People of the Philippines vs. Emilio Santos y Delgado

The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code cannot be appreciated absent proof of the primordial element of unlawful aggression; where the unlawful aggression has ceased, the person making the defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Likewise, immediate vindication of a grave offense cannot mitigate liability where the accused's knowledge of the offense is hearsay and sufficient time had lapsed for him to recover his serenity.

Appellant Emilio Santos y Delgado is the son of Emmanuel Santos, while the victims, Francisco Lacsa and Valentino Guevarra, were a barangay tanod and his close friend and compadre, respectively. The appeal implicates the Revised Penal Code's framework for circumstances that justify or mitigate criminal liability — Article 11(2) on defense of a relative, Article 13(1) on the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative, and the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense.

At around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 22, 1989, Francisco Lacsa was suddenly awakened from his sleep by the arrival of his close friend and compadre, Valentino Guevarra. Surprised to see Valentino in a torn and bloodstained shirt, Francisco asked him what had happened, and the latter replied that he had earlier had a misunderstanding with appellant's father, Emmanuel Santos. Valentino requested Francisco to intervene in settling the dispute, and Francisco, being a barangay tanod and knowing Emmanuel personally, readily acceded.

Both Francisco and Valentino proceeded to Emmanuel's house for the sole purpose of talking to him, but were greeted by the latter with a bow and arrow pointed at them. Fearing for their lives, Francisco and Valentino retreated and ran toward the corner of Laong-Laan and Dela Fuente Streets, with Emmanuel and his daughter Elizabeth in close pursuit. After running a distance of some fifty (50) meters, a tricycle carrying appellant, his brother Dionisio, and two unidentified men overtook them. The said persons alighted from the tricycle and approached Francisco and Valentino.

Dionisio, armed with a jungle bolo, attacked Valentino, hacking him on the thigh and causing him to fall face down. Thereupon, appellant, wielding a samurai, lifted the wounded body of Valentino, turned him over, and repeatedly stabbed and hacked him. The two unidentified men, armed with ordinary knives, also took turns in stabbing Valentino. Meanwhile, Emmanuel arrived at the scene and pointed his bow and arrow at Francisco, rendering the latter immobile and unable to stave off the attack on the fallen Valentino. Appellant, Dionisio, and their cohorts then turned their fury on Francisco: appellant stabbed and hacked Francisco, cutting off four fingers of the latter's left hand, while Dionisio stabbed him on his right shoulder. Francisco ceased to be fully aware of the attack on him save for the fact that he managed to run toward the nearby Fariñas Transportation Compound, where a security guard fired a shot in the air to scare off his assailants. Francisco then proceeded to the house of Barangay Chairman Benjie Ranola, who brought him to the University of Sto. Tomas Hospital. While Francisco survived, Valentino died as a consequence of the multiple wounds inflicted upon him.

Two informations were filed against the appellant — one for the murder of Valentino Guevarra and another for the frustrated murder of Francisco Lacsa. The two cases were consolidated and, during trial, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. He admitted having stabbed Francisco but averred that he acted in self-defense and in order to avenge the earlier assault by Francisco and Valentino on his father. With respect to the injuries inflicted on Valentino and his consequent death, appellant chose to remain silent.

To support his defense, appellant presented a different version. He claimed that early in the evening of October 22, 1989, he learned from his Uncle Indo that a fistfight had taken place between Valentino and Francisco on the one hand and his father Emmanuel on the other. Uncle Indo informed him that the fight ensued because Francisco and Valentino had molested and made fun of Emmanuel, who was then engaged in selling balut. Neither Emmanuel nor appellant reported the matter to the barangay or police authorities; instead, feeling certain that Valentino and Francisco would be going to their house looking for a fight, appellant armed himself with a samurai in anticipation of the duo's attack. Appellant testified that later, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Francisco and Valentino, armed with a bladed cane and a knife respectively, arrived and positioned themselves in front of their house. When Emmanuel stepped out of the door, Valentino immediately stabbed him, grazing the right side of his jaw, and Francisco likewise assaulted Emmanuel, causing him to fall to the ground unconscious. Whereupon appellant, who was in the kitchen of their house, rushed outside to aid his father, grappled with Francisco for possession of the latter's bladed cane, and succeeded. Thereafter, Francisco and Valentino fled toward the corner of Laong-Laan Street with appellant in pursuit.

After a careful and judicious scrutiny of the evidence presented before it, the trial court found the prosecution's story more plausible and gave full faith and credence to Francisco's testimony. In debunking appellant's theory of self-defense, the lower court ruled that the facts as established by the prosecution completely negated the existence of the elements of self-defense, namely, (1) that the accused is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative: Appellant invoked the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code, maintaining that he acted to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression committed by Francisco Lacsa and Valentino Guevarra against his father, Emmanuel Santos, and that not all the requisites of defense of a relative need be attendant for the privileged mitigating circumstance to apply.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: Appellant contended that his act of stabbing and hacking Francisco Lacsa was done in immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against his ascendant, namely the earlier assault by Francisco and Valentino on his father.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative: Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider in appellant's favor the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: Whether the trial court erred in failing to consider in appellant's favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against an ascendant.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative: No. The privileged mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated because the primordial element of unlawful aggression was not proved; the alleged aggression had already ceased by the time appellant confronted and attacked the victims, and the number and severity of the wounds belied any intent merely to defend a relative.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: No. The claim rested on inadmissible hearsay, appellant having admitted he was not present at the alleged fight, and sufficient time had lapsed for him to recover his composure before he armed himself and awaited the victims' arrival.

• Incomplete Defense of a Relative: Defense of a relative is a justifying circumstance under Article 11(2) of the Revised Penal Code that exculpates the accused when the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. Where not all of these requisites are attendant, the accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative under Article 13(1). The Court stressed, however, that for the claim to prosper, it is essential to prove the primordial element of unlawful aggression, because if there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel, and there could be no defense, complete or incomplete. The defense failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Francisco and Valentino against appellant's father. The trial court found incredible and chimerical the claim that Francisco, armed with a bladed cane, and Valentino, armed with a fan knife, assaulted Emmanuel, grazing the right side of his jaw and causing him to fall unconscious; appellant himself was in the kitchen on the second floor of their house at the time and could not have seen the incident involving his father. Even assuming arguendo that Francisco and Valentino had attacked appellant's father, appellant's own testimony established that the fight started from Pepin Street and that Francisco and Valentino ran toward the corner of Laong-Laan Street, so that by the time appellant stabbed and hacked Francisco, there no longer was any unlawful aggression to prevent or repel. When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. The physical evidence further militated against the claim: Francisco suffered no less than ten (10) stab wounds and the decapitation of four (4) fingers on his left hand, while Valentino suffered ten (10) stab and hack wounds, two of which were fatal enough to have caused his death. Just as the presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, so do they belie the claim of incomplete defense of a relative and indicate not the desire to defend one's relative but a determined effort to kill.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense: The defense failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove that a grave offense had in fact been committed by Francisco and Valentino against appellant's father. By appellant's own admission, he was not present when the alleged skirmish took place; his testimony, based on what his Uncle Indo had told him, was hearsay, deserving no weight whatsoever and in fact inadmissible in evidence. Further, proof existed that from the time appellant learned of the alleged fight up to the time Francisco and Valentino arrived at appellant's house, sufficient time had lapsed within which appellant could have recovered his composure and assuaged his vindictive sentiments. This was inferred from appellant's own testimony that upon knowing of the ill-treatment his father suffered at the hands of Francisco and Valentino, he proceeded to prepare a weapon in the form of a samurai, after which he anxiously awaited the arrival of Francisco and Valentino. Accordingly, the benefit of the mitigating circumstance could not be considered in his favor pursuant to the established rule that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.

• Defense of a Relative (Article 11[2], Revised Penal Code) — A justifying circumstance that exculpates the accused from criminal liability when the following requisites concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it; and (3) in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making the defense had no part therein. The Court applied this framework in assessing whether appellant's attack on the victims could be justified as an act done in defense of his father Emmanuel.
• Incomplete Defense of a Relative (Article 13[1], Revised Penal Code) — A privileged mitigating circumstance available when not all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are attendant. The Court held that the claim cannot prosper absent proof of the primordial element of unlawful aggression, since without unlawful aggression there is nothing to prevent or repel and therefore no defense, complete or incomplete.
• Unlawful Aggression as Primordial Element — Unlawful aggression is the primordial element of defense of a relative; its absence negates both the complete justifying circumstance and the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense. The defense bears the burden of proving it, and the Court found the defense's evidence incredible and chimerical.
• Cessation of Unlawful Aggression — When the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Because Francisco and Valentino had already fled toward the corner of Laong-Laan Street when appellant pursued and attacked them, the alleged initial unlawful aggression had ceased.
• Number and Severity of Wounds as Evidence of Intent to Kill — The presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense and likewise belie the claim of incomplete defense of a relative, indicating not the desire to defend one's relative but a determined effort to kill. Francisco's ten stab wounds and the severance of four fingers, and Valentino's ten stab and hack wounds (two fatal), negated the defense's theory.
• Immediate Vindication of a Grave Offense — An ordinary mitigating circumstance that cannot be appreciated where (a) the accused had no personal knowledge of the alleged grave offense and his testimony thereon is hearsay and inadmissible, and (b) sufficient time had lapsed between the accused's learning of the offense and his retaliatory act, within which he could have recovered his composure and assuaged his vindictive sentiments.

• "However, this Court has consistently held that for the claim of incomplete defense of a relative to prosper, it is essential to prove the primordial element of unlawful aggression. If there is no unlawful aggression there would be nothing to prevent or repel. In that event, there could be no defense, complete or incomplete." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for rejecting the privileged mitigating circumstance, establishing unlawful aggression as the indispensable predicate for any defense, complete or incomplete.
• "And this Court has consistently held that when the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor." — This passage supplies the second ground for rejecting the defense: even assuming an attack on appellant's father occurred, it had already ceased when appellant pursued and attacked the fleeing victims.
• "Just as the presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, so do they belie the claim of incomplete defense of a relative and indicate not the desire to defend one's relative but a determined effort to kill." — This passage articulates the evidentiary doctrine drawn from the physical evidence, extending the settled rule on self-defense to claims of defense of a relative.
• "Thus, the benefit of the said mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in favor of the appellant pursuant to the established rule that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity." — This passage states the controlling rule disposing of the second assigned error, tying the lapse of time between the alleged grave offense and the retaliatory act to the loss of the mitigating circumstance.

• People vs. Layam, 234 SCRA 424 — Cited for the rationale behind mitigating circumstances as an exercise of mercy and leniency in favor of an accused who has shown lesser perversity, and cited anew for the rule that unlawful aggression must be proved for incomplete defense of a relative to prosper.
• People vs. Agapinay, 186 SCRA 813 — Cited for the requisites of defense of a relative under Article 11(2) of the Revised Penal Code and for the requirement of unlawful aggression in claims of incomplete defense of a relative.
• People vs. Nulla, 153 SCRA 471 — Cited in support of the rule that the primordial element of unlawful aggression must be established for the claim of incomplete defense of a relative to prosper.
• People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 — Cited for the rule that when the unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense has no more right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.
• People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 — Cited for the same rule on the cessation of unlawful aggression and for the doctrine that the number and severity of wounds negate a claim of defense.
• People vs. Orbes, G.R. No. 104664, August 28, 1995 — Cited for the rule on cessation of unlawful aggression and for the evidentiary weight of the number and severity of wounds.
• People vs. Masangkay, 157 SCRA 320 — Cited for the doctrine that the presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the victim disprove self-defense.
• People vs. Ganzagan, Jr., G.R. No. 113793, August 11, 1995 — Cited for the elements of self-defense and for the doctrine that the number and severity of wounds negate a claim of defense.
• People vs. Ronquillo, et al., G.R. No. 96125, August 31, 1995 — Cited for the elements of self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. So, G.R. No. 104664, August 28, 1995 — Cited for the elements of self-defense under Article 11(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Benito, 74 SCRA 271 — Cited for the rule that there can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity.
• People vs. Pajares, 210 SCRA 237 — Cited for the same rule on immediate vindication of a grave offense and the requirement that no sufficient time have elapsed for the accused to recover his composure.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder; the provision under which appellant was convicted in Criminal Case No. 90-80422 and for which he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for self-defense as a justifying circumstance; cited in connection with the trial court's ruling that the prosecution evidence negated the elements of self-defense, namely, that the accused is not the unlawful aggressor, that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and that he employed reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression.
• Article 11(2), Revised Penal Code — Provides for defense of a relative as a justifying circumstance; cited for its requisites, namely, unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel or prevent it, and, where the provocation was given by the person attacked, the absence of any part therein on the part of the one making the defense.
• Article 13(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative, applicable when not all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability are attendant; invoked by appellant but held inapplicable for failure to prove unlawful aggression.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Panganiban, JJ., concur.