People of the Philippines vs. De Grano

An accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of judgment without justifiable cause loses the remedies available against the judgment and, unless the accused surrenders and proves justifiable cause within fifteen days, does not regain standing in court; any ruling issued upon a motion filed by such an accused is void for lack of jurisdiction and does not place the accused in jeopardy. A void judgment of acquittal may be challenged via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without offending the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.

An Information for murder was filed on November 28, 1991 against six accused—Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, Estanislao Lacaba, Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo Genil—for the shooting death of Emmanuel Mendoza on April 21, 1991 in Laurel, Batangas. At the time of the crime, Joven de Grano was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and Estanislao Lacaba was a policeman in the same municipality. Due to the mayor's position, the case was transferred from Tanauan, Batangas to the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Only Joven, Armando, and Estanislao were arraigned and pleaded not guilty; their co-accused Leonides Landicho, Leonardo Genil, and Domingo Landicho remained at large.

• The Crime and Charges: On April 21, 1991, between 9:00 and 10:00 in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, Laurel, Batangas, Emmanuel Mendoza was shot and killed, sustaining eight gunshot wounds. An Information for murder was filed on November 28, 1991 against Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, Estanislao Lacaba, Leonides Landicho, Domingo Landicho, and Leonardo Genil, alleging conspiracy, treachery, and evident premeditation. Joven de Grano was the incumbent Mayor of Laurel at the time of the crime; Estanislao Lacaba was a policeman in the same municipality.

• The Bail Proceedings: After arraignment, where Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded not guilty, respondents moved for bail, arguing the prosecution's evidence was not strong. The RTC deferred resolution to allow the prosecution to present evidence. The RTC, Branch 11, Manila, subsequently granted bail upon finding that the evidence of treachery and evident premeditation was not strong. The prosecution's petition for certiorari to the CA was denied, but the Supreme Court, in G.R. No. 129604, reversed and set aside the bail grant in a Resolution dated July 12, 1999, ordering the immediate issuance of warrants of arrest. On reconsideration, the case was remanded for trial on the merits.

• Trial and Conviction: After full trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated April 25, 2002 convicting Joven de Grano, Armando de Grano, Domingo Landicho, and Estanislao Lacaba of murder qualified by treachery. Each was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the victim's heirs P50,000.00. The case against Leonides Landicho and Leonardo Genil was archived pending their apprehension. Only Estanislao Lacaba—who was in custody—appeared at the promulgation; Joven, Armando, and Domingo failed to appear despite due notice.

• The Joint Motion for Reconsideration: Through counsel, all four respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration dated May 8, 2002. None of the absent accused (Joven, Armando, and Domingo) had surrendered, filed a motion for leave of court, or offered any explanation for their failure to appear at the promulgation.

• The RTC's Modified Order: On April 15, 2004, the RTC issued an Order modifying the Decision. It acquitted Joven and Armando de Grano on reasonable doubt and declared them free of civil liability. It downgraded the convictions of Domingo Landicho and Estanislao Lacaba from murder to homicide, sentencing each to an indeterminate prison term of six years and one day of prision mayor to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal.

• Prosecution's Recourse to the CA: The prosecution, through the Assistant City Prosecutor and the private prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA, asserting grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner argued that Joven and Armando, having deliberately evaded arrest and failed to appear at promulgation, had lost their right to seek reconsideration, and that the RTC's grounds for modifying its Decision were utterly erroneous. The OSG was informed and instructed the private prosecutor to secure a DOJ endorsement; the DOJ Secretary endorsed the petition to the Solicitor General on March 15, 2005 for his conformity.

• CA Dismissal: The CA dismissed the petition outright on January 25, 2005 on the grounds that it was not filed by the OSG and that the assailed orders were not certified true copies. On reconsideration, the CA additionally ruled that the petition was barred by double jeopardy and that the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was defective because it was signed by counsel, not by the private offended party.

• Lack of Jurisdiction over the Absent Accused: Petitioner argued that Joven, Armando, and Domingo failed to appear at the promulgation of the conviction despite due notice, neither surrendered nor explained their absence, and therefore lost their standing in court. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the RTC had no authority to entertain their joint motion for reconsideration. The resulting Order dated April 15, 2004 was void for having been issued without jurisdiction; thus, no double jeopardy attached.

• Substantial Compliance by the OSG: Petitioner contended that with the DOJ endorsement and the OSG's letter manifesting its intention to pursue the petition, the OSG had effectively conformed to the filing. Had the CA allowed additional time, the OSG would have filed the necessary pleading. The OSG subsequently filed motions for extension and a comment before the Supreme Court, dispelling any doubt about its participation.

• Liberal Application of Verification Rules: Petitioner explained that private complainant Teresita Duran could not personally sign the verification and certification because she was in hiding in the Visayas out of extreme fear following the unexpected acquittal of the former mayor, and the deadline for filing was about to lapse. The private prosecutor signed to prevent the petition from being time-barred. The OSG, as representative of the State—the real party-in-interest—had authority to sign the verification and certification.

• Double Jeopardy Bar: Respondents argued that a petition for certiorari challenging an order of acquittal is contrary to the constitutional principle of double jeopardy and is not allowed.

• Trial Court's Authority: Respondents maintained that the RTC did not lose authority to resolve the joint motion because one accused, Estanislao Lacaba, was present at the promulgation. His presence and inclusion in the joint motion preserved the trial court's jurisdiction to act on the motion as to all accused.

• Procedural Defects Fatal: Respondents insisted that the CA correctly dismissed the petition because it was not instituted by the OSG on behalf of the People and because the verification and certification were signed by counsel rather than by the offended party. Respondents further argued that the Supreme Court petition should be dismissed on the same ground.

• Jurisdiction over Absent Accused: Whether the RTC had jurisdiction to entertain the Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction and had not regained their standing in court.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the RTC's Order acquitting the absent accused and modifying their co-accused's conviction placed them in double jeopardy, barring a petition for certiorari.

• Procedural Defects in the Petition: Whether the petition before the CA was fatally defective because it was filed by the private prosecutor rather than the OSG, and because the verification and certification of non-forum shopping was signed by counsel and not by the private offended party.

• Jurisdiction over Absent Accused: The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the Joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Joven, Armando, and Domingo. Only Estanislao Lacaba was present at the promulgation. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused who fails to appear at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction without justifiable cause loses the remedies available against the judgment. While the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave within fifteen days to regain standing, Joven, Armando, and Domingo did not surrender, did not explain their absence, and did not seek leave of court. Having jumped bail or remained at large, they lost their standing in court and were deemed to have waived any right to seek relief. The RTC should have treated the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration solely filed by Estanislao.

• Double Jeopardy: No double jeopardy attached as to Joven, Armando, and Domingo because the RTC acted without jurisdiction over their persons from the outset. Any ruling issued without jurisdiction is necessarily null and void in legal contemplation; a void order cannot be the source of an acquittal. However, with respect to Estanislao Lacaba—who was in custody and present at promulgation—the RTC never lost jurisdiction. Consequently, the downgrading of his conviction from murder to homicide stands and the proscription against double jeopardy applies to him.

• Procedural Defects in the Petition: The verification requirement is merely formal, not jurisdictional; its purpose is to ensure good faith, and noncompliance does not render a pleading fatally defective. The certification against forum shopping, though obligatory, is likewise not jurisdictional and may be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance where reasonable cause exists. The private complainant's extreme fear after the acquittal of the former mayor and her physical absence in the Visayas constituted reasonable cause. Amplifying, the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification in a criminal case constitutes substantial compliance because the People or the State is the real party-in-interest. The OSG's subsequent participation—securing a DOJ endorsement, filing motions for extension, and filing a comment before the Supreme Court—confirmed its conformity with the petition.

• Doctrine of Loss of Standing of Accused at Large — An accused who jumps bail, flees, or escapes from confinement loses standing in court and is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief, unless the accused surrenders or submits to the court's jurisdiction. Under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an accused who fails to appear at promulgation without justifiable cause loses the remedies available against the judgment. To regain standing, the accused must surrender within fifteen days from promulgation, file a motion for leave of court, state the reasons for absence, and prove that the absence was for justifiable cause. The trial court acquires no jurisdiction to entertain post-judgment remedies filed by an accused who has not regained standing.

• Void Judgment as Exception to Double Jeopardy — A judgment of acquittal issued without jurisdiction is void ab initio and does not place the accused in double jeopardy. The essential elements of double jeopardy require, among others, that the court had jurisdiction to render the acquittal or conviction. When the court lacks jurisdiction—as when the accused has lost standing—no valid jeopardy attaches in the first place. A void acquittal may thus be challenged via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 without offending the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy.

• Certiorari Against Judgments of Acquittal — By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed via certiorari under Rule 65 upon a clear showing that the lower court committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, rendering the assailed judgment void. The petitioner must clearly and convincingly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a degree so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

• Verification and Certification Requirements — Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, requirement intended to assure good faith. The certification against forum shopping, though obligatory, is also not jurisdictional. Both may be relaxed under the rule of substantial compliance where a strict application would result in a patent denial of substantial justice. In criminal cases, the signature of the Solicitor General on the verification and certification—the State being the real party-in-interest—constitutes substantial compliance.

• Stages Requiring Personal Presence of the Accused — Under Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution and existing rules, the accused's personal presence is mandatory and cannot be waived at three stages: (a) arraignment and plea; (b) during trial whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of sentence, unless the offense is a light offense. At these stages, trial in absentia is not permitted.

• "Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court."

• "Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal."

• "We may tolerate an erroneous acquittal borne from an attempt to protect the innocent or from an attempt to uphold the accused's treasured right to a fair trial, but when these concerns are not evident, an erroneous acquittal is a source of substantial dismay and warrants this Court's corrective action via a special writ of error."

• "When a strict and literal application of the rules on non-forum shopping and verification would result in a patent denial of substantial justice, they may be liberally construed."

• "Competence is one of the marks of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the Rules, he erodes the public's confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance of the law."

• People v. Mapalao, G.R. No. 92415, May 14, 1991 — Cited as authority for the rule that an accused who jumps bail or escapes loses standing in court and waives any right to seek relief unless surrender or submission to jurisdiction occurs.

• People v. Court of Appeals and Maquiling, G.R. No. 128986, June 21, 1999 — Relied upon for the exception that a judgment of acquittal may be challenged via certiorari upon clear showing of grave abuse of discretion rendering the judgment void, and that a void judgment is not a source of acquittal.

• Torres v. Specialized Packaging and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6, 2004 — Applied in relaxing the verification and certification rules where extreme difficulty to secure signatures and merits of the case constitute compelling reasons.

• City Warden of the Manila City Jail v. Estrella, G.R. No. 141211, August 31, 2000 — Cited for the proposition that the Solicitor General's signature on verification and certification constitutes substantial compliance, the OSG being the legal representative of the Government.

• Pascua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140243, December 14, 2000 — Used in interpreting Section 6, Rule 120 on the procedure for an accused who fails to appear at promulgation to regain standing within fifteen days by proving justifiable cause.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Authorizes trial in absentia subject to the proviso that the accused has been duly notified and failure to appear is unjustifiable. The provision does not authorize absence at arraignment, at promulgation (except for light offenses), or at any trial stage requiring identification. Applied to establish that the accused's absence at promulgation was a jurisdictional defect.

• Section 6, Rule 120, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000) — Governs promulgation of judgment. Provides that an accused who fails to appear without justifiable cause shall lose the remedies available in the Rules against the judgment and that the court shall order arrest. Within fifteen days from promulgation, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave, stating reasons for absence; if justifiable cause is proved, remedies may be availed of within fifteen days from notice. Applied as the precise rule violated by Joven, Armando, and Domingo, and by the trial court in entertaining their motion.

• Rule 65, Section 1, Rules of Court — Grounds for the writ of certiorari: any tribunal acting without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, where no appeal or other adequate remedy exists. Applied as the procedural vehicle to correct the void order of acquittal.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice Renato C. Corona. (Associate Justices Puno, Carpio, and Corona sat as additional members in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura per raffle and special orders.)