People of the Philippines vs. Edison Arellano

Treachery requires two concurring conditions: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method, or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. The subjective element—the deliberate choice of the method of assault—must be proven by the prosecution; a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

The accused-appellant Edison Arellano was a security guard at the Victory Rice Mill in Cabatuan, Isabela, where the victim Andres Ventura was employed as a laborer. The case arose from a fatal stabbing incident that occurred on July 25, 1993, at a sari-sari store beside the rice mill. The crime was charged under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes murder.

Edison Arellano was a security guard at the Victory Rice Mill in Cabatuan, Isabela, and Andres Ventura, an eighteen-year-old laborer, was employed at the same mill. On July 25, 1993, at around 7:00 p.m., several men were drinking beer at a sari-sari store beside the rice mill, including Roberto Morales, Antonio Cordova, Gaudencio Pagon, Romeo Tindenilla, Arellano, and the victim Andres Ventura. An hour later, the storeowner named Riza asked Andres to gather the empty bottles of beer. Romeo resented Andres's act of getting the bottles in front of him, and a verbal tussle ensued, which heightened into a fistfight between Andres and Romeo. Because of the punches received from Andres, Romeo fell. Suddenly, Arellano approached Andres from behind and stabbed the latter on the right side with a pointed double-bladed instrument. Andres attempted to chase Arellano but failed as the latter escaped into the compound of the Victory Rice Mill. Andres sat down, held his side, and shouted for help. He was brought to the Bucag Hospital where he died an hour later.

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Eduardo Bucag revealed that Ventura died as a result of a stab wound on the upper right side of his body. The operative findings showed massive blood within the peritoneal cavity, transection of the hepatic artery and portal vein, and penetrating wound at the duodenum and pancreas. The victim went into cardio respiratory arrest and was pronounced dead at 1:15 a.m. on July 26, 1993.

For his defense, Arellano interposed alibi and denial. He swore that at 7:30 p.m. on July 25, 1993, he was in Calaocan, Cabatuan, Isabela, to pay respect to the dead grandfather of his friend, Arthur Corpuz. He stayed there for ten minutes, then returned to Cabatuan, arriving at 8:00 p.m. He went directly to the Victory Rice Mill, where Roberto Morales called him from the canteen three meters away from the gate. Arellano stayed in the canteen for only ten minutes and then proceeded to the rice mill. On his way, he met Romeo who was going out of the rice mill. Arellano was having his dinner when a laborer named Randy informed him that Romeo was mauled and that Andres was stabbed. A few minutes later, the police arrested him.

Romeo Tindenilla testified that he arrived at Riza's store between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m. Andres told Romeo that he would box him. Romeo picked up the bottle of beer he was drinking and turned his back with the intention of leaving. Andres nonetheless boxed Romeo on his back, causing the latter to fall down and lose consciousness. Tindenilla claimed that when Andres told Romeo that he would box him, Arellano was no longer around as he had gone to the compound of the rice mill. Mario Guillermo, the security guard on 24-hour duty at the rice mill, narrated that he heard people quarreling outside and, from a distance of about fifteen meters from the gate, saw the victim saying "Adda tamak, adda tamak," meaning "I am injured, I am injured." He initially testified that it was at that precise moment that he saw Arellano entering the Victory Rice Mill, although he later changed his testimony and stated that around five minutes had elapsed after Arellano had entered the gate when he heard someone shouting outside.

The trial court found Arellano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, ruling that the crime was attended with treachery because the victim never knew that he would be attacked by the accused, and the accused, coming from behind, suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed the victim without any warning or giving him a chance to defend himself. The trial court ruled out the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation as there was no proof that the incident was planned, and neither was motive for the killing established.

• Speculation on Witness Credibility: Appellant argued that the decision was purely based on the speculation that defense witness Mario Guillermo must have lied.
• Ignored Testimony: Appellant argued that the decision overlooked, if not totally ignored, the testimony of defense witness Romeo Tindenilla.
• Reasonable Doubt: Appellant argued that there was more than enough doubt as to his guilt.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Roberto Morales and Antonio Cordova were not free from doubt, stressing that they had been drinking beer for two and a half hours and, therefore, their observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken.
• Credibility of Defense Witness: Appellant insisted that Guillermo was a credible witness and that the trial court should have given more weight to his testimony.

• Treachery Not Established: The Solicitor General recommended that accused-appellant should be convicted of homicide, not murder, as the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been established, pointing out that "appellants decision to stab the victim was done on an impulse when he saw Tindenilla knocked down unconscious" and that "appellant was probably trying to retaliate for the serious harm done to Tindenilla or he could be trying to protect Tindenilla from further injury."

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies and in rejecting the defense of alibi.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing, thereby making the crime murder rather than homicide.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's findings on the issue of credibility were upheld, there being no justification to depart from them. The prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the perpetrator, and their credibility remained untarnished absent proof of intoxication debilitating their senses or any ill-motive on their part.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established because the prosecution failed to prove the subjective element—that the accused deliberately and consciously adopted the means of attack. The killing was done at the spur of the moment when the accused saw Tindenilla fallen, and a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. The crime committed is homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court applied the settled rule that the opinion of the trial court as to which version of the commission of the crime should be believed is entitled to great respect, since the trial judge who heard the witnesses testify and had the occasion to observe their demeanor on the stand was in a vantage position to determine who of the witnesses deserve credence. The Court found that appellant failed to show that intoxication had so debilitated the senses of the prosecution witnesses to the point of negating their claim of having seen Andres's attacker. There being no showing of improper motive on the part of Roberto and Antonio for identifying the accused as the perpetrator, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. Both prosecution witnesses clearly identified accused-appellant as the person who stabbed the victim, and both were categorical in their declaration. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over alibi and denial, which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The Court also found that Guillermo's testimony, even if given full weight and credit, was consistent with the prosecution's narration that after stabbing Ventura, Arellano escaped into the rice mill. Tindenilla's testimony that Arellano had already gone to the rice mill was of no moment, as Tindenilla was already unconscious at the time Ventura was stabbed, and considering the short distance between the rice mill and the sari-sari store, Arellano could have easily shuttled between the two places.

• Treachery: The Court cited the two conditions for the appreciation of treachery: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method, or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. While the first condition was satisfied—the victim, engaged in a fight with another person, least expected the assault upon his person as his attention was focused on the fallen Tindenilla—the subjective element of treachery was not established by the prosecution. For treachery to be appreciated, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. By the facts established, accused-appellant could not have committed the crime without the risk that he could be physically harmed as a consequence thereof, as the victim was not alone and the probability of his co-workers and drinking buddies pouncing upon accused-appellant was not remote. Neither was there proof that accused-appellant made some preparations to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the execution of the crime. What appears on record is that accused-appellant, upon seeing Tindenilla fallen, decided at the spur of the moment to act impulsively. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. In the absence of any qualifying circumstance, the crime committed is homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. Inasmuch as no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should serve the penalty of seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum penalty.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery requires two concurring conditions: (1) the means, method, and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method, or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. The subjective element—the deliberate choice of the method of assault with the special view of accomplishing the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made—must be proven by the prosecution. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.

• Alibi — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime. Positive identification, where categorical and consistent without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial.

• Presumption of Witness Credibility — Where there is no showing of improper motive on the part of witnesses for testifying against the accused, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

• Loss of Earning Capacity — The amount of loss of earning capacity is based mainly on two factors: (1) the number of years of which the damages shall be computed; and (2) the rate at which the losses sustained by the respondent should be fixed. The number of years is computed using the formula based on the American Expectancy Table of Mortality: 2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death] = life expectancy in terms of years. The rate of loss of earnings should be based on net earnings, with one half of the gross earnings considered as necessary living expenses.

• "The conditions set by law for the appreciation of treachery do not concur. These conditions are: (1) the means, method and form of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) such means, method or form of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused." — This passage states the canonical two-part test for treachery, which is the controlling doctrine in this case and frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "However, the subjective element of treachery, i.e., the deliberate choice of the method of assault with the special view of accomplishing the act without risk to the assailant from any defense that the party assailed might have made, was not established by the prosecution." — This passage identifies the missing element that led to the downgrade from murder to homicide, articulating the requirement that the prosecution must prove the accused consciously adopted the mode of attack.

• "What appears on record is that accused-appellant, upon seeing Tindenilla fallen, decided at the spur of the moment to act impulsively. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the downgrade of the crime, establishing that impulsive killings cannot be qualified by treachery.

• People vs. Sumalpong, 348 Phil. 501 (1998) — Cited as controlling authority for the definition and elements of treachery, specifically the two conditions required for its appreciation.
• People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360 (1998) — Cited for the rule that for treachery to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself.
• People vs. Salvador, 344 Phil. 580 (1997) — Cited for the proposition that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous.
• People vs. Paredes, 332 Phil. 633 (1996) — Cited for the rule that the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect.
• People vs. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the credibility of witnesses could have been adversely affected had there been proof as to how drunk they were.
• People vs. Hernandez, 304 SCRA 186 (1999) and People vs. Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32 (1991) — Cited for the presumption that witnesses without improper motive are entitled to full faith and credit.
• People vs. Amania, 318 Phil. 579 (1995) — Cited for the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial.
• People vs. Caraig, 202 SCRA 357 (1991) — Cited for the rule that alibi is the weakest of all defenses.
• Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 31 SCRA 511 (1970) — Cited as controlling authority for the computation of loss of earning capacity based on net earnings.
• People vs. Gutierrez, Jr., 302 SCRA 643 (1999) — Cited for the rule that failure to expressly claim loss of earning capacity does not prevent recovery of damages when there is sufficient basis on record.
• People vs. Daniel, 136 SCRA 92 (1985) — Cited for the two factors in computing loss of earning capacity.
• People vs. Apolinar Dando, G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000 — Cited for the rule that civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically granted to the heirs of the victim without need of any evidence other than the fact of the commission of the crime.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder, under which the appellant was originally charged and convicted by the trial court.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing homicide, under which the appellant was ultimately convicted after the Supreme Court found that treachery was not established.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — The provision governing the imposition of penalties, applied to determine that the penalty for homicide should be imposed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
• Article 2206, Civil Code — The provision making the defendant liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, with the indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the latter; applied to award damages for the victim's loss of earning capacity.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.