People of the Philippines vs. Cubay

An Information charging rape under R.A. No. 8353 is fatally defective and cannot support a conviction where it fails to allege that the accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve years of age, or demented, the mere allegation that the victim was a deaf-mute eighteen-year-old who suffered the act "against her will" being legally insufficient to constitute the crime defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

Dante Cubay y Ugsalan was employed as a watchman at a Special Education (SPED) Center and dormitory located within an elementary school in Bukidnon, where his wife served as dormitory caretaker. The victim, AAA, was an eighteen-year-old congenital deaf-mute with profound hearing impairment enrolled at the SPED Center, residing in the dormitory during school days and returning to her grandfather's house on weekends. Between September 2007 and January 2008, the accused allegedly entered the victim's dormitory room on forty-four separate occasions and had sexual intercourse with her. The victim's pregnancy, discovered in late 2007, led to the disclosure that the accused was the father, prompting the filing of forty-four separate Informations for rape under R.A. No. 8353.

• The Parties and Setting: Dante Cubay y Ugsalan served as watchman at the XXX Special Education (SPED) Center and dormitory in Bukidnon, where his wife worked as caretaker. The victim, AAA, was an eighteen-year-old congenital deaf-mute with profound hearing impairment, functioning at a Grade 2 level in formal sign language but considered teachable in basic sign language. She was a student at the SPED Center, residing in the dormitory during school days and returning to her grandfather's house on weekends. Her aunt, BBB, was a teacher at the same SPED Center.
• The Prosecution's Version: From September 7, 2007 to January 18, 2008, spanning forty-four specific dates, the accused allegedly entered the victim's dormitory room at night, undressed her, touched her body, and inserted his penis into her vagina. The victim testified that she pushed the accused and felt afraid during these incidents. The alleged rapes occurred repeatedly during school days, resulting in the victim's pregnancy, which was confirmed by medical examination on January 28, 2008. The medical report indicated old healed hymenal lacerations at 3 and 9 o'clock positions. The victim gave birth in June 2009.
• The Defense's Version: The accused admitted to having sexual congress with the victim on more than forty-four occasions but asserted the relationship was consensual. He testified they were lovers, communicating through sign language interpreted by the victim's friend, and that the victim gave him gifts including a stuff toy, a watch, and a photograph with a dedication. He claimed the victim voluntarily visited him at his post, refused to leave the dormitory when her grandfather attempted to fetch her because she feared scolding over their relationship, and only filed charges due to family embarrassment over her pregnancy.
• Lower Court Proceedings: The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of forty-four counts of rape, finding the victim's testimony credible and rejecting the defense of consent. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecution proved the elements of rape through the victim's consistent identification of the accused and the medical findings corroborating sexual assault.

• Defective Information: The Informations failed to validly charge the crime of rape because they did not allege the essential element of force, intimidation, or deprivation of reason required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, merely stating that the victim was deaf-mute and the act was committed "against her will."
• Insufficient Proof of Elements: The prosecution failed to establish the element of force or intimidation beyond reasonable doubt; the victim's testimony was terse, vague, and equivocal regarding resistance, merely stating she "pushed" the accused and was "afraid," which is insufficient to constitute the "manifested and tenacious" resistance required in rape prosecutions.
• Capacity to Consent: The victim, though deaf-mute, was eighteen years old, mentally capable, and not deprived of reason; she had completed Grade VI and was assessed by her teacher as average and normal, capable of understanding right from wrong and engaging in romantic relations, thus possessing the capacity to consent to sexual intercourse.
• Credibility Issues: The sign language interpreters engaged by the victim's family were allegedly biased in favor of the prosecution, and the trial court erred in allowing leading questions during the victim's testimony.

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had carnal knowledge of the victim forty-four times through force, threat, or intimidation, evidenced by the victim's consistent and positive identification of the accused as her rapist.
• Credibility of Witness: The victim's testimony, conveyed through competent sign language interpreters, was credible and sufficient to establish the elements of rape; her status as a deaf-mute special education student rendered her vulnerable to the accused's abuse of authority as school watchman.
• Rejection of Defense: The accused's denial and "sweetheart theory" were self-serving, uncorroborated, and insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence; the victim's pregnancy and medical findings of hymenal lacerations corroborated the commission of rape.

• Sufficiency of Information: Whether the Informations validly charged the crime of rape under R.A. No. 8353 when they failed to allege that the accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve years of age, or demented.
• Proof of Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the forty-four counts of rape, specifically the elements of force, intimidation, or lack of consent, and whether the victim's status as a deaf-mute automatically negated her capacity to consent.

• Sufficiency of Information: The Informations do not charge the crime of rape. An Information must allege every element of the offense to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation and enable him to prepare his defense pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) of the Constitution and Rule 110, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. The Informations merely alleged that the accused had sexual intercourse with an eighteen-year-old deaf-mute victim "against her will," without alleging force, intimidation, or circumstances showing deprivation of reason. Being deaf-mute does not automatically equate to deprivation of reason or inability to consent. The defect is jurisdictional and may be raised at any stage under Rule 117, Section 3(a) of the Rules of Court, notwithstanding the accused's plea of not guilty.
• Failure to Prove Elements: Even assuming the Informations were valid, the prosecution failed to establish the element of force or intimidation. The victim's testimony that she "pushed" the accused and was "afraid" was equivocal and insufficient to constitute the "manifested and tenacious" resistance required in rape prosecutions; "pushing" is subject to multiple interpretations, including a gentle refusal or shyness, and does not establish unconsented sex. The victim's sweeping statement that she was "raped" on multiple dates without specific details regarding the manner of commission for each incident constituted a mere conclusion of law insufficient to sustain multiple convictions.
• Capacity to Consent: The victim, though deaf-mute, was not deprived of reason; she was eighteen years old, had completed Grade VI, was assessed by her teacher as average and normal, and was capable of understanding right from wrong. Deaf-mute status does not per se negate capacity to consent under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. The circumstances—including the victim's refusal to leave the dormitory when her grandfather fetched her (allegedly fearing scolding over their relationship), her prior social interaction with the accused (eating snacks together), and the delayed reporting until pregnancy was discovered—supported the conclusion that the sexual relations were consensual rather than forcible.

• Sufficiency of Information (Rule 110, Section 6) — An Information is sufficient only if it states the designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting it, specifically alleging every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged. A conviction cannot stand where the Information fails to allege an essential element of the offense, as the accused cannot be convicted of a ground not alleged while defending against the ground alleged. The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation cannot be waived for reasons of public policy.
• Exception to Waiver of Objections (Rule 117, Sections 3[a] and 9) — Objections to the sufficiency of an Information based on failure to charge an offense (Section 3[a]) are not waived by failure to move to quash before arraignment, as they affect the court's jurisdiction and the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
• Elements of Rape under R.A. No. 8353 (Article 266-A, RPC) — The crime requires: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) the offender accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under twelve years of age or was demented. The second element must be specifically alleged in the Information.
• Deaf-Mute Capacity to Consent — Deaf-mute status does not automatically equate to deprivation of reason or mental deficiency under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code. Intercourse with a deaf-mute is not rape on the ground of deprivation of reason absent proof that she is an imbecile or otherwise mentally incapacitated; mental capacity to consent must be proven, not presumed from physical disability.
• Resistance in Rape — Resistance must be manifested and tenacious; a mere attempt to resist or equivocal acts (such as pushing) are insufficient to establish lack of consent, particularly where the victim is of legal age and mentally capable. The victim's bare statement that she was "raped" without detailing specific acts of aggression or resistance for each incident constitutes a conclusion of law insufficient for conviction.
• Separate and Distinct Crime — Every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime requiring independent proof; a victim's bare statement that the accused repeated his acts on succeeding dates, without detailing the manner of commission for each, is insufficient to establish multiple counts beyond reasonable doubt.

• "The Informations conspicuously lack the second element of rape, i.e. the accused employed force or intimidation, or that the victim was deprived of reason, unconscious, under twelve (12) years of age, or was demented."
• "Surely, being a deaf-mute does not necessarily take the place of the element of force or intimidation or having been deprived of reason, unconscious, or demented."
• "The act of pushing did not emanate from appellant but from AAA... 'pushing' is equivocal subject to different interpretations depending on the attendant circumstances. It may mean a gentle 'no,' 'not yet,' 'wait,' 'I am shy,' 'not here,' and many more possible interpretations or meanings."
• "For even though AAA is a deaf-mute and certified to be only at Grade 2 level in formal sign language education does not mean she is suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation which has the effect of hindering her capacity to give consent."
• "AAA's bare statements that appellant repeated what he had done on her previously were not enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt the incidents... Said declarations were mere general conclusions. The prosecution must endeavor to present in detailed fashion the manner by which each of the crimes was committed."

• Quimvel v. People of the Philippines, 808 Phil. 889 (2017) — Cited for the principle that the main purpose of requiring elements to be set out in the Information is to enable the accused to prepare his defense, and that conviction cannot stand on facts not alleged.
• Andaya v. People — Cited for the rule that an accused cannot be convicted of any offense unless it is charged in the information or necessarily included therein.
• Guelos v. People, 811 Phil. 37 (2017) — Cited for the principle that an indictment must fully state the elements of the specific offense and that the right to question conviction based on facts not alleged cannot be waived.
• People v. Butiong, 675 Phil. 621 (2011) — Cited for the doctrine that a deaf-mute is not necessarily deprived of reason and that intercourse with a deaf-mute is not rape absent proof of imbecility or mental deficiency.
• People v. Tionloc, 805 Phil. 907 (2017) — Cited for the standard that resistance must be manifested and tenacious, and that equivocal acts are insufficient to establish lack of consent.
• People v. Nuyte, G.R. No. 219111, March 12, 2018 — Cited for the rule that a victim's bare statement that she was raped on specific dates without detailing the manner of commission is a conclusion of law insufficient for conviction of multiple counts.

• Article III, Section 14(2), 1987 Constitution — The right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him; no person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
• Article 266-A, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 8353) — Defines rape and enumerates its elements, including commission through force or intimidation, or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious.
• Rule 110, Section 6, Rules of Court — Sufficiency of complaint or information requirements; states that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting it.
• Rule 117, Sections 3(a) and 9, Rules of Court — Grounds for motion to quash (failure to charge an offense) and non-waiver of objections based on these grounds even if not raised before arraignment.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, JJ.

• J. Reyes, Jr., J. — Filed a dissenting opinion (content not provided in the reported decision).