People of the Philippines vs. Daniel Hayag

A rape conviction cannot stand on the exclusive, uncorroborated sign-language testimony of a deaf-mute complainant as verbalized by her sister, where the interpreter is not an expert, admits deficiencies in their improvised communication, is interested in the outcome, and the accuracy of her interpretation cannot be checked; such evidence, coupled with lack of tenacious resistance, delayed reporting, and absence of immediate medical examination, fails to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Daniel Hayag, a 50-year-old married man with eight children, and Esperanza Ranga, a 32-year-old deaf-mute farm girl, were neighbors in Carmen, Davao del Norte; Hayag's daughter Ester was married to Esperanza's brother Antonio. Because Esperanza had not studied in a school for deaf-mutes and no instructor from such a school was available, the prosecution's ability to present her account depended on an interpreter who could communicate with her through the improvised sign language she used at home. Her sister Virginia Ranga, a public school teacher, had communicated with her by such signs since childhood and became the medium for her testimony.

Daniel Hayag, 50, married with eight children and a grade-six education, and Esperanza Ranga, 32, a farm girl and deaf-mute, were neighbors in Carmen, Davao del Norte. Hayag's daughter Ester was married to Antonio, Esperanza's brother. Hayag admitted having sexual intercourse with Esperanza nine times between 1970 and December 4, 1972, but claimed it was voluntary. The prosecution alleged that the intercourse on October 26, 1972 was rape. Because Esperanza could communicate only through improvised sign language, her sister Virginia Ranga, 26, a public school teacher and college graduate, served as interpreter.

According to the prosecution, on October 26, 1972, Esperanza worked in the ricefield of her brother Dencio and was walking home alone in the afternoon. At a grassy spot along the road, a man with a mole between his eyebrows, identified as Hayag, pulled her left hand and dragged her into the bushes. Defense counsel manifested that Esperanza did not make any sign that she was pulled to the grassy bush and that it was Virginia, the interpreter, who supplied that allegation. Esperanza resisted, but Hayag kicked her right leg, causing her to stumble; he choked her while she was prostrate and boxed her chest while standing. He removed her short pants, kissed her, and raped her. According to the interpreted testimony, she lost consciousness and regained it after the rape; her pants were beside her, there was blood in her private part, and she pushed Hayag aside. Hayag then warned her not to tell anyone or he would kill her, threw her pants over her body, and left. She put on her pants and went home crying but did not tell her mother because of the threat. On December 4, 1972, she encountered Hayag again at the same place, avoided him by passing near the central school and going to her sister-in-law's house, and arrived home at eight o'clock in the evening, when she reported the rape to her mother. A Davao General Hospital certificate dated December 7, 1972 showed she was positive for pregnancy; no medical examination was conducted immediately after the alleged October 26 rape.

Hayag claimed that he and Esperanza had known each other for more than fifteen years and loved each other. Their liaison began one morning in December 1970 when Esperanza came to his house for water and made signs that they were sweethearts; they kissed, and she signaled a desire for sexual intercourse. They had sex on the kitchen table and were seen by Hayag's daughter Florita. Four days later they met near a bridge and chapel and had sex again. Florita told her mother, Adoracion, and Hayag and his wife quarreled; his wife and three daughters left for Maco but returned after he promised to stop seeing Esperanza. Hayag said he kept the promise for more than a year. On May 12, 1972, he met Esperanza on the highway; she signaled for sex, and he cleared a spot in the talahib grass over three days. On May 15, 1973, he and Esperanza allegedly had sexual intercourse in the spot he had cleared. Thereafter, they had six other acts of sexual intercourse in that place, with Hayag specifying September 2 and 23, October 20 and 26, November 4 and December 4, 1972. Esperanza allegedly told him to remember the dates because she might become pregnant, and after each act she wrote the date on his palm; he committed them to memory. On December 4, 1972, after they had sex in their usual place, they were seen by Jose Santillan, Hayag's friend, and Esteban Ranga, Esperanza's uncle, who appeared angry, held her, and brought her home. Two days later, on December 6, Hayag was arrested by Patrolmen Rolando Yambao and Samuel Casuga because Esperanza's mother and uncle had charged him with rape.

Florita and Adoracion corroborated Hayag's account of the quarrel between him and his wife. Florita testified that Esperanza cried upon learning Hayag was in prison and, in sign language, made known that she had voluntary sexual intercourse with him and gave Florita a plastic raincoat to prove her love. Jose Santillan testified that as a voyeur he witnessed the December 4, 1972 sexual intercourse between Hayag and Esperanza in the grassy spot.

Because Esperanza had not studied in a school for deaf-mutes and no instructor from such a school was available, the trial court used Virginia as interpreter over defense objection. At the preliminary examination, the municipal judge tested Virginia's capacity. Virginia admitted that communication with Esperanza was "not too much" and that she did not understand some things, such as "invisible words" like the meaning of "truth," which could not be conveyed in one sign. She said their signs were not conventional deaf-mute signs but improvised actions, used since childhood. The municipal judge nevertheless commissioned her as interpreter. After taking the oath, the municipal judge instructed Virginia to ask Esperanza whether she understood the meaning of an oath; Esperanza replied by signs that she would tell the truth. At trial, defense counsel objected that Virginia was not an expert, was biased, and that there was no definite provision in the Rules of Court allowing a sister to serve as interpreter; the court allowed her because no instructor was available and the sisters had devised their own means of communication. Virginia took an oath to interpret faithfully. When asked why Esperanza was in court, Esperanza moved her head sidewise and placed a finger on her lips; the private prosecutor admitted it was difficult to formulate a "why" question in sign language. The fiscal noted Esperanza could answer "what, where, and when" questions but not easily "why" questions. The record did not show how the oath was administered to Esperanza, despite Virginia's testimony that "invisible words" like truth could not be made known to her in sign language.

The prosecution's case also included inconsistencies from Esperanza's mother, Mrs. Ranga. She first swore that according to her interpretation of Esperanza's sign language five rapes were admitted on different dates; she then rectified her first affidavit and swore in a second affidavit and during the preliminary examination that only one rape was committed. On the witness stand she declared that the rape was committed on December 4, 1972, but on cross-examination she declared that her daughter was abused on October 26, 1972. She also testified that Hayag did not do anything to Esperanza on December 4, 1972. The trial court disbelieved Hayag's story, branding it unusual and bizarre. It concluded that Hayag took advantage of Esperanza's physical defect and was under the illusion that, because she was a deaf-mute, she would not be able to communicate the outrage perpetrated against her.

• Biased and Incompetent Interpreter: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in basing the judgment of conviction on Esperanza's testimony in sign language as verbalized by her sister Virginia, an alleged biased interpreter. Defense counsel objected that Virginia was not an expert, was prejudiced, and that there was no definite provision in the Rules of Court allowing a sister to act as interpreter; there was no way to be sure she conveyed the same translation as Esperanza intended.
• Voluntariness of Sexual Intercourse: Petitioner maintained that his sexual intercourse with Esperanza was voluntary and not accomplished through force or against her will, relying on their long acquaintance, her alleged signs of affection and desire, their repeated meetings, and the corroboration of Florita Hayag, Adoracion Hayag, and Jose Santillan.

• Competency of Virginia Ranga as Interpreter: The prosecution maintained that Virginia should be allowed as interpreter because she had communicated with Esperanza by sign language since childhood and no instructor from a school for deaf-mutes was available; it invoked the presumption of good faith and argued bad faith is not presumed.
• Sufficiency of the Complainant's Testimony: The prosecution's case rested on Esperanza's sign-language testimony that Hayag raped her on October 26, 1972, and on the trial court's assessment that she could adequately communicate through the sisters' improvised signs.

• Trustworthiness of Interpreter's Verbalization: Whether the sign-language testimony of Esperanza Ranga, as interpreted and verbalized by her sister Virginia Ranga, was trustworthy and reliable, given Virginia's admitted communication deficiencies, use of improvised signs, alleged bias, and interest in the outcome.
• Sufficiency of Evidence / Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Daniel Hayag raped Esperanza Ranga on October 26, 1972, considering the lack of tenacious resistance, delay in reporting, absence of immediate medical examination, and uncorroborated nature of the interpreted testimony.

• Trustworthiness of Interpreter's Verbalization: No. The interpretation was doubtful; the probability of error or fabrication was manifest, and the court and accused had no means of checking the accuracy of an interpreter who was herself interested in sending the accused to prison.
• Sufficiency of Evidence / Reasonable Doubt: No. The prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the conviction was reversed and Hayag acquitted because the uncorroborated story was not clear, convincing, positive, and free from suspicion, and the surrounding circumstances created reasonable doubt.

• Trustworthiness of Interpreter's Verbalization: The trial court allowed Virginia to interpret because Esperanza had not studied in a school for deaf-mutes and no instructor was available. Although the modern rule permits a deaf-mute to testify through an interpreter and leaves the method and qualifications largely to the trial court's discretion, the record showed that Virginia's communication with Esperanza was limited and improvised. Virginia admitted she did not understand some things, including "invisible words" like "truth," and could not convey such concepts in a single sign. She was the complainant's sister, had signed the complaint, and believed Hayag had raped Esperanza. The defense objected, but the trial court allowed her. The probability of error or fabrication was found manifest; the court and the accused had no means of checking the accuracy of the verbalization made by an interpreter interested in sending the accused to prison. People vs. Bustos was cited for the proposition that this is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth, especially where liberty is at stake. Unlike People vs. De Leon and People vs. Sasota, where an instructor from a school for deaf-mutes interpreted and the conviction was not based solely on the victim's evidence, here the conviction rested exclusively on Esperanza's story as verbalized by Virginia.
• Sufficiency of Evidence / Reasonable Doubt: The record was examined and the conclusion reached that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The culpability of Hayag could not rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza as conjectured by her sister and mother; the story was not clear, convincing, positive, and free from suspicion, citing People vs. Ariarte. The Court noted lack of tenacious resistance: Esperanza did not offer much resistance, suffered no physical injuries, her dress was not torn, and she did not attempt to free herself from Hayag. This was not a teenage girl raped by a strong adult but a thirty-two-year-old farm girl allegedly forced by a fifty-year-old man. The Court observed that it is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without confederates or a deadly weapon, and resistance would be more effective in an open field; rape by a lone man is possible but rare, citing People vs. Barbo. The alleged rape occurred on October 26, 1972, but Esperanza reported it only forty days later, on December 4, 1972. There was no immediate medical examination; the December 7, 1972 certificate showed pregnancy but did not establish rape. The Court emphasized that while uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman may suffice in certain circumstances, it must be scrutinized with the greatest caution, and her conduct immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance, citing U.S. vs. Flores. The prosecution was further impaired by Mrs. Ranga's inconsistencies: she first swore five rapes, then one; she said December 4 on direct but October 26 on cross; and she testified Hayag did nothing on December 4. The trial court's disbelief of Hayag's bizarre story did not relieve the prosecution of its burden. The totality created reasonable doubt, requiring reversal and acquittal.

• Deaf-mutes as competent witnesses — Deaf-mutes are not incompetent merely because they are deaf and dumb if they can communicate the facts by a method their infirmity leaves available, have sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters testified to, and appreciate the obligation of an oath. If the person is not educated enough to understand the questions put to him, he is not competent. The Court recognized this modern rule but found the interpreter's verbalization unreliable.
• Method of eliciting deaf-mute testimony and interpreter qualification — The method should be best suited to attain the desired end, and the particular method of examination and the qualifications of an interpreter rest largely in the discretion of the trial court. A deaf-mute may be examined by written questions or through an interpreter using signs; such testimony through an interpreter is not hearsay. The trial court's method is generally not reviewed absent a showing of injury, and absent a showing of the best method, the appellate court presumes the trial court adopted the best method. Here, however, the actual interpretation was found so doubtful that the conviction could not stand.
• Trustworthiness of an interested interpreter's verbalization — Where the interpreter is the complainant's sister, is not an expert, admits deficiencies in their improvised sign language, believes the accused raped the complainant, and signed the complaint, the verbalization is not reliable. The court and accused have no means of checking the accuracy of an interpreter who is herself interested in sending the accused to prison; the probability of error or fabrication is manifest, and this is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining truth where liberty is at stake.
• Uncorroborated testimony in rape and conduct after the alleged assault — The uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman may be sufficient under certain circumstances to warrant a conviction for rape, but because of the ease of making the charge and the difficulty of disproving it, such testimony must be scrutinized with the greatest caution. The conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance; conviction should not be sustained unless the court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that her conduct at the time and immediately thereafter was such as might reasonably be expected under all the circumstances.
• Lack of tenacious resistance, delay in reporting, and absence of immediate medical examination — These circumstances create reasonable doubt as to the commission of rape. The Court noted that the victim did not offer much resistance, suffered no physical injuries, her dress was not torn, and she did not attempt to free herself; the alleged rape was reported only forty days later; and no immediate medical examination was conducted. It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without confederates or a deadly weapon, and rape by a lone man is possible but rare.
• Reasonable doubt and burden of proof — The prosecution must establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction cannot rest on an uncorroborated story that is not clear, convincing, positive, and free from suspicion, even if the trial court disbelieved the accused's defense. The judgment of conviction was reversed on reasonable doubt or insufficiency of evidence.

• "Our conclusion is that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The culpability of Hayag cannot be made to rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister and mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free from suspicion." — This states the ratio decidendi for the acquittal: the prosecution's evidence did not meet the reasonable doubt standard.
• "The probability of error or fabrication in such a case is very manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-Real, that is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth especially in a case where the liberty of an accused is at stake (People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, 390). The court and the accused have no means of checking the accuracy of the verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself interested in sending the accused to prison." — This defines the core evidentiary problem with the interested interpreter's verbalization.
• "Lack of tenacious resistance on the part of Esperanza Ranga, her delay in reporting the alleged rape to her mother and the absence of an immediate medical examination of her private organ are circumstances creating reasonable doubt as to the commission of the rape." — This identifies the specific circumstances that, together with the doubtful interpretation, created reasonable doubt.
• "In all such cases the conduct of the woman immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. Indeed it may well be doubted whether a conviction of the offense of rape should ever be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the case." — This is the canonical formulation of the caution required in rape cases based on uncorroborated testimony.

• People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539 — Cited as a prior rape conviction of a deaf-mute where a teacher in a school for deaf-mutes interpreted the victim's sign language; distinguished because in the instant case the interpreter was the victim's sister and the conviction rested exclusively on the interpreted story.
• People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281 — Cited as another rape conviction of a deaf-mute where an instructor from a school for deaf-mutes interpreted and the victim's testimony was corroborated by her seven-year-old sister and a medical examination; distinguished on the same grounds.
• People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385 — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a deaf-mute eyewitness interpreted by a teacher who did not teach the witness was not given credence; relied on for the proposition that using an interpreter whose accuracy cannot be checked is a dangerous procedure, especially where the accused's liberty is at stake.
• U.S. vs. Flores, 26 Phil. 262, 268-269 — Cited for the rule that the uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman in rape must be scrutinized with the greatest caution, and that her conduct immediately following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance in determining the truth or falsity of the charge.
• People vs. Ariarte, 60 Phil. 326 — Cited for the requirement that the prosecution's story must be clear, convincing, positive, and free from suspicion; the Court used it to reject the uncorroborated story as not ringing true throughout.
• People vs. Barbo, L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459, 467 — Cited for the observation that it is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without confederates or a deadly weapon, and that rape by a lone man is possible but rare.
• Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480 — Cited for the general rule that deaf-mutes competent to testify may give evidence by signs, through an interpreter, or in writing, and that testimony through an interpreter is not hearsay.
• Ritchey vs. People (1896), 23 Colo 314, 47 Pac. 272 — Cited as an example of a deaf-mute who could read and write being examined through written questions and answers.

Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.