does not automatically qualify a killing as murder; there must be conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack.
• People vs. Catbagan, 467 Phil. 1044, 1081-1082 (2004) — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be considered absent evidence that the accused resolved to commit the crime prior to the killing or that death resulted from premeditation, calculation, or reflection.
• People vs. Robelo, 699 Phil. 392, 401 (2012) — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from acts before, during, and after the crime and for the act of one is the act of all principle.
• People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited for the modification of civil liability awards to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
• People vs. Pat, Nitcha, 310 Phil. 287, 303-304 (1995) — Cited for the absence of evidence of preparation to kill treacherously.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention; the Court enumerated its elements and found them not sufficiently established.
• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of self-defense; the Court applied its elements and held that unlawful aggression was not proven.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery; the Court applied its two requisites and found no deliberate adoption of the mode of attack.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides for complex crimes when a single act produces two or more grave or less grave felonies; the RTC applied it, but the Supreme Court set aside the complex-crime conviction after finding kidnapping not established.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide and prescribes reclusion temporal; the Court convicted appellant under this provision.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of the homicide sentence.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chairperson); Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro; and Associate Justice Noel Gimenez Tijam.