People of the Philippines vs. Edgar Crispin

Where the trial court itself declares the prosecution's eyewitness identification doubtful, and the only other evidence consists of an affidavit of a witness who was never presented for cross-examination and testimony that is merely circumstantial, the accused's guilt is not proven beyond reasonable doubt and an acquittal must follow. An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court.

Edgar Crispin, the victim Miguel Badenas, and prosecution eyewitness Honorio Cabailo were barriomates in Magara, Roxas, Palawan, and Crispin's co-accused included his cousin Felipe Crispin. Five persons were named in a single Information for murder, but only Crispin was arrested, arraigned, and put to trial, the others remaining outside the proceedings. The charge was murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which carried the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the prosecution's case implicated the constitutional guarantees of the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation and the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against the accused.

At about eight o'clock in the evening of May 4, 1994, five men — Felipe Crispin, Edgar Crispin, Edmund Losis, Henry Losis, and Paquito Gomez — converged at the house of Danilo de Asis in Sitio Little Caramay, Barangay Magara, Roxas, Palawan, for a drinking session. Cesar Delima and the victim, Miguel Badenas, joined them at about nine o'clock that evening. Delima left an hour later, claiming he was sleepy, and the others continued drinking until midnight, when de Asis asked them to leave because it was already late. The group had consumed five bottles of beer.

The prosecution's eyewitness, Honorio Cabailo, testified that at the time in question he was active in the campaign for the forthcoming barangay elections and had just left the house of Ramon Balmonte in Sitio Caramay for Sitio Capalad, also in Barrio Magara, to meet fellow election campaigners. Walking toward Sitio Capalad, and from a distance of about five meters, he recognized Edgar Crispin, Edgar's cousin Felipe Crispin, and the victim, all of whom were his barriomates in Magara, Roxas, Palawan. According to Cabailo, Edgar Crispin and Felipe Crispin stabbed Badenas while three other men whom he failed to identify blocked the victim's way to prevent him from escaping. Overcome with fear at what he saw, Cabailo proceeded to Sitio Capalad and did not learn of Badenas's death until three days later, when a relative of the victim told him that Badenas had died of stab wounds.

The body of Miguel Badenas was fished out of the river of Little Caramay and interred immediately and without post-mortem examination, as it was already in a state of decomposition. About a month later, upon the request of Police Officer Joseph Carbonel, Chief of Police of Roxas, Palawan, the body was exhumed and examined on May 28, 1994 by Dr. Leo Salvino. The exhumation report listed nine stab wounds — penetrating the sternal area through the cardiac ventricle, the mid-clavicular area, the mid-axillary area, the paravertebral area, and the entire abdominal cavity — with the probable cause of death stated as cardiac tamponade and massive hemo-pneumothorax. Testifying on the report, Dr. Salvino declared that he found at least nine stab wounds on the deceased's body, eight of which penetrated the body cavities, and opined, based on the sizes of the wounds, that it was likely more than one person using different kinds of sharp bladed instruments had caused the injuries. Danilo de Asis, the owner of the house where the group had spent the night drinking, testified that they left his house at about twelve o'clock in the early morning of May 5, 1994; he went to sleep as soon as they left and learned of Badenas's death only four days later, when the body was fished out of the river.

For his part, accused-appellant Edgar Crispin interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that while he knew his four co-accused, he was not with them on the evening in question, having been at the residence of his brother-in-law, Rogelio Gorada, also in Sitio Little Caramay, Magara, Roxas, Palawan. He and his friend Nolito Bacaltos arrived at Gorada's house at about seven-thirty in the evening of May 4, 1994, shortly after which they began drinking beer; at about eight o'clock they finished drinking and ate supper, then spent the night in Gorada's house and left for their respective homes at around six-thirty the next morning. He claimed no knowledge of what happened to Miguel Badenas in the early morning of May 5, 1994, and came to learn of the latter's death only on May 7, 1994. Nolito Bacaltos corroborated this account; his elder sister, Editha, is married to Teodoro Crispin, an elder brother of accused-appellant, and he testified that they were together on the evening of May 4, 1994 at Gorada's house, spent the night there, and went home at about seven o'clock the following morning. The defense finally presented Ramon Balmonte, the owner of the house where Cabailo was said to have come from on the night he witnessed the killing, who was by then a member of the Sangguniang Barangay of Magara and who said he could not remember whether Cabailo had slept at his house sometime during the first week of May 1994, as he was always out of his house.

The trial court rejected the denial and alibi of accused-appellant and convicted him of murder. While it held the circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery unsubstantiated, it found the killing qualified to murder by abuse of superior strength and ruled out the generic aggravating circumstance of nighttime for lack of evidence that the accused purposely sought it. Significantly, the trial court itself entertained doubt as to Cabailo's identification, observing that the slaying took place at about midnight, that it was not a moonlit night and the only source of light was the stars, and that under the circumstances the likelihood of a wrong identification could not altogether be precluded — so that the defense of alibi might gain some credence. The conviction instead drew on the testimony of Danilo de Asis and on the sworn statement of Cesar Delima, who had been named in the Information as a principal witness but who failed to appear despite two subpoenas, and whose statement recounted the attack with the aid of a flashlight.

• Qualifying Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information: Accused-appellant argued that abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged in the Information, could not qualify the killing to murder but could only be treated as a generic aggravating circumstance; assuming the finding of abuse of superior strength to be correct, he should be convicted only of homicide. He invoked Article III, Section 14(2) of the 1987 Constitution and People vs. Lacao and People vs. Navarro.
• Doubtful Eyewitness Identification: Accused-appellant contested the trial court's reliance on the testimony of Honorio Cabailo, particularly Cabailo's claim that he recognized accused-appellant on a dark, moonless night by mere starlight, and pointed out that even the trial court acknowledged that Cabailo's identification of the perpetrators was likely inaccurate since starlight alone could not have provided sufficient illumination.
• Inadmissibility of Cesar Delima's Sworn Statement: Accused-appellant decried the trial court's reliance on the sworn statement of Cesar Delima, who was named in the Information as a principal witness but did not appear when subpoenaed, thereby depriving the accused of the right to cross-examine him; he further contended that the sworn statement could not have been validly considered because it was never formally offered in evidence by the prosecution.
• Insufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence: Without the affidavit of Cesar Delima, and considering the weakness of Cabailo's testimony, accused-appellant argued that the trial court had insufficient bases to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the murder of Miguel Badenas.

• Reliability of the Eyewitness Identification: The Office of the Solicitor General maintained that it was not impossible for Cabailo to have properly identified the five accused despite the poor illumination, since he saw the incident from a mere five meters away and because he knew these people beforehand.

• Qualifying Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information: Whether abuse of superior strength, not alleged in the Information, may qualify the killing to murder or must be treated only as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Sufficiency of Evidence — Eyewitness Identification: Whether the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt given the trial court's own finding that Honorio Cabailo's identification of the perpetrators was doubtful.
• Admissibility of the Affidavit of Cesar Delima: Whether the sworn statement of Cesar Delima, who never testified despite being subpoenaed, may be considered as evidence against the accused.

• Qualifying Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information: Not reached. The acquittal of accused-appellant rendered it unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error.
• Sufficiency of Evidence — Eyewitness Identification: No. The prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court itself having declared Cabailo's identification doubtful and the testimony of Danilo de Asis being merely circumstantial.
• Admissibility of the Affidavit of Cesar Delima: No. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant testifies, and the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC.

• Qualifying Circumstance Not Alleged in the Information: The Court expressly declined to resolve this assignment of error. Having determined that the evidence was insufficient to sustain any conviction, it held that the acquittal of accused-appellant was apropos and that it was unnecessary to pass upon the first assignment of error.

• Sufficiency of Evidence — Eyewitness Identification: The Court began from the rule that before positive identification may prevail over denial and alibi, the credibility of the eyewitness must first be put beyond question. While trial courts are best equipped to pass upon credibility, having observed the witness firsthand, the Court is inclined to find an identification less believable where the trial court itself expresses doubts on the eyewitness's credibility and looks to other evidence to secure the conviction. The RTC Decision had conceded that the slaying took place at about midnight, that it was not a moonlit night and the only light came from the stars, and that the likelihood of a wrong identification could not altogether be precluded — a concession the Court underscored by quoting the trial judge's own questioning of Cabailo, who confirmed that there was no moonlight. The Court therefore concluded that the trial court's conviction was not based on Cabailo's identification, which it in fact found unsatisfactory, but on the testimony of Danilo de Asis and the affidavit of Cesar Delima. As for de Asis, his testimony proved only that the five accused and the victim left his house together on that night; he plainly professed no knowledge of what took place after they left, and the evidence adduced from him was plainly circumstantial, from which no inference could be drawn as to the probable guilt of accused-appellant. The Court reiterated that conviction should rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense, and that the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Although alibi is an inherently weak defense, it acquires commensurate strength where no positive and proper identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses, the prosecution still bearing the onus probandi in establishing guilt.

• Admissibility of the Affidavit of Cesar Delima: The Court held that the trial court erred in considering Delima's sworn statement on the reasoning that it formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation. An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify on it; being hearsay, it is inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statement is attributed. The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily done away with, and the trial judge's duty to observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by bringing him to the witness stand. That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation did not justify treating it as evidence, because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC; such record must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of it. The prosecution having failed to present Delima as a witness, his sworn statement was patently inadmissible and deserved no consideration at all. With that affidavit excluded, and with the trial court's plain declaration that Cabailo's identification was doubtful, the prosecution had failed to present sufficient evidence to prove accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Hearsay Rule as Applied to Affidavits — An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify on it. Being hearsay, it is inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statement or writing is attributed. The Court applied this rule to reject Cesar Delima's sworn statement, which the trial court had credited notwithstanding Delima's failure to testify despite two subpoenas.
• Right to Confront and Cross-Examine Witnesses — The right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him is a fundamental right of every accused which may not be summarily done away with. A corollary justification is that the trial judge's duty to observe and test the credibility of the affiant can only be met by bringing him to the witness stand. The Court held that the admission of Delima's affidavit violated this guarantee.
• Record of the Preliminary Investigation Is Not Part of the RTC Record — The record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court; it must be introduced as evidence during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of it. The Court held that this rule foreclosed reliance on Delima's affidavit merely because it was part of the preliminary investigation records.
• Credibility of the Eyewitness as a Condition Precedent to Positive Identification — Before the rule that positive identification prevails over mere denial and alibi may apply, it is necessary that the credibility of the eyewitness be first put beyond question. Where the trial court itself expresses doubts on the credibility of the eyewitness and looks to other evidence to secure the conviction, the appellate court is inclined to find the identification by that eyewitness less believable.
• Alibi Acquires Commensurate Strength Absent Positive Identification — Although alibi is an inherently weak defense, it nonetheless acquires commensurate strength where no positive and proper identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, since the prosecution still bears the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused.
• Circumstantial Evidence Insufficient to Support Conviction — Evidence that the accused and the victim left a house together on the night of the killing is plainly circumstantial, and no inference may be drawn from it as to the probable guilt of the accused for the crime charged.
• Conviction Must Rest on the Strength of the Prosecution's Evidence — Conviction should rest on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense; the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Appellate Deference to Trial Court Credibility Findings — Trial courts are the ones best equipped to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, having had the opportunity to observe firsthand the demeanor and actuations of the witness while on the witness stand, and their conclusions command great weight and respect. The Court applied the corollary that where the trial court itself declares the identification doubtful, that finding will not be disturbed on appeal.

• "An affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify on it." — The ratio decidendi on the evidentiary status of affidavits, stated in a single sentence and applied to exclude Cesar Delima's sworn statement.
• "That the affidavit formed part of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of the record of the case in the RTC." — This passage rejects the trial court's stated justification for considering Delima's affidavit and states the rule on the separate character of preliminary investigation records.
• "Before the rule that positive identification prevails over mere denial and alibi may apply, it is necessary that the credibility of the eyewitness be first put beyond question." — The Court's framing of the threshold requirement that governed its treatment of Honorio Cabailo's testimony.
• "Even though accused-appellant invokes the inherently weak defense of alibi, such defense nonetheless acquires commensurate strength in the instant case where no positive and proper identification has been made by the prosecution witnesses of the offender, as the prosecution still has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the accused." — The Court's articulation of the doctrine that alibi gains commensurate strength where identification is absent, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent criminal cases.

• People vs. Vidal, G.R. No. 90419, June 1, 1999 — Cited, together with the cases below, for the rule that trial courts are best equipped to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, having observed their demeanor firsthand.
• People vs. Peralta, 283 SCRA 81; People vs. Oliva, 282 SCRA 470; People vs. Tan, Jr., 264 SCRA 425 — Cited in support of the same rule on appellate deference to the trial court's credibility assessments.
• People vs. Magallanes, 23 SCRA 1275 — Cited for the proposition that the conclusions of the trial judge command great weight and respect, invoked in the course of weighing the trial court's own doubts on Cabailo's identification.
• People vs. Silvestre, G.R. No. 127573, May 12, 1999; Carlos A. Gothong Lines vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 96685, February 15, 1999 — Cited for the rule that an affidavit is hearsay and has weak probative value unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand.
• People vs. Ola, 152 SCRA 1 — Cited for the proposition that hearsay evidence is inadmissible because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine its author, and again for the rule that the prosecution bears the onus probandi notwithstanding the weakness of the defense.
• People vs. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428; U.S. vs. Javier, 37 Phil. 449 — Cited in support of the necessity of bringing the affiant to the witness stand so that the trial judge may observe and test his credibility.
• People vs. dela Iglesia, 241 SCRA 718 — Cited for the rule that the record of the preliminary investigation must be introduced as evidence during trial and is not subject to judicial notice.
• People vs. Rugay, 291 SCRA 692; People vs. Meneses, 288 SCRA 95; People vs. Solis, 182 SCRA 182; People vs. Hora, 153 SCRA 21 — Cited for the settled rule that conviction should rest on the strength of the prosecution's evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
• People vs. Niño, 290 SCRA 155; People vs. Clores, 125 SCRA 67 — Cited for the rule that the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Somontao, 128 SCRA 415; People vs. Teaño, 128 SCRA 149 — Cited, together with People vs. Ola, for the doctrine that alibi acquires commensurate strength where no positive and proper identification of the offender has been made.
• People vs. Lacao, 60 SCRA 89; People vs. Navarro, 12 SCRA 530 — Cited by accused-appellant in support of his first assignment of error, that an aggravating circumstance not alleged in the Information cannot qualify a crime; the Court did not pass upon these citations, the first assignment of error having been rendered unnecessary by the acquittal.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder. The trial court invoked it in convicting accused-appellant and imposing reclusion perpetua; the conviction was reversed on reasonable doubt, so the provision's penalty was never applied.
• Article 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Governs the application of indivisible penalties when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances. The trial court applied it in fixing the penalty of reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant.
• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Accused-appellant invoked the first guarantee against the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which was not alleged in the Information; the Court relied on the second in holding Cesar Delima's affidavit inadmissible.
• Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Court — Enumerates the rights of the accused at trial, including the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. Cited in support of the inadmissibility of Delima's sworn statement.
• Section 8, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the record of the preliminary investigation. Cited for the rule that such record does not form part of the record of the case in the Regional Trial Court and must be introduced as evidence during trial.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.