People of the Philippines vs. Edgardo Herrera

Self-defense cannot prosper where the accused admits the killing but fails to prove unlawful aggression and the other requisites by clear and convincing evidence. Treachery qualifies a killing as Murder where the victim is shot from behind without warning while defenseless. The death of an unintended victim hit by a stray bullet is governed by Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and remains Homicide, not Murder qualified by treachery or a complex crime under Article 48, where the accused fired several shots from a single-action revolver. The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position is not appreciated absent proof that the accused abused his office and absent its allegation in the information when it would raise the penalty to death.

Edgardo Herrera was a police officer and the kumpadre of Enrique Ganan, being the godfather of one of Ganan’s children. The charges arose under the Revised Penal Code, with Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and Homicide under Article 249. The trial court imposed the death penalty for Murder, which brought the case before the Supreme Court on automatic review.

On May 29, 1996, at around 6:30 p.m., Enrique Ganan was seated on a steel chair at his home at 2218 Cinco de Junio Street, Pasay City, eating fishballs and cuddling his youngest child while conversing with Ma. Rizza Aguilar and his brother Edwin. His wife, Mariel, was a few meters away, and neighbor Corazon Cajipo was chatting with a friend about ten meters away. Edgardo Herrera, a police officer and Ganan’s kumpadre, approached Ganan from behind, placed his left hand on Ganan’s right shoulder, asked “Saan si Pareng Yayi,” and fired a .38 caliber revolver at close range, hitting Ganan on the right side of his neck near his head. Although wounded, Ganan passed his child to his brother and tried to crawl to safety; Herrera pursued him and fired more shots. After the sixth shot, Herrera casually walked away. Corazon Cajipo was hit in the temple by a slug and lay fatally wounded. Ganan was brought to Manila Sanitarium Hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival; the bodies were brought to Veronica Memorial Chapel for autopsy by Dr. Ludovico J. Lagat, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI.

For Enrique Ganan’s death, Herrera was charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 96-9225. The Information alleged that on May 29, 1996, in Pasay City, Herrera, with intent to kill and qualified with treachery, shot Enrique Ganan y Dura with a .38 caliber revolver on the vital parts of his body, causing instantaneous death. For Corazon Cajipo’s death, Herrera was charged with Homicide in Criminal Case No. 96-9226, the Information alleging that on the same date and place, with deliberate intent to kill, he shot Enrique Gana y Dura with a .38 caliber revolver and as a consequence hit Corazon Cajipo y Fulgencio, causing a mortal wound and instantaneous death. On November 7, 1996, Herrera pleaded “Not Guilty” to both charges. The cases were consolidated and tried jointly.

According to the prosecution, Herrera emerged from Propetario Street behind Ganan, positioned himself at Ganan’s right side, placed his left hand on Ganan’s right shoulder, and uttered “Saan si Pareng Yayi” while pointing a gun at Ganan. He immediately fired at close range, hitting Ganan on the right side of his neck near his head. After the first shot, Ganan stood and passed the child he was cuddling to his brother; Herrera shot him again. Ma. Rizza Aguilar took her daughter and Ganan’s eldest daughter and ran for safety, while Ma. Elena Sobrevilla took another child. After the second shot, Ganan was sprawled on the ground but still tried to escape by crawling toward his house; Herrera pursued him and fired several more shots, hitting him in different parts of the body. After the sixth shot, Herrera walked away. Sobrevilla heard that a stray bullet had hit somebody and found Cajipo lying on the ground with the left side of her head drenched in blood. Ganan was brought to Manila Sanitarium Hospital but pronounced dead on arrival.

Herrera admitted killing Ganan but claimed self-defense. He testified that two days before the incident, on May 27, 1996, at about 5:30 p.m., Ganan and one Tito invited him to the birthday celebration of Rene Carrasco alias Tokwa at Ganan’s house. He greeted the celebrant and shook hands with Ganan, his kumpadre and the godfather of one of Ganan’s children. He drank beer sparingly because he was recuperating from injuries from a car collision with a jeep. After consuming a second bottle, he stood to leave but passed out. He was brought home by Edmund Del Mundo and a certain Bong, where he regained consciousness. Suspecting his drink had been drugged, he induced himself to vomit, then lost consciousness again and awoke at around 10:00 a.m. the next morning. His wife told him that the two men who brought him home had left his service firearm, which upon examination had only one bullet left. Gigi Cajipo, mother of Corazon, later told him that when he passed out, Ganan and others fired his handgun and made fun of him by kicking him and urinating on him. Skeptical, Herrera decided to confront Ganan. He instructed a boy named Gardo to check if Ganan was home; upon being told Ganan was there, Herrera reloaded his revolver and walked to Ganan’s place. He found Ganan sitting on a white chair talking to several people. Herrera greeted him and asked what really happened during the birthday celebration. According to Herrera, Ganan did not answer but grabbed the muzzle of his gun, which was tucked in his waist; Herrera pulled it out and fired twice, aiming at Ganan’s hand. Ganan then stood and tried to reach for the gun, and Herrera raised his hand. Someone pushed Ganan from behind, causing Ganan to pull Herrera’s right hand downward; Ganan fell on his knees, still holding Herrera’s hand, and a gunshot came from the direction Herrera was facing. Herrera looked but saw nobody. He fired another shot at Ganan’s arm to make him let go. He heard another shot from the same direction. After freeing his hand, he raised his gun and saw Ganan pull up his shirt and try to pull a gun tucked in his waist. Herrera aimed at Ganan’s hand and fired a fourth shot, hitting Ganan in the head when Ganan stooped. He left the scene because someone was shooting at him.

The trial court convicted Herrera in both cases. On review, the Supreme Court found Herrera’s self-defense narration incredible, citing contradictions in his account of how he drew his gun, the improbability of his version, the absence of evidence of the alleged assailant or of the victim’s gun, the nature and number of the gunshot wounds—six wounds on the head, shoulder, right arm, right hand, and right thigh, with the fatal head wound inflicted not more than half an inch from behind at point-blank range—his failure to corroborate his testimony, and his flight to Batangas where he hid for one and a half months. The prosecution presented three eyewitnesses—Ma. Rizza Aguilar, Ma. Elena Sobrevilla, and Mariel Ganan—who positively identified Herrera, declared that Ganan was shot on his right from behind, and remained steadfast on cross-examination; Herrera could not impute any ill motive against them.

• Self-Defense: Petitioner admitted killing Enrique Ganan but asserted that he acted only in self-defense. He claimed unlawful aggression because the victim allegedly tried to grab his gun when he asked what really happened during the birthday of Rene Carrasco; reasonable necessity because he had to use the means most immediate to resist the attack and shot the victim’s hand; and lack of sufficient provocation because he merely asked what transpired during the birthday celebration where he lost consciousness and whether the victim and others kicked and urinated on him.
• Treachery: Petitioner argued that, assuming guilt, the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Abuse of Public Position: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that he took advantage of his position as a police officer.

• Reduction of Murder Penalty: The Solicitor General recommended that the death penalty in Criminal Case No. 96-9225 be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
• Homicide Penalty: The Solicitor General recommended that the maximum penalty in Criminal Case No. 96-9226 be within the medium period of reclusion temporal.
• Upgrade of Corazon Cajipo’s Killing: The Solicitor General contended that there is jurisprudential support to upgrade the killing of Corazon Cajipo to Murder on account of alevosia although she was not the intended victim, citing People vs. Basao. He argued that assuming the real object of the assault was Enrique Ganan and that Cajipo’s death was purely accidental, it does not modify the nature of the crime nor lessen the accused’s criminal liability because when the accused fired his gun, the attack was made in continuous aggression that cannot be broken up into separate, distinct, and independent assaults.

• Self-Defense: Whether the trial court erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and Homicide and in disregarding his testimony that he acted only in self-defense.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
• Abuse of Public Position: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance that accused-appellant took advantage of his position as a police officer.
• Corazon Cajipo’s Killing and Complex Crime: Whether the killing of Corazon Cajipo should be qualified by treachery or treated as a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and whether the penalty imposed for Homicide was proper.
• Civil Liability and Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, actual damages, and exemplary damages were proper.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established; accused admitted the killing but failed to prove unlawful aggression and the other requisites, and his uncorroborated testimony was incredible.
• Treachery: No error. Treachery qualified the killing of Enrique Ganan as Murder; the victim was shot from behind without warning while seated and defenseless.
• Abuse of Public Position: No. The aggravating circumstance was improperly appreciated; there was no proof that accused abused his office, and the information did not allege it.
• Corazon Cajipo’s Killing and Complex Crime: The killing of Corazon Cajipo remains Homicide, not Murder, and the case is not a complex crime under Article 48; accused is liable under Article 4 for the stray-bullet death, but treachery cannot qualify a killing of a victim who was merely in the wrong place.
• Civil Liability and Damages: Civil indemnity and moral damages of P50,000 each are proper; actual damages of P25,000 for Corazon’s funeral and burial are sustained; exemplary damages are deleted for lack of aggravating circumstance.

• Self-Defense: Self-defense is a justifying circumstance that shifts the burden to the accused to prove by clear, sufficient, and convincing evidence (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The most decisive requisite is unlawful aggression. Herrera admitted killing Ganan, so the burden shifted to him. His account was incredible: he contradicted himself on whether Ganan grabbed the gun or he pulled it out; it was inconceivable that he could aim at Ganan’s hand while they were supposedly grappling for the gun; he claimed two gunshots from an unseen assailant but could not identify the gunman and no slugs or spent shells from the alleged assailant’s firearm were recovered; no evidence showed that Ganan’s alleged gun existed; six gunshot wounds, including a fatal head wound inflicted not more than half an inch from behind at point-blank range, negated self-defense; his calm demeanor and failure to corroborate his testimony further weakened his claim. Even if his version were true, Ganan’s attempt to grab the gun did not amount to unlawful aggression because Herrera already had the firearm in hand, was taller, and was a trained policeman, while Ganan was seated; there was no imminent or real threat to Herrera’s life or limb. Preparatory acts—loading the revolver and having Gardo watch Ganan’s house—and flight to Batangas for one and a half months indicated guilt. The prosecution evidence was overwhelming: three eyewitnesses positively identified Herrera and remained steadfast, and physical evidence showed multiple wounds and intent to kill.

• Treachery: Article 248 defines Murder as the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed therein, including treachery. Treachery under Article 14, paragraph 16 requires (1) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Ganan was at home eating fishballs, cuddling his youngest daughter, and conversing with visitors when Herrera shot him in the head from behind. As in People vs. Padilla, treachery is evident when the accused suddenly positions himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, points his gun at him, and without warning delivers the fatal shots. Ganan was unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger behind him; he could not have defended himself, taken flight, or avoided the assault. Treachery thus qualified the killing to Murder.

• Abuse of Public Position: To appreciate the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1, the public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence is whether the accused abused his office to commit the crime. There was no showing that Herrera took advantage of being a policeman to shoot Ganan or that he used his influence, prestige, or ascendancy in killing the victim. He could have shot Ganan even without being a policeman. The mere fact that he was a policeman and used a government-issued .38 caliber revolver was insufficient to establish that he misused his public position. Moreover, the information failed to allege this aggravating circumstance; a generic aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information if its appreciation would raise the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death. With no modifying circumstances, the proper penalty for the killing of Enrique Ganan was reclusion perpetua under Article 63, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 248, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

• Corazon Cajipo’s Killing and Complex Crime: The Solicitor General argued for upgrading Corazon Cajipo’s killing to Murder on account of alevosia and treating the act as continuous aggression. The Court agreed only insofar as it affirmed Herrera’s culpability for Cajipo’s death, but held that treachery cannot qualify a killing where the victim was hurt solely because she was in the wrong place at the wrong time. The case does not fall under Article 48’s complex crime. In People vs. Basao, the victims were on a speeding motorcycle when they were fatally strafed with a volley of automatic gunfire from an M-16 Armalite rifle; here, Herrera used a single-action .38 caliber Smith & Wesson revolver and fired several times. Under People vs. Bermas, People vs. Vargas, Jr., People vs. Mones, and People vs. Desierto, successive shots causing several deaths produce distinct crimes; it is the number of bullets that actually produced the deaths, not the act of pressing the trigger, that determines liability. Thus, no complex crime was committed. Nonetheless, Herrera is liable for Cajipo’s death under Article 4: criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended; one who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale is el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado. Herrera performed voluntary acts with the purpose to kill; the mistake in the identity of the victim did not exculpate him. The killing of Corazon Cajipo remained Homicide. For Homicide, the penalty is reclusion temporal. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, Article 249 in conjunction with Article 64(1) prescribed reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty was ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

• Civil Liability and Damages: The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of each victim was proper without any need of proof other than the death of the victim. The award of moral damages of P50,000.00 to each victim’s heirs was likewise proper under controlling case law, considering the pain and anguish brought about by the deaths. The award of P25,000.00 as actual damages for the funeral and burial expenses incurred by the heirs of Corazon Cajipo, being amply supported by documentary evidence, was sustained. With the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the award of exemplary damages was deleted.

• Self-defense as a justifying circumstance — Self-defense requires (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused who invokes self-defense admits authorship of the killing and bears the burden of proving the elements by clear, sufficient, and convincing evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to reject Herrera’s claim because he failed to prove unlawful aggression and his testimony was incredible and uncorroborated.
• Unlawful aggression as the most decisive requisite of self-defense — Among the requisites of self-defense, unlawful aggression is the most decisive because the theory of self-defense is based on the necessity of preventing or repelling an attack. Absent evidence of a prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, self-defense cannot prosper. The Court found no unlawful aggression because Herrera already had his gun in hand, was taller and a trained policeman, while Ganan was seated and in a disadvantageous position.
• Treachery (alevosia) — There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The two conditions are (1) that at the time of the attack the victim was not in a position to defend himself and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed. The essence is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation. The Court applied this to qualify Enrique Ganan’s killing as Murder.
• Abuse of public position as an aggravating circumstance — To appreciate taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1, the public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means to realize his purpose. The inquiry is whether the accused abused his office to commit the crime. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. The Court held that the mere fact Herrera was a policeman and used a government-issued revolver was insufficient, and the circumstance was not alleged in the information.
• Complex crimes under Article 48 — A complex crime exists when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The penalty for the most serious crime is imposed in its maximum period. The Court held that the case did not fall under Article 48 because Herrera fired several shots from a single-action revolver, producing distinct crimes rather than a single act constituting multiple felonies.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code, and mistake in the identity of the victim — Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally or logically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. The rationale is el que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado. The Court applied this to hold Herrera liable for Corazon Cajipo’s death even though she was not the intended victim.
• Flight as implied admission of guilt — Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. The Court considered Herrera’s flight to Batangas, where he hid for one and a half months, as an implied admission of guilt.
• Credibility of testimonial evidence — Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must foremost be credible in itself. The test is whether the testimony conforms to common knowledge and is consistent with the experience of mankind. The Court applied this to discredit Herrera’s self-defense narration.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — The Indeterminate Sentence Law requires the imposition of a minimum and maximum penalty. The Court applied it to the Homicide conviction, fixing the minimum at ten (10) years of prision mayor and the maximum at seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal.
• Civil indemnity and moral damages — Civil indemnity for death may be awarded without proof other than the fact of death. Moral damages may be awarded to the victim’s heirs considering the pain and anguish caused by the death. The Court sustained the awards of P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral damages for each victim’s heirs.

• “There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.” — This passage defines alevosia under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code and supports the qualification of Enrique Ganan’s killing as Murder.
• “The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.” — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of treachery, applied to the sudden shooting of Ganan from behind while he was seated and defenseless.
• “It cannot be said that a crime against a victim was qualified by treachery where he was hurt solely because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time.” — This passage is the key ruling rejecting the upgrade of Corazon Cajipo’s killing to Murder qualified by treachery.
• “The fact that accused killed a person other than their intended victim is of no moment. According to Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended.” — This passage states the basis for holding Herrera criminally liable for Corazon Cajipo’s death despite the mistake in the identity of the victim.

• People vs. Cabansay, G.R. No. 138646, March 6, 2001 — Reiterated the rule that self-defense shifts the prosecutorial burden to the accused, who must prove the elements of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of means, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• People vs. Gadia, G.R. No. 132384, September 21, 2001 — Held that where an accused invokes self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life, and that unlawful aggression is the most decisive requisite.
• People vs. Riduca, 55 SCRA 190 (1974) — Rejected a claim of self-defense where there was no imminent or real threat to the accused’s life or limb, even if the victim allegedly took hold of the weapon.
• People vs. Padilla, G.R. Nos. 138472-73, August 9, 2001 — Cited for the rule that treachery is evident when the accused suddenly positions himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, points a gun, and without warning delivers fatal shots.
• People vs. Basao, 310 SCRA 743 (1999) — Cited by the Solicitor General to argue for upgrading the unintended victim’s killing to Murder; distinguished because the victims there were strafed with a volley of automatic gunfire from an M-16 Armalite rifle, unlike the single-action revolver used here.
• People vs. Bermas, 309 SCRA 741 (1999) — Reiterated that successive shots causing several deaths produce distinct and separate crimes, not a complex crime under Article 48.
• People vs. Vargas, Jr., 184 SCRA 254 (1990) — Cited in Bermas for the rule that several persons killed or injured by successive shots result in separate crimes.
• People vs. Desierto, C.A. 45 O.G. 4542 — Held that with a submachine gun, it is not the act of pressing the trigger but the number of bullets that actually produced the deaths which determines criminal liability.
• People vs. Hilario, G.R. No. 128083, March 16, 2001 — Held that the fact the accused killed a person other than the intended victim is of no moment under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
• People vs. Guillermo, 302 SCRA 507 (1999) — Cited for the rule that a crime against a victim cannot be qualified by treachery where the victim was hurt solely because he was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
• People vs. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767 (2000) — Held that to appreciate abuse of public position, the public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy of his office to commit the crime.
• People vs. Villa, Jr., 331 SCRA 142 (2000) — Held that a generic aggravating circumstance must be alleged in the information if its appreciation would raise the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.
• People vs. Maneng, G.R. No. 123147, October 13, 2000 — Cited for the deletion of exemplary damages in the absence of any aggravating circumstance.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Provides the justifying circumstance of self-defense. The Court applied it by requiring Herrera to prove the elements of self-defense after admitting the killing.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery or alevosia. The Court applied it to qualify the killing of Enrique Ganan as Murder.
• Article 14, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position. The Court held it was not proven and was not alleged in the information.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes Murder. The Court held the killing of Enrique Ganan was Murder qualified by treachery, but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Homicide. The Court applied it to the killing of Corazon Cajipo.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Defines complex crimes. The Court held the case did not fall under either instance of a complex crime.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act be different from that which is intended. The Court applied it to hold Herrera liable for Corazon Cajipo’s death.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Governs the penalty when there are no modifying circumstances. The Court applied it to impose reclusion perpetua for Murder.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the penalty in its medium period when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. The Court applied it to the Homicide penalty.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires the imposition of a minimum and maximum penalty. The Court applied it to fix the Homicide penalty at ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur. Buena, J., was on official leave.