People of the Philippines vs. Erlindo Talo

In a prosecution for the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape, the use of a deadly weapon as a qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information with respect to the rape, or with respect to both the forcible abduction and the rape, to justify the imposition of the death penalty; where the allegation refers only to the forcible abduction, the use of a deadly weapon is appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance, and the penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua.

The accused, Erlindo Talo, was a 50-year-old farmer and resident of Barangay Gata Daku, Clarin, Misamis Occidental, who managed a farm in the neighboring Barangay Tinaclaan. The complainant, Doris Saguindang, was a 19-year-old resident of the same barangay who had studied in Iligan City and was not well acquainted with the accused. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the Regional Trial Court imposed the death penalty, a disposition that required the Court's mandatory review under the rules governing capital offenses.

At around 9 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, Doris Saguindang, a 19-year-old resident of Gata Daku, Clarin, Misamis Occidental, retired for the night in her family's house. At about 2 o'clock the following morning, she was awakened by an intruder in her room who identified himself as a rebel and claimed that his "commander" wanted to see her. The man poked a knife at her and covered her mouth to prevent her from crying out; he was wearing briefs, her father's overseas cap, and her sister's shirt. He led her out of the house through the back door and, outside, twice called out, "Commander, we are here," but no one responded. He then dragged her toward a ricefield about 800 meters from the house and there, at knifepoint, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. Doris tried to fight back, but the man, who was also carrying a bolo, was too strong for her.

After the man rolled to his side following the sexual act, Doris immediately picked up her clothes and ran naked as fast as she could to the nearby house of her uncle, Margarito Saguindang, who later brought her home. She was then accompanied by her parents to the Philippine National Police station, where she reported the incident and described her attacker to SPO2 Jesus Macala. Seven suspects were presented to her, but none was her assailant, and for that reason the incident was entered in the police blotter without any complaint being filed in court. Complainant and her mother also sought the help of their pastor, Ponciano Ayop, Sr., who arranged for her medical examination by Dr. Daniel Medina, the municipal health officer of Clarin.

Dr. Medina conducted the examination at around 2 o'clock that afternoon and issued a report noting a slightly hyperemic vagina with whitish mucous fluid, no hymen, a 3-cm linear abrasion on the right lower thigh in two places, a 2-cm hematoma on the right postero-lateral chest, a 1.5-cm hematoma on the left posterior chest, and a 1-cm curvilinear abrasion on the right neck above the scapula, with five slides negative for sperm. He testified that the perforation of the hymen could have been caused by sexual intercourse and that the mucous, though devoid of spermatozoa, was a sign of recent sexual contact, the absence of sperm being possibly due to complainant's having taken a bath after the incident. He stated that the neck injury was caused by a fingernail and was consistent with complainant's claim that she was choked, and that the thigh abrasion and the hematomas were caused by rough and hard objects, respectively. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he found no lacerations in the vaginal orifice, that the perforation of the hymen could be caused by other factors such as riding a bicycle, horse, or carabao, and that it could have occurred earlier than May 12, 1995. Pastor Ayop and his family took complainant to Bukidnon for a three-week vacation because she was having nightmares, and she returned to Clarin in May 1995.

At around 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, while Doris and her friends were walking along the road in Tinaclaan, a neighboring barangay of Gata Daku, she saw accused-appellant in a nearby ricefield distributing seedlings to farm workers. Because he was not facing her, she could not clearly make out his features, but she could see that his body build resembled that of her attacker; she asked one of her companions, a certain Enan Undag, for accused-appellant's name. A week later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 3, 1995, while she and a friend, Grace Endab, were walking along the road in Tinangay Sur, she again saw accused-appellant coming from the opposite direction; when he saw them, he hurriedly walked past them. Thoroughly shaken, Doris told Endab, who knew of the rape, that the man they had just encountered was the one who raped her, and Endab corroborated her on this point. After consulting Ayop and her parents, Doris filed a complaint for rape against accused-appellant on Monday, June 5, 1995, which she later amended to charge forcible abduction with rape. She positively identified accused-appellant in court as her assailant, saying she saw his face when she was awakened in her room and in the ricefield where the moon was bright. On cross-examination, she stated that although she was born in Gata Daku, she did not know everybody in the barangay since she had stayed in Iligan City for three years to study; that before May 12, 1995, she had seen accused-appellant once but did not know his name; and that while in high school in Clarin, she had heard of a peeping tom named Erlindo Talo.

Accused-appellant, 50 years old, denied the charge. He testified that he was a resident of Barangay Gata Daku and managed a farm in the neighboring Barangay Tinaclaan, and that until he met complainant in court, he had never known her. As to his whereabouts at the time of the incident, he said that at 9 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, he was in the house of Otelo Londera in Barangay Kinangay Sur playing mahjong with Londera, Laureano Basaya, and Buena Narbay, and that except for a few breaks they played until 5 o'clock in the morning of May 12, 1995, after which he went home to Gata Daku and later, at around 9:30 in the morning, went to Barangay Tinaclaan to the house of Leonardo Fuentes, whose son Celso wanted him to procure a piglet, where he allegedly heard that someone had been raped in Gata Daku. Although he had a farm in Tinaclaan, he denied having gone there at 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, claiming that he was then in Kinangay Sur with Celso Fuentes buying a piglet for the latter's son's birthday and went to his farm only at around 11 o'clock to pay his workers. He likewise denied being in Kinangay Sur at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 3, 1995, claiming that he was then in his farm in Tinaclaan gathering kuhol. On cross-examination, he said that Londera's house, where he allegedly played mahjong on the morning of May 12, 1995, is about 500 meters from Gata Daku, and he admitted that he used to deliver rice to complainant's house.

The defense presented corroborating witnesses. Otelo Londera, Buena Narbay, and Laureano Basaya supported the alibi, with Londera stating that the distance between his house and Barangay Gata Daku could be negotiated in 10 minutes by foot, and Narbay saying she could not remember whether she played mahjong in Londera's house on the dates in question. Celso Fuentes, Angel Saldaña, and Flaviano Narbay corroborated accused-appellant's testimony that he was not in his Tinaclaan farm at 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, but on cross-examination Narbay admitted that he did not know the year when the events he testified to took place and that the date May 27 was supplied to him by defense counsel. The then incumbent barangay chairman of Gata Daku, Joven Japay, testified that at around 4:00 in the morning of May 12, 1995, Cesar and Margarito Saguindang reported to him that complainant had been raped at around 2 o'clock that morning, and that he and SPO2 Macala thereafter questioned complainant, who allegedly described her attacker as around 30 years old, curly haired, bearded, and with a big body build; on the basis of this description, accused-appellant was not included among the possible suspects because, although he matched the description as to body size and height, he was neither curly haired nor bearded. The prosecution recalled complainant to rebut Japay, and she denied having told him that her attacker was curly haired, saying that what she said was that his hair was close-cropped or kopkop, and denied having said that he was bearded, explaining that although she used the local term bangason, what she meant was that the man had newly grown facial hair. The prosecution also presented Cesar Saguindang, complainant's father, who testified that for three years accused-appellant regularly delivered rice to their house in Gata Daku, and Antonina Mutia, whose house in Kinangay Sur is about 200 meters from Londera's, who testified that at around 10 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, she passed by the Londera residence and noticed that it was very quiet and that although the adjoining nipa hut where mahjong sessions were usually played was lighted, no mahjong game was being played, and that before 11 o'clock she again passed by and noticed the same quiet. As sur-rebuttal, the defense presented Catalina Londera, wife of Otelo Londera, who said that at around 8 o'clock in the evening of May 11, 1995, she met Mutia and her husband in the house of a certain Tagaloguin in Tinaclaan, that the three returned to Kinangay Sur on board the Mutia spouses' truck, and that after arriving home at around 9 o'clock, her husband, Laureano Basaya, Buena Narbay, and accused-appellant started playing mahjong.

The trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of forcible abduction with rape, aggravating the crime by dwelling and nocturnity and qualifying it by the use of a deadly weapon, and sentenced him to death, ordering him to indemnify the complainant P30,000.00 as moral damages, with costs. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

• Consensual Intercourse / Previous Understanding: Accused-appellant contended that he and complainant had a "previous understanding" and that their sexual intercourse was consensual, which allegedly explained why no member of the household was awakened when he and complainant went out of the house and why complainant did not push him away when he removed her clothes or undressed.
• Delay in Filing the Complaint: Accused-appellant argued that complainant's failure to promptly file the criminal complaint rendered her claim of abduction with rape suspect.
• Alibi: Accused-appellant maintained that he was elsewhere at the times material to the charge — playing mahjong at Otelo Londera's house in Barangay Kinangay Sur on the morning of May 12, 1995, and engaged in other activities in Barangay Tinaclaan and Kinangay Sur on May 27 and June 3, 1995 — and could not have been at the scene of the crime.
• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Accused-appellant pointed to alleged inconsistencies in complainant's testimony as to his age, type of hair, and whether he was bearded.

• Consent / Previous Understanding: Whether the sexual intercourse between accused-appellant and complainant was consensual, as allegedly shown by a "previous understanding" between them.
• Delay in Filing the Complaint: Whether complainant's delay in filing the criminal complaint rendered her claim of abduction with rape suspect.
• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant's defense of alibi should prosper.
• Qualifying Circumstance and Penalty: Whether the use of a deadly weapon qualified the crime of rape so as to justify the imposition of the death penalty.

• Consent / Previous Understanding: No. The claim of a consensual relationship was a bare assertion unsupported by any evidence, and it was contradicted by accused-appellant's own testimony that he had never met complainant; the force and intimidation employed, confirmed by the medical findings and complainant's conduct after the incident, negated consent.
• Delay in Filing the Complaint: No. The complaint was filed less than three weeks after the incident, the delay being attributable to the fact that accused-appellant's identity was not ascertained until June 3, 1995, when complainant came face to face with him.
• Alibi: No. For alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that the accused was elsewhere at the time of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene; Londera's house was only about 10 minutes by foot from Barangay Gata Daku, and the corroborating testimony was either uncorroborated, self-serving, or discredited.
• Qualifying Circumstance and Penalty: The use of a deadly weapon was alleged only with respect to the forcible abduction and not the rape; it cannot qualify the rape and is appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua must be imposed regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Consent / Previous Understanding: Accused-appellant never claimed that he and complainant had any relationship; in fact, he claimed he had never met her before, testifying that he did not know her and had never been to her residence. Apart from his bare assertion that they were lovers, he showed no other evidence of such a relationship, such as love letters, photographs, or other tokens of endearment. Complainant, on the other hand, stoutly maintained that she had never known accused-appellant before and that he forced her at knifepoint to go with him and molested her in a ricefield. The Court found that complainant was alone in her room, far from where the other members of her family were sleeping, her parents sleeping in a separate room furthest from hers while her twin siblings and nephew slept in the adjoining room separated by a concrete wall with an opening near the roof; accused-appellant prevented her from making an outcry by covering her mouth and poking a knife at her, and she resisted but was overpowered. It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death; force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible, it need only be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. Physical resistance need not be established when, as in this case, intimidation was exercised upon the victim and she submitted to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. The medical findings of abrasions on her neck and right thigh and hematomas on her chest, in addition to the complete perforation of her hymen, confirmed her claim that she had been forced to have sexual intercourse. Finally, complainant's conduct after she had been abused — running away naked and reporting the incident to her uncle — negated any probability of consensual intercourse, it having been observed that the conduct of a woman following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim.

• Delay in Filing the Complaint: Complainant filed the case less than three weeks after the incident. The delay was due to the fact that accused-appellant's identity was not ascertained until June 3, 1995, when complainant came face to face with him and learned that his name was Erlindo Talo. While complainant's father testified that accused-appellant had been delivering rice to their house for three years, there was no evidence that complainant knew accused-appellant; accused-appellant himself testified that he stayed in Cebu City to study college, returned to Gata Daku in 1982, and decided to work on the farm, and it was probably then that he delivered rice for the barangay captain, at which time complainant was only eight years old. Complainant studied at Clarin National High School in the poblacion and went to Iligan City for college, so it was probable that she really did not know accused-appellant. Moreover, the delay in identification was due mainly to the failure of the Gata Daku police, specifically SPO2 Jesus Macala, to include accused-appellant in the lineup of suspects presented to complainant on May 12, 1995; Macala admitted that complainant's description of her attacker in fact matched accused-appellant, but he did not include him in the lineup because he thought that accused-appellant, whom he admitted was a childhood friend, was innocent. As to the alleged inconsistencies in complainant's testimony regarding accused-appellant's age, type of hair, and whether he was bearded, complainant explained that she did not really say he was curly haired or that he had a beard, but that his hair was short to the scalp and that he had newly grown facial hair, and that she described him only as similar to the age of her father. The Court found complainant's testimony credible, corroborated as it was by the medical examination, and the defense had not shown any ill motive on her part to falsely implicate accused-appellant in a very serious charge, it being settled that no woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and expose herself to the stigma and humiliation of a public trial if she were not motivated by a desire to seek justice against the one who had defiled her.

• Alibi: Accused-appellant's defense was that on May 12, 1995, he was in the house of Otelo Londera in Barangay Kinangay Sur. However, Londera himself said that Barangay Gata Daku could be reached in 10 minutes by foot from his house. For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that accused-appellant was somewhere else at the time the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The same held true with respect to his claim that on May 27 and June 3, 1995, when complainant said she saw him after the incident, he was in some other place and could not possibly have been seen by her. Defense witness Narbay, who was supposed to corroborate accused-appellant's testimony that he was not in his farm in Tinaclaan at around 7 o'clock in the morning of May 27, 1995, admitted on cross-examination that he did not know the year when the events he testified to took place and that the date May 27 was just given to him by defense counsel. Accused-appellant's testimony that he was in his farm in Tinaclaan and not in Kinangay Sur at about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of June 3, 1995 was not only uncorroborated but also self-serving, and could not prevail over the testimony of complainant, which was corroborated by Grace Endab.

• Qualifying Circumstance and Penalty: The trial court correctly found accused-appellant guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. Under Arts. 342 and 335, in relation to Art. 48, of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of this crime are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; (3) that the abduction is with lewd design; and (4) that the abducted woman is raped under any of the circumstances provided in Art. 335. The evidence showed that, at knifepoint, accused-appellant forcibly took complainant from her parents' house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forced her to have sexual intercourse with him. In the event of conviction in cases of complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime should be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Forcible abduction is punishable by reclusion temporal, while rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua, unless committed with the use of a deadly weapon, in which case the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Thus, the penalty for rape should be imposed in its maximum period. However, the use of a deadly weapon, being a qualifying circumstance, must be alleged in the information, otherwise it should be treated only as a generic aggravating circumstance and the lower penalty (reclusion perpetua) should be imposed. Here, the information alleged that "armed with a bolo and hunting knife, and by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats," accused-appellant took and carried away complainant, and that "upon reaching the ricefield, by means of force, violence, intimidation and threats," he had carnal knowledge of her; the allegation of the use of a deadly weapon thus referred not to the rape but to the crime of forcible abduction. To justify the imposition of the death penalty, the use of a deadly weapon should be alleged with respect to the rape or with respect to both the forcible abduction and the rape; since it was alleged only with respect to the forcible abduction, it could not qualify the crime of rape and could be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance. The trial court correctly appreciated the other generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, nighttime, and unlawful entry. Dwelling was correctly taken into account as the evidence showed that complainant was forcibly taken from the house of her parents. Nighttime was also correctly held present, as accused-appellant sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime. Unlawful entry likewise attended the crime, the barangay chairman having testified that when he went to the victim's house the day after the incident, he noticed that a baluster in the ceiling at the rear part of the house had been forcibly removed and that there was a ladder propped nearby, showing entry through an opening not intended for that purpose. Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed was reclusion perpetua, because under Art. 63 a single indivisible penalty should be imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. The damages awarded by the trial court were modified: complainant must be paid P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Art. 2229 of the Civil Code.

• Resistance in Rape Need Not Be unto Death — A rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible are beside the point. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting accused-appellant's claim of consent, holding that complainant's resistance and the force and intimidation employed sufficed to establish the crime.
• Physical Resistance Not Required Where Intimidation Is Employed — Physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life or personal safety. The Court found that accused-appellant's threats at knifepoint brought complainant into submission, dispensing with the need to prove physical resistance.
• Conduct of the Victim After the Assault — The conduct of a woman following the alleged assault is of utmost importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of her claim. Complainant's act of running away naked and reporting the incident to her uncle negated any probability of consensual intercourse.
• Credibility of a Rape Victim's Testimony — No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and expose herself to the stigma and humiliation of a public trial if she were not motivated by a desire to seek justice against the one who had defiled her. The Court found complainant's testimony credible, corroborated as it was by the medical findings and untainted by any showing of ill motive.
• Requisites of Alibi — For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that the accused was somewhere else at the time the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. The Court rejected the alibi because Londera's house was only about 10 minutes by foot from Barangay Gata Daku.
• Elements of Forcible Abduction with Rape — Under Arts. 342 and 335, in relation to Art. 48, of the Revised Penal Code, the elements are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status or reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; (3) that the abduction is with lewd design; and (4) that the abducted woman is raped under any of the circumstances provided in Art. 335.
• Penalty in Complex Crimes — In the event of conviction in cases of complex crimes, the penalty for the most serious crime should be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.
• Qualifying Circumstance Must Be Alleged in the Information — The use of a deadly weapon, being a qualifying circumstance, must be alleged in the information; otherwise, it should be treated only as a generic aggravating circumstance and the lower penalty should be imposed. In forcible abduction with rape, the use of a deadly weapon must be alleged with respect to the rape, or with respect to both the forcible abduction and the rape, to justify the death penalty.
• Indivisible Penalties Under Art. 63 — Under Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, a single indivisible penalty should be imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of aggravating circumstances, reclusion perpetua was imposed.

• "It is settled that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death. Force, as an element of rape, need not be irresistible; it need only be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result, all considerations of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the element of force in rape and is the canonical formulation of the rule that resistance need not be unto death.
• "Indeed, physical resistance need not be established in rape when, as in this case, intimidation was exercised upon the victim and she submitted to the rapist's lust because of fear for her life or for her personal safety." — This passage defines the doctrine that intimidation dispenses with proof of physical resistance, which the Court applied to reject the defense of consent.
• "For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be shown not only that accused-appellant was somewhere else at the time the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed." — This passage states the controlling requisites of the defense of alibi, which the Court applied in rejecting accused-appellant's defense.
• "Accordingly, to justify the imposition of the death penalty in this case, the use of deadly weapon should be alleged with respect to the rape or with respect to both the forcible abduction and rape. Since, in this case, this qualifying circumstance was alleged only with respect to the commission of the forcible abduction, it cannot be taken to qualify the crime of rape. The use of a deadly weapon can be appreciated only as a generic aggravating circumstance." — This passage is the decisive ruling on the qualifying circumstance that warranted the reduction of the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.

• People vs. Igdanes, 272 SCRA 113 (1997) — Cited in support of the rule that a rape victim is not required to resist her attacker unto death.
• People vs. Gumahob, 265 SCRA 84 (1996) — Cited together with Igdanes for the same rule on the degree of resistance required of a rape victim.
• People vs. Bayani, 262 SCRA 660 (1996) — Cited for the rule that force in rape need not be irresistible and need only be present to bring about the desired result.
• People vs. Napiot, 311 SCRA 772 (1999) — Cited for the rule that physical resistance need not be established where intimidation was exercised upon the victim.
• People vs. Prades, 293 SCRA 411 (1998) — Cited together with Napiot for the same rule on intimidation dispensing with physical resistance.
• People vs. Bayron, 313 SCRA 727 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the conduct of a woman following the alleged assault is of utmost importance in establishing the truth or falsity of her claim, and also for the rule that the use of a deadly weapon must be alleged in the information to qualify the crime.
• People vs. Magalantay, 304 SCRA 272 (1999) — Cited for the rule that no woman would concoct a story of defloration and expose herself to the stigma of a public trial absent a desire to seek justice.
• People vs. Oliver, 303 SCRA 72 (1999) — Cited together with Magalantay for the same rule on the credibility of a rape victim's testimony.
• People vs. Berzuela, G.R. No. 132078, Sept. 25, 2000 — Cited for the requisites of the defense of alibi.
• People vs. Payot, 308 SCRA 43 (1999) — Cited together with Berzuela for the same rule on alibi.
• People vs. Lacanieta, G.R. No. 124299, April 12, 2000 — Cited for the elements of forcible abduction with rape and for the appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance where the complainant was forcibly taken from her house.
• People vs. Grefiel, 215 SCRA 596 (1992) — Cited for the rule that forcible abduction with rape committed at 2 o'clock in the morning is attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime.
• People vs. Jose, 71 SCRA 273 (1976) — Cited as one of the cases affirming convictions for forcible abduction with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon where the use of the weapon was alleged with respect to the forcible abduction.
• People vs. Angeles, 222 SCRA 451 (1993) — Cited together with Jose and Lacanieta for the same point on the allegation of the use of a deadly weapon.
• People vs. Rivera, 245 SCRA 421 (1995) — Cited as a case affirming a conviction for forcible abduction with rape qualified by the use of a deadly weapon where the allegation referred to the complex crime.
• People vs. Famador, 113 SCRA 310 (1982) — Cited together with Rivera for the same point.
• People vs. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 (1995) — Cited as a case where the use of a deadly weapon was alleged in the portion of the information referring to the crime of rape.
• People vs. Baid, G.R. No. 129667, July 31, 2000 — Cited among the recent rulings supporting the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages.
• People vs. Dreu, G.R. No. 126282, June 20, 2000 — Cited together with Baid and Licanda for the same point on damages.
• People vs. Licanda, G.R. No. 134084, May 4, 2000 — Cited together with Baid and Dreu for the same point on damages.
• People vs. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages pursuant to Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in view of the attendance of aggravating circumstances.

• Art. 342, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes forcible abduction, which is punishable by reclusion temporal. The Court applied this provision in identifying forcible abduction as one of the component crimes of the complex crime charged.
• Art. 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua, unless committed with the use of a deadly weapon, in which case the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision in determining the penalty for the more serious crime in the complex crime.
• Art. 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes, providing that the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. The Court applied this provision in holding that the penalty for rape should be imposed, subject to the qualification regarding the use of a deadly weapon.
• Art. 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that a single indivisible penalty shall be imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance which may have attended the commission of the deed. The Court applied this provision in imposing reclusion perpetua notwithstanding the presence of aggravating circumstances.
• Art. 2229, Civil Code — Governs the award of exemplary damages. The Court applied this provision in awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstances.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred. Kapunan, J., was on leave.