People of the Philippines vs. Efren Mendoza y Salvador

An accused who admits killing and invokes self-defense or defense of a relative must prove unlawful aggression by clear and convincing evidence; absent it, the justifying defense fails. Treachery, being a qualifying circumstance, qualifies the killing as murder and cannot be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance to offset the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Efren Mendoza was charged with murder for the July 14, 1993 hacking death of Anchito A. Nano in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte. Mendoza was the husband of Emily Mendoza and father of seven-year-old Ernie Mendoza, whose alleged injury by Nano formed part of the defense. The prosecution alleged murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with treachery and evident premeditation, while the defense invoked self-defense and defense of relative under Article 11. The case also implicated the distinction between qualifying and generic aggravating circumstances, voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

On July 14, 1993, at around 7:00 p.m., Anchito A. Nano and Marianito Rafael passed by the house of Efren Mendoza in Barangay Manlucugan, Vinzons, Camarines Norte, and asked Emily Mendoza, Efren’s wife, for a drink. According to the prosecution, Anchito spoke with Emily about four arms-length from Marianito when Efren suddenly appeared and hacked Anchito on the nape; Marianito fled out of fear for his life. Barangay Kagawad Pedro Saman, together with Ernesto Cribe and Trinidad delos Santos, later arrived and found Anchito kneeling and already dead, with three hack wounds on the nape and two at the back. Trinidad reported the incident to the Aguit-it sub-station; SPO2 Silverio Rafael proceeded to the scene and saw the body still kneeling with hack wounds at the back of the neck and body. Barangay officials identified Efren as the perpetrator. SPO4 Rafael observed that Efren’s house was in total disarray, surmised that things might have been taken in a hurry, and noted that there was no weapon anywhere near the victim’s body. Later that night, Efren surrendered to Senior Police Officer Leonardo Almadrones, who turned him over to Chief Investigator Joel Guinto. During investigation, Efren claimed that Anchito ransacked his house and hacked his seven-year-old son Ernie. Two days later, Emily and Ernie went to the Vinzons police station to blotter Ernie’s wound; Investigator Guinto interviewed Ernie and concluded that the wound was made by somebody other than the victim because it was not deep enough, and the child said that when he woke up he already had a wound. Investigator Guinto filed the charge after the victim’s common-law wife brought witnesses who executed sworn affidavits.

The defense presented six witnesses: Efren Mendoza, his wife Emily, his son Ernie, Bayani Aguilar, Dr. Gaudencio Albano, and Carmen Herico. Emily testified that at around 7:00 p.m., Anchito and Marianito arrived and Anchito destroyed two windows of their house; she saw Ernie hacked by Anchito while peeping through the destroyed window; she shouted for help; Efren responded and saw Anchito about to attack him, but Efren hacked first; Marianito fled. She brought Ernie first to a faith healer and the following morning to the Provincial Hospital. Efren testified that at around 7:30 p.m. he was at the comfort room about twenty meters from their house when he heard his wife shouting for help; he ran home and saw Anchito destroying the lock of their window; he looked for a piece of wood but found a bolo; he heard his son shout, “Ama, tinaga ako”; he approached Anchito to prevent him from entering the house, but Anchito tried to hack him; he delivered a hacking blow ahead on the right side of the neck; he then went to the Municipal Hall of Vinzons and surrendered voluntarily. Ernie testified that he noticed somebody hacking their house, peeped through the window, saw Anchito hack him on the head, and lost consciousness while his mother shouted for help; he was brought first to a quack doctor and the following morning to the provincial hospital, where Dr. Albano treated his head injury. Bayani Aguilar, police chief of Vinzons PNP, issued a certification on August 3, 1993 about Efren’s voluntary surrender and another regarding Emily’s report that Anchito had hacked their son. Dr. Gaudencio Albano testified that he treated Ernie for a four-centimeter laceration at the middle of the head, which could have been caused by a blunt object. Carmen Herico testified that she heard her daughter Emily shouting for help, ran toward her daughter’s house, met her halfway, and saw the fallen window; she and Emily then went to Pedro Saman and informed him.

The trial court rejected the defense, finding that an eyewitness testified Efren suddenly attacked and hacked the victim outside the house; that the number, location, and severity of the hack and incised wounds, the autopsy findings, and the photographs showed the wounds came from behind; that no weapon was found near the victim; and that the house was in good condition. It found no altercation, warning, or challenge that would have made the victim the aggressor, and held that the aggression must be real or at least imminent, not merely imaginary. It disbelieved the defense witnesses’ testimonies and found the self-defense claim not well-founded.

• Defense of Relative: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not upholding the theory of defense of relative despite corroborative evidence; he claimed he hacked Nano to defend himself, his family, and his home after Nano destroyed windows, injured his son, and was about to attack him.
• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder despite the absence of the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation alleged in the Information.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant argued that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor because he immediately went to the Municipal Hall and surrendered to the police on the night of the incident.

• Voluntary Surrender: The Solicitor General submitted that appellant’s surrender was not unconditional, a position the Court rejected.
• Civil Indemnity: Citing People vs. Victor, the Solicitor General argued that the civil indemnity should be raised from P50,000 to P75,000.

• Self-Defense and Defense of Relative: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting appellant’s claim of self-defense and defense of relative despite corroborative evidence.
• Treachery: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery as alleged in the Information.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was established as a qualifying circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Offsetting Circumstances: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery may offset the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the penalty should be reclusion perpetua or an indeterminate penalty under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
• Civil Indemnity: Whether civil indemnity should be increased from P50,000 to P75,000.

• Self-Defense and Defense of Relative: No. The defense fails because unlawful aggression was not proven by clear and convincing evidence; the wounds and absence of a weapon contradicted appellant’s claim.
• Treachery: Yes. The killing was qualified by treachery; the victim was unaware of the sudden attack, as shown by the nature, number, and location of wounds and eyewitness testimony.
• Evident Premeditation: No separate finding. The Court affirmed the murder conviction on treachery alone and did not rely on evident premeditation.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. All requisites were proven, and the surrender was unconditional.
• Offsetting Circumstances: No. Treachery is a qualifying circumstance, not a generic aggravating circumstance, and cannot offset voluntary surrender.
• Proper Penalty: Indeterminate penalty. Because the crime was committed before RA 7659 took effect and voluntary surrender was mitigating, the minimum period of reclusion temporal (maximum) was imposed, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law applied.
• Civil Indemnity: No. The P75,000 award in People vs. Victor involved rape and the death penalty and is inapplicable; P50,000 civil indemnity and P30,000 moral damages are affirmed.

• Self-Defense and Defense of Relative: Since appellant admitted hacking Nano, he bore the burden of proving self-defense or defense of relative by clear and convincing evidence; he could not rely on the weakness of the prosecution. The requisites are unlawful aggression, lack of sufficient provocation, and reasonable necessity of the means used; defense of relative requires the first and second requisites and that the defender did not participate in the provocation. The Court found no unlawful aggression. The victim was found kneeling with five wounds—three on the nape and two at the back—which contradicted the claim that Nano was about to attack appellant. The bolo allegedly used by Nano was not found near the scene and was not presented. The claim that Nano caused Ernie’s head injury was not adequately proven: Ernie said he lost consciousness after being hacked, but appellant heard him cry “Ama, tinaga ako” and did not see Nano hit him; Carmen Herico saw only a fallen window and no injured child; Pedro Saman saw the children in the house but did not mention an injured child. The trial court disbelieved the defense witnesses, and its credibility findings are respected absent overlooked facts. Thus the justifying defenses failed.
• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly and especially to insure the crime’s execution without risk from the offended party’s defense. Its essence is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation. The victim’s lack of awareness was shown by the nature, number, and location of his wounds. Marianito Rafael, against whom no ill motive was imputed, testified that appellant came out suddenly and hacked Nano; Rafael saw the first hack and fled. Treachery therefore qualified the killing as murder.
• Evident Premeditation: The Court made no separate finding on evident premeditation; it affirmed the murder conviction on the basis of treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: The requisites are: the offender has not been actually arrested; the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and the surrender is voluntary. The defense must show intent to surrender unconditionally either because of an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to spare the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture. All requisites were proven. Chief Inspector Bayani Aguilar issued a certification that Efren voluntarily surrendered to the station, including his bolo used to hack “Yoyoy Nano” three times. Contrary to the Solicitor General’s submission, the surrender was unconditional: appellant admitted hacking the victim and placed himself under police custody.
• Offsetting Circumstances: The trial court erred in ruling that voluntary surrender was offset by treachery. A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime; a generic aggravating circumstance does not affect the designation of the crime and merely provides for imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. A generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance; a qualifying circumstance may not. Treachery in this case was qualifying, not generic; it characterized the killing as murder and could not also be considered a generic aggravating circumstance to warrant the maximum penalty. It therefore could not offset voluntary surrender.
• Proper Penalty: When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. RA 7659, which reimposed the death penalty, was not yet in effect. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender impelled imposition of the minimum period of the applicable penalty, reclusion temporal (maximum). Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court sentenced appellant to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its maximum period. The Indeterminate Sentence Law applied because the maximum penalty actually imposed was reclusion temporal in its maximum period, not death or life imprisonment; the law uses “punished” rather than “punishable,” so the actual penalty imposed controls.
• Civil Indemnity: The Solicitor General’s reliance on People vs. Victor was erroneous. That case held that civil indemnity for rape effectively qualified by circumstances authorizing the death penalty should be not less than P75,000. It involved rape and the death penalty and cannot apply to this murder case. Consistent with current jurisprudence, the Court affirmed P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral damages for the anguish and wounded feelings suffered by the victim’s heirs, which were duly proven.

• Self-defense and defense of relative — burden and requisites — An accused who admits killing and invokes self-defense or defense of a relative must prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence of the requisites: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender, and reasonable necessity of the means used to repel the aggression. For defense of a relative, the first and second requisites must be present, and if the provocation was given by the person attacked, the defender must have had no part therein. The accused cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution. In this case, appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression, so the defenses collapsed.
• Unlawful aggression — Unlawful aggression must be real, or at least imminent, and not merely imaginary. A threat, even if made with a weapon, is not sufficient; the aggressor’s intent must be ostensibly revealed by hostile attitude and external acts constituting the commencement of actual, material, unlawful aggression. The Court found no unlawful aggression because the victim was hacked from behind, no weapon was found near him, and the defense’s claim that Nano attacked appellant was not credible.
• Credibility of witnesses — Findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great weight and respect, absent a clear showing that some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that could have affected the result of the case were overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. Appellant failed to show any reason to reverse the trial court’s disbelief of the defense witnesses.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without risk arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Its essence is a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. The victim’s lack of awareness may be gleaned from the nature, number, and location of his wounds, as well as eyewitness testimony. Here, treachery qualified the killing as murder.
• Qualifying vs. generic aggravating circumstances — A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime; a generic aggravating circumstance does not affect the designation of the crime and merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. A generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, but a qualifying circumstance may not. Treachery in this case was qualifying, so it could not offset voluntary surrender.
• Voluntary surrender — To establish voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, the following requisites must be shown: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. The defense must show intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because of an acknowledgment of guilt or because of a wish to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to the search and capture of the accused. All requisites were proven here.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that it does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment. Because the law uses the word “punished” instead of “punishable,” what should be considered is the penalty actually imposed, not the imposable penalty. Since the maximum penalty actually imposed in this case was reclusion temporal in its maximum period, the Indeterminate Sentence Law applied.
• Civil indemnity for murder — The civil indemnity of P50,000 for murder was affirmed. The increased award of P75,000 in People vs. Victor was held inapplicable because that ruling involved rape and the death penalty, not murder.

• "True, a father and husband has the duty and the right to defend himself, his family and his home. However, in order to successfully invoke self-defense and defense of relative, he must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the concurrence of three elements, the most important of which is unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Absent unlawful aggression, these defenses collapse and the accused must be convicted." — This passage states the threshold rule for self-defense and defense of relative, emphasizing that unlawful aggression is indispensable and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
• "The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of treachery, which it used to qualify the killing as murder.
• "A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not." — This passage distinguishes qualifying from generic aggravating circumstances and explains why treachery could not offset voluntary surrender.
• "When the crime was committed on July 14, 1993, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. At the time, however, RA 7659 which reimposed the death penalty was not yet in effect. In any event, the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender impels the imposition of the minimum period of the applicable penalty, reclusion temporal (maximum)." — This passage governs the proper penalty, showing why the RTC’s reclusion perpetua was modified to an indeterminate sentence.

• People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (July 28, 1998) — Cited with companion cases for the rule that an accused invoking self-defense or defense of a relative must present clear and convincing evidence and cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution.
• People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19 (March 14, 1996) — Cited for the rule that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight and respect absent a clear showing of overlooked facts.
• People vs. Rebamontan, 305 SCRA 609 (April 13, 1999) — Cited for the essence of treachery as a sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation.
• People vs. Deopante, 263 SCRA 691 (October 30, 1996) — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (September 25, 1998) — Cited for the requirement that the surrender be unconditional, either from acknowledgment of guilt or from a wish to spare the authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture.
• People vs. Moises, 66 SCRA 151 (August 13, 1975) — Cited for the rule that the Indeterminate Sentence Law uses “punished” rather than “punishable,” so the penalty actually imposed controls.
• People vs. Victor, G.R. No. 127903 (July 9, 1998) — Distinguished; its ruling raising civil indemnity to P75,000 involved rape and the death penalty and was held inapplicable to this murder case.
• People vs. Quitlong, G.R. No. 121562 (July 10, 1998) — Cited with companion cases for the current jurisprudence affirming P50,000 civil indemnity for murder.

• Article 11(1) and (2), Revised Penal Code — Defines the justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of relative and their requisites. Applied: appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression, so the defenses were rejected.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes murder. Applied: the killing was qualified by treachery, and appellant’s conviction for murder was affirmed.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery. Applied: treachery was the qualifying circumstance that characterized the killing as murder.
• Article 64(2), Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the minimum period of the penalty when a mitigating circumstance is present. Applied: voluntary surrender impelled the minimum period of reclusion temporal (maximum).
• Section 2, Indeterminate Sentence Law — Provides that the law does not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment. Applied: because the law uses “punished,” the actual penalty imposed—reclusion temporal (maximum)—made the Indeterminate Sentence Law applicable.
• Republic Act No. 7659 — Reimposed the death penalty effective December 31, 1993. Applied: it was not yet in effect on July 14, 1993, so the penalty for murder at the time of the crime was reclusion temporal (maximum) to death.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.