People of the Philippines vs. Esperidion Alegarbes, Jr.

The killing of a helpless victim who was unexpectedly shot while kneeling and unarmed constitutes murder qualified by treachery, and the accused's public position as a soldier tasked to protect the victim aggravates the offense. The conviction was affirmed, but the death penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, and the civil indemnity was increased to P30,000.00.

The accused, Esperidion Alegarbes, Jr., was a soldier connected with the 40th Infantry Battalion and designated as Assistant Chief of the Military Police assigned in Bacolod, Lanao del Norte. The victim, Arlington Rara, was a stranger to the place who had been mauled by unknown persons. The case arose from the accused's investigation of the victim, which culminated in the victim's shooting death. The trial court convicted the accused of murder and imposed the death penalty, prompting automatic review before the Supreme Court.

On the evening of April 23, 1978, at around 7:00 o'clock, the victim Arlington Rara was seen lying unconscious on the road at the poblacion of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte, near the house of Pablita Mejorada. Mejorada informed the persons in the store of Martin Pumicpic about the man lying on the road. Two persons, Damian Argao and Andres Pumicpic, went to the MP Detachment, about 100 meters away, to inform the soldiers of the presence of the man lying on the road. Two soldiers responded and brought the victim to the premises of the store of Martin Pumicpic, where they tried to find out who had mauled him. The victim answered that he did not know. The two army men were about to bring him to the MP Checkpoint when the accused, Esperidion Alegarbes, Jr., arrived at the scene, wearing short pants and a white T-shirt.

Alegarbes proceeded to investigate the victim as to who mauled him. Rara could not give the identity of the person who mauled him. After repeated questioning by Alegarbes and the same answer from Rara that he did not know who mauled him, Alegarbes struck the victim with the back of his left hand, causing him to fall to the ground. Alegarbes then pulled the victim's hair up and, taking his revolver from his waist, fired toward the side of the victim but did not hit him. Still not getting an answer, Alegarbes got hold of the victim's belt and whipped him five times at the back. The victim knelt before the accused and asked forgiveness. Alegarbes answered, "Why should you ask forgiveness from me when I am not God and I was not the one who mauled you?" Then he pulled Rara up by the hair and, while doing so, again took his revolver from his waist and shot Rara, hitting him on the neck below the Adam's apple.

The victim fell down, sitting on the ground, with head bent downward. One of the soldiers present approached the victim and verified where he was hit. Alegarbes then ordered those present to take Rara to a doctor. Rara was already hovering between life and death when he was brought to the clinic of Dr. Daranan, where he died shortly thereafter despite efforts to save his life. The victim's cadaver was autopsied by Dr. Guillermo Layos, the Municipal Health Officer of Bacolod, Lanao del Norte, who issued a post-mortem report finding a bullet wound over the anterior aspect of the neck, about 1 cm. below the Adam's apple, with powder burns over the exterior aspect of the neck. The doctor testified that the presence of powder burns showed the gun was fired only about one foot away by the assailant.

The defense presented a different version. The accused claimed that at 9:00 o'clock in the evening of April 23, 1978, he was on patrol in the market place of the poblacion when a civilian reported that a person was being mauled. When told that a person was lying on the road, he got his service rifle (Armalite) and proceeded to the place, also armed with a hand grenade. On his way, he heard a shot which he knew by experience was from a .22 caliber firearm. When he arrived, he was informed that five persons participated in the mauling. A person passed at his back and tried to assault him, so he blocked him with his Armalite and fired a warning shot upward. Another civilian told him that his warning shot hit somebody, but he answered that it was impossible because he fired his shot upward. The accused then inspected the victim and, seeing the wound in the neck, ordered that the victim be brought to the clinic.

The trial court did not give credence to the accused's defense that the victim tried to assault him, firstly because the victim was already groggy after having been mauled by unknown persons, and secondly because the three prosecution eyewitnesses—Damian Argao, Andres Pumicpic, and Rey Salvacion—belied the claim that the victim tried to assault the accused.

• Criminal Liability: The appellant assigned as error the trial court's holding him responsible for the death of Arlington Rara and convicting him of murder.
• Treachery: The appellant argued that the trial court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery against him.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The appellant argued that the trial court erred in considering the ordinary aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and cruelty.
• Mitigating Circumstances: The appellant argued that the trial court erred in not considering in his favor the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender.

N/A — The decision does not separately recount the arguments of the prosecution-appellee beyond the prosecution's version of the facts as presented through its eyewitnesses.

• Criminal Liability: Whether the trial court erred in holding the accused responsible for the death of Arlington Rara and convicting him of murder.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in considering the qualifying circumstance of treachery against the accused.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in considering the ordinary aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and cruelty.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the trial court erred in not considering in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstances of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and voluntary surrender.

• Criminal Liability: No. The conviction for murder was affirmed, the trial court's finding that the killing was deliberate, intentional, cruel, and treacherous being supported by the testimonies of three eyewitnesses whom the trial court believed and whom the Court had no reason to disbelieve.
• Treachery: Yes, treachery was present. The victim was not in a position to defend himself when he was unexpectedly shot by the accused; unarmed, he was a helpless victim of the senseless assault.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes, both abuse of public position and cruelty attended the killing. The accused took advantage of his public position as a soldier, and the cruelty inflicted on the victim before the shooting was abundantly clear.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. Voluntary surrender was not established because there was no spontaneous acknowledgment of guilt, and the accused in fact tried to mislead the authorities. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong was likewise not considered in his favor.

• Criminal Liability: The Court found no merit in the appellant's assignments of error. The trial court's finding that the killing was deliberate, intentional, cruel, and treacherous was supported by the testimonies of Damian Argao, Andres Pumicpic, and Rey Salvacion, who were eyewitnesses to the incident. None of the three had reason to testify falsely against the appellant. The trial court believed their testimonies, and the Court saw no reason to disturb its findings. The appellant's version was uncorroborated—no witnesses, including his soldier companions, testified for him. His version was also inconsistent: he claimed he heard a shot on his way to the checkpoint, making it appear the victim was already shot when he arrived, yet he also claimed someone tried to attack him from behind and he fired a warning shot upward which probably hit the victim. His uncorroborated version could not prevail over the testimonies of three eyewitnesses who narrated the true version of the incident.

• Treachery: Treachery was present because the victim was not in a position to defend himself when he was unexpectedly shot by the accused. Unarmed, he was a helpless victim of the senseless assault. The victim was kneeling before the accused, asking forgiveness, when the accused pulled his hair and shot him pointblank on the neck.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The trial court did not err in considering both aggravating circumstances of abuse of public position and cruelty. The appellant undoubtedly took advantage of his public position as a soldier when he maltreated and killed a civilian victim of mauling, whom he was supposed to protect in the performance of his duties. The cruelty inflicted on the victim before the shooting—boxing him, belting him with his own belt, threatening him by firing his pistol in the air—was abundantly clear. The victim was kneeling and helpless, and yet the appellant, with abuse of superior strength, consciously and deliberately did everything to torture and intimidate him. His actuations showed him to be heartless and without mercy. He knew the deceased was not the aggressor but was the victim of a physical assault by unknown persons, and yet for the flimsy reason that the victim could not identify those who mauled him, the appellant decided to turn his inexplicable ire on him.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender could not be considered in his favor because it was not shown that there was a spontaneous acknowledgment by the accused of his guilt, or that he wished to save the authorities from the trouble and expense incurred in his capture. The appellant did not actually surrender to the police; what he did was merely to inform the police headquarters about the incident. In fact, he tried to mislead the authorities by claiming that he was not the one who shot the victim.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery is present when the offender commits the crime against a person who is not in a position to defend himself, employing means that ensure the execution of the offense without risk to the offender. In this case, the victim was kneeling, unarmed, and helpless when he was unexpectedly shot pointblank by the accused, making the killing treacherous.

• Abuse of Public Position — This aggravating circumstance attends a crime when the offender takes advantage of his public position to commit the offense. The accused, a soldier tasked to protect civilians, used his position to maltreat and kill a civilian victim of mauling, thereby aggravating the murder.

• Cruelty — This aggravating circumstance is present when the offender deliberately and consciously inflicts unnecessary suffering on the victim beyond that required to accomplish the killing. The accused boxed the victim, whipped him with his own belt, fired a pistol near him, and taunted him before finally shooting him, demonstrating heartlessness and lack of mercy.

• Voluntary Surrender — For this mitigating circumstance to apply, there must be a spontaneous acknowledgment of guilt and a wish to save the authorities from the trouble and expense of capture. Merely informing the police headquarters about the incident, while denying responsibility for the shooting, does not constitute voluntary surrender.

• "Treachery was present in the killing, because the victim was not in a position to defend himself when he was unexpectedly shot by the accused. Unarmed, he was a helpless victim of the senseless assault by the accused." — This passage states the Court's finding on the qualifying circumstance of treachery, which elevated the killing to murder.

• "Appellant undoubtedly took advantage of his public position as a soldier, when he maltreated and killed a civilian victim of mauling, whom he was supposed to protect in the performance of his duties." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position.

• "The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be considered in his favor, because it is not shown that there was a spontaneous acknowledgment by the accused of his guilt, or that he wished to save the authorities from the trouble and expense incurred in his capture." — This passage defines the requisites for the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and explains why it was not applied in this case.

N/A — The decision does not cite any prior jurisprudence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining murder. The Court affirmed the conviction for murder, qualified by treachery, and aggravated by abuse of public position and cruelty.
• 1987 Constitution — The provision abolishing the death penalty. The Court reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua in view of the 1987 Constitution.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the decision.