People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Ladrillo

An Information alleging that the offense was committed "on or about the year 1992" is insufficiently definite and violates both Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; a conviction cannot stand where the prosecution fails to prove the date of the offense as alleged and the evidence does not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Jane Vasquez, an eight-year-old girl, was the cousin of the accused Edwin Ladrillo, and the two lived in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, where the accused's house stood only five meters from Jane's home. The prosecution arose from a charge of rape allegedly committed against the child, and the case turned on the sufficiency of the Information's allegation of time and on the credibility of the complainant's testimony. The constitutional presumption of innocence and the requirement that the prosecution prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt supplied the controlling legal framework for the appeal.

Jane Vasquez, an eight-year-old girl, was the cousin of the accused Edwin Ladrillo. They lived in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, where the accused's house stood only five meters from Jane's home. According to the prosecution, one afternoon Jane went to the accused's house, where he asked her to pick lice off his head; she complied. He then told her to lie down on the bed, stripped himself naked, removed her panty, and placed himself on top of her, inserting his penis into her vagina. He covered her mouth with his hand to prevent her from shouting as he gyrated his buttocks, and succeeded in raping her four times on the same day, making his penis hard again after each intercourse and inserting it back into her vagina. He then threatened to "send her to the police" if she reported the incident to anyone.

Sometime in 1994, Salvacion Ladrillo Vasquez, Jane's mother, noticed that Jane had difficulty urinating and kept pressing her abdomen and holding her private part. Jane approached her mother and said, "Ma, hindi ka maniwala sa akin na 'yung uten ni Kuya Edwin ipinasok sa kiki ko." Perturbed, Salvacion immediately brought her daughter to their church, the Iglesia ni Kristo, where she was advised to report to the National Bureau of Investigation. At the NBI, Salvacion was referred to the Puerto Princesa Provincial Hospital so that Jane could be physically examined. Dr. Danny O. Aquino reported in his medico-legal certificate that Jane had a "non-intact hymen," and later testified that this could either be congenital or caused by trauma, but that he could not distinguish which, and that he was not able to recognize or appreciate any healed wound or laceration. On 3 February 1995, Jane Vasquez, with the assistance of her mother, filed a criminal complaint against Edwin Ladrillo.

The defense was anchored on alibi and denial. The accused claimed that in 1992, the year he allegedly raped Jane as stated in the Information, he was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, and did not even know Jane or her mother at that time; he moved to Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, only in 1993. Wilfredo Rojas and Teodoro Aguilar, both neighbors of the accused in Liberty, corroborated that in 1992 the accused was still their neighbor in Liberty and moved to Abanico only in 1993. Edito Ladrillo, the accused's father, testified that his family lived in Abanico for the first time only in 1993, and that when he and his sister Salvacion, Jane's mother, had a quarrel, he forbade his son Edwin from attending church services with Salvacion at the Iglesia ni Kristo, which caused his sister to be all the more angry with him; the criminal case, he claimed, was a means employed by his sister to exact revenge for their past disagreements.

The trial court found the accused guilty as charged. It found that the accused had repeatedly raped or sexually abused Jane Vasquez, whom it described as then only five years old, and that it had no reason to doubt the veracity of her testimony given the straightforward clarity and simplicity with which it was made. It considered it highly improbable that a young, eight-year-old girl would falsely testify that her own cousin had raped her, and held that her testimony bore all the characteristics of truth and was entitled to great weight and credence.

• Alibi and Non-Residence: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in not giving credence to his defense that at the supposed time of the commission of the offense he was not yet residing in Abanico, Puerto Princesa City, and did not know the complainant nor her family.
• Failure of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding him guilty of rape considering that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Indefinite Date of Commission: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in not finding that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish with particularity the date of commission of the offense.
• Credibility of Complainant: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in giving great weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in failing to consider the mitigating circumstance of minority in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, assuming for the sake of argument that the crime of rape was committed.

• Sufficiency of the Information as to Time: Whether the Information alleging that the offense was committed "on or about the year 1992" sufficiently informed the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of the Complainant: Whether the trial court erred in giving great weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Whether the mitigating circumstance of minority should have been considered in imposing the penalty.

• Sufficiency of the Information as to Time: No. The phrase "on or about the year 1992" is too indefinite and uncertain, violating Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court and the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction was accordingly reversed.
• Credibility of the Complainant: Yes, the trial court erred. The complainant's testimony suffered from discernible defects that, weighed in their totality, compelled reversal.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Moot. The acquittal rendered it unnecessary to resolve the question of the mitigating circumstance of minority.

• Sufficiency of the Information as to Time: Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the time of the commission of the offense be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit, and the Constitution guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information alleged the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992," a phrase encompassing not only the twelve months of 1992 but also the years prior and subsequent to it, such as 1991 and 1993, for which the accused would have to virtually account for his whereabouts. The failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the offense, and its further failure to prove during trial the date as alleged, deprived the accused of the opportunity to intelligently prepare his defense and convincingly refute the charge; at most, he could establish his residence only for the year indicated and not for the particular time of the supposed rape. Applying United States vs. Dichao by analogy, where an Information alleging rape "on or about and during the interval between October 1910 and August 1912" was held too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense, the Court found the allegation here equally defective.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense, and the prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The complainant had absolutely no recollection of the precise date she was sexually assaulted, testifying that she forgot the month and could not recall the year, and that she knew of no incident that would place the event in 1992 or thereafter. Following People vs. Ulpindo, where the complaining witness's testimony was rejected as inherently improbable for her failure to testify on the date of the supposed rape, the complainant's inability to recall the date created serious doubt on the commission of the rape and the sufficiency of the evidence for conviction. The records showed that in 1992 the accused was still residing in Liberty, Puerto Princesa City, a town different from Abanico, and had never been to Abanico at any time in 1992; he moved to Abanico only in 1993. It was therefore impossible for him to have committed the crime in 1992 at his house in Abanico, and the trial court's reliance on the proximity of Liberty and Abanico was irrelevant under the complainant's own narration. The prosecution never adequately explained or established the factual basis for the year 1992, and the prosecutor himself admitted he could not provide the specific date; the allegation of date was thus based merely on speculation and conjecture, insufficient to satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction.

• Credibility of the Complainant: The complainant's testimony bore discernible defects that militated heavily against according it full credit. First, she had no recollection of the precise date of the assault. Second, the testimony of Dr. Danny O. Aquino did not help the prosecution's cause: he could not distinguish whether the "non-intact hymen" was congenital or the result of trauma, he was not able to recognize or appreciate any healed wound or laceration, and his answers to whether the complainant had been raped were uncertain and inconclusive, such as "I cannot tell for sure," "That is a big probability," and "Very likely." Third, the complainant's narration that the accused was holding her hand, covering her mouth, and gripping his penis all at the same time was obviously untruthful and defied ordinary human experience, since evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. Fourth, the complainant reported the alleged rape to her mother only in 1994, or two years after its occurrence, which hardly conformed to human experience for a child, who is naturally more spontaneous and candid and usually lacks the discretion and sensibility of older victims; the concealment seriously impaired her credibility. The rule that the Court should refrain from disturbing the trial court's conclusions on credibility does not apply where the trial court overlooked facts of substance or value that would affect the outcome, or where the disputed decision is based on a misapprehension of facts.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Minority: Because the acquittal rested on the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence and reasonable doubt, the question of whether the mitigating circumstance of minority should have been considered in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua was rendered unnecessary to resolve.

• Prosecution Evidence Must Stand on Its Own Weight — The prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense. The prosecution must demonstrate the culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, for accusation is not synonymous with guilt; only when the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction exists may the liberty, or even the life, of an accused be declared forfeit. The Court applied this principle in acquitting the accused, holding that denial and alibi, though often weak, may tilt the scales of justice in the accused's favor when the prosecution evidence itself is weak.

• Right to Be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusation — The Constitution guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and Section 11, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the time of the commission of the offense be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. An allegation that the offense was committed "on or about the year 1992" is too indefinite and uncertain, encompassing not only the twelve months of that year but also the years prior and subsequent to it, and thereby depriving the accused of the opportunity to intelligently prepare his defense.

• Time as Material to the Offense — Although time is not an essential ingredient or element of the crime of rape, it assumes importance where it creates serious doubt on the commission of the rape or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of conviction. Where the prosecution fails to prove the date of the offense as alleged in the Information, a conviction anchored on speculation and conjecture cannot satisfy the quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt.

• Judicial Caution in Rape Prosecutions — Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical; judges, however, as interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying her having been sexually abused, and must equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice based on the law.

• "It is basic that the prosecution evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the defense." — This opening principle frames the entire disposition; it states the controlling standard that the weakness of the defense cannot supply the deficiency in the prosecution's proof and underlies the acquittal.

• "The phrase 'on or about the year 1992' encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to virtually account for his whereabouts." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the sufficiency of the Information, defining why the allegation of time was too indefinite to satisfy the right to be informed.

• "Denial and alibi may be weak but courts should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no other defenses but denial and alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself is weak." — This formulation is frequently cited on the proper treatment of denial and alibi, particularly where the prosecution evidence is itself weak.

• "Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in publicly seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection." — This passage articulates the standard of judicial caution required in rape prosecutions and is commonly quoted in later jurisprudence.

• United States vs. Dichao, 27 Phil. 421 (1914) — Applied by analogy; the Court sustained the dismissal of a rape complaint on demurrer where the Information alleged the offense was committed "on or about and during the interval between October 1910 and August 1912," holding the statement of time too indefinite and uncertain to give the accused the information required by law.
• People vs. Ulpindo, G.R. No. 115983, 12 April 1996, 256 SCRA 201 — Followed; the Court rejected the complaining witness's testimony as inherently improbable for her failure to testify on the date of the supposed rape, which she claimed she could not remember, and acquitted the accused.
• People vs. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09, 6 December 1995, 250 SCRA 676 — Cited for the principle that judges must deal with a rape charge with extreme caution and circumspection, free of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman decrying sexual abuse.

• Section 11, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Requires that the time of the commission of the offense be alleged as near to the actual date as the information or complaint will permit. The Information's allegation of "on or about the year 1992" was held to violate this requirement.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The indefinite allegation of time was held to run afoul of this constitutionally protected right, depriving the accused of the opportunity to intelligently prepare his defense.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.