People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ariola and Rolando Galang

A plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance and a judicial confession of all material facts alleged, including aggravating circumstances, but it cannot sustain a conviction for an aggravated offense where the accused's own testimony negates the aggravating circumstances and the prosecution fails to prove them; treachery and evident premeditation must be established by evidence, not presumed. Where the killing is not attended by treachery or evident premeditation, the crime is homicide, not murder; if committed while serving sentence, Article 160, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code imposes the maximum period of the penalty for the new felony.

Maximino Padilla was a 21-year-old prisoner serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal; Eduardo Ariola and Rolando Galang were fellow prisoners at the same institution. The prosecution charged the killing as murder under the Revised Penal Code, implicating the rules on qualifying and aggravating circumstances, plea of guilty, recidivism, and Article 160, paragraph 1, which governs the commission of a felony while serving sentence.

On March 30, 1971, Maximino Padilla, a 21-year-old prisoner serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, died during a prison riot. Fellow prisoners Eduardo Ariola, Rolando Galang, Lamberto Dungo, and Rafael Echane were charged with murder. Dr. Alberto Reyes performed a postmortem examination and testified that the cause of death was severe hemorrhage resulting from multiple stab wounds; the victim sustained 17 stab wounds and 3 incised wounds, ten of which were at the back of the body.

At arraignment on July 6, 1973, Ariola and Galang, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of guilty, while Dungo and Echane pleaded not guilty. Trial followed, with both prosecution and defense presenting evidence. The prosecution presented Dr. Reyes and prison guards-investigators Tolentino Avelina and Jesus Tomagan. Avelina and Tomagan testified that they separately investigated Galang and Ariola, respectively; that the two admitted their participation in the crime, recounted how the assault was perpetrated, and surrendered their weapons. The prosecution identified Galang's sworn statement as Exhibit "D" and Ariola's as Exhibit "F", as well as the weapons used by them as Exhibits "D-5" and "G".

For the defense, Galang admitted having been convicted by final judgment for murder by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila. He admitted signing a sworn statement but claimed he did not read it. Asked whether there was any plan among his gang mates to kill the victim, he answered that there was none; they made no plans to retaliate against their enemies, only plans to defend themselves. He also claimed the victim was armed with a "matalas" at the time of the incident. Ariola admitted prior final convictions for homicide and murder by the Court of First Instance of Zambales and the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila, respectively. He admitted killing the victim by stabbing him on the arm and shoulder but claimed he did not do so intentionally. He also admitted signing a sworn statement but claimed he did not understand the investigator. Ariola testified that there was a commotion outside their brigade and they were forced to run out; he met a person carrying something in his hands, and when he got hold of him, he stabbed him twice. Galang likewise testified that there was no plan to kill the victim and that there was a commotion inside. Neither of them participated in the forcible opening of the gate of Brigade 5-C, the place where they were incarcerated; upon learning that it had been opened, they just joined their co-prisoners in rushing out.

During the scheduled trial on February 27, 1974, the prosecution moved in open court for dismissal of the case against Dungo and Echane for lack of sufficient evidence, and the Circuit Criminal Court granted the motion. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment against Galang and Ariola, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing them to death, with orders to indemnify the heirs of the offended party P10,000, pay moral damages of P5,000 and exemplary damages of P5,000, and pay their proportionate share of the costs.

• Treachery: Accused-appellants assigned as error the appreciation of treachery and the consequent qualification of the crime to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Accused-appellants assigned as error the appreciation of evident premeditation.
• Recidivism: Accused-appellants assigned as error the appreciation of recidivism.
• Death Penalty: Accused-appellants assigned as error the application of the greater penalty of death pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated to qualify the killing to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was properly appreciated.
• Recidivism: Whether recidivism was properly appreciated despite the absence of the date of last conviction and release in the information.
• Plea of Guilty: Whether the plea of guilty was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder and the alleged aggravating circumstances.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Whether the proper crime is murder or homicide and whether the death penalty was correctly imposed.
• Article 160: Whether Article 160, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code applies to the accused who committed the felony while serving sentence.

• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be presumed and must be proven by the manner of attack; no eyewitness account and no proof that the mode of attack was deliberately chosen to accomplish the killing without risk.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The essential elements—time of determination, act manifesting persistence, and sufficient interval for reflection—do not affirmatively appear.
• Recidivism: Yes. Both accused admitted prior final convictions for crimes embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code; recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance. The date of last conviction and release need not be recited in the information except for habitual delinquency.
• Plea of Guilty: The plea is mitigating and a judicial confession, but it does not sustain the murder conviction because the accused's testimonies negated treachery and evident premeditation and the prosecution failed to prove them.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Homicide, not murder. Article 160, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code applies because the felony was committed while serving sentence, requiring the maximum period of the penalty for the new felony; the death penalty was not proper.
• Indeterminate Sentence: Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty is twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Treachery: The Court held that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven by the manner in which the victim was attacked. The prosecution presented no eyewitness account. The prison guards-investigators testified only on the results of their investigations, relying entirely on the accused's sworn statements, which the accused did not totally affirm in court. Ariola testified that there was a commotion outside their brigade and they were forced to run out; he met a person carrying something and stabbed him twice. Galang testified that there was no plan and that there was a commotion inside. Neither participated in the forcible opening of the gate of Brigade 5-C; upon learning it had been opened, they joined their co-prisoners in rushing out. Nothing showed that the mode of attack was sudden and unexpected and deliberately chosen with a special view to accomplishing the act without risk to them. Thus, treachery was not appreciated. The Court cited People vs. Asilo, People vs. Arciga, and People vs. Durante, and Aquino's commentary.
• Evident Premeditation: The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. The elements are: (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. These elements do not affirmatively appear. The accused's testimonies negated a plan. The Court cited People vs. Durante and People vs. Lim, People vs. Bodoso, People vs. Manangan, People vs. Ardisa, People vs. Diva, People vs. Beralde, and People vs. Corachea.
• Recidivism: Recidivism was properly appreciated. Ariola and Galang testified that they had been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Recidivism is a generic aggravating circumstance. The date of last conviction and release need not be recited in the information; such recital is necessary only in case of habitual delinquency. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism was offset by the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt.
• Plea of Guilty: A plea of guilty is a mitigating circumstance and a judicial confession of all material facts alleged in the information, including aggravating circumstances. However, the essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits guilt freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act. If the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, the technical language used, or the consequences of his admission, the plea should not be accepted; if accepted, it should not be sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court quoted Justice Carson's rationale. Here, although the accused pleaded guilty, their testimonies failed to show treachery or premeditation. The Court cited People vs. Duaban, which cited U.S. vs. Jamad. It also cited People vs. Yturriaga and People vs. Ong for the rule that a qualified plea of guilty does not deny guilt and that the accused should not be deprived of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt because of erroneous allegations of aggravating circumstances.
• Proper Crime and Article 160: Since treachery and evident premeditation were not established, the proper crime is homicide, not murder. Article 160, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code provides that any person who commits a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The accused committed the homicide while serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison. Thus, each was sentenced to reclusion temporal in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty was fixed at twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum. The Court noted People vs. Avellana and People vs. Atienza, where killings of co-prisoners under similar circumstances were held to be homicide, not murder.

• Plea of Guilty as Mitigating Circumstance and Judicial Confession — A plea of guilty is both a mitigating circumstance and a judicial confession of all material facts alleged, including aggravating circumstances. However, it must be entered freely, voluntarily, and with full knowledge of its consequences and the nature of the offense; if the accused does not understand the technical charges or consequences, the plea cannot sustain conviction for the aggravated offense. In this case, the plea was appreciated as mitigating, but the accused's testimonies negated treachery and evident premeditation, so it did not sustain murder.
• Treachery — Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proven by the manner of attack. Mere indications of a sudden and unexpected attack, without precise data, do not suffice. The mode of attack must be deliberately chosen to accomplish the crime without risk to the offender. Here, no eyewitness and no proof of deliberate mode; treachery not appreciated.
• Evident Premeditation — Requires (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient interval of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. These elements must affirmatively appear. Here, they did not.
• Recidivism — A generic aggravating circumstance where the accused, at the time of trial for the new crime, has been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. The date of last conviction and release need not be recited in the information except for habitual delinquency. Here, both accused admitted prior final convictions; recidivism was appreciated but offset by plea of guilt.
• Article 160, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Any person who commits a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. Applied because the accused committed homicide while serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• "It is a well-established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a judicial confession of guilty — an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information including the aggravating circumstances." — States the general rule on plea of guilty, which the Court then qualifies by requiring full knowledge and voluntariness.
• "In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was attacked. Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proven" — States the ratio for rejecting treachery where the prosecution presented no eyewitness and no proof of the mode of attack.
• "The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment." — Defines evident premeditation and anchors the Court's ruling that its elements were absent.
• "We hereby rule that the proper crime chargeable against the accused is homicide and pursuant to Article 160, paragraph 1, R.P.C. above-quoted, each of the accused, Eduardo Ariola and Rolando Galang, should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its maximum period." — States the final holding on the proper crime and the controlling penalty provision.

• People vs. Avellana, L-38345, March 28, 1980 — Cited as a recently decided case involving convicts at the New Bilibid Prison where the killing of a co-prisoner under similar circumstances was held not attended by treachery and evident premeditation; characterized as homicide.
• People vs. Atienza, L-38571, March 31, 1980 — Cited with Avellana for the same ruling on similar prison killings.
• People vs. Yturriaga, 86 Phil. 534, 539 — Cited for the rule that a qualified plea of guilty does not deny guilt and that the accused should not be deprived of the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt because of erroneous allegations of aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Ong, 62 SCRA 174 — Cited with Yturriaga for the same principle on plea of guilty and erroneous aggravating circumstances.
• People vs. Duaban, 92 SCRA 743, L-31912, Aug. 24, 1979, citing U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305, 313-14 — Cited for the requirement that a plea of guilty be intelligent and fully understood; otherwise it should not be accepted or cannot sustain conviction.
• People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 — Cited for the essence of evident premeditation and for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed.
• People vs. Asilo, 4 Phil. 175 — Cited for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed but must be fully proven.
• People vs. Lim, 71 SCRA 249 — Cited, together with other cases, for the elements of evident premeditation.

• Article 160, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that any person who commits a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The Court applied it because the accused committed homicide while serving sentence at the New Bilibid Prison, imposing reclusion temporal in its maximum period.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the indeterminate penalty of twelve years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Teehankee (Acting C.J.), Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Fernando, C.J., was on leave.