People of the Philippines vs. Dennis Torpio y Estrera

A killing is homicide, not murder, where the prosecution fails to prove treachery and evident premeditation with the same certainty required for the commission of the crime charged; and the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and vindication of a grave offense arising from one and the same incident are counted as a single mitigating circumstance.

Dennis Torpio y Estrera and his father Manuel Torpio were charged with murder for the killing of Anthony Rapas, a companion from Barangay Camp Downes, Ormoc City, with whom Dennis had gone on a drinking spree. The charge was brought under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, with treachery, evident premeditation, and intent to kill alleged as the qualifying circumstances. The case was tried before the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City, Branch 35.

On the night of October 11, 1997, in Zone 3, Barangay Camp Downes, Ormoc City, Dennis Torpio was at home with his family — his father Manuel, his mother, and an elderly visitor named Fausta Mariaca — when Anthony Rapas knocked at their door and invited him for a drinking spree. The two left after supper and drank tuba at the store of a certain Codog, about seventy meters from the Torpio house, joined by a companion named Porboy Perez. Two small bottles of Red Horse beer were added, after which the three proceeded to a cottage at the Shoreline beach resort.

At the cottage, other people who were drinking offered them drinks, which the two accepted. Porboy later arrived bringing gin, which only he and Anthony drank. Anthony tried to make Dennis drink the gin, and when the latter continued to refuse, Anthony bathed Dennis with gin and mauled him several times. Dennis crawled beneath the table, and Anthony tried to stab him with a fan knife but missed. Dennis got up and ran towards their home.

Upon reaching home, Dennis took a knife. His mother was alarmed and shouted, and a commotion ensued. Manuel awoke and tried to scold Dennis and confiscate the knife, but he failed and instead suffered a wound on his left hand. Dennis left with the knife and, taking another route, returned to the cottage by the seashore. Upon seeing Dennis, Anthony avoided him and ran along the shore towards the creek. According to Dennis, Rey Mellang came out of his house at that point and said, "meet him 'Den,'" alluding to Anthony. Being familiar with the terrain despite the darkness, Dennis went through the nipa plantation, met and virtually blocked Anthony, and stabbed him. When he was hit, Anthony ran but became entangled in a fishing net beside the creek and fell on his back; Dennis mounted him and continued stabbing him.

After the stabbing, Dennis left and did not go home; he slept in a grassy meadow at Camp Downes until morning. At about 7:00 a.m., he went to a known police officer named Boy Estrera on San Pedro Street, Ormoc City, and voluntarily surrendered. He was later turned over to the police headquarters.

The trial court found that the killing of Anthony by Dennis was attended with treachery and evident premeditation, and appreciated in Dennis's favor the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party, immediate vindication of a grave offense, and voluntary surrender. It acquitted Manuel Torpio of the crime charged. The trial court's judgment, however, stated no factual basis for its conclusion that treachery and evident premeditation attended the killing beyond the bare assertion that the evidence adduced supported it.

• Treachery: Appellant argued that treachery was not attendant when he killed the victim because he did not consciously adopt a mode of attack to ensure the accomplishment of his criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer; his act of stabbing Anthony was preceded by a quarrel between them, so that the victim had been forewarned of the danger to his life and limb.
• Evident Premeditation: Appellant asserted that evident premeditation was not likewise attendant because the prosecution failed to prove that he had planned and prepared any plot to kill the victim, and no direct and positive evidence had been shown that sufficient time had elapsed between his determination to commit the crime and its execution to enable him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
• Proper Offense: Appellant argued that he is guilty only of homicide as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Anthony Rapas so as to qualify the same to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation attended the commission of the killing.
• Proper Offense, Penalty, and Damages: Whether the appellant is liable only for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and, consequently, what penalty and civil liability should be imposed.

• Treachery: No. The record is barren of evidence showing any method or means employed by the appellant to ensure his safety from any retaliation the victim might put up, and the essence of treachery — a swift and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation by the victim — was absent.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to establish the confluence of the requisites of evident premeditation: the time the offender determined to commit the crime, an act manifestly indicating that he clung to that determination, and a sufficient interval of time between determination and execution to allow reflection.
• Proper Offense, Penalty, and Damages: Homicide only. Absent any qualifying circumstance, the killing amounts only to homicide under Article 249, punishable by reclusion temporal; with two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code requires the imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law.

• Treachery: Apart from its bare statement that the killing was attended with treachery and evident premeditation, the trial court did not state the factual basis for its conclusion. Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the crime charged; they cannot be presumed, nor can they be based on mere surmises or speculations, and in case of doubt they must be resolved in favor of the accused. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make, and there must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation by the victim. Here, the record is barren of evidence showing any method or means employed by the appellant to ensure his safety from any retaliation that could be put up by the victim. The appellant acted to avenge Anthony's felonious acts of mauling and stabbing him; although he bled from his stab wound, he ran home, armed himself with a knife, and confronted Anthony intentionally, and when the latter fled, the appellant ran after him and managed to stab and kill the victim. Treachery was thus not attendant.

• Evident Premeditation: To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of three requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The qualifying circumstance requires that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment, and it demands proof of the time when the intent to commit the crime was engendered in the mind of the accused, the motive which gave rise to it, and the means beforehand selected to carry out that intent. Nothing in the records supports the trial court's conclusion. The utterance attributed by Manuel Torpio to the appellant — "I have to kill somebody, 'Tay, because I was boxed" — is not sufficient to show that the crime was a product of serious and determined reflection, the interval between the statement and the actual stabbing not being sufficient or considerable enough to allow the appellant to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There was no sufficient interregnum from the time the appellant was stabbed by the victim, when the appellant fled to their house and armed himself with a knife, and when he stabbed the victim. There is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan, but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger. Without proof of any circumstance that would qualify it, the killing could not amount to murder, and the appellant should be held liable only for homicide.

• Proper Offense, Penalty, and Damages: Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. The trial court properly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it having been established that the appellant, after killing Anthony, lost no time in submitting himself to the authorities by going to Boy Estrera, a police officer. The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was likewise properly appreciated, the appellant having been humiliated, mauled, and almost stabbed by the deceased; although the unlawful aggression had ceased when the appellant stabbed Anthony, it was nonetheless a grave offense for which he may be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance. The mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation, however, cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense, since both arose from one and the same incident — the attack on the appellant by Anthony — so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. With two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance attendant to the crime, the imposable penalty, following Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code, is prision mayor, the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period the court may deem applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty is taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while the minimum is taken from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision correccional; hence, the imposable penalty is imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. As to damages, the award of ₱100,000 as actual damages representing funeral and wake expenses must be deleted, as no receipts or other tangible documents were presented to support it. The award of ₱50,000 as attorney's fees is proper, the records showing that the heirs of the victim engaged the services of a private prosecutor, and recovery of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages is allowed under Article 2208 of the Civil Code when the court deems it just and equitable. The award of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Anthony, as well as ₱25,000 as temperate damages, is likewise warranted pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. There must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate; the essence of the crime is a swift and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation by the victim. The Court found no such evidence, the appellant having acted to avenge the victim's felonious acts of mauling and stabbing him, and having openly confronted and pursued the victim after arming himself at home.
• Evident Premeditation — To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of three requisites: (a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The circumstance requires that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon a resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment, and proof of the time the intent was engendered, the motive giving rise to it, and the means beforehand selected. The Court held that none of these requisites was shown, the killing having arisen from rising tempers and the heat of anger rather than a deliberate plan.
• Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with the same certainty as the crime itself — Such circumstances cannot be presumed, nor can they be based on mere surmises or speculations; in case of doubt, they must be resolved in favor of the accused. The trial court's failure to state any factual basis for its conclusion that treachery and evident premeditation attended the killing was fatal to the murder conviction.
• Sufficient provocation and vindication of a grave offense arising from one and the same incident constitute a single mitigating circumstance — Where both mitigating circumstances arise from one and the same incident — here, the attack on the appellant by the victim — they cannot be considered apart from each other and must be counted as only one mitigating circumstance.
• Application of Article 64(5) and the Indeterminate Sentence Law — When two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period it may deem applicable. For homicide, punishable by reclusion temporal, the penalty next lower is prision mayor; under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum is taken from the medium period of prision mayor and the minimum from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, prision correccional.
• Actual damages require proof — An award of actual damages for funeral and wake expenses must be deleted where no receipts or other tangible documents were presented to support it.
• Attorney's fees as actual or compensatory damages — Recovery of attorney's fees is allowed under Article 2208 of the Civil Code, one of the instances being when the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered, as where the heirs of the victim engaged the services of a private prosecutor.
• Temperate damages — Where actual damages are not fully proven, temperate damages may be awarded pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.

• "It is axiomatic that qualifying and aggravating circumstances, like treachery and evident premeditation, must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the crime charged." — This passage states the quantum of proof governing qualifying circumstances and supplies the decisive ground for reducing the conviction from murder to homicide, the trial court having failed to state any factual basis for its conclusion.
• "There is treachery when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tends directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — This is the canonical formulation of treachery applied by the Court in rejecting the qualifying circumstance, supplemented by the requirement that the mode of attack be consciously or deliberately adopted.
• "To warrant a finding of evident premeditation, the prosecution must establish the confluence of the following requisites: ... (a) the time when the offender [was] determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act." — This enumerates the three requisites of evident premeditation, which the Court found unestablished on the record.
• "But the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances arose from one and the same incident, i.e., the attack on the appellant by Anthony, so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance." — This passage establishes the rule that mitigating circumstances arising from a single incident are counted as one, which determined the penalty computation under Article 64(5) of the Revised Penal Code.

• People vs. Loterono, 391 SCRA 593 (2002) — Cited as authority for the rule that qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the crime charged.
• People vs. Matore, 387 SCRA 603 (2002) — Cited for the rule that qualifying and aggravating circumstances cannot be presumed nor based on mere surmises or speculations.
• People vs. Mahilum, 390 SCRA 91 (2002) — Cited for the rule that doubt as to the existence of qualifying circumstances should be resolved in favor of the accused.
• People vs. Caloza, Jr., 396 SCRA 329 (2003) — Cited for the definition of treachery and the requirement that the mode of attack be consciously or deliberately adopted by the culprit.
• People vs. Adoc, 330 SCRA 626 (2000) — Cited for the rule that the essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation by the victim.
• People vs. Baldogo, 396 SCRA 31 (2003) — Cited as the source of the three requisites of evident premeditation.
• People vs. Recepcion, 391 SCRA 558 (2002) — Cited for the requirement that the execution of the criminal act be preceded by cool thought and reflection, and for the need to prove the time the intent was engendered, the motive, and the means beforehand selected.
• People vs. Guerrero, Jr., 389 SCRA 389 (2002) — Cited for the rule that there is no evident premeditation when the fracas was the result, not of a deliberate plan, but of rising tempers, or when the attack was made in the heat of anger.
• David vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 727 (1998) — Cited for the rule that sufficient provocation and vindication of a grave offense arising from one and the same incident should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Diaz, 395 SCRA 52 (2003) — Cited as basis for deleting the award of actual damages unsupported by receipts or other tangible documents.
• People vs. Bergante, 286 SCRA 629 (1998) — Cited as authority for the award of attorney's fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages.
• People vs. Aposaga, G.R. No. 127153, October 23, 2003 — Cited as basis for the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of the victim.
• People vs. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003 — Cited as basis for the award of temperate damages.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and punishes murder; the provision under which the appellant was originally charged, with treachery, evident premeditation, and intent to kill alleged as qualifying circumstances. The Court held that the qualifying circumstances were not proven, so the provision could not sustain the conviction.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines homicide and punishes it with reclusion temporal; the provision under which the appellant was ultimately convicted after the qualifying circumstances were rejected.
• Article 13, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the mitigating circumstances. Paragraph 4 (sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party), paragraph 5 (immediate vindication of a grave offense), and paragraph 7 (voluntary surrender) were considered by the trial court; the Court credited only voluntary surrender and vindication of a grave offense, and treated sufficient provocation and vindication as a single mitigating circumstance.
• Article 64(5), Revised Penal Code — Provides that when there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance is present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period it may deem applicable according to the number and nature of such circumstances. Applied to lower the penalty for homicide from reclusion temporal to prision mayor.
• Article 2208, Civil Code — Allows recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation when the court deems it just and equitable; applied to sustain the award of ₱50,000 in attorney's fees to the victim's heirs, who engaged a private prosecutor.

Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ.