People of the Philippines vs. Edna Cordero y Pontilaga

A killing is only Homicide, not Murder, where evident premeditation and treachery are not proved beyond reasonable doubt; evident premeditation requires proof of the offender’s determination, an act of persistence, and sufficient interval for reflection, while treachery requires proof of means or methods that insure execution without risk from the victim’s defense. Dwelling likewise cannot be appreciated absent proof that the offended party did not give provocation.

Edna Cordero y Pontilaga and Aurora Medina y de Leon were connected through Ricardo Cordero, Edna’s husband and Aurora’s live-in partner. The charge arose under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes Murder, and the Information alleged evident premeditation and treachery. The Revised Penal Code also supplies the aggravating circumstances invoked and the lesser offense of Homicide under Article 249.

Edna Cordero y Pontilaga and Aurora Medina y de Leon were connected through Ricardo Cordero, Edna’s husband and Aurora’s live-in partner. On August 6, 1988, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Evelyn Cruz Serrano, Aurora’s 22-year-old daughter, was in the kitchen of their house at No. 2353 Jacobo St., Singalong, Manila, when Edna arrived. Edna hurled a stone at the door, shouted, and looked for Ricardo. An exchange of words followed between Edna and Aurora, who was then in the sala. Aurora went upstairs to the room where Carding was, then came down followed by Carding, who talked to Edna outside. After a brief conversation, Edna entered the house; Evelyn then heard a sound of slapping. When Evelyn looked toward the sala, she saw Edna pulling a sharp instrument from the front portion of Aurora’s stomach. Carding tried to pacify Edna by holding her left hand. Evelyn shouted for help; neighbors came and brought Aurora to the hospital and Police Station No. 9 of the WPD. After returning from the police station, Evelyn went with policemen to Edna’s house and told them Edna had stabbed her mother; Edna was talking with her in-laws when police entered and apprehended her. Evelyn identified her police statement, Exhibit “A.”

Gloria Torres testified that on the same date and time she was in front of her cousin Pilar Valencia’s house in the same compound as her sister, the victim, at 2353 Singalong, Manila. She was cooking when Edna passed by. Gloria corroborated Evelyn in part, testifying that Edna stoned the house and exchanged words with Aurora, including the remarks “Palabasin mo ang asawa ko. Sabi ko na sa iyo na huag mong aargabiadohin ang anak ko.” After the exchange, Edna entered Aurora’s house, where a short commotion occurred inside; Ricardo Cordero was holding Edna’s hands while she held a bladed weapon in one hand, full of blood. When Gloria approached, Carding told her not to pacify him because “may tama si Aurora.” Gloria shouted for help; two men carried Aurora outside, borrowed a neighbor’s car, and brought her to the Philippine General Hospital, where at 8:00 o’clock in the evening a physician pronounced her dead. Gloria identified the bladed weapon as Exhibit “1” and her police statement as Exhibit “G.” She also testified to expenses: P12,000.00 for funeral expenses paid to Tres Amigos Funeral Parlor, Official Receipt No. 0159, Exhibit “J”; P31,000.00 for the tomb; P12,750.00 for daily expenses; and P1,675.00 for the eight-day wake, totaling P50,675.00. At the time of the incident, Aurora was a businesswoman who owned a store and a passenger jeepney rented at P250.00 a day.

Accused-appellant relied on the above narration in her own statement of facts but disputed evident premeditation and treachery. She claimed she went to the victim’s house in search of her husband to ask for money. According to her, when she arrived shouting and hurling stones, Aurora invited her inside to avoid a scene; the eyewitness, then in the kitchen, heard a slapping sound and, looking back, saw Edna pull a sharp instrument from Aurora’s stomach. Edna argued that the intention to kill was not manifest and carefully meditated, and that it was enough that the intention arose at the moment of aggression. She also asserted that she at first refused to enter the house after being invited, and that she slapped Aurora before inflicting the fatal injury, circumstances that contradicted treachery. On dwelling, appellant testified that when Aurora came out from the kitchen while appellant and her husband remained in the sala, Aurora called upon appellant: “Halika rito para makita mo ang hinahanap mo.” The prosecution did not rebut this testimony.

The trial court gave full credence to Evelyn Serrano’s testimony. Her testimony, however, was limited to the pulling out of the bladed instrument from the belly of the victim; she could not give details on how the initial attack commenced. The evidence also showed that when accused-appellant hurled stones at the house, the victim invited accused-appellant inside but the invitation was declined. The prosecution did not present evidence to show that Aurora had not given provocation in her house, and it did not rebut appellant’s testimony that Aurora called her with the words “Halika rito para makita mo ang hinahanap mo.”

• Evident Premeditation: Accused-appellant argued that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to establish evident premeditation; she went to the victim’s house in search of her husband to ask for money, the intention to kill was not manifest and carefully meditated, and it was enough that the intention arose at the moment of aggression.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant maintained that the evidence showed she at first refused to enter the house after being invited and that she slapped the victim before inflicting the fatal injury, factors that contradicted treachery.
• Proper Crime: Accused-appellant concluded that the proper crime of which she could be convicted was Homicide only and not Murder.

• Evident Premeditation and Treachery: The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, agreed with accused-appellant that the crime committed was simple Homicide because evident premeditation and treachery were not duly established by the prosecution to have attended the killing.
• Dwelling: The Solicitor General opined that dwelling should not be considered because a condition sine qua non is that the offended party had not given provocation, which must be shown by the prosecution and cannot be assumed; the prosecution failed to establish this, while appellant’s testimony that Aurora called her was unrebutted.

• Evident Premeditation: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation against accused-appellant.
• Treachery: Whether the lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery against accused-appellant.
• Dwelling: Whether dwelling may be considered as an aggravating circumstance in this case.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Whether accused-appellant should be convicted of Murder or Homicide, and what penalty and civil indemnity should be imposed.

• Evident Premeditation: No. The requisites of evident premeditation were not established; the events happened spontaneously and the attack followed on the spur of the moment and in the heat of the argument.
• Treachery: No. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness did not see how the assault started, and accused-appellant declined the victim’s invitation to enter the house.
• Dwelling: No. Dwelling cannot be considered absent proof that the offended party had not given provocation; the prosecution failed to establish this condition sine qua non.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: Homicide only. With no aggravating circumstance proved, the crime is Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized by reclusion temporal in its medium period, with an indeterminate sentence and civil indemnity of P50,000.00.

• Evident Premeditation: For evident premeditation to be appreciated, Article 14, paragraph 13, of the Revised Penal Code requires proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to that determination; and (3) a lapse of interval between determination and execution sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of the act. These requisites were not established. The events happened spontaneously; before the stabbing, accused-appellant had an altercation with the victim; the attack followed on the spur of the moment and in the heat of the argument. There was no showing that accused-appellant reflected on her purpose sufficiently to permit deliberate determination. People vs. Narit held that evident premeditation must be based on external acts, evident, not merely suspected, and cannot be presumed from hatred or ill-will; People vs. Barba and People vs. Francisco required a period sufficient for meditation and reflection. Evident premeditation was thus not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery: Article 14, paragraph 16, of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as employing means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly or specially to insure execution without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. The trial court gave full credence to Evelyn Serrano, but her testimony was limited to pulling out the bladed instrument from the victim’s belly; she could not give details on how the initial attack commenced. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the lone eyewitness did not see how the assault started. Moreover, when accused-appellant hurled stones at the house, the victim invited her inside but accused-appellant declined; treachery therefore cannot be considered.
• Dwelling: Although the crime was committed at the victim’s residence, dwelling should not be considered. A condition sine qua non of dwelling is that the offended party had not given provocation to the offender; the prosecution must show this and cannot assume it. The prosecution did not establish it. Appellant testified that when Aurora came out from the kitchen, while appellant and her husband remained in the sala, Aurora called upon appellant: “Halika rito para makita mo ang hinahanap mo.” The prosecution did not rebut this evidence. Dwelling was thus not appreciated.
• Proper Crime and Penalty: With no aggravating circumstance proved, accused-appellant can be liable only for Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, penalized by reclusion temporal, imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence should be ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, conformably with People vs. Gamut. The civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 conformably with People vs. Sison and People vs. Sazon.

• Evident Premeditation — An aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 13, Revised Penal Code. Its requisites are: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to that determination; and (3) a lapse of interval between determination and execution sufficient to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences of the act. It must be based on external acts that are evident, not merely suspected, and cannot be presumed from hatred or ill-will. In this case, the events happened spontaneously after an altercation, and the attack followed on the spur of the moment and in the heat of argument, so evident premeditation was not proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Treachery — An aggravating circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code, present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in execution that tend directly or specially to insure the execution of the crime without risk to the offender arising from the defense the offended party might make. It was not appreciated because the lone eyewitness saw only the pulling out of the bladed instrument from the victim’s belly and could not describe how the initial attack began; treachery cannot be established where the witness did not see the start of the assault. The victim’s invitation to accused-appellant, which the latter declined, further negated treachery.
• Dwelling — An aggravating circumstance that cannot be considered unless the offended party had not given provocation to the offender. The lack of provocation is a condition sine qua non and must be shown by the prosecution; it cannot be assumed. The prosecution failed to establish it, and appellant’s unrebutted testimony that the victim called her inside negated dwelling.
• Homicide and Indeterminate Sentence Law — Where no aggravating circumstance attends a killing, the crime is Homicide under Article 249, Revised Penal Code, penalized by reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty was fixed at ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
• Civil Indemnity for Death — The civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 conformably with recent rulings, specifically People vs. Sison and People vs. Sazon.

• "This Court has consistently held that for evident premeditation to be appreciated against an accused, the following requisites must be proved: 1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; 2) an act manifestly indicating that that offender had clung to his determination; and 3) the lapse of an interval time between determination to commit the crime and execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act (Par. 13, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code)." — States the requisites for evident premeditation and the standard the prosecution failed to meet.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly or specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make (Par. 16, Art. 14, Revised Penal Code)." — Defines treachery and supplies the rule applied to reject it in this case.
• "A condition sine qua non of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is that the offended party had not given provocation to the offender. That the offended party has not given provocation in his house is a fact that must be shown by the evidence of the prosecution, as it cannot be assumed." — States the condition for appreciating dwelling and explains why it was not considered.
• "Considering that no aggravating circumstances was proved to have attended the killing of Aurora Medina, accused-appellant can be held liable only for homicide which is penalized by reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the same to be imposed in its medium period." — Articulates the ratio for downgrading the conviction from Murder to Homicide.

• People vs. Narit, 197 SCRA 334 (1991) — Cited for the rule that evident premeditation must be based on external acts that are evident, not merely suspected, and cannot be presumed from hatred or ill-will; the Court used it to reject evident premeditation.
• People vs. Barba, 203 SCRA 436 (1991) — Cited for the requirement that there be a period sufficient in a judicial sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection before the crime.
• People vs. Francisco, 182 SCRA 305 (1990) — Cited with Barba on the need for sufficient time for reflection to establish deliberate premeditation.
• People vs. Gamut, 118 SCRA 35 (1982) — Cited as basis for computing the indeterminate sentence after the crime was downgraded to Homicide.
• People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 (1990) and People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 (1990) — Cited as recent rulings supporting the increase of civil indemnity to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Mendova, 100 Phil. 811 — Cited within Narit for the rule that criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing determination to commit the crime.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Murder; the Information charged and the trial court convicted under this provision; the Supreme Court modified because no aggravating circumstance was proved.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Homicide; applied by the Supreme Court after finding no aggravating circumstances, with penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period.
• Article 14, paragraph 13, Revised Penal Code — Evident premeditation; the Court enumerated its requisites and found them unproved.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Treachery; the Court defined it and found it unproved.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment after the crime was downgraded to Homicide.

• Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
• Justice Bidin
• Justice Davide, Jr.
• Justice Romero