People of the Philippines vs. Edgar S. Go

Courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The failure to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party in a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals does not ipso facto deprive the CA of jurisdiction, as the remedy is to implead the non-party rather than dismiss the action.

The case involves the criminal prosecution arising from the sinking of M/V Princess of the Stars, a passenger cargo vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI), during Typhoon Frank on June 21, 2008. Respondent Edgar S. Go was SLI's First Vice-President for Administration and team leader of the Crisis Management Committee. The Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and heirs of passengers instituted a complaint for reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code before the Department of Justice against SLI, its officers, and the vessel's captain. The DOJ conducted a preliminary investigation through a panel of four prosecutors, which conducted clarificatory hearings on March 13 and 20, 2009.

On June 20, 2008, M/V Princess of the Stars, a passenger cargo vessel owned and operated by Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (SLI), was expected to depart at 8:00 p.m. from the Port of Manila for Cebu City. At 11:00 a.m. that day, PAGASA issued Severe Weather Bulletin No. 7, raising Storm Warning Signal No. 1 over Romblon, Marinduque, Southern Quezon, Cebu, Bohol, Panay Island, and Surigao del Norte. At 3:00 p.m., Captain Benjamin Eugenio, SLI Manila Port Captain, met with Captain Florencio Marimon, Master of the vessel, for a pre-departure conference to discuss SWB No. 7, and they decided to await the next PAGASA forecast expected at around 5:00 p.m.

At 4:45 p.m., PAGASA issued SWB No. 8, hoisting SWS No. 3 over Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Burias Islands, Sorsogon, Catanduanes, Masbate, and the Samar provinces, and SWS No. 2 over Quezon, Marinduque, Romblon, Northern Cebu, and Southern Leyte. Prior to departure, PCG Boarding Officer PO1 Felix Sardan boarded the vessel to inspect its documents and safety equipment. Finding the vessel's documents in order, PO1 Sardan informed Captain Marimon that SWS No. 3 was hoisted over Masbate, which was along the vessel's regular route. Captain Marimon showed PO1 Sardan a new voyage plan, explaining he would navigate the route west of Tablas below Panay Island, which would not be affected by SWS No. 3. PO1 Sardan relayed the alternate route to PCG Station Commander Erwin Balagtas, who approved it with the order that should SWS No. 3 affect the alternate route, the vessel should take shelter or return to port.

After obtaining clearance from the PCG, Stars departed at 8:04 p.m. for its regular Friday voyage to Cebu under Voyage No. 392 along its regular route, carrying 709 passengers, 29 contractors, and 111 crew members, totaling 849 persons. At around 11:20 p.m., when Stars was in the vicinity of Cape Santiago, Manila radio operator Edgar Gorillo received PAGASA's SWB No. 9, which forecasted that Typhoon Frank was moving northwest away from the vessel's route. At 5:00 a.m. of June 21, 2008, Gorillo and Captain Eugenio received SWB No. 10 indicating that Typhoon Frank had been moving westward away from its original northwest movement. At 5:30 a.m., respondent arrived at SLI's Manila Office and checked on the radio room, where Gorillo informed him that Captain Marimon assessed the sea condition as "slight."

At 7:05 a.m., Captain Marimon sent SLI Manila a telegram stating that he was steering Stars away from its regular course, moving towards the south of Tablas to take shelter. At 8:30 a.m., the vessel was within the vicinity of Aklan Point where it was caught in the center of Typhoon Frank. At 9:00 a.m., communications with the vessel were cut off. At 11:30 a.m., Captain Nestor Ponteres, Cebu port captain, received a text message from his nephew Jay Franco Labiada, second mate in Stars, informing him that the vessel was "listing to port 25-30 degrees." Captain Marimon informed Captain Ponteres that the vessel had listed and he could no longer steer it, and later declared that he had given the order to abandon ship. Stars eventually capsized and sank in the Sibuyan Sea at around 12:30 p.m. of June 21, 2008. Of the 849 persons on board, only 32 survived, 227 died, and 592 were reported missing.

The Board of Marine Inquiry, in an Investigation Report dated August 18, 2008, concluded that the immediate cause of the capsizing was the failure of the Master to exercise extraordinary diligence and good seamanship, and that the proximate cause was the failure of SLI management to effectively implement its Safety Quality Management Manual. The BMI also found that the First Vice-President failed to exercise extraordinary diligence to apprise the Master of the potential danger of Typhoon Frank and to discourage the Master from sailing despite the severe weather condition. The DOJ Panel found probable cause to indict respondent, reasoning that as First Vice-President for Administration and team leader of the Crisis Management Committee, he was involved in making decisions on whether a vessel should be allowed to sail, and that he failed to exercise extraordinary care and precaution considering the severe weather conditions.

• Failure to Implead Indispensable Party: The People argued that the CA erred in taking cognizance of respondent's petition for certiorari because respondent failed to implead the People of the Philippines, which is an indispensable party in criminal prosecutions.
• Non-Interference Doctrine: The People argued that the determination of the existence of probable cause for indictment is left to the sound discretion of the prosecutor and may not be interfered with by courts absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, and that the CA unmistakably substituted its own judgment for that of the prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice.
• Sufficiency of Probable Cause: The People argued that the DOJ Panel conducted the requisite preliminary investigation, including clarificatory hearings on March 13 and 20, 2009, and that respondent was remiss in his responsibilities as an officer of SLI, having failed to exercise extraordinary care and precaution in securing the safety of the passengers.

• Matter for Trial: The People argued that the determination and appreciation of respondent's culpability for the crime charged are better left to the trial court's assessment, as the issue involves only the existence of probable cause to indict, not his conviction.

• Authority and Duty of Respondent: Petitioners in G.R. No. 210854 contended that respondent possesses the authority and duty to control and decide matters pertaining to the vessel's navigation at sea, as the Port Captains and Safety Officers of SLI directly report to him.

• Failure to Order Shelter: Petitioners argued that it was within respondent's power to order the Master to drop anchor or seek shelter upon learning that the vessel was already in the path of Typhoon Frank, and that despite his knowledge, he did not instruct the Master to take shelter.
• Active Management and Control: Petitioners argued that respondent's liability is premised not on his ownership of SLI but on his active management and control over SLI's vessels and employees.
• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the DOJ Panel did not commit grave abuse of discretion because it did not just rely on affidavits but also conducted clarificatory hearings, and that respondent's defenses are better threshed out in a full-blown trial.

• Captain's Responsibility: Respondent countered that in a reckless imprudence case involving a common carrier, it is the captain who should be subjected to criminal culpability, as he is in the best position to determine the best measures for the protection of the passengers, crew, vessel, and cargo.
• Civil Nature of Shipowner's Liability: Respondent argued that the liability of the common carrier or shipowner is merely civil in nature even if the accident results in death or injury of passengers, and even when the negligence of the shipowner concurs with the negligence of the captain.
• Lack of Authority: Respondent argued that his duties as Vice-President for Administration for Land-Based Personnel and Head of the Crisis Management Committee did not include the authority to control and supervise matters pertaining to vessel movement and navigation, and that he did not order the Master to find a safe place and drop anchor because he had no authority to do so.
• Not on Board: Respondent argued that no liability for criminal negligence may be imputed against him because he was never on board the vessel when the tragic accident occurred.

• Jurisdiction over Petition for Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in taking cognizance of respondent's petition for certiorari and granting the same, despite the failure to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party in the proceedings below.
• Probable Cause for Indictment: Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that there is no probable cause to indict respondent Edgar S. Go, and consequently in dismissing Criminal Case No. 09-269169 as against him.

• Jurisdiction over Petition for Certiorari: No. The failure to implead the People of the Philippines does not ipso facto deprive the CA of jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari. While the petition was defective for failing to implead the People as an indispensable party, the remedy is to implead the non-party, not to dismiss the action, and the People, through the OSG, was given the opportunity to refute respondent's arguments but refused.
• Probable Cause for Indictment: Yes, the CA committed reversible error. No grave abuse of discretion attended the DOJ Panel's Resolution finding probable cause to indict respondent for reckless imprudence. The DOJ Panel's Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC has been committed, and the CA improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the prosecutor.

• Jurisdiction over Petition for Certiorari: Section 5, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor, making the People of the Philippines the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution. However, the Court has repeatedly declared that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for dismissal of an action; the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. In this case, the CA required then DOJ Secretary Leila De Lima to comment on the petition, and the OSG declared that it was merely a nominal party and refused to appear. Thus, it would be the height of injustice to sustain the People's claim of denial of due process and to dismiss the petition for certiorari for a procedural defect.

• Probable Cause for Indictment: The policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations leaves to the investigating prosecutor ample latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. Courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings on probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. The DOJ Panel explicitly identified the decisions respondent could have taken to prevent Stars from sailing, found that respondent's acts were voluntary though not malicious, noted that only 32 persons survived out of 849 on board, and concluded that respondent's act of allowing the vessel to sail despite the severe weather condition demonstrated inexcusable lack of precaution. The DOJ Panel did not just rely on affidavits but also conducted clarificatory hearings on March 13 and 20, 2009. Respondent's petition for certiorari before the CA merely identified alleged errors of fact and law, not acts constituting grave abuse of discretion. The Court's ruling is not equivalent to a determination of respondent's guilt, as the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.

• Non-Interference in Preliminary Investigations — Courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable cause for the purpose of filing an information in the absence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to determine whether facts and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime. To justify judicial intrusion, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion, exercising his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

• Probable Cause — Probable cause refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it require absolute certainty. A finding of probable cause is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged, and merely binds over the suspect to stand trial; it is not a pronouncement of guilt.

• Elements of Reckless Imprudence — The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

• Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Liability of Common Carriers — A civil action based on the contractual liability of a common carrier under Articles 1755, 1756, and 1759 of the Civil Code is distinct from an action based on criminal negligence under Article 365 of the RPC. The obligation of the common carrier to indemnify its passenger or his heirs for injury or death arises from the contract of carriage, while criminal negligence punishes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. A civil action against a shipowner for breach of contract of carriage does not preclude criminal prosecution against its employees whose negligence resulted in the death of or injuries to passengers.

• "The necessary component of the Executive's power to faithfully execute the laws of the land is the State's self-preserving power to prosecute violators of its penal laws. This responsibility is primarily lodged with the DOJ, as the principal law agency of the government. The prosecutor has the discretionary authority to determine whether facts and circumstances exist meriting reasonable belief that a person has committed a crime." — This passage from PCGG Chairman Elma vs. Jacobi articulates the foundational rationale for the non-interference doctrine in prosecutorial determinations of probable cause.

• "To justify judicial intrusion into what is fundamentally the domain of the Executive, the petitioner must clearly show that the prosecutor gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in making his determination and in arriving at the conclusion he reached. This requires the petitioner to establish that the prosecutor exercised his power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility; and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, before judicial relief from a discretionary prosecutorial action may be obtained." — This passage from Elma vs. Jacobi sets the high threshold for judicial interference with prosecutorial discretion, which respondent failed to meet.

• "The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place." — This passage from Senit vs. People enumerates the elements of reckless imprudence, which the DOJ Panel's Resolution was found to support prima facie.

• Commissioner Domingo vs. Scheer, 466 Phil. 235 (2004) — Cited for the principle that the failure to implead an indispensable party is not a ground for dismissal of an action, and that the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable.
• First Women's Credit Corporation vs. Hon. Perez, 524 Phil. 305 (2006) — Cited for the policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations, leaving to the investigating prosecutor ample latitude of discretion in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause.
• PCGG Chairman Elma vs. Jacobi, 689 Phil. 307 (2012) — Cited for the rationale of the non-interference policy and the high threshold for judicial intrusion into prosecutorial discretion, requiring a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
• United Coconut Planters Bank vs. Looyuko, 560 Phil. 581 (2007) — Cited for the rule that courts do not reverse the Secretary of Justice's findings on probable cause except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.
• R.R. Paredes vs. Calilung, 546 Phil. 198 (2007) — Cited for the definition of probable cause as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
• Webb vs. Hon. De Leon, 317 Phil. 758 (1995) — Cited for the proposition that a finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand trial and is not a pronouncement of guilt.
• Senit vs. People, 776 Phil. 372 (2016) — Cited for the enumeration of the elements of reckless imprudence.
• People vs. Buan, 131 Phil. 498 (1968) — Cited for the principle that the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act, and that the law penalizes the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof.
• Candano Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. Sugata-on, 547 Phil. 131 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that the obligation of a common carrier to indemnify its passenger or his heirs for injury or death arises from the contract of carriage.
• Air France vs. Gillego, 653 Phil. 138 (2010) — Cited for the distinction between criminal negligence, where negligence must be established beyond reasonable doubt, and breach of contract, where the action can be prosecuted by proving the existence of the contract and the failure to transport the passenger safely.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing reckless imprudence, under which respondent was charged. The Court found that the DOJ Panel's Resolution supported a prima facie finding that reckless imprudence had been committed.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that all criminal actions are prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. The Court applied this provision in determining that the People of the Philippines is the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution and an indispensable party in criminal cases.
• Article 1755, Civil Code — Provides that a common carrier is bound to carry passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons. The Court distinguished this civil obligation from criminal liability under Article 365 of the RPC.
• Article 1756, Civil Code — Provides that in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. The Court noted this presumption applies to civil actions based on the contract of carriage.
• Article 1759, Civil Code — Provides that a common carrier is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its employees. The Court distinguished this contractual liability from the criminal liability of employees whose negligence resulted in death or injuries.

Peralta (Chairperson), Leonen, Gesmundo, and Hernando, JJ., concurred.