People of the Philippines vs. Espejo, et al.

All who take part as principals in a robbery are liable as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide for a killing committed on the occasion of the robbery, unless they endeavored to prevent the killing; conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts; and a plea of guilty admits the material averments of the information, including aggravating circumstances alleged therein.

Ko Pian was a Chinese merchant in Batac, Ilocos Norte, operating a store across the public market. The accused were charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime, with the information alleging use of motor vehicle, nighttime, treachery, and superior strength as aggravating circumstances.

Ko Pian was a Chinese merchant in Batac, Ilocos Norte, whose store stood across the public market. On the night of May 14, 1963, at about 9:25 o’clock, Claudio A. Bagaoisan, Chief of Police of Batac, was driving his jeep toward the municipal hall when he noticed the headlights of a vehicle on the municipal dirt road leading to the national highway. Suspicious because of a recent robbery in the locality, he stopped at the junction. The vehicle, a jeep, reached the highway and sped northward. Bagaoisan gave chase, blew the police siren, and fired a warning shot. The jeep slowed, and as he was about to overtake it, a passenger looked back and shouted a question. The jeep then shot forward and escaped. During the brief encounter, Bagaoisan observed that one passenger in the front seat was a woman and noted the face of the passenger who shouted; he also recorded the jeep’s plate number, 22274, Series 1963. Realizing further pursuit was futile, Bagaoisan returned, went to the police station, and proceeded to the municipal hall. There the guard told him that Petronilo Espejo of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte had called, asking the Batac police to watch for a jeep with plate number 22274, allegedly stolen from its owner, and to relay the message to the PC detachment at Badoc. Shortly after midnight, Espejo, Jovencio Tabios, a certain Ching Macadangdang, and another unnamed companion arrived at the municipal hall. Espejo asked whether the jeep had been seen in Batac. Bagaoisan described what he had seen and the passenger who had shouted, prompting Espejo to remark that he could surmise who that passenger was. The group then left.

The following morning, May 15, 1963, between six and seven o’clock, Ko Pian was found stabbed to death inside his garage behind his store. The police investigation showed that one steel safe and two axes displayed at the store were missing, while the other steel safe had been pulled slightly forward and had a piece of rope tied to it. The post-mortem examination revealed five stab wounds and five puncture wounds in the neck and chest, causing death from massive hemorrhage. Suspecting the jeep’s occupants, Bagaoisan went to San Nicolas, learned from Ching Macadangdang that the jeep had been found, and tried to contact Espejo, who had gone to Laoag. Bagaoisan located Espejo and asked him to identify the passenger he had described; Espejo first hesitated but later named Anselmo Tolentino. Bagaoisan informed the PC headquarters and requested that the jeep be impounded and Tolentino picked up for questioning. In the afternoon, Espejo, Tabios, and another unidentified person brought the jeep to the PC headquarters. Tabios admitted ownership but claimed it had been stolen. That evening Tolentino was apprehended by the PC and denied participation in the robbery-killing, but when Bagaoisan was summoned, he positively identified Tolentino as the passenger who had shouted during the chase. On May 16, Tabios executed a sworn statement stating that he owned the jeep, had lent it to Tolentino at about 6:30 in the evening of May 14, and had falsely reported it stolen because he feared Espejo’s anger over the lending. On the same day, Tolentino gave a sworn statement before Judge Wenceslao Ortega admitting participation in the Batac robbery; he named Espejo as mastermind, said he had three companions including a woman, that they used Tabios’s jeep with himself driving, that he was left to guard the jeep, and that his companions returned and loaded something before they drove away with someone else at the wheel. A criminal complaint for robbery with homicide was filed that day against Tolentino, Espejo, and four John Does and Mary Does; after preliminary investigation, warrants were issued, the second stage was waived, and the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance.

A PC reinvestigation followed. On June 25, 1963, Tabios personally wrote another statement admitting that on the night of May 14 he drove his jeep to and from Batac with Julio Arzadon, Anselmo Tolentino, two girls named Chita and Tessie, and an unidentified companion; that before leaving Batac, Anselmo, Julio, and the unidentified companion loaded a square container placed inside a sack; that they were pursued by another jeep; and that after the chase, Anselmo and Julio revealed they had killed somebody. On the same day, Conchita Topinio and Teresita Nolasco were picked up by PC operatives, and Julio Arzadon was apprehended on the night of June 26. The PC recovered, from the place indicated by Tolentino in Barrio Tulnagan, Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, the door and metal box of the steel safe and one of the axes taken from Ko Pian’s store. On June 27, Arzadon gave a statement confessing participation; he named Estanislao Manding, Tolentino, Topinio, Nolasco, and Tabios as companions, said the jeep belonged to Tabios, that the robbery was planned by Tolentino and Topinio, that he saw Topinio explain a sketch of the Chinaman’s place, that they forcibly opened the steel safe in Pasuquin, that Tolentino said about P5,000 was inside, and that Tolentino kept the money. That afternoon, Nolasco gave a written statement saying that Arzadon, Topinio, and she went to rob Ko Pian; that Tolentino, Topinio, and Constante Cachuela planned the robbery but Cachuela did not go; that she saw Tolentino, Topinio, and Cachuela prepare a sketch at Topinio’s house; that on May 14, upon instruction of Chita, she bought chewing gum from Ko Pian’s store and told him that Chita and she would enter through the back door; that Ko Pian opened the door for them; and that when they were about to leave, Tolentino, Arzadon, and Manding entered and she saw Arzadon and Tolentino stab the Chinaman. On June 29, Tolentino gave an additional statement naming Topinio, Nolasco, Arzadon, Manding, and Tabios as companions, admitting he stabbed the victim on the chest with an ice pick three or four times, and stating that Topinio and Cachuela planned the robbery and that his earlier statement about Espejo was not true. Nolasco’s statement and Tolentino’s additional statement were sworn before Fiscal Honorio Reyes on June 29, 1963. On July 2, 1963, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information accusing Petronilo Espejo, Anselmo Tolentino, Julio Arzadon, Estanislao Manding, Constante Cachuela, Jovencio Tabios, Conchita Topinio, and Teresita Nolasco of robbery with homicide. The information alleged that on or about May 14, 1963, in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the accused conspired and, with the use of a motor vehicle, took a steel safe valued at P200.00, cash of P5,000.00, and two axes valued at P16.00, or a total of P5,216.00, from Co Piang; that on the occasion and for the purpose of facilitating the robbery, with evident premeditation and treachery, they stabbed Co Piang with ice picks and other sharp-pointed instruments, causing his death; and that the crime was committed with use of motor vehicle, nighttime, treachery, and superior strength as aggravating circumstances.

At arraignment on July 8, 1963, all accused were present except Estanislao Manding, who was at large. Counsel de oficio were appointed, and all accused pleaded not guilty. On August 27, 1963, before the prosecution presented evidence, Tolentino and Arzadon, through counsel, moved to withdraw their not guilty plea and substitute a guilty plea. The trial court granted the motion, and after re-arraignment both pleaded guilty; because the charge was capital, the court withheld judgment until after evidence. During trial, Conchita Topinio was discharged as a defendant and used as a prosecution witness. She testified that on April 25, 1963, Cachuela confided to her at a mahjong place in Laoag a plan to rob Ko Pian and sought her cooperation because she was known to the Chinaman; that Espejo later asked her whether Cachuela had gone to her house and said he would send Cachuela again; that on May 2, Cachuela and Tolentino went to her house, and when she refused, they threatened her with death; and that on May 3, Cachuela, Tolentino, Arzadon, Tabios, and Manding returned and told her they were going to Batac. That evening, she, Nolasco, Tolentino, Arzadon, Tabios, and Manding went to Batac in a jeep driven by Tabios; Cachuela did not go. On the way, they discussed how to enter and leave the store; she pointed out Ko Pian’s house and the back door; Tabios said there was an exit westward and drove in that direction, then circled back to the rear of the store. They returned to Laoag after reconnoitering. On May 9, the same group went to Batac again, but the store was closed; Conchita knocked, got no response, and Tolentino decided to return on May 12. May 12 failed because no jeep was available, so the plan was postponed to May 14.

On May 14, between eleven and twelve noon, Tolentino reminded Conchita of the trip and instructed her to go to his boarding house at 5:30 p.m. with Nolasco. They did so and met Arzadon; later Tabios and Manding arrived in a jeep. Tolentino, Arzadon, Nolasco, and Conchita joined them and proceeded to Batac. Near the public market, Conchita and Nolasco were ordered to get off. They entered the market through the southern gate and went to the western gate in front of Ko Pian’s store. Because Ko Pian would not let them enter without notice, Conchita sent Nolasco to buy chewing gum and to tell him they were there and would pass through the back door. Nolasco returned and said Ko Pian agreed. The two girls went to the rear and hid near the fence; after a while Ko Pian let them in, and the three went upstairs. Ko Pian and Nolasco entered his bedroom, leaving Conchita outside; after about ten minutes they came out and all three went downstairs. Ko Pian opened the door to let them out, and Tolentino, followed by Arzadon and Manding, suddenly barged in. Tolentino covered Ko Pian’s mouth, Manding held him, and Arzadon stabbed him in the neck with a double-bladed weapon; they laid him on the ground, and Tolentino stabbed him several times with an ice pick. The wounded man was left moaning and bleeding. Tolentino and Arzadon took a steel safe and loaded it on the jeep; they tried to take the other safe but could not lift it. They took two axes, pushed the girls into the jeep, and sped away. The plan was to open the safe near the river in Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, but on the highway they were pursued by another jeep. Tolentino ordered Tabios to drive faster, but the other vehicle closed the distance. Tolentino told Tabios to slow down, leaned out, and shouted at the driver when the other jeep was abreast; Tabios then stepped on the gas and left the other jeep behind. When they heard a gunshot, Tolentino loaded his gun and warned his companions to get ready, but the pursuit was not pressed. Upon reaching San Nicolas, the group took a sideroad where the jeep developed engine trouble and stopped; they pushed it until the motor started. North of the provincial capitol in Laoag, the two girls asked to get off. Tabios agreed and said he would report that the jeep had been stolen. The girls then went to a restaurant to eat.

The prosecution also submitted Tolentino’s May 16 sworn statement, Arzadon’s sworn statement, the jeep with plate No. 22274, the door and metal box of the steel safe, and one of the axes taken from Ko Pian’s store. Nolasco’s defense was that she was unaware of the criminal intent of her co-accused when they went to Batac on May 14, 1963, and that her purpose was merely to verify the result of her application as a salesgirl in Ko Pian’s store. She denied the truth of most answers in her sworn statement and claimed she signed it twice, at the barracks and at the Provincial Fiscal’s office, because Constabulary soldiers threatened to rape her if she did not. Tabios testified that he was unaware of any plan to commit the crime and did not participate; while admitting he drove his jeep with Tolentino, Arzadon, Manding, Nolasco, and Topinio on May 3, 9, and 14, 1963, he alleged that Tolentino had hired the jeep only to go out on dates with girls, paying P20.00 per trip, and that he first learned somebody had been killed by Tolentino and his companions while driving back to Laoag. Espejo and Cachuela made blanket denials and relied on alibis; they were acquitted on reasonable doubt. Tolentino’s counsel initially reserved the right to present evidence of mitigating circumstances but later waived it and submitted a memorandum on the aggravating circumstances. The trial court found Topinio’s testimony, despite her low morality and status as a co-conspirator, consistent in details, harmonious with surrounding circumstances, and corroborated by the interlocking confessions and admissions of Tolentino, Arzadon, Tabios, and Nolasco, as well as other evidence; it gave her testimony full credence. The trial court also found Tabios’s participation in the conspiracy established by his driving the jeep for the reconnaissance and the robbery, parking about 100 meters from the store, loading the articles taken, and driving the escape; and it found Nolasco knew the purpose of the trip and performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy.

• Due Process and Time to Prepare (Tolentino): Tolentino argued that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional right to due process by continuing the trial on August 27, 1963 despite his counsel de oficio’s repeated manifestations of unpreparedness; the request for separate trial was an implied motion for postponement, and unpreparedness of counsel was a valid ground under Section 2, Rule 119.
• Improvident Plea of Guilty (Tolentino): Tolentino maintained that the trial court failed to sufficiently explain the meaning and consequences of his guilty plea, rendering it improvident.
• Death Penalty and Aggravating Circumstances (Tolentino and Arzadon): They argued that the trial court erred in imposing death; the use of motor vehicle should not have been considered because the information alleged it only as a means of carrying away property after the robbery was consummated, not as a means to commit the crime; and under Article 63, the guilty plea should have been offset against both aggravating circumstances, not merely treachery, leaving motor vehicle to justify death.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Homicide (Tabios): Tabios argued that the prosecution failed to establish his participation in the conspiracy by strong, clear, and convincing evidence; the only evidence was the testimony of Conchita Topinio, a co-conspirator of low morals; and even if he knew of the robbery plan, he should not be liable for robbery with homicide because the killing was not part of the conspiracy, citing People vs. Basisten.
• Reasonable Doubt and Sworn Statement (Nolasco): Nolasco argued that she should be acquitted on reasonable doubt; that the trial court considered only the inculpatory portions of her sworn statement and disregarded the exculpatory portions; and that the case should have been dismissed upon motion of the defense after the Provincial Fiscal finished presenting its evidence.

• Due Process and Time to Prepare: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Tolentino’s counsel time to prepare for trial, violating his right to due process.
• Validity of Plea of Guilty: Whether Tolentino’s plea of guilty was improvidently made because the trial court did not sufficiently explain its meaning and consequences.
• Use of Motor Vehicle as Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the trial court properly appreciated use of motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance despite the claim that it was not alleged as a means to commit the crime.
• Application of Article 63: Whether the trial court erred in offsetting only treachery with the guilty plea and leaving use of motor vehicle to justify the death penalty.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide (Tabios): Whether Tabios’s participation in the conspiracy was established, and whether he is liable for robbery with homicide despite not directly taking part in the killing.
• Reasonable Doubt and Sworn Statement (Nolasco): Whether Nolasco should be acquitted on reasonable doubt, and whether the trial court erred in considering only the inculpatory portions of her sworn statement and in not dismissing the case after the prosecution’s evidence.
• Penalty on Nolasco: Whether the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was properly appreciated, and whether her minority required the penalty next lower in degree.

• Due Process and Time to Prepare: No. The trial court did not abuse its discretion; Tolentino had more than the two days required by the Rules, and his counsel admitted having fifteen days to study the case.
• Validity of Plea of Guilty: Yes, valid. The trial court sufficiently explained the meaning and consequences of the plea, and Tolentino, assisted by counsel and a college student, entered it with full knowledge.
• Use of Motor Vehicle as Aggravating Circumstance: Yes. A plea of guilty admits all material averments, including the aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle alleged in the information; evidence also showed its use in going to the scene, carrying away effects, and facilitating escape.
• Application of Article 63: No error. The guilty plea could be offset against treachery, leaving use of motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance; with one aggravating circumstance remaining, the death penalty was properly imposed.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide (Tabios): Yes, conspiracy and liability established. Conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts, and all principals in the robbery are liable for robbery with homicide unless they endeavored to prevent the killing; Tabios did not.
• Reasonable Doubt and Sworn Statement (Nolasco): No. Nolasco’s knowledge and overt acts were shown by Topinio’s testimony and her own sworn statement; the trial court did not err in considering the statement or in denying dismissal.
• Penalty on Nolasco: The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong was improperly appreciated, but her minority required the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion temporal in its maximum period, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law fixed her sentence at 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Due Process and Time to Prepare: The contention cannot be sustained. The record shows that on July 8, 1963 the trial court appointed Atty. Santiago Ranada, Sr. as Tolentino’s counsel de oficio; on the same date, with the assistance of said counsel, he entered a plea of not guilty; on July 30, 1963 Atty. Loreto U. Bautista formally entered his appearance also as counsel; and on August 27, 1963 trial was started. Tolentino therefore had more than the two days provided for in the Rules to prepare for trial, and his counsel even admitted that he was given fifteen days to study the case. Under the circumstances, even if an express request for postponement had been made, the trial court would not have erred in denying the same.
• Validity of Plea of Guilty: The claim is unfounded. The transcript of stenographic notes shows that after conferring with his client, Atty. Ranada manifested that Tolentino decided to plead guilty to the charge, reserving his right to prove mitigating circumstances at the proper time. The trial court then questioned Tolentino: whether he heard the manifestation of his counsel, whether he realized that the penalty for the offense was life imprisonment to death, whether he realized that by pleading guilty he would be sentenced in accordance with law, and whether he was willing to withdraw his former plea of not guilty and substitute it with that of guilty. Tolentino answered yes and pleaded guilty. Considering that he was assisted by counsel and was a college student at the time, the explanation made by the court as to the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty was sufficient, and he entered his plea with full knowledge of its significance. The plea was made on August 27, 1963, and sentence was promulgated on August 24, 1966; during the intervening period of three years he could have complained that his plea had been improvidently made, but he did not. Instead, there appears in the record a letter dated November 24, 1964, addressed by him to the Presiding Judge, pleading for a “humanitarian decision” inasmuch as he had pleaded guilty. The suggestion that the trial court entertained a reasonable doubt as to his guilt has no basis; the court did not even fix bail for his temporary liberty, and when he offered to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide the court turned him down, considering the facts and circumstances appearing on the record.
• Use of Motor Vehicle as Aggravating Circumstance: The contention is untenable. The information recites that the crime was committed with several aggravating circumstances, one of which was “use of motor vehicle.” Since a plea of guilty admits all the material averments in the information including the aggravating circumstances alleged therein, the appellants cannot now question the actuation of the trial court in appreciating “use of motor vehicle” as an aggravating circumstance. Besides, it has been established during the trial that the accused used the motor vehicle in going to the place of the crime, in carrying away the effects thereof, and in facilitating their escape.
• Application of Article 63: No error was committed in the application of Article 63. The facts of the case, particularly the manner the victim was repeatedly stabbed and the utter senselessness of the killing itself, show the correctness of the court’s ruling. Since there is still one aggravating circumstance left, the penalty of death was properly imposed by the trial court on Tolentino and Arzadon.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide (Tabios): The trial court did not err. On the issue of credibility, the trial court was aware of the low morality of Conchita Topinio and of her being a co-conspirator, but after examining her testimony with jealous care and watchful scrutiny, it found her testimony consistent in its details, harmonizing with the surrounding circumstances, and corroborated by the interlocking confessions and admissions of Tolentino, Arzadon, Tabios, and Nolasco, as well as other evidence. Appellate courts generally will not disturb the findings of the trial court on credibility unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value. No cogent reason existed to disagree. Tabios’s participation in the conspiracy was corroborated by the interlocking confessions of Arzadon and Nolasco: on May 3, 1963, Tabios drove his jeep with the group on and from Batac to survey the scene of the projected robbery; on the way they discussed how to enter and leave the store; Tabios told his companions about an exit westward and drove in that direction; on May 9 he again drove his jeep to Batac with Tolentino, Arzadon, Topinio, Nolasco, and Manding to carry out the plan, which failed because the Chinaman did not open the door; on May 14 the same group went to Batac again on his jeep, some armed with an ice pick, a bladed weapon, and a pistol; all understood what each had to do; Tabios parked about 100 meters from the store, ready to pick up his companions; when fetched by Arzadon he drove to the rear of the store to load the articles taken; and he drove the jeep in escaping. Conspiracy was thus fully established. On the claim that the killing was not part of the conspiracy, the Court rejected the ruling in People vs. Basisten and reverted to U.S. vs. Macalalad: all those who took part as principals in the commission of the robbery are guilty as principals in the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the unlawful killing. This rule was applied in People vs. Bautista, People vs. Atencio, and other cases. Since Tabios was a co-conspirator and performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, he was liable for robbery with homicide as a co-principal. When a group of malefactors conspire to commit robbery and arm themselves for the purpose, no member of the group may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery. The only exception is when a co-conspirator tried to prevent the homicide or other acts of violence. In robbery by a band under Article 296, proof of conspiracy is not required to hold all members liable for assaults committed on the occasion of the robbery, whereas such proof is necessary where several accused, not constituting a band, are charged with robbery with homicide under Article 294. Strictly speaking, Tabios should suffer the same penalty as Tolentino and Arzadon, but some members of the Court were of the opinion that a distinction should be made because Tabios, although a co-conspirator, was not in the immediate scene of the crime but guarding the jeep some distance away and had no direct hand in the killing. For lack of the required number of votes to impose the maximum penalty, the penalty meted out by the trial court on Tabios stood affirmed.
• Reasonable Doubt and Sworn Statement (Nolasco): The trial court committed none of the errors assigned. Although Conchita Topinio testified during cross-examination, as found by the trial court, that she did accompany Nolasco to the store of Ko Pian to apply for a job as a sales clerk three weeks prior to May 14, 1963, that fact does not negate Nolasco’s knowledge of the criminal intent of her co-accused nor her participation in the crime charged. Topinio’s testimony, corroborated by Nolasco’s sworn statement, clearly shows not only her knowledge of the purpose of the trip to Batac on May 14 but also her own overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. In her sworn statement she stated that Anselmo Tolentino, Conchita Topinio, and Constante Cachuela planned to rob the Chinese, and that she knew this because she saw them make the map or sketch of the place where they were going to rob. Knowing the plan as she did, she still went with the group and actively cooperated by facilitating the entry of her companions through the back door so that the robbery could be carried out.
• Penalty on Nolasco: In the computation of the penalty to be imposed on Nolasco, the trial court appreciated in her favor the mitigating circumstance of “lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.” This is error. She being part of the conspiracy, the intentional act of her co-conspirators of stabbing the victim to death is considered as the act of all. However, taking into account that Nolasco was 15 years and 5 months old at the time of the commission of the crime, the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law should be imposed in its proper period. The penalty for robbery with homicide being reclusion perpetua to death, one degree lower than said penalty is reclusion temporal under Article 61, paragraph 2 and Article 71, Scale No. 1. Since there are two aggravating and no mitigating circumstances in her case, the penalty should be reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, she should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Conspiracy inferred from acts — Conspiracy need not be proved by previous agreement; it may be inferred from the acts of the accused when they point to a joint purpose and design. The Court applied this to Tabios, whose driving the jeep for reconnaissance, waiting near the store, loading the stolen articles, and driving the escape showed concerted action.
• Liability of co-conspirators in robbery with homicide — All who take part as principals in a robbery are guilty as principals in the complex crime of robbery with homicide for a killing committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears they endeavored to prevent the killing. The Court applied this to Tabios despite his claim that the killing was not part of the conspiracy.
• Armed co-conspirators and violence — When a group conspires to commit robbery and arms itself, no member may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery; the only exception is when a co-conspirator tried to prevent the homicide or other acts of violence. Applied to Tabios.
• Plea of guilty admits material averments — A plea of guilty admits all material averments in the information, including aggravating circumstances alleged therein. Applied to Tolentino and Arzadon, who could not question use of motor vehicle after pleading guilty.
• Use of motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance — Under Article 14, paragraph 20 of the Revised Penal Code, use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when used in going to the place of the crime, carrying away effects, or facilitating escape. The Court found it established.
• Application of Article 63 — Where both mitigating and aggravating circumstances attend the commission of the act, courts may offset them; if an aggravating circumstance remains after offsetting, the greater indivisible penalty may be imposed. The Court found no error in the death penalty because use of motor vehicle remained.
• Credibility of witnesses — Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial court’s findings on credibility because it heard the witnesses and observed their demeanor, unless it plainly overlooked facts of substance and value. Applied to uphold Conchita Topinio’s testimony.
• Minority and penalty — A defendant who was 15 years and 5 months old at the time of the crime is entitled to the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law, to be imposed in its proper period. Applied to Nolasco, reducing her penalty to reclusion temporal in its maximum period, and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to 10 years and 1 day prision mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong in conspiracy — The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong cannot be appreciated in favor of a co-conspirator because the intentional act of the co-conspirators is considered the act of all. Applied to Nolasco.

• "To establish conspiracy, it is not necessary to prove previous agreement to commit a crime if there is proof that the malefactors have acted in concert and in pursuance of the same objective. This Court has repeatedly decided that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such acts point to a joint purpose and design. Their action must be judged by what they do and not altogether by what they say; for what men do is the best index of their intention." — This passage states the conspiracy doctrine applied to Tabios, grounding his liability on his concerted acts rather than a prior agreement.
• "when homicide takes place as a consequence or on the occasion of a robbery, all of those who took part in the robbery shall be guilty as principals of the complex crime of robbery with homicide unless there is proof that they had endeavored to prevent the killing" — This is the ratio for holding Tabios liable for robbery with homicide despite his not directly participating in the killing.
• "When a group of malefactors conspire to commit robbery and arm themselves for the purpose, no member of the group may disclaim responsibility for any act of violence that is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion of the robbery." — This passage defines the scope of liability of armed co-conspirators and explains why the killing was attributable to the entire group.
• "Since a plea of guilty admits all the material averments in the information including the aggravating circumstances alleged therein" — This passage supports the Court’s holding that Tolentino and Arzadon could not question the appreciation of use of motor vehicle after pleading guilty.

• People vs. Estrada, G.R. L-26103, Jan. 17, 1968 (22 SCRA 111, 126) — Quoted for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts and that men’s actions are the best index of their intention.
• People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493 — Cited by Tabios for the proposition that a co-conspirator who did not participate in the homicide is liable only for robbery; the Court noted this ruling was later abandoned.
• People vs. Rogel, G.R. No. L-15318, March 31, 1962 (4 SCRA 807) — Rejected the Basisten view and reverted to the doctrine in U.S. vs. Macalalad.
• U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1 — Controlling precedent: all who took part as principals in the robbery are guilty as principals in robbery with homicide unless they endeavored to prevent the killing.
• People vs. Bautista et al., 49 Phil. 389 — Followed Macalalad and held that all principals in the robbery are liable for the complex crime although they did not actually take part in the homicide.
• People vs. Atencio, G.R. No. L-22518 (Jan. 17, 1968) — Applied the same rule where appellants did not participate in the slaying but took part in the robbery.
• People vs. Sinaon, G.R. No. L-15631, May 27, 1966 (17 SCRA 260) — Cited for the rule that appellate courts generally do not disturb the trial court’s credibility findings.
• People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969 (27 SCRA 1037) — Cited for the rule that a plea of guilty admits all material averments in the information, including aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Bautista, G.R. Nos. L-23303-23304, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184 — Cited for the rule that a co-conspirator is liable for the intentional act of his co-conspirators.
• U.S. vs. Santos, 4 Phil. 419; People vs. Silerio, 81 Phil. 124 — Cited to support denial of postponement where counsel had sufficient time to prepare.

• Article 294, paragraph (1), Revised Penal Code — Defines robbery with homicide; the basis for conviction and penalties.
• Article 14, paragraph 20, Revised Penal Code — Use of motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance; appreciated because accused used it to go to the crime scene, carry away effects, and facilitate escape.
• Article 63, paragraphs 2 and 4, Revised Penal Code — Rules for applying indivisible penalties; offsetting mitigating and aggravating circumstances; death penalty proper because one aggravating circumstance remained.
• Article 61, paragraph 2 and Article 71, Scale No. 1, Revised Penal Code — Used to determine the penalty next lower in degree for Nolasco, i.e., reclusion temporal.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to Nolasco, fixing minimum at 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and maximum at 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
• Section 5, Rule 116; Section 7, Rule 118; Section 2, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Time for counsel de oficio to prepare, time to prepare for trial, and postponement; no violation because Tolentino had sufficient time.
• Article 296, Revised Penal Code — Robbery by a band; mentioned by analogy for the exception where a co-conspirator tried to prevent the homicide or other acts of violence. In robbery by band, proof of conspiracy is not required; under Article 294, it is.

• Reyes, J.B.L.
• Makalintal
• Zaldivar
• Castro
• Fernando
• Teehankee
• Barredo
• Villamor

Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., were on leave.