People of the Philippines vs. Esrael Amondina, et al.

Conspiracy is established where the accused's acts demonstrate a concert of action obviously aimed at a common purpose, rendering all conspirators equally liable for the victim's death whoever actually dealt the lethal blow; the sudden and consecutive nature of the attack constitutes treachery, which absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men. A trial court's finding, in resolving a petition for bail, that the evidence of guilt is not strong does not constitute an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt and does not preclude conviction on the merits.

The killing of Floro Gantalao occurred at twilight on the evening of February 23 (the decision's narrative states 1983, while the testimonies of the witnesses refer to 1984) at the townsite of Poblacion, Mabinay, Negros Oriental. Francisco Tangon was pasturing his carabao nearby and, from where he stood some 36 feet away, saw the three accused — Esrael Amondina, Aquillo Cataytay and Romulo Amantillo — sitting on the side of the road. He recognized all of them, having known Amondina since 1969, while Cataytay and Amantillo were his neighbors. When Floro Gantalao arrived, the three men immediately and suddenly attacked him: Amondina swung a pestle and hit Floro on the left jaw, sending him sprawling to the ground; Cataytay followed by hacking Floro with a long bolo that bloodied and fractured his head; and Amantillo struck Floro on the nape with a piece of wood around two feet long as the latter lay wounded and helpless. The three then fled, as did Tangon, who ran in the opposite direction toward his house, but not before he had drawn their attention and was recognized.

Later that same night, Amondina went to Tangon's house and warned him not to tell anyone about the incident, otherwise he would be killed. When Tangon woke at 4:00 o'clock the following morning, he reported the matter to the police, and at 5:00 a.m. he and four other men went to the scene of the crime to retrieve Floro's body. Two policemen, Jessie Mission and Jomie Moreno, were already at the scene, and Tangon testified that he secretly told Moreno what he had witnessed the night before.

The victim's wife, Manolita Gantalao, testified that on February 23, 1984, at around 6:00 p.m., she went to the Namangyan river to get their carabao and, on her way home, espied the three accused, who seemed frightened upon seeing her and started running toward the "hagonoy" bushes. When she reached home, she waited for her husband, who was supposed to return early because he was going to work as a watchman at the NAPOCOR tower. It was later that night that his lifeless body was found by a search party composed of relatives near the road in the "hagonoy" bushes, where she had earlier seen the three accused.

Jomie Moreno, the policeman who investigated the killing in the early morning of February 24, 1984, testified that Francisco Tangon approached him and said that the killers of Gantalao were Amondina, Cataytay and Amantillo. Having been informed that somebody had seen drops of blood on the steps of the uninhabited house of Eleuterio Acosta, Moreno proceeded to that place and found a pestle with stains of blood, small stones and "hagonoy" grass sticking to it. He then went to the house of Aquillo Cataytay, whose wife allowed him to take a pair of blood-stained pants hanging on a window beam and one long bolo ("pinuti") which had blood on its handle and on the point of the blade. Finally, at the house of Romulo Amantillo, to which he was also admitted, Moreno recovered a 14-inch machete with blood stains on its handle. The injuries sustained by the victim, as reported by Dr. Herminio Garcia, who conducted the autopsy, were consistent with Tangon's narration of the attack upon Gantalao by the three accused with their respective weapons.

The common defense of the three accused was denial and alibi. Cataytay claimed that on February 23, 1984, he worked on his farm in Barangay Namangka and went home at around 5:00 p.m., staying there until the next morning; he was alone because his wife was in Bindoy with her mother. Amondina testified that on that same date he too worked on his farm, which is one kilometer from Cataytay's place and 50 yards from the Namangyan river, and went home at 5:00 p.m. to his wife and children, waking up at 4 o'clock the following morning. Amantillo swore that on February 23, 1984, he was working on his farm, which is one-half kilometer from Cataytay's farm and 100 meters from the Namangyan river, until 5:00 p.m., when he went back to his house, staying there until 5:00 o'clock the following morning with his wife and seven-month-old child.

The appellants' brief stressed the inconsistency of the trial court in convicting the accused after casting much doubt on the prosecution witnesses in its order dated October 10, 1984, in which the trial judge granted bail on the finding that the evidence of their guilt was not strong. The trial court found the eyewitness account credible and the alibis unpersuasive, and the case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the judgment of conviction.

• Inconsistency of the Trial Court's Bail Finding: The appellants' brief stressed the inconsistency of the trial court in convicting the accused after casting much doubt on the prosecution witnesses in its order dated October 10, 1984, in which the trial judge granted bail on the finding that the evidence of their guilt was not strong.
• Misappreciation of the Evidence: The appellants maintained that a proper appreciation of the evidence, especially of the defense, should have led the trial judge to a verdict of acquittal.
• Denial and Alibi: Each accused denied participation in the killing, claiming that he worked on his farm until 5:00 p.m. on the date in question and remained at home thereafter until the following morning.

• Bail Finding Not Conclusive: The Solicitor General observed that the resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits, and that the trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt ensuring an inevitable acquittal.
• Strength of the Prosecution's Case: The prosecution presented an impartial eyewitness who saw and described with detail the killing of the deceased, an investigating officer whose investigation yielded physical and testimonial evidence corroborating the eyewitness account, and the widow of the deceased whose testimony corroborated the eyewitness and provided factual basis for inferring plausible motives.
• Widow Not Ipso Facto Biased: The fact that the witness is the widow of the victim does not ipso facto make her a biased witness, citing People vs. Urgel.
• Medico-Legal Corroboration: The results of the examination conducted by the investigating medico-legal physician supported the version of the eyewitness as to the manner in which the victim was killed, and the evidence adduced by the prosecution satisfied the standard of moral certainty for conviction in criminal cases.

• Effect of the Bail Finding: Whether the trial court's finding, in granting bail, that the evidence of guilt was not strong precluded a judgment of conviction on the merits.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the alleged contradictions in the testimonies of Francisco Tangon and Jomie Moreno impaired the veracity of their testimonies in their entirety.
• Proof of Motive: Whether motive had to be established in order to sustain the conviction.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy among the three accused was established.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing, and whether the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men should have been separately considered.
• Scoffing at the Corpse: Whether the circumstance of scoffing at the corpse was proved.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the killing.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Penalty: Whether the guilt of the accused-appellants was proved beyond reasonable doubt and whether the penalty and civil indemnity imposed were proper.

• Effect of the Bail Finding: No. The resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits, and the trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt ensuring an inevitable acquittal.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The alleged contradictions of Tangon and Moreno are not of such consequence as to impair the veracity of their testimonies in their entirety; contradictions in a witness's testimony may in fact indicate veracity and bolster probative value.
• Proof of Motive: No. Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant, but not when the accused has been positively identified.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established based on the concert of the accused's acts obviously aimed at the common purpose of killing Floro, rendering all of them equally liable for the victim's death whoever actually dealt the lethal blow.
• Treachery: Yes. The killing was qualified by treachery because of the sudden and consecutive attacks calculated to insure its execution without risk to the accused; treachery absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men, which should not have been separately considered by the trial court.
• Scoffing at the Corpse: No. There is no showing that the victim was already dead when Amantillo struck him with the piece of wood after the attack by Amondina and Cataytay, and the conclusion is not supported by the autopsy report or the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
• Evident Premeditation: No. It has not been shown that the three accused purposely waited for the deceased in order to kill him, and the prosecution failed to establish its elements.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Penalty: Yes. The guilt of the accused-appellants in the murder of Floro Gantalao was proved beyond reasonable doubt, and they are justly punished with reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties, with the civil indemnity increased to P50,000.00 for which all three are solidarily liable.

• Effect of the Bail Finding: The appellants argued that the trial court contradicted itself by convicting them after having cast doubt on the prosecution witnesses in its October 10, 1984 order granting bail. The Court adopted the Solicitor General's observation that the resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits. A bail hearing is a preliminary and summary proceeding addressed to the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of provisional liberty; it does not purport to adjudicate the merits. The trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt was not strong could not, therefore, be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt ensuring an inevitable acquittal. To hold otherwise would allow the merits of a criminal case to be resolved entirely in the bail hearing, dispensing with the need to proceed any further.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The appellants pointed to alleged contradictions in the testimonies of Francisco Tangon and Jomie Moreno. The Court found that these contradictions were not of such consequence as to impair the veracity of their testimonies in their entirety. It reiterated the rule that contradictions in the testimony of a witness, instead of suggesting prevarication, may in fact indicate veracity and bolster the probative value of such testimony as a whole, citing Ebajan vs. Court of Appeals. The separate testimonies of witnesses are not required to mesh with perfect congruence. The eyewitness account of Tangon was detailed and internally consistent on the material points of the attack, and Moreno's investigation yielded physical evidence — the bloodstained pestle, pants, bolo and machete — that corroborated the eyewitness narration.

• Proof of Motive: The Court held that motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant, but not when the accused has been positively identified, as in the case before us. Since Tangon positively identified all three accused, whom he had known for years, proof of motive was not indispensable. Nonetheless, the testimony of the victim's wife supplied plausible motives: there had earlier been a heated argument between Floro and Amondina over the sharing of a harvest; her husband had suspected Cataytay of stealing his chickens; and Amantillo is the uncle of Cataytay. These circumstances explained the resentment of the accused against Floro and their ganging up on him that night.

• Conspiracy: The Court approved the finding of a conspiracy among the three accused based on the concert of their acts obviously aimed at the common purpose of killing Floro. The sequence of the attack — Amondina striking the victim on the jaw with a pestle, Cataytay hacking him with a bolo, and Amantillo striking his nape with a piece of wood as he lay helpless — demonstrated a unity of purpose and design. As conspirators, they are all equally liable for the victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the lethal blow.

• Treachery: The killing was qualified by treachery because of the sudden and consecutive attacks made by the three accused, which were calculated to insure its execution without risk to them arising from the defense the victim might make. The victim was set upon without warning and rendered defenseless before he could offer any resistance. The Court further held that treachery absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men, citing People vs. Mori, People vs. Sespeñe, and People vs. Domingo. These circumstances should not have been separately considered by the trial court, as they are deemed absorbed in the qualifying circumstance of treachery.

• Scoffing at the Corpse: The Court held that scoffing at the corpse has not been proved. There is no showing that the victim was already dead when Amantillo struck him with the piece of wood after the attack by Amondina and Cataytay. This conclusion is not supported by the autopsy report or the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses. The circumstance therefore could not be appreciated against the accused.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation was likewise not present because it has not been shown that the three accused purposely waited for the deceased in order to kill him. The prosecution failed to establish the elements of evident premeditation, to wit: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between that determination and the execution of the offense, citing People vs. Balansi. Absent proof of these elements, evident premeditation could not aggravate the liability of the accused.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Penalty: The Court was satisfied that the guilt of the accused-appellants in the murder of Floro Gantalao had been proved beyond reasonable doubt and that they are justly punished with reclusion perpetua and all its accessory penalties. The prosecution's evidence — the impartial eyewitness, the corroborating investigation, the widow's testimony, and the medico-legal findings — satisfied the standard of moral certainty for conviction in criminal cases. However, the Court increased the civil indemnity, for which all three accused-appellants are solidarily liable, to P50,000.00.

• Conspiracy inferred from concert of acts — Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement; it may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused that obviously tend to achieve a common purpose. Once conspiracy is established, all conspirators are equally liable for the victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the lethal blow. In this case, the successive and coordinated attack by the three accused — pestle blow to the jaw, bolo hack to the head, and a strike to the nape with a piece of wood — demonstrated a unity of purpose to kill Floro Gantalao.

• Treachery absorbs superior strength and aid of armed men — Where treachery qualifies a killing, the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men are deemed absorbed and may not be separately appreciated as aggravating circumstances. Treachery exists where the attack is sudden and consecutive, calculated to insure the execution of the offense without risk to the offender arising from any defense the victim might make. The Court held that the trial court erred in separately considering superior strength and aid of armed men, as these are absorbed by treachery.

• Elements of evident premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between that determination and the execution of the offense. All three elements must concur and be established with the same degree of certainty as the crime itself. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the accused purposely waited for the deceased in order to kill him.

• Bail finding is not conclusive of guilt — The resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits. A trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt ensuring an inevitable acquittal. Otherwise, the merits of a criminal case would be resolved entirely in the bail hearing, dispensing with the need to proceed any further.

• Contradictions may indicate veracity — Contradictions in the testimony of a witness, instead of suggesting prevarication, may in fact indicate veracity and bolster the probative value of such testimony as a whole. The separate testimonies of witnesses are not required to mesh with perfect congruence.

• Motive not essential when identity is positively established — Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant, but not when the accused has been positively identified. Where the eyewitness positively identified the accused whom he had known for years, proof of motive is not indispensable to conviction.

• Widow of the victim not ipso facto a biased witness — The fact that a witness is the widow of the victim does not ipso facto make her a biased witness. Her testimony is entitled to the same consideration as that of any other witness and must be weighed on its merits.

• "The resolution of a petition for bail is not based on the entirety of the evidence presented during the trial on the merits. The trial court's initial finding that the evidence of guilt is not strong cannot be treated as an irrevocable finding of reasonable doubt thereby ensuring an inevitable acquittal. Otherwise, the merits of a criminal case will be resolved entirely in the bail hearing thereby dispensing of the need to proceed any further." — This passage, adopted from the Solicitor General's observation, states the ratio decidendi on the effect of a bail finding and is the Court's answer to the appellants' principal assignment of error.

• "We also approve the finding of a conspiracy among the three accused based on the concert of their acts obviously aimed at the common purpose of killing Floro. As conspirators, they are all equally liable for the victim's death, whoever of them actually dealt the lethal blow." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the conspiracy doctrine as applied in this case, establishing the equal liability of all conspirators regardless of who inflicted the fatal blow.

• "Treachery absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men, which should not have been separately considered by the trial court." — This passage states the rule on the absorption of aggravating circumstances by treachery, correcting the trial court's separate appreciation of superior strength and aid of armed men.

• "Motive is essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the assailant, but not when the accused has been positively identified, as in the case before us." — This passage states the rule on the non-necessity of proving motive where the accused has been positively identified, a frequently cited formulation in criminal law jurisprudence.

• People vs. Urgel, 134 SCRA 483 — Cited by the prosecution for the rule that the fact that a witness is the widow of the victim does not ipso facto make her a biased witness.
• Ebajan vs. Court of Appeals, 170 SCRA 178 — Cited by the Court for the rule that contradictions in the testimony of a witness, instead of suggesting prevarication, may in fact indicate veracity and bolster the probative value of such testimony as a whole.
• People vs. Mori, 55 SCRA 382; People vs. Sespeñe, 102 Phil. 199; People vs. Domingo, 18 Phil. 250 — Cited by the Court for the rule that treachery absorbs the circumstances of superior strength and aid of armed men, which should not be separately considered.
• People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566 — Cited by the Court for the elements of evident premeditation, which the prosecution failed to establish in this case.

Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ.