People of the Philippines vs. Dionisio Ancheta

In incestuous rape, the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to the offender constitutes a single special qualifying circumstance that must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty; the accused's admission of paternity during pre-trial cannot establish the qualifying circumstance of relationship where the pre-trial stipulation was not signed by the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by Rule 118, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Dionisio Ancheta is the father of Ginalyn Ancheta, who was born on July 22, 1986, and who lived with him at Sitio Bacsayan, Barangay Poblacion, San Gabriel, La Union. At the time of the alleged offense, Republic Act No. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, had repealed Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and reclassified rape as a crime against persons, with Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code governing its definition and penalties. Article 266-B authorizes the death penalty where the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, among other qualifying circumstances.

Ginalyn Ancheta was born on July 22, 1986, and was almost twelve years old at the time of the incident. She lived with her father, appellant Dionisio Ancheta, at Sitio Bacsayan, Barangay Poblacion, San Gabriel, La Union.

On the evening of July 13, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m., Ginalyn was inside her bedroom when the appellant entered and forcibly undressed her. After removing his own clothes, he lay on top of her. She struggled, but her efforts were in vain because the appellant was strong. Failing in her plea, she tried to reason with him and asked, "Why are you doing this father? I am your daughter." The appellant gave no reply and proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lust, he threatened Ginalyn with bodily harm if she would tell anyone what had happened.

Ginalyn ran towards a grassy place and hid there until the following morning. She then went to the house of her aunt, Perla Andaya-Onaliban, at Barangay Salangsang, San Gabriel, La Union, and confided to her the ordeal she had experienced with the appellant. Since then, Ginalyn never returned to their house. It was only on July 17, 1998, that Perla accompanied Ginalyn to the police station to report the rape. Her statements were reduced into writing and served as the basis for the filing of a formal complaint against the appellant. Arcely Viluan, a social worker of the DSWD of San Gabriel, was assigned to assist Ginalyn in the case. Ginalyn was medically examined at the Ilocos Training and Regional Medical Center, where she was attended to by Dr. Ma. Asuncion Pamuspusan.

The pelvic examination yielded the following results: no bleeding, with whitish mucoid discharge; positive old healed laceration at the 4, 5, 6, and 9 o'clock positions; on speculum examination, the cervix was pinkish, with no bleeding and no foul-smelling discharge; and on internal examination, the cervix was softish, closed, and non-tender, with a small uterus and no adnexal mass or tenderness.

For his part, the appellant interposed the defense of denial and alibi. He admitted that Ginalyn is his daughter, that she was twelve years old, and that she was living with him when the alleged incident took place, but denied committing rape. He claimed that he could not have had sexual intercourse with Ginalyn at around 7:00 p.m. on July 13, 1998, because he came home late that night after working at the residence of Councilor Bangsel Liwan at the town proper of San Gabriel, La Union; that when he arrived home, Ginalyn was not there; that he searched for her but, unable to find her, returned home and slept; that the following day, as he was on his way to work, Ginalyn arrived home; that he scolded and slapped her; that he then went to work; and that Ginalyn left the house and never returned.

The trial court convicted the appellant based on Ginalyn's testimony, which it found credible and corroborated by the results of the medical examination showing healed lacerations in various positions. On the witness stand, Ginalyn could not hold back her tears as she narrated the acts committed by her own father, and the trial court noted that her crying was evidence of the truth of the rape charges.

• Proof of the Victim's Age: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death despite the failure of the prosecution to present competent proof of the victim's actual age. He asserted that the records were bereft of evidence, such as the complainant's Certificate of Live Birth, Baptismal Certificate, or school records, accurately showing her age. Appellant did not assail the trial court's conclusion that the evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his own daughter; he faulted the trial court only with respect to the imposition of the death penalty.

• Proof of the Victim's Minority: Whether the qualifying circumstance of minority was proved with moral certainty to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.
• Proof of Relationship: Whether the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the victim and the offender was proved with moral certainty to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.

• Proof of the Victim's Minority: Yes. The prosecution proved minority through the victim's birth certificate, which showed she was born on July 22, 1986, and was therefore less than twelve years old at the time of the rape; the birth certificate was formally offered as prosecution evidence and admitted without objection from the appellant.
• Proof of Relationship: No. The qualifying circumstance of relationship was not proved with moral certainty, the prosecution having failed to adduce independent and competent evidence beyond the victim's testimony and the appellant's pre-trial admission, which was inadmissible for lack of the signatures of the accused and his counsel.

• Proof of the Victim's Minority: The Court began by affirming the finding of guilt, noting that the trial court convicted the appellant based on Ginalyn's credible testimony, corroborated by the medical examination showing healed lacerations in various positions. Findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect, absent any clear showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance. No such circumstances obtained. The Court further observed that when a woman, more so a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed, and that courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and expose her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice. Ginalyn's crying while testifying was likewise evidence of the truth of the rape charges. As to minority, the birth certificate showing that Ginalyn was born on July 22, 1986, was presented and formally offered as evidence for the prosecution, and the appellant did not interpose any objection to its admission. Minority was thus established.

• Proof of Relationship: Notwithstanding the affirmation of guilt, the Court held that the death sentence imposed by the trial court could not be sustained. Where the life of another human being hangs in the balance, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be established in order for the corresponding penalty to be upheld. To justify the imposition of the death penalty in cases of incestuous rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitutes one special qualifying circumstance which must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty. Although the Information specifically alleged the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship, only minority was proved by the presentation of the birth certificate. The prosecution failed to adduce independent and competent evidence to prove the special qualifying circumstance of relationship. Aside from Ginalyn's testimony that the appellant is her father and the appellant's admission during pre-trial and during trial that Ginalyn is his daughter with his estranged wife, Erlinda V. Aquino, the trial court had no basis for appreciating the qualifying circumstance of relationship. The Court cited its recent holding in People vs. Mendoza that the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused during pre-trial and trial as to their relationship do not suffice, for an accused cannot be condemned to suffer the supreme penalty of death on the basis of stipulations or his own admissions. This strict rule is warranted by the seriousness of the penalty of death; the fact that the appellant is the father of the complainant must be sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence. Moreover, the fact that the appellant admitted during pre-trial that he is the father of Ginalyn, thus dispensing with the need to present evidence to prove the same, would not justify the trial court's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of relationship, because a perusal of the pre-trial order showed that the stipulation was not signed by the appellant and his counsel. Rule 118, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. This requirement is mandatory. The omission of the signatures of the accused and his counsel rendered the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. Considering that the relationship of the victim and the offender was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant could only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua. As to damages, the Court sustained the lower court's award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and awarded an additional P50,000.00 as moral damages, moral damages being automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.

• Qualifying circumstances in incestuous rape — In incestuous rape, the concurrence of the victim's minority and her relationship to the offender constitutes a single special qualifying circumstance that must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that although minority was proved through the birth certificate, relationship was not, thereby reducing the conviction to simple rape and the penalty to reclusion perpetua.

• Inadmissibility of unsigned pre-trial stipulations — Under Rule 118, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference must be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. This requirement is mandatory. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that the pre-trial order containing the appellant's admission of paternity, not having been signed by him and his counsel, was inadmissible and could not establish the qualifying circumstance of relationship.

• Proof of relationship in incestuous rape — The bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused during pre-trial and trial as to their relationship do not suffice to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship; the fact of paternity must be sufficiently established by competent and independent evidence. The Court applied this doctrine by rejecting the prosecution's reliance on Ginalyn's testimony and the appellant's admissions.

• Credibility of witnesses — Findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect, the trial judge being in a better position to determine the issue of credibility, having observed the deportment of witnesses during trial; such findings will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could have altered the conviction. The Court applied this doctrine by affirming the finding of guilt based on Ginalyn's credible testimony.

• Testimony of a rape victim — When a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Courts usually give greater weight to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault, especially a minor in cases of incestuous rape, because no woman would be willing to undergo a public trial and expose her own degradation were it not to condemn an injustice. The crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the conviction.

• Moral damages in rape cases — Moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. The Court applied this doctrine by awarding P50,000.00 as moral damages in addition to the civil indemnity.

• Duty to review all death penalty cases — The Court has not only the power but the duty to review all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court, because nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible. The Court applied this doctrine by painstakingly sifting through the evidence despite the appellant's failure to assail the finding of guilt, in order to make its own determination as to his guilt or innocence.

• "We hold, however, that there is more wisdom in our existing jurisprudence mandating our review of all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court. Nothing less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible." — This passage, quoting People vs. Esparas, articulates the Court's constitutionally mandated duty to review all death penalty cases and explains why the Court examined the entire record notwithstanding the appellant's failure to challenge the finding of guilt.

• "To justify the imposition of the death penalty in cases of incestuous rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitutes one special qualifying circumstance which must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the qualifying circumstances in incestuous rape, which the Court applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua after finding that relationship was not proved.

• "all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused." — This passage quotes Rule 118, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the mandatory requirement whose violation rendered the pre-trial stipulation of paternity inadmissible against the appellant.

• "Moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime, because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award." — This passage states the rule on moral damages in rape cases, which the Court applied in awarding P50,000.00 as moral damages in addition to the civil indemnity.

• People vs. Esparas, 329 Phil. 339, 352 [1996] — Cited for the doctrine that the Court has the power and the duty to review all death penalty cases, regardless of the wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the court; quoted at length in the decision.

• People vs. Mendoza, G.R. Nos. 146693-94, 31 July 2003 — Controlling precedent for the holding that the bare testimony of the complainant and the admission of the accused during pre-trial and trial as to their relationship do not suffice to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship in incestuous rape; followed by the Court.

• People vs. Agravante, G.R. Nos. 137297 & 138547-48, 11 December 2001, 372 SCRA 64, 77 — Cited for the mandatory requirement under Rule 118, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that pre-trial agreements or admissions be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel.

• Fule vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-79094, 22 June 1988, 162 SCRA 446, 449 — Cited for the rule that the omission of the signatures of the accused and his counsel renders a stipulation of facts inadmissible in evidence.

• People vs. Umayam, G.R. No. 147033, 30 April 2003 — Cited for the rule that moral damages are automatically granted in rape cases without need of further proof other than the commission of the crime.

• People vs. Aliben, G.R. No. 140404, 27 February 2003 — Cited for the rule that findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses deserve a high degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing of overlooked facts or circumstances of weight and substance.

• People vs. Cortezano, G.R. No. 123140, 23 September 2003, citing People vs. De Guzman, G.R. Nos. 140333-34, 11 December 2001, 372 SCRA 95 — Cited for the rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed, and that greater weight is given to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual assault.

• People vs. Besmonte, G.R. Nos. 137278-79, 17 February 2003 — Cited for the rule that the crying of a victim during her testimony is evidence of the truth of the rape charges.

• People vs. Esureña, G.R. No. 142727, 23 January 2002, 374 SCRA 424, 429 — Cited for the rule that where the life of another human being hangs in the balance, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established in order for the corresponding penalty to be upheld.

• People vs. Miclat, G.R. No. 137024, 7 August 2002, 386 SCRA 515, 534 — Cited for the rule that to justify the imposition of the death penalty in cases of incestuous rape, the concurrence of the minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender constitutes one special qualifying circumstance which must be both alleged and proved with moral certainty.

• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 8353) — Defines rape and the circumstances under which it is committed, including through force, threat, or intimidation, and when the offended party is under twelve years of age. The Court cited this provision in affirming that the appellant had carnal knowledge of Ginalyn through force and intimidation.

• Article 266-B, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 8353) — Provides that rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, and that the death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. The Court applied this provision in holding that the appellant could only be convicted of simple rape, punishable by reclusion perpetua, because the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not proved.

• Rule 118, Section 2, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise they cannot be used against the accused. The Court applied this provision in holding that the pre-trial order containing the appellant's admission of paternity, not having been signed by him and his counsel, was inadmissible in evidence.

• Article 47, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Governs the automatic review by the Supreme Court of death penalty cases. The Court cited this provision as the basis for the elevation of the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.