People of the Philippines vs. Delfin Muit

Treachery qualifies a killing as murder where the victim is shot at the back, suddenly and unexpectedly, and is thereby deprived of any opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; a plea of self-defense cannot prosper absent unlawful aggression on the victim's part, the accused bearing the burden of proving self-defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. Where two mitigating circumstances attend the commission of murder and no aggravating circumstance is present, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is imposable.

Delfin Muit was a retired PC second lieutenant whose wife, Rosario Muit, served as Barangay Zone President of Barrio Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur, while Rodolfo Torrero was the Zone Auditor. The two had played the leading man and the leading lady in a drama presentation staged in the barrio, and their frequent meetings as barangay officials gave rise to rumors that they were having an affair, which eventually reached Muit's ear sometime in December 1975. The relationship and the rumors surrounding it supply the backdrop against which the killing on February 26, 1976, and the accused's claim of jealousy-driven loss of self-control, were later assessed.

Delfin Muit was a retired PC second lieutenant residing in Barrio Tamban, Tinambac, Camarines Sur. His wife, Rosario Muit, was the Barangay Zone President, while Rodolfo Torrero was the Zone Auditor. Before the killing, Torrero and Mrs. Muit had played the leading man and the leading lady in a drama presentation staged in the barrio, and because of the stage play and their official duties the two used to meet frequently. These meetings spawned rumors around the barrio that they were having an affair, and the rumors eventually reached Muit's ear sometime in December 1975.

At around 2:45 in the afternoon of February 26, 1976, Rodolfo Torrero, his wife Purificacion Nidea-Torrero, his mother-in-law Maria Bataller, his friend Benigno Gubatan, and a child, Francis Tresvalles, were on their way home from a picnic and passed by the house of the accused. Muit, who was then alone because his wife and children were not around, invited them to his house to take a rest. Once the group was inside, Muit remarked that his invitation showed he had no ill-feeling against the Torreros and that he knew they likewise bore him no ill-feeling. As they engaged in amenities, a group of barangay members and PC authorities in charge of the sanitation and cleanliness program, it being Community Day, paid them a visit and, after a short talk, left. Torrero conducted the group on their way out and, upon his return, Muit requested him to take a seat.

The accused then confronted Torrero as to why the latter always visited his wife even during nighttime and why he often invited her out. Torrero replied that, being the barangay zone auditor, he had to confer with the accused's wife on barangay matters since she was the barangay zone president. Muit then asked why Torrero even gave food and money to his children if he had no bad intention toward his wife. Torrero's wife answered that they did it out of pity because there were times when they would see the accused's children in need of food and money. The accused angrily stood up and countered, "Why should you give when your husband had also a family to support?" To avoid trouble, Torrero likewise stood up and said that if that was the way they talked about the matter it would end in nothing, so it was better that he should leave, and he proceeded to move out of the house.

When Torrero was already outside the house and walking along the pathway, the accused followed him and, on reaching the door, shouted, "Wait because we have not yet finished." At that instant, the accused raised his left hand toward Torrero and with his right hand pulled out his .45 caliber pistol and aimed it at the deceased. He angrily fired at Torrero, who was only about three and a half meters away, hitting him at the lower left side below the nape. On being hit, Torrero spun from his left to the right, his face writhing in pain. Upon hearing the gunshot, Gubatan immediately grabbed and held the accused from behind with an embrace and said, "Manoy Delfin, why are you like that?" But as soon as Gubatan embraced the accused from behind, a second shot was fired, hitting Torrero's elevated left hand, with the bullet penetrating through the breast. Torrero fell on his knees, bent forward with his face downward and his body in a prone position. Gubatan tightened his grip around the accused as he tried to wrestle with him. Mrs. Torrero, shocked by the first shot, rushed toward her fallen husband, but the accused, on seeing her, aimed his gun at her; Gubatan quickly grabbed the accused's right forearm and jerked it upward so that the third shot was fired toward the sky, missing its target. Gubatan then said, "Manoy Delfin, that is enough," and moved the accused away near a coconut tree. There the accused tried to free himself, pointed his gun at Gubatan, and said, "Set me free Benny or I will shoot you." When Gubatan could no longer hold him, he let him go, and the accused slowly put down his arm, started to move away, made a short last look at his victim, and continued on his way. Torrero died shortly thereafter.

The defense presented a different account. According to the accused, at about 2:45 p.m. on February 26, 1976, he was at the door of his house, about to leave to visit his farm, with his .45 caliber pistol tucked in his front waistline under his T-shirt, when Torrero and his companions passed by. Muit invited them to drop by, and the invitation was accepted; Muit was alone because his wife and children were in Naga City at that time. After the usual amenities, the group conducting an inspection of the houses in the zone arrived and soon left, and Muit and Torrero's group resumed their conversation. Torrero was carrying a bolo slung in its scabbard and hanging from his right shoulder, and he was left-handed. When the conversation was resumed, Torrero took offense at what Muit brought up and, in a huff, stood up and walked toward the door. Muit followed him, asking Torrero not to leave, and then a shot was fired; other shots, the number being controverted, followed, and Torrero fell. Gubatan embraced Muit from behind either before or after the second shot, a point also controverted. Torrero suffered three gunshot wounds — one on the left arm, one on the chest which was the fatal one with the bullet entering from the front and exiting at the back, and a superficial one on the nape — all inflicted by shots fired from the .45 caliber pistol licensed in Muit's name as a retired PC second lieutenant. Under the defense's theory, the first shot, deliberately fired by Muit, hit Torrero on the left arm; the second shot, fired while the gun was still held by Muit, hit Torrero on the chest; and the third wound was obviously inflicted last, although no witness could tell the precise moment of its infliction, with Dr. Froyalde opining that it was inflicted when Torrero was already lying on the ground. The bolo of Torrero was already drawn from its scabbard when the sketch of the scene was drawn by Patrolman Darilay minutes after the shooting, and it was also shown in the photographs taken of the body where it fell, a fact confirmed by both Gubatan and Mrs. Torrero. Muit did not get near the body of Torrero after the latter fell but immediately proceeded to the PC detachment to surrender himself and his gun.

The trial court credited the prosecution's version. It found that the victim was hit by a bullet at the nape or back portion of the neck at the first shot, and it rejected as unnatural and unconvincing the testimonies of defense witnesses Herminigildo Bermido and Alfredo Martinez, whose declarations cast doubt on their presence near the scene of the crime.

• Denial of the Right to Present a Witness: Appellant maintained that the trial court erred in denying him his right to be heard by refusing to allow him to present a vital witness in his defense, Jesus Evangelista, who could have proved that the principal witness for the prosecution, Benigno Gubatan, far from being the disinterested person he claimed to be, was actually interested personally in prosecuting the accused.
• Denial of Due Process: Appellant argued that the trial court denied him due process of law by ignoring facts clearly established in evidence and relying instead on baseless presumptions; by violating his right to remain silent; and by being palpably biased against him.
• Rejection of Self-Defense and Accident: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in rejecting his plea of self-defense and accident and in convicting him.

• Reopening of Trial to Prove Bias of a Prosecution Witness: Whether the trial court erred in denying the accused his right to be heard by refusing to allow him to present Jesus Evangelista, a vital witness who could have proved that the principal prosecution witness, Benigno Gubatan, was personally interested in prosecuting the accused.
• Due Process: Whether the accused was denied his right to due process of law by the trial court's alleged disregard of facts clearly established in evidence, reliance on baseless presumptions, violation of his right to remain silent, and palpable bias against him.
• Self-Defense and Accident: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the accused's plea of self-defense and accident and in convicting him.
• Treachery, Evident Premeditation, and Mitigating Circumstances: Whether treachery qualified the killing as murder, whether evident premeditation was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, and whether mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.

• Reopening of Trial to Prove Bias of a Prosecution Witness: No. The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and no reversible error attended its denial.
• Due Process: No. The accused was fully afforded his right to be heard and to present his defense, the judgment being substantiated by the evidence; neither the trial judge's clarificatory questions nor his order of transfer after conviction amounted to bias.
• Self-Defense and Accident: No. Having invoked self-defense, the accused bore the burden of proving it by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence, and the evidence showed that the victim was treacherously shot at the back, negating unlawful aggression on his part.
• Treachery, Evident Premeditation, and Mitigating Circumstances: Treachery qualified the killing as murder, but evident premeditation was not adequately shown; voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation were appreciated in favor of the accused, warranting the penalty next lower than that prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Reopening of Trial to Prove Bias of a Prosecution Witness: After trial had terminated and within the period to file memoranda, the defense moved to reopen the trial so that Jesus Evangelista could testify and prove the bias of principal prosecution witness Benigno Gubatan. Evangelista was to testify on the alleged illicit relations between Gubatan and Mrs. Evangelista, formerly the victim's wife, who had remarried after being widowed. The trial court denied reopening on the ground that, even assuming such a liaison, it had happened in 1977 whereas Gubatan had submitted himself as a government witness as early as March 4, 1976, and that the testimony would not prove bias on Gubatan's part, he being an eyewitness to the tragic incident, nor the culpability or non-culpability of the accused. The Supreme Court found no reversible error, since the reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. It added that it was very possible Evangelista was merely smitten with jealousy and that the alleged illicit relationship was pure conjecture. Additionally, even if Evangelista's testimony could prove bias on Gubatan's part, Gubatan was not the only prosecution witness who testified as to the culpability of the appellant, and Gubatan had been subjected to rigid cross-examination by the defense counsel, who was thereby given every opportunity to impeach his credibility.

• Due Process: The accused was fully afforded his right to be heard and to present his defense. The criterion is that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and punished only after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. The appealed decision sufficiently met that standard, its judgment being substantiated by the evidence. The contention that the trial court had ignored and unreasonably rejected the testimonies of defense witnesses Herminigildo Bermido and Alfredo Martinez was untenable. Bermido's story — that he had gone to Barrio Tamban precisely to see the accused in connection with the purchase of railroad ties, that he had witnessed the shooting incident from a distance and saw the deceased try to hack the accused, but that he left immediately after and never mentioned the incident to the authorities nor approached the accused — was unnatural behavior that did not inspire belief; having gone precisely to meet with the accused, he could have shown concern at the very least. Martinez did not witness the actual incident because he was buying a cigarette and merely corroborated Bermido's story that they had gone to Barrio Tamban precisely to see the accused. A reading of their declarations cast doubt as to their presence near the scene of the crime, and their version was unconvincing compared to the forthright testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. The appraisal by a trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to the greatest respect in the absence of established exceptions. On the alleged violation of the right to remain silent, what the trial judge did was merely to draw an inference from the accused's failure to volunteer his plea of self-defense at the time of his surrender, which would have been the most natural reaction; the accused was neither under investigation nor interrogation, so that his right against self-incrimination was never endangered. On the alleged bias of the trial judge, the clarificatory questions propounded by him during the trial were intended to test the credibility of witnesses and to extract the truth, and the order transferring the accused to Muntinlupa after conviction was no manifestation of bias, considering that the Supreme Court had upheld said action in its Resolution dated February 21, 1979.

• Self-Defense and Accident: The accused's plea of self-defense and accident was unavailing for being inconsistent with the environmental milieu of the case. Having invoked self-defense, he had the burden of proving it and had to establish the same by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. The defense submission was that the accused had no intent to kill; that he drew his gun in self-defense and to disarm the victim of his bolo; that the first shot, which he had deliberately fired, hit the victim on his left arm; that the fatal second shot which hit the victim on his chest was fired accidentally as a direct consequence of Gubatan's embracing the accused from behind; and that the third shot hit the victim at the nape of the neck when the victim was already prostrate on the ground. That was not the sequence of the occurrence as established by the evidence. The victim did not try to hack the accused with his bolo, which hung from his right shoulder; there was no reason for him to physically harm the accused, having already decided to leave the accused's house in order to avoid trouble. He was already out of the front yard of the accused's house, about four meters more or less from its "lean to," when he was shot at. The fact that the bolo was found lying on the victim's side out of its scabbard was no proof that the victim had used it; it must have dropped as the accused fell to the ground after having been hit. What was established by the evidence was that the victim was hit by a bullet at the nape or back portion of the neck at the first shot; the victim spun around from left to right involuntarily, at which point he was hit by the second shot on the left arm and on his chest; and the third shot did not hit its mark as it was deflected upward by Gubatan, who jerked the accused's hand skyward. Clearly, therefore, the accused had treacherously shot the victim at the back, thereby disproving the element of unlawful aggression on the victim's part, which the defense sought to establish as an essential element of self-defense. The submission that the fatal second shot was unintentional and was the direct consequence of Gubatan's act of embracing him from behind was also untenable, because Gubatan demonstrated during the trial that he had embraced the appellant around the chest in such a way that the appellant was still free to use his right hand, which was holding the gun. Treachery was undeniably proven: the accused was armed with a .45 caliber pistol and made full use of it; the victim was first hit at the nape or back portion of the neck; and he was fired at suddenly and unexpectedly, devoid of any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. There should be no question, then, that the crime committed is Murder with the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery.

• Treachery, Evident Premeditation, and Mitigating Circumstances: Evident premeditation as a generic aggravating circumstance was not adequately shown. To properly appreciate that circumstance, it is necessary to establish (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. As there was a dearth of evidence as to when the appellant first conceived of killing the deceased and that he was afforded sufficient time to reflect on the consequences of his contemplated crime before its final execution, the circumstance of evident premeditation could not be appreciated. On the other side of the coin, to be appreciated in favor of the accused were the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. There could be no question that the accused was driven strongly by jealousy because of the rumors regarding the amorous relationship between his wife and the victim; the feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control. In other words, it is a powerful instigator of jealousy and prone to produce anger and obfuscation. The crime of Murder, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Considering the two mitigating circumstances present, without any aggravating circumstances to offset them, the penalty next lower to that prescribed was imposable, or prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

• Treachery (Alevosia) as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. In this case, the accused shot the victim at the nape or back portion of the neck at the first shot, suddenly and unexpectedly, so that the victim was devoid of any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; treachery was therefore undeniably proven and qualified the killing as murder.

• Self-Defense; Burden of Proof — An accused who invokes self-defense bears the burden of proving it and must establish the same by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence. The defense in this case failed to discharge that burden, its version being inconsistent with the environmental milieu of the case.

• Unlawful Aggression as an Essential Element of Self-Defense — Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is an essential element of self-defense. The evidence established that the victim did not try to hack the accused with his bolo and had no reason to harm him, having already decided to leave the accused's house to avoid trouble; the accused therefore treacherously shot the victim at the back, disproving unlawful aggression.

• Accident as a Defense — The claim that the fatal second shot was unintentional and was the direct consequence of Gubatan's act of embracing the accused from behind was untenable, because Gubatan had embraced the appellant around the chest in such a way that the appellant's right hand holding the gun remained free.

• Reopening of Trial; Sound Discretion of the Trial Court — The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its denial will not be disturbed absent reversible error. The denial was sustained where the proposed testimony concerned an alleged liaison occurring in 1977 while the witness had submitted himself as a government witness as early as March 4, 1976, where the witness was an eyewitness to the incident, and where he was not the only prosecution witness and had in any event been subjected to rigid cross-examination.

• Due Process in Criminal Proceedings — If an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction, proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and punished only after inquiry and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law.

• Right Against Self-Incrimination; Inference from Failure to Volunteer a Defense — The right against self-incrimination is not endangered where the accused is neither under investigation nor interrogation. A trial judge may draw an inference from the accused's failure to volunteer his plea of self-defense at the time of his surrender, such being the most natural reaction.

• Evident Premeditation; Requisites — To properly appreciate evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to this determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect. A dearth of evidence on the first and third requisites precludes its appreciation.

• Passion and Obfuscation; Jealousy — The feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control; it is a powerful instigator of jealousy and prone to produce anger and obfuscation. The accused, driven strongly by jealousy because of the rumors of an amorous relationship between his wife and the victim, was entitled to this mitigating circumstance.

• Voluntary Surrender as a Mitigating Circumstance — The accused's act of surrendering himself and turning in the pistol he had used to the Detachment Commander of the Tamban Police Patrol Base soon after the incident was appreciated in his favor as a mitigating circumstance.

• Penalty for Murder with Mitigating Circumstances — Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Where two mitigating circumstances are present and no aggravating circumstance offsets them, the penalty next lower to that prescribed is imposable, that is, prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period.

• "The reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the Trial Court." — This states the controlling standard governing the defense's motion to reopen the trial to present Jesus Evangelista; the denial of the motion was sustained on this ground.

• "Having invoked self-defense, he has the burden of proving it, and must establish the same by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence." — This is the ratio on the third assigned error, fixing the quantum and burden of proof borne by an accused who pleads self-defense.

• "Treachery has been undeniably proven. The accused was armed with a .45 caliber pistol and made full use of it. The victim was first hit at the nape or back portion of the neck. He was fired at suddenly and unexpectedly, devoid of any opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate." — This passage supplies the Court's canonical application of treachery as the qualifying circumstance that raised the killing to murder.

• "To properly appreciate that circumstance, it is necessary to establish: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to this determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow him to reflect." — This sets out the three requisites of evident premeditation, whose absence in the record led the Court to discard the aggravating circumstance found by the trial court.

• "The feeling of resentment resulting from rivalry in amorous relations with a woman is a powerful stimulant to jealousy and is sufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control." — This is the formulation relied upon to appreciate passion and obfuscation in the accused's favor, one of the two mitigating circumstances that lowered the imposable penalty.

• People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 (1946) — Cited, together with a line of subsequent cases, for the rule that an accused who invokes self-defense bears the burden of proving it by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Ardisa, 55 SCRA 245 (1974) — Cited, with companion cases, for the three requisites of evident premeditation, the absence of which barred its appreciation against the accused.
• U.S. vs. Santillan, 4 Phil. 170 (1905) — Cited through Aquino's Revised Penal Code for the principle that jealousy arising from rivalry in amorous relations is a powerful stimulant sufficient to produce loss of reason and self-control, supporting the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
• People vs. Castillo, 76 Phil. 73 (1946) — Cited for the criterion of due process in criminal proceedings, which the appealed decision was held to have satisfied.
• U.S. vs. Visquera, et al., 4 Phil. 381 (1905) — Cited, with companion cases, for the rule that the reopening of a case for the reception of further evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.
• People vs. Aguilar, 86 Phil. 693 — Cited by the trial court in convicting the accused of murder for having gunned down the victim treacherously.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The provision was applied because treachery qualified the killing of Rodolfo Torrero as murder; with two mitigating circumstances present and no aggravating circumstance to offset them, the penalty next lower to that prescribed — prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period — was imposed.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.