People of the Philippines vs. Dario Margen, et al.

Obedience to an order of a superior gives rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose. An illegal order need not be obeyed, and one who directly participates in the execution of an illegal order is liable as a coprincipal of the crime committed, even without proof of conspiracy.

The case arose during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines in 1944, when the deceased, Diego Testor, was accosted by a military detachment composed of seven or eight men under the command of Sergeant Dario Margen in the barrio of Trinidad, municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar. The appellant, Andres Midoranda, was a soldier in this detachment. The military setting is significant because the appellant invoked obedience to superior orders as a defense.

Some time before March 11, 1944, the deceased Diego Testor was accosted by a military detachment in the barrio of Trinidad, municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar. The detachment was made up of seven or eight men with Dario Margen in command. Needing food for his children, Testor traded fish for camote, and when he was sent for, he brought to the Sergeant Margen a quantity of another kind of fish called kalapion.

Irritated by Testor's conduct, Sergeant Margen took hold of the fish and threw them into Testor's face, and then had Testor's hands tied behind his back and gave him fist blows. Taking their cue from the sergeant, three of the soldiers — Julian Tarrayo, Domingo Ramos (now deceased), and Andres Midoranda — also maltreated Testor by hitting him in different parts of the body. Thereafter, Sergeant Margen forced Testor to eat up to two of the kalapions. In this, the sergeant forced Testor's mouth open, and Midoranda held the loose end of the rope with which Testor's hands were tied. After this ordeal, Testor was taken to Calbayog where, despite medical attendance, he died the following day, March 12, 1944. The cadaver presented various contusions, but autopsy revealed that death was due to the perforation of the intestines by fish bones.

For the death of Diego Testor, Margen, Tarrayo, and Midoranda were prosecuted for murder. Only Midoranda, the appellant, was tried because the other two were able to escape. The appellant claimed that he did not join his companions in maltreating the deceased, alleging that all he did was stand by and watch. This allegation was contradicted by the testimony of eye-witnesses whose veracity was not put in doubt. Indeed, appellant's own witness, Eleuterio Anabeso, admitted on cross-examination that appellant was among those who slapped the deceased in the face. The evidence clearly showed that appellant cooperated with his codefendants in binding and beating up the deceased, as well as in the inhuman act of making him devour raw fish — flesh, scales, spines, and all.

• Obedience to Superior Orders: Counsel for the defense argued that, in the absence of proof of conspiracy, appellant should not be held liable for the crime because he merely obeyed the orders of his superior.

• Direct Participation: The prosecution's evidence, through eye-witness testimony, established that the appellant actively participated in the maltreatment of the deceased, including slapping him, binding him, and forcing him to eat raw fish.

• Obedience to Superior Orders: Whether the appellant is exempt from criminal liability for murder because he acted pursuant to the orders of his superior, Sergeant Margen.
• Conspiracy: Whether the appellant can be held liable for murder in the absence of proof of conspiracy.

• Obedience to Superior Orders: No. Obedience to an order of a superior gives rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose, pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code. The order to torture the deceased was illegal, and the appellant was not bound to obey it.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in the death of the deceased, the appellant must be held as a coprincipal of the crime of murder, even without proof of conspiracy.

• Obedience to Superior Orders: The Court applied Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, which exempts from criminal liability one who acts in obedience to an order of a superior only when the order is for some lawful purpose. Sergeant Margen's order to have the deceased tortured was not lawful; the sergeant had no right to take the law into his own hands and subject the offender to inhuman punishment. The order was illegal, and the appellant was not bound to obey it. Moreover, the Court found that the appellant was not prompted solely by a sense of duty toward his superior. The evidence showed that he and his companions had a common grievance against the deceased, who had misappropriated a quantity of fish intended for their consumption. It was natural that they should all want to teach the deceased a lesson by making him suffer for the fault he had committed.

• Conspiracy: The Court found that proof of conspiracy was unnecessary because the appellant took direct part in the unlawful acts. The evidence clearly showed that the appellant cooperated with his codefendants in binding and beating up the deceased, as well as in making him devour raw fish. The appellant's claim that he merely stood by and watched was contradicted by eye-witness testimony and by his own witness, Eleuterio Anabeso, who admitted on cross-examination that the appellant was among those who slapped the deceased in the face. Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts, and nothing having been proved which would exempt him from criminal liability, the appellant was properly held as a coprincipal of the crime of murder.

• Obedience to Superior Orders — Under Article 11, paragraph 6 of the Revised Penal Code, obedience to an order of a superior gives rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose. An illegal order need not be obeyed, and one who executes it cannot claim exemption from liability. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the appellant's defense, finding that the order to torture the deceased was illegal and that the appellant was not prompted solely by duty but by a common grievance against the deceased.

• Direct Participation as Coprincipal — One who takes direct part in the execution of an unlawful act is liable as a coprincipal of the crime committed, even in the absence of proof of conspiracy. The Court applied this principle to hold the appellant liable for murder, as the evidence showed he actively cooperated in binding, beating, and forcing the deceased to eat raw fish.

• "Obedience to an order of a superior give rise to exemption from criminal liability only when the order is for some lawful purpose (art. 11, par. 6, Revised Penal Code)." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on obedience to superior orders and is the basis for rejecting the appellant's defense.

• "The order was illegal, and appellant was not bound to obey it." — This passage articulates the core principle that an illegal order from a superior carries no duty of obedience, and thus no exemption from liability for one who executes it.

• "Having taken direct part in the unlawful acts which resulted in the death of the deceased and nothing having been proved which would exempt him from criminal liability, appellant must be held as coprincipal of the crime of murder charged in the information." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: direct participation in the unlawful acts makes one a coprincipal, even without proof of conspiracy.

N/A — The decision does not cite any prior case law.

• Article 11, paragraph 6, Revised Penal Code — The provision exempting from criminal liability one who acts in obedience to an order of a superior for some lawful purpose. The Court applied it to hold that the exemption does not apply when the order is illegal, as in this case.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concurred. Chief Justice Moran also certified that Mr. Justice Montemayor, who was in Baguio, took part in the disposition of the case and voted in favor of the decision.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the decision.