People of the Philippines vs. Daniel Magnaye

In a murder prosecution, lack of instruction is not mitigating where the accused can write his name; a combination house and store is not a dwelling under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code; and craft is absorbed by treachery when treachery qualifies the killing as murder, so that with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance the penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Daniel Magnaye was known to Pedro Bele and his family in San Andres, Bondoc, Atimonan, Quezon, and Graciano Laraquel, a prosecution witness, was the husband of the sister of Magnaye's wife. The appeal implicated the Revised Penal Code's treatment of murder, the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and craft.

At about 9 o'clock in the evening of December 9, 1946, Pedro Bele and his family were in their small combination house and store in San Andres, Bondoc, Atimonan, Quezon. Someone called to buy cigarettes. When the caller opened the door, Bele recognized him as Daniel Magnaye. As Bele was delivering the cigarettes, Magnaye pulled his extended arm and immediately stabbed him. Bele cried, "Kuya (referring to his brother Catalino Estrada), I am wounded," and ran into the room where his wife and children were; Magnaye followed him and gave him more thrusts with his knife before leaving hurriedly. Catalino Estrada pursued the fleeing assailant but failed to overtake him, returned, and with Aurelia Escritor, Bele's wife, attended to the victim. After some time Catalino went to the house of Isabelo Bele, the victim's brother, for succor, and reported the matter to the barrio lieutenant, who immediately proceeded to Bele's house.

The next morning, Bonifacio Garin, who was in charge of the Security and Home Guards in the town, upon receiving the report of the incident, repaired to the house of the deceased. In the course of his intervention, Bele told him that Magnaye was his attacker and that he believed he would not survive his stab wounds. Garin indorsed the case to the Chief of Police, who conducted his investigation at the provincial hospital where Bele had been taken. When questioned by the Chief of Police, Bele reiterated his assailant. Two days later, on December 12, 1946, Pedro Bele died as a result of his wounds. The ante mortem declaration was corroborated not only by Aurelia Escritor and Catalino Estrada, who knew Magnaye beforehand and recognized him because there was sufficient light in the room where the offense was committed, but also by Graciano Laraquel, the husband of the sister of Magnaye's wife, who had been invited by Magnaye to go with him that night to the place where Bele's house was situated. Magnaye said he did not know of any reason why Laraquel would point him out as the killer.

The only defense testified to by Magnaye was that from the afternoon of December 8 to the early hours of December 10, 1946, he was in the house of Severino Kuya in Padre Burgos assisting the latter because a big celebration in connection with the town fiesta was being held there. The evidence supporting this alibi was weak and inconclusive; there was no showing that it was physically impossible for Magnaye to go to Barrio San Andres, two and a half kilometers from Padre Burgos, to commit the murder. Severino Kuya even admitted that Magnaye could have left his place and stayed out for three hours without his noticing him. This evidence could not prevail over the positive declarations of the deceased, his wife, his brother, and Laraquel, who all identified Magnaye as the murderer.

Another defense set up by Magnaye's attorney was that Graciano Laraquel was the one who stabbed Pedro Bele to death, according to Exhibit "H," an affidavit subscribed and sworn to before the Justice of the Peace of Padre Burgos and attested by the Mayor and an official of Public Works, in which Laraquel made such an admission. Laraquel repudiated that affidavit in Exhibit "G," subscribed and sworn to three days afterwards before the Provincial Fiscal of Lucena, after the Mayor of Padre Burgos sent him to the fiscal. Laraquel deposed before the fiscal that what was stated in Exhibit H was not true because Magnaye had threatened to kill him unless he admitted stabbing Bele, and because he had been maltreated by Policemen Pancho Decena, Benito Tatlonghari, and Delfin Jaro and instructed to admit the killing. None of those policemen was produced as a witness to deny the maltreatment imputed to them. In open court, Laraquel testified that on the night of December 9, 1946, Magnaye asked him to go with him to the deceased's house to buy cigarettes; that upon approaching the gates of the house, he saw Magnaye, who walked ahead of him, stab the deceased; that because of fright he hurriedly left and went home; that shortly thereafter Magnaye arrived and told him to admit the stabbing or else Magnaye would kill him; that on February 6, 1947, Policeman Decena, accompanied by Tatlonghari and Jaro, arrested him and brought him to the municipal building, where he was severely treated and instructed to admit the killing; and that because of the intimidation he was forced not only to execute Exhibit H but also to falsely admit the killing to the Justice of the Peace, the Mayor, the Police Sergeant, and a reporter.

The apparent reason why the Mayor of Padre Burgos ordered Policeman Decena to get Laraquel and take him to the municipality before he was taken to the Mayor's house and made to subscribe and swear to Exhibit H on February 6, 1946, before the Justice of the Peace and Mayor, was, according to Justice of the Peace Hugo O. Arellano, in whose land Magnaye's father was working, that after Daniel Magnaye was arrested by the policemen of Padre Burgos, Magnaye told the policeman that somebody else also killed Pedro Bele, and that news reached the Mayor. Magnaye, however, when asked in court whether he knew that Laraquel was suspected of being the one who killed Bele, answered that he did not know it and had only heard about it in court.

To bolster the theory that Laraquel killed Bele, Magnaye presented Adriano Eroles and Honorio Abendan, who corroborated the former's testimony only as to having seen Laraquel pass in front of Eroles' house going toward Pedro Bele's store on the night of December 9, 1946. There was nothing particular about that, because Laraquel testified that he had really gone there that night at Magnaye's invitation. What made the testimony wholly incredible was Eroles' assertion that from the door of his house he and Abendan, notwithstanding that it was a moonless night and raining, saw Laraquel, who did not look up toward him but walked straight ahead with a face pale and rather harsh, which led him to suspect that Laraquel would do something; that shortly afterwards he heard an outcry for help which he recognized distinctly as the voice of Bele's wife coming from Bele's house, situated one hundred meters away; that he went to Bele's house and, when about three meters from it, met Laraquel jumping out and running away carrying a balisong with the blade pointed upward and stained with blood; and that after meeting Laraquel he went inside and found nobody there but the victim Pedro Bele and his wife during the whole night. Only at dawn did several neighbors go to the house, and Eroles did not tell anybody about what he saw that night until he testified in court. This testimony was incredible prima facie and contradicted by Catalino Estrada, who testified that he pursued Magnaye, who ran away immediately after stabbing Bele, at a distance of five meters but could not overtake him, so he returned home to attend the victim; that there were no other persons in the house but Bele's family; and that only afterwards, during the same night, the barrio lieutenant came with other persons from the barrio. If Eroles' testimony were true, he would have met Catalino Estrada, who was pursuing the aggressor and later returned to the house, and would also have met the barrio lieutenant who went to the place that same night. Eroles would also have notified the authorities that it was not Magnaye but Graciano Laraquel who killed Bele, instead of waiting about two years before disclosing at trial what he saw.

The non-participation of Laraquel in the killing was in accordance with Bele's dying declarations, Exhibits C and I, and the testimony of eyewitnesses Aurelia Escritor and Catalino Estrada. It was not believable that the deceased, Aurelia, and Catalino could have been mistaken in the identity of the assailant, because the place was sufficiently lighted, the final blows were inflicted in the room where Aurelia and Catalino were at the time, and Magnaye was well known to all of them. The prosecution's case rested on the identification made by Bele before his death and by Aurelia, Catalino, and Laraquel. The trial court found these declarations credible and rejected Magnaye's alibi and his claim that Laraquel was the killer; the Supreme Court likewise found the alibi weak and inconclusive, Laraquel's repudiation of Exhibit H credible, and Eroles' testimony incredible.

• Alibi: Appellant Daniel Magnaye maintained that from the afternoon of December 8 to the early hours of December 10, 1946, he was in the house of Severino Kuya in Padre Burgos assisting the latter because of a big celebration in connection with the town fiesta, making it impossible for him to have committed the crime.
• Third-Party Culprit: Appellant argued that Graciano Laraquel, not he, stabbed Pedro Bele, relying on Exhibit "H," Laraquel's affidavit admitting the killing.
• Witnesses Eroles and Abendan: Appellant presented Adriano Eroles and Honorio Abendan to corroborate that Laraquel was seen going toward Bele's store and later running from the house with a bloodstained balisong.

• Lack of Instruction: The Solicitor General contended that the trial court erred in crediting the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction because appellant can write his name.
• Dwelling: The Solicitor General argued that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was obviously present in the commission of the crime.
• Craft: The Solicitor General argued that craft should also be considered present because appellant, to facilitate and insure the execution of his evil design, pretended to be a purchaser in Bele's store.
• Penalty: The Solicitor General asked that the death penalty be imposed.

• Guilt and Identification: Whether the conviction for murder was supported by evidence beyond reasonable doubt despite appellant's alibi and claim that Graciano Laraquel was the assailant.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Instruction: Whether the trial court erred in crediting lack of instruction as a mitigating circumstance where appellant can write his name.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: Whether the combination house and store where the crime was committed constitutes dwelling under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Craft: Whether craft should be appreciated separately from treachery in the killing.
• Penalty: Whether the death penalty should be imposed as prayed for by the Solicitor General.

• Guilt and Identification: Yes. The conviction for murder was affirmed; the prosecution's positive identification by the deceased, his wife, his brother, and Laraquel prevailed over the weak alibi and incredible third-party-culprit defense.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Instruction: No. The mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction was improperly credited because appellant can write his name.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: No. The combination house and store cannot be considered dwelling within the meaning of Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Craft: No. Craft is included in treachery, which qualifies the offense as murder.
• Penalty: No. With no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death.

• Guilt and Identification: The prosecution established that at about 9 o'clock in the evening of December 9, 1946, Bele recognized Magnaye when the latter called to buy cigarettes; Magnaye pulled Bele's arm and stabbed him, followed him into the room, and inflicted more thrusts. Bele's ante mortem declarations to Garin and the Chief of Police identified Magnaye, and these were corroborated by Aurelia Escritor and Catalino Estrada, who knew Magnaye and recognized him under sufficient light, and by Laraquel. Magnaye's alibi was weak and inconclusive; no physical impossibility was shown, and Severino Kuya admitted Magnaye could have left for three hours unnoticed. The third-party-culprit defense failed because Laraquel repudiated Exhibit H in Exhibit G, claiming threats from Magnaye and maltreatment by policemen, and the policemen were not produced to deny it. Eroles' testimony was incredible and contradicted by Catalino Estrada; Laraquel's non-participation was consistent with Bele's dying declarations and eyewitness testimony. Thus, the conviction was affirmed.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Instruction: The trial court erred in taking lack of instruction into consideration. The appellant can write his name, so the mitigating circumstance cannot be credited. The Solicitor General was right on this point.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: The combination house and store where the crime was committed cannot, obviously, be considered as dwelling within the meaning of Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court did not err in not taking this aggravating circumstance into account.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Craft: What the Solicitor General considered craft—pretending to be a purchaser to facilitate and insure the execution of the evil design—is included in treachery, which qualifies the offense of murder. It cannot be separately appreciated.
• Penalty: Because there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment appealed from was affirmed with that modification and with costs against appellant.

• Alibi — For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. In this case, the alibi was weak and inconclusive; no physical impossibility was shown, and the distance of two and a half kilometers from Padre Burgos to Barrio San Andres, plus Severino Kuya's admission that Magnaye could have left for three hours unnoticed, defeated the defense.
• Positive Identification and Dying Declarations — Positive identification by eyewitnesses who knew the accused and by the victim's ante mortem declarations prevails over alibi and denial. The deceased, his wife, his brother, and Laraquel identified Magnaye, and the place was sufficiently lighted; the Court relied on these declarations and eyewitness testimony.
• Lack of Instruction as Mitigating Circumstance — Lack of instruction is not mitigating where the accused can write his name. The trial court erred in crediting it.
• Dwelling as Aggravating Circumstance under Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code — A combination house and store is not a dwelling for purposes of the aggravating circumstance. The Court held that the place where the crime was committed could not be considered dwelling under Article 14(3).
• Craft Absorbed by Treachery — Craft is included in treachery when treachery qualifies the offense as murder. The Solicitor General's claim of craft—pretending to be a purchaser—was absorbed by treachery and could not be separately appreciated.
• Effect of No Mitigating or Aggravating Circumstance — Where no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attends the commission of murder, the penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Court imposed reclusion perpetua.

• "The Solicitor General is right in that the trial court erred in taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction; but the lower court did not err in not taking into account the aggravating circumstances pointed out by the Solicitor General." — This passage resolves the modifying circumstances: it removes lack of instruction as a mitigating circumstance and rejects the Solicitor General's proposed aggravating circumstances.
• "The combination house and store where the crime was committed cannot, obviously be considered as dwelling within the meaning of Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code; and what is considered as craft by the Solicitor General is included in treachery, which qualifies the offense of murder in the present case." — This is the ratio decidendi on the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and craft, holding that the former is absent and the latter is absorbed by treachery.
• "Wherefore, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and with this modification the judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered." — This is the dispositive portion, stating the final penalty and the affirmance of the judgment with modification.
• "The non-participation of Laraquel in the killing of the deceased is in accordance with Bele's dying declarations (Exhibit C and I) and the testimony of eyewitnesses Aurelia Escritor and Catalino Estrada." — This passage supports the rejection of the third-party-culprit defense and the reliance on the victim's dying declarations and eyewitness identification.

• Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code — The Court cited this provision on the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and held that the combination house and store where the crime was committed could not be considered a dwelling within its meaning.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Reyes, Montemayor, and Jugo, JJ., concurred.