People of the Philippines vs. Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction only if it constitutes an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, and engenders moral certainty; evidence that merely arouses suspicion or raises the possibility or probability of guilt cannot sustain a conviction. In a prosecution for robbery with homicide, the robbery must itself be proved beyond reasonable doubt, proof of the homicide alone being insufficient.

Yu Hing Guan, also known as Roy Ching, was a deaf-mute who operated a store at 1042 Benavidez Street, Binondo, Manila, where his sister Diana Yu worked in the office and where Jimmy Pagaduan served as a helper. Appellants Danilo Asis and Gilbert Formento, both deaf-mutes, moved within the victim's circle: Asis had been his friend since 1995 and frequented the store, while Formento was known to him as a fellow deaf-mute. The shared disability of the victim and the appellants, and the resulting absence of spoken communication, framed both the prosecution's theory of the crime and the defense's objection to the manner of the warrantless search.

Yu Hing Guan, also known as Roy Ching, a deaf-mute, kept a store at 1042 Benavidez Street, Binondo, Manila, where his sister Diana Yu worked in the office and where Jimmy Pagaduan had served as a helper for five years. George Huang, Diana's son and the victim's nephew, regularly passed by the store to bring food, ice, and other items to his uncle and mother. Danilo Asis, a deaf-mute and a friend of the victim since 1995, frequented the store; Gilbert Formento, likewise a deaf-mute, was known to the victim and came to the store only on the night of February 9, 1998. Pagaduan testified that he saw both appellants at the store every day and that, as far as he knew, Asis owed the victim P3,000.00, a debt reflected in a list the victim had shown him.

On the morning of February 9, 1998, at around 6:30 o'clock, Huang arrived at the store and found the steel door locked from the outside. Upon opening it, he found everything normal except the inner door, which was always left open but was then closed with a chair blocking it. Removing the chair, he discovered the body of his uncle lying prostrate on the ground with a knife embedded in his nape. He closed the door, proceeded to Luneta to inform his mother, and then reported the incident at the Chinatown Police Station and again at a station at Soler corner Reina Regente.

Diana Yu testified that on February 9, 1998, before 8:30 o'clock in the evening, she was in the office of her brother, where she worked, and saw the two appellants and the victim, all deaf-mutes, conversing in sign language. Asis frequented the office, while Formento came only on the night of February 9, 1998. At around 8:30 o'clock in the evening she left the office, leaving both appellants and the victim behind. The following morning, at around 7:30 o'clock, her son informed her of her brother's death; she went to the office, saw the body, and discovered that the sales proceeds of the preceding day and the necklace her brother always wore were missing. On re-direct examination, she testified that she suspected both appellants, especially Formento, because she had seen the victim's pair of shorts in Formento's bag. Pagaduan, for his part, testified that he left the store at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of February 9, 1998 and saw both appellants conversing with the victim.

SPO2 Pablo Ileto testified that on February 11, 1998, he was at Barangay Sto. Niño, Hagunoy, Bulacan with Sgt. Napoleon Timbol, PO3 Luis Chico, and Diana Yu, searching for Formento in connection with the victim's death. They coordinated with the Hagunoy police and searched the area; Diana Yu spotted Formento in a delivery truck and pointed him out. They invited Formento to the WPD Homicide Section but first brought him to his house, where Diana Yu asked Formento's wife for the stolen money. Unable to understand each other, the wife gave Diana Yu Formento's bag, in which Diana Yu noticed the pair of shorts belonging to the victim; PO2 Ileto noticed what appeared to be bloodstains on the shorts. SPO1 Benito Cabatbat testified that on February 10, 1998 he and a team from the District Crime Laboratory Division went to the crime scene, where they saw the victim lying prostrate, barefooted, and clad only in brief; after photographing the victim, the team went upstairs and found traces of blood on the second and third floors. During the investigation, SPO1 Cabatbat received a phone call that Asis had returned to the scene, and Asis was brought to the police station, where he denied involvement; SPO1 Cabatbat noticed a bloodstain on Asis' T-shirt. During the presentation of Dr. Olga Bausa, the parties stipulated that the bloodstains found on the white T-shirt bearing the lettering "Collorrific" and on the short pants were human blood.

Formento testified through sign interpreter Nelda Bahena that on February 9, 1998 at about 11:00 a.m. he was in the house of Roy Ching, where they talked about things and events; when he left, he proceeded to Bulacan while Asis went to Luneta. He denied having in his possession Ching's clothes found with him in Bulacan. A policeman met him at his house in Sto. Niño, Hagunoy, Bulacan and handcuffed him immediately; he was whipped for the first time in his life and brought to Manila at Funeraria Paz, where the relatives of Roy Ching pointed to him while he was being whipped by two policemen. Nestor Paglinawan, a vendor at the PICC area and a friend of Asis for five years, testified that Asis occasionally helped him by guarding his selling items and preparing coffee, communicating through sign language, and that on February 9, 1998 at about 10:00 p.m. Asis was with him at the PICC and stayed until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Asis himself testified through sign interpreters Theta Figuerres and Nelda Bahena that Ching had been his friend since 1995; that on February 9, 1998 he went to Ching's store because Ching had called him to help, found Formento already there, and drank beer with them; that he left at 9:00 p.m. ahead of Formento and proceeded to the PICC to help Nestor; that he denied killing Ching; and that when he returned to the store at 10:00 a.m. the following day, he felt depressed upon learning of Ching's death and was arrested and incarcerated that same day.

The RTC found that although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were presented, the circumstantial evidence, including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused, proved that the two committed the crime. It also heard the pathologist who examined the shorts testify that although the blood was human, its blood grouping could not be determined.

• Insufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Appellants argued that the trial court gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide notwithstanding the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, there having been no eyewitnesses to the robbery or the homicide and none of the allegedly stolen items having been recovered or presented.
• Evident Premeditation, Treachery, and Conspiracy: Appellants maintained that the trial court gravely erred in concluding that evident premeditation, treachery, and conspiracy attended the killing of Roy Ching.
• Physical Infirmities of the Accused: Appellants contended that the trial court gravely erred in not considering the physical infirmities of the two accused-appellants, who are deaf-mutes.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: Appellants objected to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered from Formento's bag, arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the shorts illegal and tainting them as inadmissible.

• Sufficiency of the Circumstantial Evidence: The prosecution countered that the pieces of circumstantial evidence submitted, taken together, necessarily lead to the conviction of the appellants.
• Presumption from Possession of Recently Stolen Property: The prosecution argued that the strongest piece of evidence was the victim's bloodstained pair of short pants recovered from Formento's bag, and that since the trousers were recovered from one of the appellants, Rule 131(j) of the Revised Rules of Court should apply.
• Valid Consent to the Warrantless Search: The prosecution contended that it was the wife of appellant Formento who voluntarily surrendered the bag containing the bloodstained trousers, and that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a warrant.
• Motive of Indebtedness: The prosecution attempted to ascribe motive to the appellants by arguing that Asis allegedly owed the victim P6,070.
• Last Persons Seen with the Victim: The prosecution argued that the appellants were the last persons seen with the victim, giving rise to the suspicion that they were the authors of the crime.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
• Admissibility of the Bloodstained Pair of Shorts: Whether the bloodstained pair of shorts recovered from appellant Formento's bag is admissible in evidence, having been obtained through a warrantless search.
• Proof of the Robbery: Whether the robbery element of the complex crime of robbery with homicide was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy attended the commission of the crime as alleged in the Information.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. The circumstances proved did not constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons, and thus failed to engender the moral certainty required for conviction.
• Admissibility of the Bloodstained Pair of Shorts: No. The shorts were seized on the occasion of an unlawful warrantless search and are inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree; the consent purportedly given by Formento's wife was invalid since Formento himself was present and, being a deaf-mute without an interpreter, could not have validly waived his personal constitutional right.
• Proof of the Robbery: No. The robbery was left totally unsubstantiated, and proof of the homicide alone cannot support a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
• Conspiracy: No. The RTC made no pronouncement as to the presence of conspiracy, and conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself; absent such proof, the extent of each appellant's individual participation should have been clearly delineated.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence, which is not a weaker form of evidence than direct testimony, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court permits conviction on circumstantial evidence if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court found two things to stand out: there were no eyewitnesses to the robbery or the homicide, and none of the items allegedly stolen were recovered or presented in evidence. The bloodstained pair of shorts did not trigger the presumption under Rule 131(j) that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act, because the retrieval of the shorts by itself did not prove that the appellants robbed the owner of cash and jewelry and killed him, nor that they perpetrated the aggression causing his death; ownership of the shorts was not definitively determined, and even granting that it belonged to the victim, there was no evidence that it was taken from him on the night of the homicide, and it could not be ruled out that he had lent or given it to either appellant, considering their friendship and commonality as deaf-mutes. The bloodstains on the shorts did not help the prosecution, since the pathologist testified that although the blood was human, its grouping could not be determined. As for the bloodstain on Asis' shirt, this did not indicate guilt and at most led to suspicion; courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicion or conjecture, and for such evidence to lead to conviction it must engender moral certainty. The imputed motive of indebtedness failed because the fact of indebtedness was never conclusively established: the victim's sister claimed Asis still owed P6,070, yet the testimony of Asis showed it was actually the victim who had been indebted to him, and the logbook entries relied upon were made by the victim himself, were explained by a sister who admitted having no personal knowledge thereof, and were never shown to be veracious, with the erasures or scratches thereon unexplained. The claim that the appellants were the last persons seen with the victim raised only speculation; mere presence at the locus criminis is not sufficient to implicate them, their presence at the store was not unusual given their established acquaintance with the victim, and there was a paucity of evidence that no other person had or could have had access to the store. Their complicity became even more doubtful because the neighbors' shouts testified to by the victim's sister could not have come from deaf-mutes, and the non-presentation of the fingerprint test results was questioned. Finally, no evidence showed that the appellants pointed to one another as the author of the crime; even during cross-examination neither shifted the blame to the other, and both denied having done so when questioned by the public prosecutor.

• Admissibility of the Bloodstained Pair of Shorts: Although the appellants were arrested without a warrant and no valid search warrant was obtained, they never questioned the legality of their arrest through a motion to quash the Information, entering instead a plea of not guilty and participating in trial; under settled rule, any objection involving the arrest or the trial court's procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before arraignment, otherwise it is deemed waived. What the appellants objected to was the introduction of the bloodstained shorts allegedly recovered from Formento's bag. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal, cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one expressly authorized to do so on his behalf. The prosecution's own witnesses showed that Formento, together with his wife and mother, was present when the shorts were recovered; being the very subject of the search, he himself should have given consent, and since he was physically present, the waiver could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, cited by the OSG, was distinguished because there the accused was not present when the search was made, so the consent given by the occupant of the hotel room was deemed his consent. To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that the right exists, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right, and that he had an actual intention to relinquish it. Formento could not have consented to a warrantless search when he did not understand what was happening, the prosecution witnesses themselves testifying that there was no interpreter to assist him — a deaf-mute — during the arrest, search, and seizure. As Justice Laurel held in Pasion vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent but merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law, and courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights. Neither could the OSG claim that Formento's wife voluntarily surrendered the bag, since, as admitted by PO2 Ileto, the victim's sister and Formento's wife could not understand each other; the surrender could not be voluntary when the person surrendering did not understand the person she was communicating with. The OSG could not invoke the argument that the search was made by a private individual, since the victim's sister herself testified that the bag was given to the policemen and that they searched it, foreclosing the assertion that it was not the police authorities who conducted the search and belying PO2 Ileto's testimony. The bloodstained pair of shorts was thus a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure, tainted and excluded as the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree, and inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding under Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1986 Constitution.

• Proof of the Robbery: To sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide, which is primarily an offense against property, it is essential that the robbery be proved beyond reasonable doubt; proof of the homicide alone is not sufficient. Essential to robbery is the taking, with intent to gain, of personal property belonging to another by means of violence or intimidation against persons or by the use of force upon things, and there is robbery with homicide when, by reason or on the occasion of a robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of persons, homicide is also committed. The elements are: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide is committed. The prosecution tried its best to prove the crime of homicide, even if unsuccessfully, but in the process left the crime of robbery totally unsubstantiated.

• Conspiracy: The Information charged the appellants with conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, yet the RTC Decision found them both guilty without any pronouncement as to the presence of conspiracy. To serve effectively as a basis for conviction, conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself. Had the alleged conspiracy been established, the precise modality of each individual conspirator would become secondary, since the act of one would be deemed the act of all and the degree of actual participation would be immaterial. Because there was neither proof nor finding of conspiracy, the extent of the individual participation of each appellant should have been clearly delineated. In criminal cases the prosecution bears the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused; ei incumbit probatio non qui negat — he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The burden must be discharged on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense. Circumstantial evidence that has not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot be the basis of conviction, and suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum being proof beyond reasonable doubt. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to their guilt; where there is no moral certainty, they must be acquitted even though their innocence may be questionable, the constitutional right to be presumed innocent being overthrown only by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence than direct testimony and may sustain a conviction, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court requires: (a) more than one circumstance; (b) that the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) that the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this test and found the prosecution's circumstances insufficient, since no eyewitnesses testified and none of the stolen items were recovered or presented.
• Moral Certainty — Circumstantial evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility or even probability of guilt; it must engender moral certainty, otherwise the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails and the accused deserves acquittal. Evidence that merely arouses suspicion or gives room for conjecture cannot sustain a conviction. The Court held that the circumstances narrated by the prosecution engendered doubt rather than moral certainty.
• Presumption from Possession of Recently Stolen Property (Rule 131[j]) — A person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is presumed the taker and doer of the whole act. The Court refused to apply the presumption to the bloodstained pair of shorts, since their retrieval did not prove that the appellants robbed the owner of cash and jewelry and killed him, ownership of the shorts was not definitively determined, and there was no proof that the shorts were taken from the victim on the night of the homicide.
• Waiver of the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is personal and cannot be waived by anyone except the person whose rights are invaded or one expressly authorized to do so on his behalf. To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that (1) the right exists; (2) the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The Court held that Formento, a deaf-mute who was present and unassisted by an interpreter, could not have validly consented, and that his wife's surrender of the bag was not voluntary because she did not understand the person she was communicating with.
• Fruit of the Poisonous Tree — Evidence seized on the occasion of an unlawful search and seizure is tainted and must be excluded; in the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. The Court applied this to the bloodstained pair of shorts.
• Conspiracy Must Be Proved as Convincingly as the Criminal Act Itself — Conspiracy cannot be presumed; it must be established by proof as convincing as that required for the criminal act itself. Where conspiracy is proved, the act of one is deemed the act of all and the degree of actual participation becomes immaterial; absent such proof, the extent of each accused's individual participation must be clearly delineated.
• Elements of Robbery with Homicide — The elements are: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide is committed. Because the complex crime is primarily an offense against property, the robbery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt; proof of the homicide alone is insufficient.
• Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases — The prosecution bears the onus probandi of establishing the guilt of the accused, expressed in the maxim ei incumbit probatio non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The burden must be discharged on the strength of the prosecution's own evidence, not on the weakness of that for the defense.

• "Circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict. It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal." — This is the Court's opening formulation of the controlling standard and the ratio decidendi of the acquittal; it is the canonical statement of the moral-certainty requirement applied throughout the decision.
• "The accused may be convicted on the basis of circumstantial evidence, provided the proven circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person." — This states the unbroken-chain test for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence, the framework against which the prosecution's evidence was measured and found wanting.
• "To constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right." — This enumerates the three requisites of a valid waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, which the Court found absent because Formento, a deaf-mute, was unassisted by an interpreter during the search.
• "To sustain a conviction for the complex crime of robbery with homicide, which is primarily an offense against property, it is essential that the robbery be proved beyond reasonable doubt." — This articulates the rule that proof of homicide alone cannot support a conviction for the complex crime, and it supplied the ground for holding the robbery element wholly unsubstantiated.

• People vs. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28 (1995) — Source of the formulation that circumstantial evidence is akin to a tapestry, made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven; relied upon to describe how circumstantial evidence must cohere.
• People vs. Prado, 254 SCRA 531 (1996) — Held that circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct evidence; cited to establish that conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence.
• Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs, 68 SCRA 320 (1975) — Distinguished. There, the accused was not present when the search was made, so the consent given by the occupant of the hotel room was deemed the accused's consent; here, Formento was present, so consent had to come from him.
• Pasion vda. de Garcia vs. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689 (1938) — Per Justice Laurel; held that peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an invitation thereto but merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law; relied upon to reject the claim of consent by a deaf-mute who did not understand the proceedings.
• People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986) — Held that courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and do not presume acquiescence to their loss; cited in support of the strict standard for waiver.
• People vs. Geron, 281 SCRA 36 (1997) and People vs. Parel, 261 SCRA 720 (1996) — Held that in robbery with homicide the robbery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt and that proof of the homicide alone is insufficient; controlling on the failure to establish the robbery element.
• People vs. Robles, 333 SCRA 107 (2000) — Enumerated the elements of robbery with homicide; relied upon in setting out the requisites the prosecution failed to prove.
• People vs. Leaño, G.R. No. 138886 (2001) — Held that conspiracy must be proved as convincingly as the criminal act itself; cited in rejecting the RTC's failure to make any finding of conspiracy.
• People vs. Marquita, 327 SCRA 41 (2000) — Source of the aphorism that "the sea of suspicion has no shore, and the court that embarks upon it is without rudder or compass"; cited to reject conviction on suspicion.
• People vs. Williams, G.R. No. 125985 (2001) — Held that courts do not rely on circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicion or conjecture; applied to the bloodstain on Asis' shirt.
• Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 142295 (2001) — Cited for the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, under which evidence obtained through an unlawful search is inadmissible.
• People vs. Bongalon, G.R. No. 125025 (2002) — Held that any objection involving the arrest or the trial court's procedure of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before arraignment, otherwise it is waived; cited in disposing of the challenge to the legality of the arrest.

• Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes robbery with homicide; the RTC convicted the appellants under this provision and imposed the death penalty, which the Supreme Court set aside on acquittal.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if there is more than one circumstance, the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and the combination of all the circumstances produces conviction beyond reasonable doubt; this was the governing test applied to the prosecution's evidence.
• Section 3(j), Rule 131, Rules of Court — Establishes the disputable presumption that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act; the Court refused to apply it to the bloodstained pair of shorts.
• Section 2, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to overcome the presumption of innocence; cited in holding that suspicion alone is insufficient and that the required quantum was not met.
• Article III, Section 3(2), 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that evidence obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding; applied to exclude the bloodstained pair of shorts as fruit of the poisonous tree.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo Sr., JJ., concur. Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., were on official leave.